injury set forth in the act. During the years 1970-73, the President authorized workers in five industries to apply to the Secretary of Labor for a determination and certification for adjustment assistance: two industries-pianos (except grand) and earthenware-received affirmative findings of import injury from the Tariff Commission; and three industries-barber's chairs and parts, marble and travertine, and sheet glass-received evenly divided rulings from the Commission.

Since fiscal 1970, the Department has received 17 worker petitions filed on behalf of about 4,300 workers in four of these five industries. Two originated in earthenware, two in marble and travertine, five in sheet glass, and eight in the piano industry. All but two of the petitions were certified, authorizing assistance to over 4,100 workers.

In addition, the Department has issued 33 certifications to worker groups who petitioned directly to the Tariff Commission and were found to have met the criteria of the act; and 136 certifications to worker groups who petitioned the Tariff Commission but the Commission, being evenly divided, made no finding. The President subsequently accepted the view of those Commissioners voting affirmatively.

Senator TALMADGE. The next witness is the Honorable Ben B. Blackburn, a Representative from Georgia.

It is a pleasure indeed for the Chair to welcome a warm, personal friend and one of the most distinguished Members of the House.

STATEMENT OF HON. BEN B. BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Mr. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Senator.

I have submitted a more complete statement, and I am giving a summary at this point.

In the body of the statement which I have submitted for the record, I recite instance after instance in which the United States has transferred to the Soviet Union computer and ball bearing technology. Both technologies have direct military application.

We are all aware of proposed and current American development of Soviet manufacturing facilities for trucks, petro-chemicals and fertilizers. Most of these facilities are being financed by American capital at the rate of approximately 90 percent of the investment cost. Should any one need reassurance as to the lethal results which could flow from continuation of this policy, I would invite him to review the body of my statement with its abundance of documentation.

Any one whose imagination is not stultified by a self-induced sense of Machiavellian greatness cannot avoid the conclusion that, in our present trade relations with the Soviet Union, we are simply being duped. We are being duped, not so much by the cleverness of Soviet leadership, but by our own persistent stupidity.

Failure to see the obvious puts us in the position of the Emperor who had no clothes. The hazards of imperial streaking, however, are not so great as the hazard of blindly developing our enemy's strength at the expense of our own.

Our stupidity is compounded by our continued insistence in building up our Soviet adversary-even as he continues to demonstrate little more than implacable hostility toward us.

Permit me to cite but a few more notable examples: (1). Soviet military advisers now in Peru.

(2). Soviet broadcasts to the Middle East urging citizens of oilproducing nations to pressure their governments not to remove the embargo against us-even while those governments seek to negotiate away the Middle Eastern atmosphere of permanent crisis.

(3). Middle Eastern events prior to, during, and following the latest warfare offering conclusive proof that those hostilities were inspired and supported materially by the Soviet Union.

(4). Soviet development of MIRV and ICBM delivery vehicles continuing at a feverish pace.

Historically, the mention of trade with another country conjures up an exchange of goods and services resulting in a net benefit to each trading partner. Such an image remains valid when dealing with a friendly country; a nation harboring no ambitions hostile to our national best interests.

The desirability of trading with such a country could be determined solely on economic grounds, with economic justification readily apparent even to the most sophisticated observer.

When, however, we speak of trade with a nation seeking world domination, as does the Soviet Union, the normal rules regarding trade desirability become inoperative.

From the beginning, Soviet leaders have made clear that their life's mission is seizure of the world in the name of so-called scientific socialism.

When the Bolsheviks seized control of Russia in 1917, their possibility of world domination seemed laughable. Subsequent events however, have silenced the laughter. Millions who once laughed have since been sent to their graves by the Soviet masters.

Today, after 55 years of terror, aggression and general duplicity, Soviet-created Communist regimes are firmly entrenched in the long, broad East European belt from the Baltic to the Adriatic; as well as in China and Cuba, with Soviet inroads elsewhere in our Southern hemisphere as well as on the continent of Africa.

