perfections that to us is, and must ever remain, incomprehensible. We cannot expect to comprehend the whole nature of Deity. We cannot represent to ourselves in thought the distinction in question; but neither can we represent to ourselves in thought the existence without beginning of the God whom we worship. We do not know in what this distinction consists of which we speak ; but neither do we know in what the divine essence consists, nor in what respects it differs from other essences. This, however, is no argument against the divine existence, nor against his existence in the manner now supposed. Is it any more conceivable to suppose three distinct minds in one essence? or the powers and faculties of three minds united in one being? or how three distinct beings can in any proper sense of the word be one being? Those who hold either of these theories ought surely not to object to any other theory that it is inconceivable.

True, we ought not to multiply mystery unnecessarily. The simplest theory is the best, provided it meet and consist with the facts of the case. But in the present instance the theories which are simplest, and most readily conceivable, do not consist with the facts of the case. That is precisely the difficulty with them. Nothing is simpler than to conceive of three distinct individuals, or of the Logos as a being unequal with the Father, and whose existence is derived and not eternal; but neither of these theories consists, or can be made to consist, with the great essential facts of the case, the true and proper unity of God, the true and proper divinity of the Logos.

It may be further objected that if the Divine Being is strictly and numerically one, then either the whole divine being becomes incarnate in Christ, or else that one divine being or divine essence becomes divided. If the former, then how is it that Christ speaks of the Father as sending him, and of himself as doing the will of the Father? And how is it that he prays to the Father as a distinct being from himself? If the latter, then are we not driven to conceive of the one divine mind divided now into two, each having its own separate existence; the one in heaven as supreme Deity; the other on earth as Reedemer ?

I reply: The view which we maintain supposes such a distinction eternally existing in the divine nature as admits of the manifestation in time of the Logos or Word; not the whole divine essence or

divine mind becoming incarnate in the person of Christ, but only the second distinction or hypostasis, the Logos. How this could be, of course, we know not. Great is the mystery of this godliness manifest in the flesh; and any theory which should render the sublime fact of the incarnation less a mystery would be in that very respect suspicious. It is rather an argument in favor of the theory above maintained, than against it, that it makes no attempt at such explanation.

And even if it were not so, is the difficulty now urged at all diminished if, instead of this, we adopt some other theory? Suppose, for example, we take the theory of three distinct minds co-existing in one essence. When one of these minds becomes incarnate, the others remaining as before, is not the one essence thus divided? Or take the theory of one mind with three distinct consciousnesses, sensibilities, and wills; one of which sets of mental attributes becomes incarnate, the others not. Is there not here again, the very same difficulty as before- -a division of this one mind or essence? To say nothing of the fact that it is inconceivable, not to say impossible, that one mind should possess the faculties of three minds, it is a supposition which when made relieves the difficulty not one whit, but is open to the very same objection.

NOTE D.- Page 322.

It may be thought by some that the argument in this article against the theory of three divine minds in one Divine Being, and the theory that there are three divine intellects, three divine consciousnesses, sensitivities, and wills, in one Divine Being, is inconclusive; inasmuch as it does not recognize the metaphysical distinction, often employed by the advocates of these theories, between essence or substance or substratum, and attributes or properties. It may be said by the advocates of these theories: True, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are one in essence, but are distinct and three in attributes; we believe as firmly as you that they are one in essence or substratum; but we also believe, say the advocates of one theory, that in that one essence inhere three divine minds, each thinking, feeling, willing, acting, for himself; or, we believe, say the advocates of the other theory, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have each his own distinct intellect, consciousness and will.

This metaphysical distinction and statement, in our view, does not relieve these theories at all from the objections which we have brought against them.

Take the boldest and frankest of these theories, that there are three divine minds, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in one divine essence or being. This same philosophy resolves every mind into essence or substance or subtratum, and attributes; and thus we have, according to this theory fully carried out, three divine substances or essences, with their attributes, in one divine substance or

essence.

Or, if we take the more cautiously expressed theory, that in one divine essence there are three sets of divine attributes, three divine intellects, three divine sensibilities, three divine wills, — we see that it is not really diverse from the other, and is easily reducible to it. For what, according to this same philosophy, are intellect, sensibility or susceptibility, and will, but mental faculties, powers pertaining to a mind? Or, rather, what are they but a mind, in certain classified relations, or operating in particular ways, ercising thought, feeling and purpose? In other words, three divine intellects, three divine sensitivities or capacities of affection, and three divine wills, in one divine essence or being, are three divine minds in one divine essence or being; which, as we have seen, are three divine essences, with their attributes, in one divine essence.

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III.

THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE ITS DIGNITY AND VALUE.1

WHEN one enters upon the duties of a new and responsible office, especially when a new institution opens its doors, and invites the educated and Christian intellect of the land to resort thither for professional training and instruction, it is expected of him who enters upon such duties that he shall set forth in some sort the claims of that department which he comes to teach-binding, with pious hand, what little wreath he can about the altar at which he is to serve.

I am to speak, then, on this occasion, of systematic theology. And what, then, is THEOLOGY? Is it a science, and in what sense? Is it a progressive science? What is its rank, as such, in the scale of sciences? What, also, its practical value and importance? These questions demand answer in the present discourse. I shall undertake to show that theology is a science; that it is a progressive science; that it is of the highest rank and dignity as such; that it is also of highest practical value and importance.

I. Theology is a science. This is evident from the name itself; from any and every correct definition of the same.

What, then, is theology? What means the word?

1 An Inaugural Address, delivered on assuming the Duties of Professor of Systematic Theology in Chicago Theological Seminary, Oct. 20, 1858,

Literally, the science of God. In a wider sense, however, I understand by theology the science of the Christian religion the systematic statement of the principles and doctrines of the Christian faith. As botany is the science which explains the structure and laws of the vegetable kingdom; as astronomy has for its object to unfold the arrangements and movements of the heavenly bodies; as psychology is the science of the human mind; so theology has for its definite aim and end the correct statement of those great truths and principles which constitute the Christian faith.

But here we are met by the objection that religion, and especially the Christian religion, is entirely and eminently a practical thing, not a matter of theory and speculation, not a thing to be learned from books or taught in schools, not, in fact, of the nature of science at all—a simple matter of the heart, and not of the head. It becomes necessary, then, at the outset, to make good our definition.

When we affirm that theology is a science, we do not affirm that science and religion are identical. There may be a science without religion, and a religion without science. So, too, there may be a science of religion. We maintain that there is, and that theology is that science. It was the great mistake of the Socratic and Platonic philosophy to make virtue and knowledge identical. For a man to do right, it was only necessary that he should know what the right is, since the right is always that which is most useful and best. But, alas, human history in all ages has but too clearly shown that to know the right is not always to do itthat virtue and knowledge are by no means the same thing. Religion, certainly, is not science. Viewed as