void, even in the hands of bona fide holders, who, in order to enforce payment thereof, must show that the requisite consent was given. (23 N. Y., 439; 24 id., 114; 36 id., 224.) That equity would not interfere to restrain suit upon, or transfer not paid up the arrears of taxes and assessments, he could only have set it up by supplemental answer, which it would have been in the discretion of the Court to allow, and in such case he had his election to resort to a new action; that the terms imposed were as favorable to of, or to compel the cancellation the defendant as he could reasonably demand, and fully indemnified him; that under the circumstances the Court had power to grant the relief sought, and it properly exercised that power. of an instrument void upon its face, as, in order to authorize the interposition of a court of equity, it must appear to be necessary to prevent an injury which equity alone could avert. That the fact that the holders of the bonds might resort to a tribunal in which a different Covenants in a lease to pay taxes and assessments are in the nature of covenants to pay money, and forfeitures incurred rule of decision prevails was not sufficient by their breach may be relieved upon the to authorize a court of equity to intersame principles. The forfeiture is merely fere. In any view, a court of equity a security for such payments, and equity will not allow it to be enforced after the party has obtained all it was intended to secure him. Giles, respt., v. Austin, applt. would not interfere to relieve plaintiff against the bonds, except upon condition that it surrendered what it had received therefor. Also held, that the fact that the bonds N. Y. Court of Appeals, Sept. 21, 1875. were held by numerous individuals, who Opinion by Rapallo, J. Will not relieve by injunction against suits on void instruments, though in the hands of bona fide holders. At least, except upon condition that plaintiff should restore what he had received. Though different individuals might bring like suits they cannot be compelled to join in one suit. This action was brought to have certain bonds issued by railroad commissioners of plaintiff, under Chap. 375 of the Laws of 1852, declared illegal and void, and to restrain defendants, the holders thereof, from transferring them or prosecuting any action to collect them in the United States courts, or other wise. The Referee before whom the action was tried found that the bonds were issued without the requisite consent of tax-payers and were void, but that the action could not be maintained, and directed a dismissal of the complaint. Held, no error; that the bonds, being issued without the requisite consent, were might bring different suits, was not sufficient to justify an action to compel them to litigate their claims in one suit. (N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y., 592, & 34 id., 30, distinguished.) Town of Venice, applt., v. Gould et al., respts. N. Y. Court of Appeals, Sept. 21, 1875. Opinion by Rapallo, J. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DE- Forcing open a window in a vacant son or persons shall hereafter make any second Ward of the City of Philadelphia, entry into lands, tenements, or other pos- with the good-will, to the appellee for a sessions, but in cases where entry is given gross sum; and in the sale she agreed that by law, and in such cases not with a she would not engage in the same busistrong hand, nor with multitude of peo- ness directly, or indirectly, within the ple, but only in a peaceable manner; and limits of that ward, for ten years from if any person from henceforth do the the sale, but would, by her advice and contrary, and thereof be duly convicted, counsel, endeavor to encourage and prohe shall be punished by fine." The jury found for the plaintiff. Held, There was sufficient force used to justify the action. Ainsworth v. Barry. 35 Wisconsin, pp. 136-141. Opinion by Cole, J. GRAND JURY. The Court may direct that a list of the witnesses before the grand jury be given to the accused. But he cannot have a copy of their testimony unless strong ground is laid. The defendant was indicted for forgery. There was no examination before a committing magistrate, and he moved for an order requiring the District Attorney to give him a list of the witnesses sworn before the grand jury, and also for the minutes of their testimony. Held, 1. It is within the discretion of the Court to order a list of witnesses to be given. 2. But the defendant cannot have the minutes of the proceedings of the grand jury unless there are strong reasons shown. United States v. Southmayd. INJUNCTION. Good-will. Contracts on restraint of trade. Idle injunction will not issue. Irreparable injury must be shown to justify injunction. Elizabeth Harkinson, in 1868, sold a bakery and a confectionery in the Twenty mote the business interests of the vendee. The bakery and the confectionery had been owned and carried on by the husband of Mrs. Harkinson, for twenty-two years, in the ward. He devised most of his estate to the appellant absolutely, and appointed her the sole executrix. Ile left six children. In 1875 the appellant purchased a lot at Chestnut Hill, in the ward, but four miles from the old bakery, and built and fitted up a house and other appliances suited to a bakery and a confectionery. The third son, David, and she were active