considered an unfair attempt to deprive them of the only means they had of operating payment of their debts, prevailed upon the charger (the only creditor who had a decree, or other ground of debt on which diligence could proceed), to give the suspenders a charge upon his decree, with the view of inducing them to enter into the said arrangement. The suspenders brought the present suspension of the charge, on the grounds,-I. That they were minors when they entered into the chapel speculation, and were not liable for the debts of the congregation.-II. That the bill was only granted by four of the Committee of Management, whereas it required five to concur in all acts binding on the shareholders.-III. That the charge was given at the instigation of some of the creditors, for the improper purpose of concussing the suspenders into a disadvantageous private sale of their property, instead of exposing it to public sale. The charger answered,-I. That the suspenders were sui juris at the time they embarked in the chapel speculation, and could as lawfully divest themselves of the property as they could originally vest themselves in it.—II. That the bill, although granted only by four of the Committee, was a renewal of a previous bill, granted by other three of the same Committee, which was an acknowledgment or homologation of the debt by more than the quorum.-III. That the object of the charger in following out his diligence was fair and legitimate, being the only alternative left him by the conduct of the suspenders: That having expended money on the chapel, he was entitled either to have payment of his debt from the suspenders (as shareholders) or by the sale of the chapel, which they opposed; and that the private offer made by the new congregation was greater than could be expected at a public sale. The Lord Ordinary, by an interlocutor of 29th October 1830, passed the bill on juratory caution; and the charger having reclaimed, and insisted for full caution, or refusal of the bill, Lord President observed, that the suspenders' pleas of minority and non-representation were groundless, in the circumstances of the case, but that their interest in the church rendered juratory caution sufficient. Lord Balgray seemed to consider that the object of the creditors in inducing the charger to use his diligence, being avowedly to concuss the suspenders into a private sale, which they averred to be disadvantageous and oppressive to them, they (the suspenders) were entitled to insist on a public sale. The Court adhered. First Division.-Lord Ordinary, Gillies.-Act. SolicitorGeneral (Hope), Dunbar.-Alt. Dean of Faculty (Jeffrey), et al-James Bennet, W.S., and W. Pollock, Agents.-Sir R. Dundas, Clerk. 23d November 1830. No. 25.-THOMAS HAMILTON, Petitioner, v. JAMES KERR, Respondent. Bankrupt-Sequestration Trustee-Ranking-Petition and Complaint-Held, that the trustee has no power, after the scheme of ranking has been exposed for 30 days, to withhold payment of the dividend on any of the claims ranked, on discovering that it was erroneously ranked : Opinion expressed, that a person having furnished goods to a company, for which he took their bill at three months' date for the full invoice price, on the condition that they should get back £21 of discount if the bill was duly paid; and having discounted the bill with a Bank, and then advance Hamilton, as commercial agent for some English houses, sold goods to Chisholm & Company, merchants in Glasgow, to the extent of £364, 10s., being the amount of the invoice prices, and for which he got their acceptance at three months, dated the 28th October 1828. The bill was made payable to himself, and was discounted with James and Robert Watson, bankers in Glasgow. The terms of the transaction were, however, that if Chisholm & Co. payed the debt within three months, as in a cash transaction, they should be entitled to the usual discount, viz. £21. In November 1828, Chisholm & Company prevailed on Hamilton to advance them the £21 of discount out of his own pocket. But before the previous bill fell due, Chisholm and Company were sequestrated on 11th December 1828, and Mr Kerr was chosen trustee. J. & R. Watson ranked on their estate for the amount of the bill, £364, 10s., and Hamilton made affidavit, May 1828, to the debt of £21, due to him, which he had paid to them in anticipation of an eventual discount, which could no longer be due. In consequence of an acceleration by the Court of the period for paying the dividend, Hamilton was postponed until the second period of division; and on 9th November 1828, the trustee, in preparing for the second dividend, pronounced a formal judgment upon the scheme of ranking, in which he confirmed Hamilton's claim. Hamilton, in consequence, after the expiry of three months from the date of the judgment, made several applications to the trustee for payment, which