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profit, and that appellant refused to pay him any part thereof.

It was objected that no partnership was alleged to have been formed, and, also, that the contract set up in the same paragraph is void by the Statute of Frauds.

A motion was made in arrest of judgment, because of the insufficiency of the complaint.

COPYRIGHT.

Copyright in a map, at common law, is lost by a sale of the right to make a copy without restriction. Publication. W. P. Davie, an engraver, in 1860, at the suggestion of S. H. Kerfoot, a real estate broker in Chicago, compiled, from the public records, maps of Chicago showing the subdivisions, streets, alleys, etc., of the town. Davie sold these maps to

Held, 1. That a partnership was suffi- several real estate dealers, amongst whom ciently alleged.

2. That the contract is not void. It does not allege a sale, but an agreement for compensation for services.

3. If either paragraph of the complaint was good, the motion to arrest and the assignment of error ought not to prevail.

Kelsey v. Henry.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
48 Ind., pp. 37-38.
Opinion by Pettit, J.

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were Rees & Slocum, whom the appellants succeeded, and Ogden & Sheldon. No copyright was taken out by Davie or

Kerfoot.

In the great fire of 1871 all the maps sold by Davie, except those belonging to the appellants and Ogden & Sheldon, were destroyed, and these firms sought to make a monopoly upon these two sets of maps and their uses. They formed a copartnership to control this use, and to participate in the profits. In the maps published there were added new streets, etc.

The Board of Public Works of the city having daily necessity for the use of these maps, it applied to the owners of these firms to obtain a copy of them. The price demanded was $5,000. The Board had no legal authority to make such a contract, and it undertook to lay the matter before the Common Council, and nothing more. In this condition of the matter Ogden & Sheldon permitted the work of the copying of the maps to be

commenced. The Board addressed a communication to the Mayor and Aldermen of Chicago in Common Council assembled, stating the necessity there was for the use of the maps, and giving an opinion that the price "was as reasonable as could be expected under the circumstances." This was the only mode under its charter to bind the City of Chicago. Ogden was a member of the Council, and also of the Finance Committee through which the matter was to be brought before the Council for action. On the report of the Board the Finan

Com

8. For the acts of Ogden & Sheldon were the acts of the appellants by reason of the partnership between them.

mittee first acted, and Ogden insisted that the $5,000 should be paid, on the ground that the owners of the maps would thereby lose their monopoly. He 9. Ogden's participation, as a public asked for no restrictions, and there were officer of the City of Chicago, in making none in the report of the Board. The the sale without restriction, estopped the Finance Committee reported in favor of appellants from setting up any allegamaking the contract, and the Council tion of restriction. passed an ordinance to that effect.

The appellants filed a bill to restrain the respondents from publishing an atlas containing these maps, which were taken from the copies made by the Board of Public Works, for which the $5,000 was paid, on the ground that it was an invasion of a copyright therein attaching to appellants' ownership of such an atlas. The bill was dismissed and this appeal was taken.

Held, 1. There is no right here under the Acts of Congress relating to copyright.

2. Whatever right there is springs from the common law. That gives an exclusive right of property in maps, charts, writings and books, and mechani cal inventions, as long as they are kept within the possession of the author.

3. There is no copyright in a published work at common law; such copyright exists by statute law only.

4. Davie made a voluntary publication of his maps, and whatever right he had, as the author of them, were lost to him, and the maps became common property. 5. The owner of a copy of Davie's maps could confer a right on any one to make copies of them, and no injunction could restrain him.

6. The addition of streets, etc., in appellants' copy is not new, it did not change the plan; there was no authorship, and, consequently, no author's right.

7. But whatever rights appellants acquired by the accession of the new matter was lost to them by the sale to the City of Chicago of the privilege to make a copy, for public use, without restriction; that contract made the maps common property of the community.

10. Equity will not grant relief upon alleged rights arising out of such a transaction as this with the City of Chicago, for it is, constructively at least, fraudulent, by reason of Ogden's interest in the contract; and the appellants were jointly interested with him.