in managing the construction of the establishment; and having put over the door the name of "Harkinson," she gave David possession. He was to pay interest on the sums expended in this transact on, when the business should be thoroughly established; in case of her death the property was to become his, and if its value was greater than his share of his father's estate, he was to account to his brothers and sisters for the difference. The business was that of David Harkinson, managed and carried on by him, on his own credit and means, and not by the appellant. The appellant denied, in her answer, that she encouraged or promoted the business of others with the intent and effect to injure the appellee; on the contrary, she alleges and avers that she had advised and encouraged the customers of the old place to continue their custom, and that she had endeavored to remove objections on their part to purchas ing there. The Master found that "there was no proof of any special damage suffered by plaintiff by reason of the opening of the Hill, or that customers had left him and gone there." bakery and confectionery at Chestnut drinking, he was asleep in his room, having left the door unfastened, when he was robbed of $175 which he had in his pocket. The Court below, on the report and finding of the Master, that the appellant had violated the true intent and spirit of her contract, decreed an injunction, and Mrs. Harkinson appealed. Held, 1. An injunction against the appellant would be idle. It would not affect David Harkinson, and the business would go on. 2. The acts of the appellant do not come within the recognized violations of such contracts as that made by her on the sale of the good-will. 3. There is not only no irreparable damage shown, and that must be shown to justify an injunction, but there is no appreciable damage shown to have been done, or that it may be looked for, to be guarded against. 4. Courts do not sit to decide abstract questions, but to determine relative rights and to redress relative wrongs. The appellee has not sustained, nor has he any reason to fear any substantial injury to his property. Harkinson's Appeal. Supreme Ct. of Penn., May 10, 1875. INN-KEEPER. The defense was that the plaintiff was a boarder, and not a transient guest; that he contributed to the loss by his own negligence, and that there was no liabil ity where the plaintiff had the exclusive control of the money. The jury found for the plaintiff, and defendants moved for a new trial, on the ground, amongst others, of newly discovered evidence. This evidence was in a paper which defendants said could not be found in time to be used on the trial. The affidavits did not rebut the presumption of intentional omission or unpardonable negligence in not producing the paper on the trial. Held, 1. That there was nothing to show that the plaintiff was a boarder. only. He was a traveler, and the duration of his sojourn would not deprive him of that character. 2. That the liability of defendants as inn-keepers is excused only by a loss caused by the act of God, or the public enemy, the misconduct of the guest, his servants, or companions whom he brought with him. 3. That the custody of the guest and of his property is the custody of the innkeeper. 4. A want of ordinary care on the part of the guest will relieve the inn-keeper. A traveler remains a guest though his 5. The denial of a new trial on the stay is long. The liability of an innkeeper is general, the excuses are few ground of newly-discovered evidence and well settled. The custody of the was not an abuse of the discretion of the guest is the custody of the inn-keeper. A Court. Such motions are received with want of ordinary care on the part of great caution, and are regarded with susthe guest will relieve the inn-keeper. A new trial for newly discovered evidence picion and disfavor. The presumption of will not be granted unless the omission intentional omission and unpardonable. is justified. negligence in not discovering the evidence in time for the trial must be fairly rebutted before a new trial will be granted. The plaintiff went to the public house kept by the defendants and asked them whether they took boarders and at what price. He was told $4.50 a week. He said he would come, and he paid his board by the week. One day, after | Jalie v. Cardinal. 35 Wisconsin, pp. 118-13. LANDLORD AND TENANT. Court may direct the jury to find special facts. Cannot ask for facts of which doubted right to direct the jury to find a special verdict. It is one of the recognized modes by which the facts are put 3. The Act of 21st March, 1872, gives double the value of the goods distrained, against the persons making the distress, not against those in whose names the distress was taken. Fretton et ux, plffs. in error, v. Karcher, there is no evidence. Such a course into the record. fatal to the losing party. Double dam2. It was error to submit the questions ages against the party making the dis-6, 9, 10 and 11 to the jury, for there was tress only. no evidence upon which they could be The plaintiff in error, Mrs. Fretton, founded. And they tended to prejudice leased certain premises to the defendant the jury, since, they indicated a wanton in error, and a distress warrant was issued disregard of duty and a reckless exercise by the plaintiff to the constable who exe- of a pretended right through the forms of cuted it. Defendant sued in trespass law. It must have been that the jury quare clausam fregit, and recovered found the verdict of $2,500 on these un$2,500 damages, and remitting one-half, sustained facts. judgment was entered for $1,250. The value of the property levied on was $343. On the trial the Court directed the jury to find a special verdict, on these points: 1. Was there the tenancy? 