were refused, on the grounds that the claim was originally illegal, and that the subsequent confirmation of it was a mistake on the part of the trustee, which he was entitled at any time to correct, and to refuse implement of. Hamilton then brought the present petition and complaint against the trustee, in which he maintained, I. That his claim for a dividend upon the £21, advanced by him to the bankrupts, was well founded: That the bankrupts not having paid their bill to his employers within the stipulated time, were not entitled to discount, and were bound to pay a dividend on the full invoice prices: That, in that view, the £21 advanced by the petitioner must be considered as a private loan, and a good claim upon the bankrupt estate. II. That, further, his claim having been duly sustained by a judgment of the trustee, and no objection having been stated by any creditor within 30 days thereafter, it was incompetent for the. trustee, after that period, to alter the scheme of division, or to refuse payment of the dividend on this claim, in which the petitioner had then a vested right. The trustee answered,-I. That the bill was, by mistake, granted by Chisholm & Company, for £364, 10s, instead of £343, 10s., the difference being the discount to which Chisholm and Company were entitled, by granting their bill at so short a date: That when the bill was discounted by Messrs Watson, the petitioner received £21 more than he was entitled to, and this sum he repaid to Chisholm and Co., out of the proceeds of the bill, when discounted by him.-II. That the trustee, not being aware when he ranked the petitioner for the £21, that this sum was included in the bill for £364, 10s., for which J. and R. Watson had ranked, was entitled, when he discovered the error in the scheme of division, to correct it, and to withhold the dividend on this sum, which he had inadvertently doubly ranked: That the trustee, or any creditor, before the scheme of ranking has been acted upon, is entitled, upon discovering that a claim has been improperly ranked, to object to it, and expunge it from the ranking: That if the trustee would be entitled, after having ignorantly or erroneously paid the dividend on such improper claim, immediately after to pursue the creditor for repetition, by condictio indebiti; multo magis, must he be entitled, on discovering the error immediately before payment, to object to it, and refuse payment. The Lord Ordinary (4th October 1830), pronounced this interlocutor: "The Lord Ordinary on the Bills, having considered this condescendence, with the answers thereto, productions and previous pleadings, Appoints the parties to prepare mutual cases on the points at issue, and to lodge the same with the clerk within three weeks from this date; and thereafter to revise, print, and box the same to the Lords of the First Division, on or before the third sederunt-day in November next.-Note.— The record has been prepared in this case in the Bill-Chamber; but the Lord Ordinary does not think it necessary or expedient to close it. The case relates only to a ranking of a small claim of £21. But it involves two questions, the decision of which is said to be looked to for the guidance of trustees in other cases: I. Whether the act of a trustee, in sustaining a claim, and ranking it without discussion, becomes final, if not complained of within thirty days? and II. Whether the claim in this case is well founded on its merits? The plea of the complainer on the first point appears to the Lord Ordinary not to be well founded. He cannot think that a trustee, who has inadvertently ranked a claim, may not correct a mistake; and the plea would amount to this, that the judgment was final as to the trustee the instant after he pronounced it, because he could not bring a complaint against his own act. The other point is, perhaps, more doubtful. Goods are sold at a fixed price; but with the understanding, that if cash or a bill at three months be paid, a certain discount shall be allowed. A bill is drawn for the full nominal price without discount; and the seller, relying on the regular payment of the bill, pays over in money the amount of the discount. The purchaser becomes bankrupt before the bill falls due; and the bill is ranked, being in the hands of an onerous indorsee. The question is, Whether the seller is entitled to be ranked for the sum of discount which he paid over, the bill not having been paid? This seems to be the same question in principle as if the bill had been originally drawn for the price, minus the discount, and the seller claimed a right to rank for the sum so discounted from the credit price. It is admitted, that if no bill had been granted, the ranking would have been for the full price, without discount; and though there may be difficulty in the question, the Lord Ordinary thinks that the granting of the bill ought not to