11. Any person may make copies of the whole or any part of these maps, with the permission of the city authorities.

12. And the bill was properly dismissed on the ground that Ogden and Sheldon were necessary parties thereto. Rees et al. v. Peltzer et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois, June 16,

1875.

Opinion by McAllister, J.

CORPORATION.

Subscription to stock-when inchoatewhen perfected. Fraud in procuring charter of railroad company cannot be attacked collaterally.

The defendant in error was incorporated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but no charter could be had until a required number of subscribers, and $9,000 for each mile of the road had been obtained.

The plaintiff in error was an original subscriber, and his name remained on the subscription lists when the Company, having fulfilled the requirements of the Act, filed their article in the proper office of the State.

On the trial it was shown that an authorized agent of the Company had said, at the meeting to obtain the original subscribers, that no subscriber would be bound. The plaintiff in error insists that

he is not liable for his subscription, on the ground that he was told by the agent of the Company that he would not be liable, and on the further ground that the proceedings in getting and filing of the subscriptions were a fraud in obtain ing the charter.

There was a conviction, and this appeal was taken.

Held, 1. That the facts enumerated in the charge would constitute a sale to both A. and B.

2. The sale to two persons will not sustain an indictment for a sale to one of

different in law.

Held, 1. That the charter of a railroad them. The transactions are essentially company cannot be attacked collaterally for bad faith in obtaining it.

2. That whilst the scheme was inchoate any subscriber could have withdrawn from his subscription.

3. The evidence as to the acts of the agent at the meeting to get subscriptions was not competent to contradict the written evidence of subscription, duly filed with the State.

4. The subscription, inchoate before, had ripened into a perfect obligation on the filing of the papers.

Garrett v. The Dillsburg and Mechan-
icsburg R. R. Co.

Brinks v. The Same.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Opinion by Agnew, C. J. May 24, 1875.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Evidence. Variance. Proof of the sale of liquor to two persons will not sustain an indictment for selling to one.

Brown v. The State.
Supreme Court of Indiana
48 Ind., pp. 38-40.
Opinion by Worden J.

DECEIT.

Representation not actionable. Sale of patent rights.

The plaintiff sued for damages for a deceit in the sale of a patent right.

The representations of the defendant, relied upon, were substantially these: That the patent right was "a good thing; " that is was "of great utility and benefit, and popular;" that "it was in great demand, and that the defendant had been offered $40,000 for it, for the territory of Pennsylvania; " that he had "sold one quarter of the right for the territory of Pennsylvania for $4,000; that "it had been rapidly gold, and he had sold interests in it as fast as he could travel on the road;" that "he had himself bought additional interests in it at great prices, and that he and others had made large sums of money in making sales of it;" that "the plaintiff "If A. and B. went into the saloon of could sell it upon the territory for which the defendant on the Sunday in question he was to have it, and, if he did not sucand called for whisky, intending to pur-ceed, that he would go and sell it for chase it of the defendant, and the defend- him, and would assure him at he would ant set it, the whisky, out to them in the regular course of his trade, intending to make a sale to them, and in pursuance of such mutual intention he delivered the liquor to them, and they accepted it and drank it, this would constitute a sale,

The defendant was indicted for selling intoxicating liquor, on Sunday, to A. The Court gave the following instruction 'o the jury:

make a large amount from the transaction." The plaintiff averred that the right was of no value; in no demand, and that it could not be sold, and that the defendant knew this to be so. It was not cortended that the article had no efficiency as burn; but that it had

no superior advantages in those respects ion of the Judge regulating such matters for which it was patented.

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The Judge then refused to allow the original record to be read to the jury.

Feld, 1. The record should have been admitted. It was competent, and, strictly speaking, the only original evidence. A verified copy, though admissible, is still only secondary evidence.

2. The jury were not entitled to the book in their room. A domestic record must be tried by the Court; a foreign record by the jury. The former can be inspected, whilst the veracity of the latter is for the jury.

will not be revised, unless it is clear that some injustice had thereby been done. Sawyer v. Garcelon. 63 Maine, pp. 25-27.