2. Any rent due? 3. Was constable employed by Mrs. Fretton? 4. Was distress made by him, and when? 5. Was the five days notice, before appraisement, with the cause of the distress, given? 6. Any appraisement made; if so, by whom: were they freeholders; were they duly sworn, and who appointed them? 7. Were the goods sold at public sale? 8. Was six days public notice of the sale given after the appraisement? 9. Did Mrs. Fretton know before, or at the time of the sale, that the five days notice, with the cause of the distress, was not given? 10. And that the appraisers were not freeholders? 11. And that the six days public notice was not given? And they found: 1. Yes. 2. None. 3. Yes. 4. Yes; Sept. 20, 1867. 5. No. 6. Yes, but by persons not freeholders. 7. Yes. 8. No. 9. Yes. 10. Yes. 11. Yes. The evidence showed that the appraisers were duly sworn, and that Mrs. Fretton had no knowledge of any of the proceedings after signing the landlord's warrant which was addressed to the constable, and that Mr. Fretton participated in the sale only. The questions of law on the facts found were reserved for the Opinion by Mercur, J. May 10, 1875. Mortgagor in possession, after foreclosure, the nature of ejectment. The defendant and his wife made a mortgage of the premises in question to secure a note, with a power of sale. The note was not paid and the premises and took proceedings to dispossess dewere sold. The plaintiff purchased them, fendant. The plaintiff originally instituted proceedings under the "Landlord and Tenant" Act, before a Justice of the Peace, which were brought by the appeal of the defendant to the Superior Court. The judgment was against the defendant, who was adjudicated a bankrupt, and his assignor moved for a writ of restitution. The plaintiff resisted, on the ground that the property had passed from Love, the original defendant, and that the assignee Held, 1. That the Court had the un- never had had possession. Court in banc. Held, 1. That the case did not come do assure the life of William Warnecke, within the operations of the "Landlord of Dubuque, State of Ohio, for the sole and Tenant Act." use of the said Charlotte Warnecke, in the amount of fifteen hundred dollars, for the term of his natural life. 3. The writ of restitution must be granted. The Justice's action was void. McMillan v. Love. "And the said Company do hereby 2. It is a mere play upon words to say that Love has lost his rights because of the assignment, and that the assignee cannot have possession, because he never promise and agree to pay the said sum had possession. He stands in Love's assured, at their office, to the said asshoes. sured, or her executors, administrators or assigns, in ninety days after due notice and proof of death of the said person whose life is hereby assured (the balance of year's premium and all notes. given for premiums, if any, being first deducted therefrom), and in case of the death of the said assured before the death of the said person whose life is assured, the amount of the said insurance shall be payable to the heirs-at-law of the said William Warnecke. 72 No. Carolina, pp. 18-20. Opinion by Pierson, C. J. LIFE INSURANCE. When premium notes are given, with cash William Warnecke for the use and bene fit of Charlotte Warnecke for $1,500. William is dead, and so is Charlotte, and her administrator sues for two-tenths of the sum insured, less the amount of certain promissory notes of William to the defendant, made under the contract of insurance. The material clauses of the policy are as follows: "The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company by this policy of as surance, A statement of facts were admitted in evidence on the trial as follows: "1st. The policy sued on was issued July 12, 1865, at which time the semiannual payment of $24.84 was made, and a note for $43.25 was executed by Warnecke. Upon the making of this payment, and the execution of the note, the policy was delivered to Warnecke. "In consideration of the representations made to them in the application for On the 12th of January, 1866, the this policy, and of the sum of twenty- semi-annual payment was made. On the four dollars and eighty-four cents to 12th of July, 1866, the semi-annual paythem in hand paid by Charlotte War- ment of $24.84 was made; also the necke, wife of William Warnecke, wood year's interest on the note above dedealer, and of the annual premium note scribed, and a second note of like of forty-three dollars and twenty-five form and tenor for the sum of cents, and the semi-annual cash premium $43.84, was executed by Warnecke and of twenty-four dollars and eighty-four delivered to the defendant, and proper cents, to be paid at or before noon on or renewal receipt was delivered to Warbefore the twelfth day of July and Jan- necke. On the 12th of January, uary in every year during the first ten 1867, Warnecke failed 40 pay the years of the continuance of this policy, semi-annual cash payment then coming |