make any difference. In the present case, the seller is simply creditor of the bankrupt for repetition of a sum of money which turns out not to be due." At advising the cause upon cases, Lord Balgray considered that the general question of law here had not been decided. The clause in the bankrupt act, limiting the period for complaints, related only to the resolutions of the creditors. It was nowhere declared in the 45th or 46th sects. that a judgment of the trustee could not be complained of after that period. Here the trustee sustained the petitioner's claim in the scheme of ranking, but he did not pronounce any special judgment upon it in reference to objections-for no objections were made. The scheme of division must lie open for 30 days before payment. But where there had been no special judgment on the claim, but merely a general approval of the scheme in which the claim was inserted, and that scheme unchallenged for 30 days, was the Court thence bound to infer in law that the claim had been submitted to scrutiny, and irremediably sustained; and was the trustee, on afterwards discover. ing, before payment, that one of the claims was utterly groundless, to be so entirely barred from correcting the scheme? No doubt, if he made the payment he would then be exauctorated, and could have no remedy but the condictio indebiti; but to hold that, after the 30 days, he was not entitled to correct a flagrant and palpable error in the scheme, seemed to carry the doctrine to a narrow and dangerous extreme. Mr Bell, in his last edition of his Commentaries, had noticed this defect in the act. The great difficulty that weighed with him was the form in which the object here had been attained. The trustee was the officer of the creditors, and bound to obey their instructions. Now, was not the trustee authorised, and called upon by the express direction of the creditors, to pay according to the scheme of ranking after the 30 days, if no objections were previously made; and was he entitled, without the express interposition of the creditors, regularly appearing in the sederunt-book, to withhold or delay payment after the 30 days, when no creditor had objected? Indeed, no creditor even now appeared, from the proceedings, to have objected. And, under these circumstances, ought not the trustee rather to have called a meeting of creditors, and pronounced another judgment in reference to this claim, and got one of the creditors to object or complain. Still, it was doubtful if the Act of Parliament would justify a judgment against the trustee on the general question of law. On the merits of the case, he had no doubt that the claim had been improperly rejected. Lord President observed, that perhaps the creditors should have called a general meeting, and objected. Lord Gillies differed, and thought the trustee had acted irregularly, and was alone to blame. He first pronounced a judgment, expressly sustaining the petitioner's claim. The statute said that the scheme of ranking shall be open for a month, and then the trustee shall pay the dividend on the claims ranked. The scheme, in this instance, did lie for a month without objection from any quarter, and at the expiry of that period the trustee was bound, in terms of the act, to pay; and if he did not then pay, he disobeyed the law. He had no longer the power to sit in judgment upon the claims. He was there merely the officer of the creditors, to distribute in obedience to the statute, and in conformity to the scheme which had been approved. A Lord Ordinary might as well, after he had pronounced an erroneous judgment, resume the cause, and recal or alter it, suo motu, when he discovered his error. The creditors might complain at any time; but after the scheme had lain for 30 days unimpeached, the trustee was bound to pay. He also agreed with Lord Balgray on the merits. Lord Craigie agreed with Lord Gillies. The Court "Find that the trustee, in terms of his judgment on the scheme of ranking, was bound, in terms of the Act of Parliament, to pay the complainer the dividend effeiring to his claim, and that on the expiry of 30 days after the date of his judgment; and therefore sustain the complaint, in terms of the prayer of the petition, and decern; also find the petitioner entitled to the expenses incurred by him; appoint an account," &c. Petitioner's Authorities.-Bell, II. p. 420, 421. Sederunt, 1806, sec. 12, &c. Respondent's Authority.-II. Bell, 430. Act of First Division.-Lord Ordinary, Moncreiff.-Act. Dean of Faculty (Jeffrey), Neaves.-Alt. Solicitor-General (Hope), J. S. More.-John Cullen, W.S., and W. A. G. and R. Ellis, W.S., Agents.-Sir R. Dundas, Clerk. 