Even so, the Soviet regime has continued to find itself on the horns of self-inflicted dilemma: To maintain order among the Russian and other peoples they have subjugated into the Soviet Union, they must continue to offer promise of a better life in the foreseeable future.

Yet, that regime remains determined that, before it can deliver a better life, it must first achieve its unswerving goal of world domination.

To do so, it must attain unquestioned military superiority over the West in general, and the United States in particular; for from the outset, Soviet leadership has seen the United States, with its unequaled capacity for productivity, and its great technological and scientific know-how, as the major barrier to the Soviet objective.

With a narrowly planned, rigidly controlled socialist economy badly hobbled by its own self-inflicted inefficiencies, pursuit of military superiority becomes a heavy burden.

Reliable sources within our government see the Soviet government's allocation of gross national product for military purposes running from 40 percent to 50 percent.

This, of course, has been made necessary by maintenance of massive armed forces at home, throughout Communist Eastern Europe, and into the Middle East. Further, in this era of highly sophisticated

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scientific weaponry, research and development adds such burden that the Soviet economy becomes simply unmanageable. Consequently, little remains of life's material goods for Soviet citizens.

In stark contrast to this gigantic Soviet military allocation of GNP, the United States currently devotes just 6 percent of its gross national product to military purposes. West European countries are now working to devote up to 5 percent of their GNP to such purposes, compared to 2 percent and 3 percent previously.

The only way the Soviet regime can continue to maintain its position of dominance over its own people is by continued mass regimentation, discipline and control, with propaganda and indoctrination remaining as much a part of daily life as bread, vodka and cabbage.

In the main, the long-promised better, freer, more affluent tomorrow continues to hover somewhere around a yet unseen corner. The official alibi is, of course, that the Soviet military burden is necessary as protection against the capitalist aggressiveness of the United States.

So, in 1972, history repeated itself. Once again, the inevitable fruit of this Soviet policy was the threat of starvation for the Soviet citizens.

With such usual external food grain sources as Canada and Australia unable to meet the massive Soviet need, an uneasy and fearful Soviet leadership donned, once again, its mask of smile long enough to seek, and get, foodstuffs necessary to prevent serious upheaval among their people.

These Soviet leaders were, of course, well aware of Lenin's warning that revolutions were born on empty stomachs. To eliminate the problem with the program of planned death by starvation which Stalin once imposed would be difficult-and embarrassing. These leaders had denounced Stalin for that very practice. Further, the voices of such Soviet writers as Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov were being heard throughout the world; Kremlin efforts to restrain them notwithstanding.

So it was that, for instant treatment of their again irritated Achilles' heel, the Soviet leaders turned to Washington. And Washington responded with a favorable decision which gave low priority to traditional economic considerations.

Now, so enriched with our wheat that they have been able to sell it elsewhere, at a profit, the Soviet leaders have returned to their more traditional, tougher stance in such critical matters as SALT II.

Having purchased time via the U.S. filling of the stomachs of the Soviet citizenry, these Soviet leaders are intensifying their efforts to gain more and more U.S. goods with obvious economic and military

use.

For example, vehicles assembled at the American built Kama River truck plant, ostensibly to carry crops from the field, also can carry troops and munitions into battle.

A petro-chemical plant purchased ostensibly for peaceful purposes can also manufacture plastics and chemicals for military use.

Computers purchased ostensibly to assist in crop planning also can compute trajectories in intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads.

Precision machines for manufacturing ball bearings purchased ostensibly for peaceful purposes have direct military application. Note, please, that, here in the United States, 90 percent of the product of these machines which the Soviet Union has been able to purchase from us are used for the guidance systems for ballistic missiles.

Development of the Soviet Siberian gas reserve can serve the red war machine just as easily as it can heat apartments in Moscow.

The economic grounds on which this country is entering into trade with the Soviet Union are shaky, to say the least.

During the past year, the Soviet Union imported $1.2 billion worth of U.S. goods. The Soviet Union exported to the United States $235 million worth of goods. Thus, the Soviet balance of trade with the United States is running about 51⁄2 to one in favor of the United States.