Opinion by Peters, J.; Appleton, C. J., and Walton, Dickerson, Barrows and Virgin, JJ., concurring.

Admissibility of receipt not stamped.

Defendant objected to the admission of his receipt because it had not been stamped, as required by the laws of the United States. He was then called, and testified that he had not omitted to stamp the receipt from any intent to defraud the revenue.

Held, That the instrument was properly admitted.

Emery v. Hobson.

63 Maine, pp. 33-44. Per curiam opinion.

Measure of damages. Rule of, for lanc taken by railroad company. Admissibility of declarations of owner as to value to show value. Also, of price at which a portion of the property had been sold to show value.

On the trial of an action to recover damages for the appropriation of farm. lands by a railroad company, the defendant offered to show the declarations of the plaintiff as to value of the lands, and also the price at which certain portions of the same lands had been sold.

The offer was rejected, the defendant excepted, and on the judgment against it sued out the writ of error.

Held, 1. That the declarations of the owner as to the value of his property were competent when offered by the defendant.

2. The price at which a portion of the land had been sold was a fact for the jury, showing the value the owner put upon the land.

3. It is inevitably, to some extent, a question of discretion with the Court whether papers used at a trial shall be taken to the jury room. And the decis- 3. The rule is well settled that the

measure of damages in such a case as this is the difference between the value of the whole property before the opening of the road, and its value as affected by the road.

The East Brandywine and Waynes-
burg R. R. Co. v. Ranek.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Opinion by Parson, J. May 24, 187!

Bankruptcy. Ejectment. Title. Appointment of assignee. Authority to sell.

In an action of ejectment the plaintiff,

who derived his title from an assignee in bankruptcy, the plaintiff gave in ev dence (1) a certified copy of the pet tion in bankruptcy; (2) the certificat of the bankrupt's discharge, and (3) the

deed from the assignee.

Held, 1. That the proof was defective in not showing the appointment of the assignee.

2. It was also defective in not showing his authority to sell the property.

Alexander v. Me Cullough et al.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Per curiam opinion. May 24, 1975.

Acknowledgment of deed. Certificate of Certificate of justice of the peace a judicial act, and conclusive unless fraud or duress is shown.

The official certificate of a justice of the peace showed that certain things had been done in the acknowledgment of a deed. Evidence was given to impeach the certificate, but no fraud or duress. was shown, and the Judge, deeming the evidence conclusive, would not permit the official certificate to go to the jury.

Held, 1. That the certificate of a justice of the peace of the acknowledgment of a deed is a judicial act.

2. It is conclusive of the facts certified to in the absence of fraud or duress. Hector v. Glasgow.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Opinion by Paxson, J. May 31, 1875.

Promise made in consideration of thi execution of an instrument may be proven by parol.

The plaintiff rented a farm from the defendant as a "cropper," and in a suit fo damages sustained for want of prope room and place for his cattle and grain.

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"That, before the 1st of April, 1869, Moore proposed to plaintiff that if would lease, and move on his farm fer a year, as a cropper,' he, Moore, woul! build a barn thereon before harvest, and that Shughart agreed thereto; that when Moore brought the agreement, signed by helf, to Shughart to sign, Shughart refused to sign it, because it did not men tion that Moore was to build the barn; hat Moore then said that that was not

ecessary, that he was a man of his word, and would do as he had promised;

at Shughart relied on Moore's promise. to build the barn, and was then induced to sign the agreement; that Moore, when. called upon to build the barn, refused to do so, and that the plaintiff thereby suf fered great loss."

The offer was rejected as an effort t prove a contract of lease by parol, when there was a written lease, which did not contain the matter offered in proof.

Held, 1. That it is settled, beyond all question, that when a promise is made by one party in consideration of the execu tion of a written instrument by the other, it may be shown by parol evidence.

Shughart v. Moore.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May 24, 1875.

Opinion by Sharswood, J.

GAS LIGHT COMPANIES. Must pay damages to owner of land for running gas pipes under pubic road in front of the land.

These were statutory proceedings to appraise compensation to respondent for land taken by the appellant under its charter. The petitioner was incorporated

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