23d November 1830. No. 26-JOHN FRASER & JAMES TAIT, Suspenders, v. EDINBURGH AND GLASGOW UNION CANAL Co., Respondents. Lease-Clause-Construction-Quarry-Canal-The proprictor of a stone quarry having entered into an agreement with a Canal "Company, formed by Act of Parliament, empowering them to carry their Canal through the quarry, on condition of paying a lordship for the stones covered by the Canal, and forming a tunnel under it for the use of the quarry; and, two years after this agreement, having granted a lease of the quarry, with a stipulation that no new quarry was to be opened during the subsistence of the lease; and the Canal Company having contracted with a third party to form the tunnel, and sold him the stones to be worked in making the tunnel ; and the tenants of the quarry having brought a suspension and interdict against the Canal Company, to prevent them from dis− posing of the stones, in violation of their lease-bill of suspension refused. The suspenders took a 19 years' lease, in February 1820, from Sir T. G. Carmichael, of a free-stone quarry, on the estate of Wester Hailes. The lease contained clauses binding the tenants to work the quarry constantly, and in a regular manner,—to pay a certain lordship, and not to open up, during the lease, a new quarry, separate from the one let, without the landlord's consent, and also the following clause :— "And, on the other hand, the said Sir Thomas Gibson Carmichael is not to be at liberty to open up any quarry for the sale of free-stone, of a similar description with that contained in the quarry hereby let, on any part of the estate of Wester Hailes, without the consent of the said tacksmen." In September 1830, the suspenders presented the present bill of suspension and interdict against their landlord, and the Glasgow and Edinburgh Union Canal Company, narrating-That, before the line of the canal was fixed, Sir Thomas Gibson Carmichael and the Canal Company had entered into an agreement, whereby it was stipulated, in the event of the line of the canal interfering with Sir Thomas's quarry, the Canal Company should be bound either to turn the canal at their own expense over the rubbish, so as to leave the rock free, or, in the option of the parties, to construct "such an aqueduct as will allow the rock to be wrought to the southward; and to pay to him and his foresaids the lordship or worth to him for the time, of whatever stone the Canal may cover, to be ascertained by reference to proper judges at the time, as soon as the adjoining workings prove that it really does eover such rock and impedes the operations of the quarry:" That the canal had now reached the quarry, and the Canal Company and Sir Thomas had determined to abide by the last alternative of their agreement, viz. constructing a tunnel under the canal, to facilitate the working of the quarry: That the suspenders did not object to this, provided they got a small compensation for the stones to be quarried by the Company in forming the tunnel : That the Company had, however, refused this, and had re-sold the stones to Mr Johnston, who had contracted with them for the formation of the tunnel; and that Mr Johnston had begun to work these stones, and to advertise them for sale at a lower price than the suspenders could sell theirs: That this proceeding was in violation of the terms of their lease, and they therefore prayed for interdict against the parties from quarrying, removing, or selling any of the stones from the said quarry. Answers were given in for Sir Thomas Carmichael, and for the Company, stating-That the agreement between Sir Thomas and the Canal Company was entered into two years previous to the suspenders' lease: That one of the conditions in the agreement was, that, in the event of the canal reaching the quarry, the Company : should either remove the canal over the rubbish, or allow it to remain, and in that event construct an aqueduct, and pay to Sir Thomas a lordship for the stones covered by the canal: That the Canal had reached the quarry, and the respondents had chosen the last alternative: That the suspenders themselves were most urgent with the Canal Company to complete the tunnel That the Company had offered to pay the tenants £40, and to give them the stones, provided they would complete the tunnel: That they (the tenants) had insisted on the stones, and £100 if they finished it, and a compensation of £30, if the contract was given to another: That the Company thought this demand unreasonable; and being obliged to complete the tunnel, and pay a lordship to Sir Thomas, they conceived themselves justified in giving the 'contract to Mr Johnston, who offered more reasonable terms: That this was not a violation of the suspenders' lease, not being the opening of a new quarry; and at all events, the Company's agreement, being prior to the suspenders' lease, could not be affected by it. The Lord Ordinary pronounced this interlocutor:"13th October 1830.