It takes little more than common business judgement to appreciate that such imbalance cannot long continue. Worse, Soviet inability to pay the yawning difference between their imports and exports with us remains a matter of serious question.

Most of the grandiose plans for American expansion of the Soviet industrial base entail financing by the United States; either through government-guaranteed loans or private sources, of $9 out of every $10 of the cost of such investment. That the shrewd Yankee trader would find himself entering willy nilly into such questionable business transactions is enough to boggle the mind.

We have not imposed what, normally, is the most fundamental requirement of any creditor: insist that the debtor reveal his net worth.

Requests to the Soviet Union for information on her gold reserves, gold production and gold consumption are met with stony silence. Such silences are justified with the rationale that, for Moscow to reveal its gold reserve might jeopardize its credit. This, the novel argument that if Moscow has too much gold in reserve, we might determine that Moscow needs no credit-and, if she has too little gold, she might not be credit worthy.

Any small town banker would laugh all the way to the door while ejecting any potential borrower with such logic. Such simple fundamentals seem to escape our own national leaders.

Since we are dealing with a nation whose primary consideration in development trade is political rather than economic, we will be extremely unwise if we do not take into account political factors before expanding trade.

We must appreciate that trade with the West under the thin guise of "detente," is the only device with which Soviet leaders can continue their drive for world domination at the expense of a mismanaged domestic economy.

In our own enlightened self interest, I submit that it's high time we stopped participating in this deadly game of Russian roulette. Senator TALMADGE. Congressman, I hate to call the time on you, but the 10 minutes has expired.

Mr. BLACKBURN. I understand, Senator. We live on a 5-minute rule in the House, so I feel muchly enhanced by having a 10-minute rule.

Senator TALMADGE. I want to congratulate you on your excellent

statement.

I take, from the thrust of what you have said, that you are not in favor of guaranteeing credit to the Soviet Union to develop its oil and gas industry, are you?

Mr. BLACKBURN. Oh, I definitely am not, Senator. The figures that I have seen indicate that we would end up investing perhaps as much as $48 billion in the Soviet Union to develop her oil and gas potential. If we are going to make that kind of investment, I think it would be far wiser that we made that investment here in this country where we sit on the tap.

Senator TALMADGE. I agree with you fully.

Senator Curtis has asked me to ask you this question: What is your view of granting most favored nation status to the Soviet Union?

Mr. BLACKBURN. Senator, as I understand the testimony of the Secretary of State, he stated to this committee that the proposal to grant most favored nation treatment to the Soviet Union was not different from our granting the same treatment to other nations.

Now, his statement was not completely candid. In fact, I think it was somewhat dishonest. The only basis for most favored nation is that there be a quid pro quo between this country and the other country to which we grant such most favored nation treatment. We have to keep in mind that most favored nations deals with a tariff imposed by a government to prevent its citizens from either buying too much of a foreign commodity or to raise taxes.

Now, Senator, there are no import duties to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is its own purchaser. When we sell, we are not exporting goods to be sold to Soviet consumers or Soviet businessmen. When we sell to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is buying for its own use. So if the Soviet Union attempted to impose a tariff on these imports it, in effect, would be taxing itself. So we are dealing with a completely different situation from that which exists where we are importing commodities to be sold to the citizens of a foreign country. So what I am saying is that it is absolutely impossible for the Soviet Union to grant us a quid pro quo for most favored nations. Second, there are technical aspects of most favored nations with which the Soviet Union has not complied. For one, every nation that now enjoys most favored nation treatment is a member of GATT. They are also members of the International Monetary Fund.

In order to belong to the International Monetary Fund, it is necessary that these nations provide regularly to the whole world information on their balance of payments, their balance of trade, their gold production, their reserves of hard currency. Now, the Soviet Union absolutely refuses to comply with any of these requests.

Furthermore, one of the most fundamental concepts of International Monetary Fund membership is the convertibility of the currency. There is no convertibility of the ruble on international markets. The Soviet Union does not allow it.

So, Senator, I think it is a perfectly valid question as to how we can be proposing to grant most favored nation treatment to the Soviet Union when she is a unique country unto herself.