-It appears of importance to the parties, that the discussion between them should, if possible, be terminated without passing the bill of suspension and interdict; and, with that view, the following observations have occurred :-On the one hand, it appears, that the personal agreement between Sir T. G. Carmichael and the Union Canal Company, though prior in date to the complainers' lease, could not affect their interest. On the other hand, it is not alleged by the suspenders themselves, that they can, under the colour of this legal plea, prevent the excavations necessary for completing the canal. Now, as Sir T. Carmichael has taken care of his interest, by stipulating a lordship or allowance for his interest in the stones to be taken out in the course of the excavations, it occurs, that the complainers ought to have the same benefit or share in the disposal of these stones, as if they had been quarried by themselves : what may be the amount of this share or benefit, it should seem, might be easily settled between the parties themselves; but any neutral person acquainted with the subject could readily determine it. As to the probable consequences of the determination upon the future occurrences, there is no reason to apprehend any difficulty. With a view of following out these suggestions, the Lord Ordinary proposes to supersede further advising of the bill for a few days; but if either of the parties think that he has taken an incorrect view of the case, he will be glad to hear them at any hour, betwixt and Saturday next, that may be most convenient for them." " 15th October 1830.-Having resumed consideration of this bill, with the answers for Sir T. G. Carmichael, and also those given in for the Union Canal Company, and productions, and having heard Counsel thereupon, passes the bill, in order to try the question; but, in the meanwhile, interdicts the further sale of the stones without the suspenders' consent, or carrying them away." The Canal Company and Sir Thomas G. Carmichael having reclaimed, Lord Balgray observed, that the Canal Company had, by law, an undoubted right to carry through the canal; and their right to carry it through this quarry was prior to the suspenders' lease. The restrictive clause in the suspenders' lease must be interpreted according to equity and common sense; and the only question for the Court to consider must be, was Sir Thomas infringing their lease by opening this tunnel? It seemed impossible to hold that this temporary operation, originally intended for the benefit of the tenants of the quarry, and or which they were to derive the benefit, could be construed into an infringement of their lease, or could properly be considered tantamount to opening up a new and rival quarry. The tenants, besides, concurred in the necessity of its completion, and only now objected, because the fair offer which the Company at first made to them was not so advantageous as they desired. Lord President said, the Canal Company was formed by virtue of an act of Parliament; and the question was, if they could be interdicted in this summary way, from performing what Sir Thomas G. Carmichael had stipulated before the date of the suspenders' lease? Sir Thomas had an option of turning the canal over the rubbish of the quarry, which he did not embrace. Even if a direct patrimonial injury to the tenants, and a violation of their lease, could be proved from this operation, the right of the Canal Company could not be affected, although the landlord might be liable in damages. Lord Craigie differed, and thought that the lessees of the quarry should have been made parties to the option given to the Company by Sir Thomas. The Company should also have offered to refer the amount of compensation, to which the tenants might be entitled for the loss they might sustain from the sale of stones of the tunnel, at a reduced price, by another party. Lord Gillies concurred with Lord Balgray. The Court then altered, and remitted to the Lord Ordinary to refuse the bill. First Division.-Lord Ordinary, Craigie-Act. Keay, Rutherfurd. Alt. Skene, et alii.-J. G. Davidson, W. S., and Phin & Pitcairn, W.S., Agents.-Sir R. Dundas, Clerk. 23d November 1830. No. 27.-MARY-ANN ALSOPP v. JAMES ALSOPP. Mandate-An officer abroad on service, defending a cause in this Court, bound to sist a sufficient mandatory. This was an action of reduction at Mrs Alsopp's instance, of a decree of divorce obtained in absence by her husband; and it being admitted that the defender (pay-master in the 17th regiment of foot), did not reside in Scotland, the Lord Ordinary, by an interlocutor (7th July 1830), appointed "him to produce a mandate to a person in this country, who is willing to sist himself as his mandatory in this cause, and that by the first box-day in the ensuing vacation." The defender reclaimed-but the Court adhered. First Division-Lord Ordinary, Moncreiff. Act. Keay, Thomson. Alt. Fergusson, Milne.-Geo. Ritchie, W.S., and R. M'Kenzie, W.S., Agents. -Mr Hamilton, Clerk. OUTER HOUSE. 16th November 1830. No. 28.-SUTHERLAND, Pursuer, v. CRAIG, Defender. Process.-Jury Causes-Jud. Stat. I. Wm. IV., c. 69—An action of damages having, according to the former practice, been enrolled in the Regulation Roll, his Lordship declined pronouncing an order for defences, but remitted the case to the rol of Jury causes, in order that the Jury Clerks might write the order for defences. Lord Ordinary, Medwyn.-Act. Rutherfurd.-Alt. Cockburn. -M., Clerk. 17th November 1830. No. 29.-BROWN'S TRUSTEES, Pursuers, v. JOHN PALMER, Defender. Process-Competency-Jurisdiction-A defender being domiciled in India, where the cause of action and all the vouchers wereHeld incompetent to sue him in the Courts of Scotland, where the pursuers resided, and had arrested ad fundandam jurisdictionem. The pursuers arrested funds in the hands of Walter Stirling Glass, residing in James's Place, Leith Walk, Edinburgh, belonging to the defender, ad jurisdictionem fundandam, and then raised an action of count and reckoning against him, setting forth, that, by a deed of settlement, dated the 3d March 1817, the pur suers were nominated trustees by David Brown, indigo planter, then resident in Bengal: That on the same day, the said David Brown executed in the English form a testament, whereby he appointed the defender, John Palmer and others, his executors in India, and ordained them to remit to the pursuers in Great Britain the proceeds of his estate. The defender pleaded in limine,-That he was resident and domiciled in India, where Mr Brown's property and all the vouchers were: That the will was entirely Indian, and that the intromissions and office of executor had been confined to that country: That the Courts of India afforded the only proper forum against the defender, and remedy to the pursuers: That supposing the Court of Session had jurisdiction, yet, it would be inexpedient for it to exercise that power. Answered-The plea of inexpediency is irrele. vant. If the action be competent, the defender must plead to the merits. The will orders the funds to be remitted to Great Britain, to the pursuers, who are in Scotland. The defender's doctrine would go the length of maintaining, that, if he were here, the pursuers would have to go to India, because the property was situated in that country. The Lord Ordinary had no doubt as to a right of action; but where the property and all the documents were abroad, and the defender had never been in this country, he thought that the pursuers should seek their remedy in the Courts in India. His Lordship dismissed the process, but found no expenses due. Pursuers' Authorities.-Oswald and Mandatory v. Patison and Mandatory, 14th December 1826; Sh. and D. Defender's Authorities.-Douglas, &c., 19th November 1793; Mor. 4602, reversed. Peters, &c. v. Martin, 18th June 1825; Shaw and Dunlop. Lord Medwyn, Ordinary.-Act. Ivory.-Alt. Rutherfurd.Agents, Daniel Fisher, S. S. C., and J. & C. Nairne, W.S.W. Clerk. 20th November 1830. No. 30.-BOYES, Pursuer, v. RowAT, Defender. Process-Non-entry-Vassal-In a declarator of non-entry, it is not necessary to call the heir of the vassal last entered, if, in consequence of deeds of alienation by his ancestor, he has no interest. The pursuer brought an action of non-entry against the defender, who pleaded as a preliminary defence, That the proper parties had not been called, and therefore there was no process, in respect that neither the present tenants, nor the heir apparent of the vassal last infeft, had been called. Answered-It is not necessary to call the heir, because he is excluded by a disposition with procuratory and precept from his ancestor, in favour of the party who has been in possession since 1817. "His Lordship repelled the preliminary defence, that the heir of the last vassal, and the present tenants in the lands have not been called as defenders," &c. Pursuer's Authorities.-Magistrates of Dundee, 26th June 1829; Scottish Jurist, Vol. I. p. 328. Lord Ordinary, Medwyn.-Act. Maitland.-Alt. G. G. Bell, -B. Clerk. ACT OF SEDERUNT. HOUSE OF LORDS. No. 31. 20th November 1830. Act regulating the rotation and business of the six Permanent Lords Ordinary in the Outer House. The Lords of Counsel and Session, considering that the number of Permanent Lords Ordinary has now been reduced from seven to six, passed an Act of Sederunt on the above date, whereby they repealed the 40th, 41st, 42d, 43d and 44th sections of the Act of Sederunt, of 11th July 1828, and Enacted and Declared, that from and after this date, and until otherwise provided for, Rotation of I. "Each of the five senior Permanent Lords Permanent Ordinary shall, in his turn, officiate as Ordinary Lords Oranty. for the week in the Outer-House, and upon oaths and witnesses, beginning with Lord Newton of the First Division, for the next ensuing week, as the Lord Ordinary in the Onter-House then in rotation, Lord Fullerton of the Second Division for the second week, Lord Corehouse the third week, Lord Mackenzie the fourth week, Lord Newton the fifth week, Lord Medwyn the sixth week, Lord Corehouse the following week, and so on, in time coming, a Permanent Lord Ordinary of the one Division being always succeeded by a Permanent Lord Ordinary of the other Division, alternately; but with power to any of the other Permanent Lords Ordinary, when in the Outer-House, to take the oaths of witnesses and havers,"— p. 2. Calling their II. "The said five senior Permanent Lords Ordinary shall call their respective Hand-Rolls Hand-Rolls. each week, as follows, viz. Lord Mackenzie on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, Each beginning at nine o'clock in the morning,"-p. 2, 3. Lord Ordinary III. "The Lord Ordinary officiating in the for the week. Outer-House for the week shall call the Regulation-Roll, and the Roll of Advocations and Suspensions, on the first day of his officiating in the Outer-House, and the Ordinary Action-Roll on the day following; with power to call his Hand-Rolls also on either of these days, if time permit, and his continued causes as well as his Hand-Roll on the third day; and also power to call a Regulation-roll daily at the end of each Session, as at present,"-p. 3. Bars. Disposal of VI." Upon Friday, one of the Bars shall be at the disposal of the Court for the use of any of the three Permanent Ordinaries hereby appointed to sit on Tuesday, who may apply for it. In like manner, on Tuesday, one of the Bars shall be at the disposal of the Court, for the se of any of the other three Permanent Ordinaries who may appiy for it: All which applications shall be made to the Lord President in the First Division of the Court,"-p. 4. (Speeches taken from Mr Gurney's Short-Hand Notes.) No. 32. GEORGE PENTLAND, Appellant, v. LADY GWYDYR Sale-Contract-A plan'ation having been sold, under the reser- In 1817, it was resolved by the respondents to cut down the wood of Strelitz, on their estate of Stob. hall. It consisted of 209 Scots acres, two of which were sold to a person of the name of Pitcairn, and four to the respondent. Thereafter, the following letter was addressed by the appellant to the respondents' factor: "January 13, 1818.-Sir, Since I had the pleasure of seeing you at Stobhall on the 29th ult., when I purchased the few weedings of larch trees, I have been considering your offer or proposal of purchase of the wood of Strelitz, and hereby make you the following offer for the same; viz. £10 Sterling per acre, and to be allowed six years to cut the wood (as sales are but slow), and payment to be made each December for the quantity cut during that season; or, if more agreeable to you, and to avoid all trouble on either side, I will give you £2000 Sterling for the whole lot, payable by bill at one or two years, a discount of five per cent. being given me, allowing that sum to have been. divided into six yearly payments, of course I being allowed my own time to cut down the wood," &c. On 21st April thereafter, the respondents' factor wrote the appellant: "From the estimate of the quantity and size of the timber on the Strelitz plantations, it appears that the amount of such valuation, at the lowest average, would be £2452, for which sum I now make you the offer of that wood, to be cut and paid for according to the agreements drawn out by us when you were in London last; that is, the whole to be cleared off in three years from commencement of cutting. 2lly, To be paid by bills at six months, dividing the whole into six payments, of which the first payment to be paid in advance, and a bill given at six months for the next payment; and the wood reserved to be deducted at payment of last bill. 3lly, The screen of wood not to be more than twenty-five Scots acres, nor less than fifteen acres, and chosen by the proprietor or his agents. 4thly, A third of the whole plantation, or nearly so, to be cut and cleared yearly, and that in one part only. If this meets your intentions, you will let me know," &c. The appellant answered, on the 30th: "I was favoured with your's of the 21st current, making me an offer of the timber on the Strelitz plantations at £2452 Sterling. Although I have again perambulated them, I really think the sum is high; but I shall throw myself entirely into your hands; and when you consider that it is clearing you without further trouble, I hope both Mr Burrell and you will be disposed to give me an abatement, and make each payment of the six £350 each, which would make £2100. That I leave entirely to Mr Burrell's consideration and your's; for a person taking off-hand such a bargain should have a little latitude, as there is considerable risk. Please receive inclosed a bankdraft for £350 Sterling, payable to you, or order, which would be the first instalment of the price, if allowed to be £2100; but |