CONTRACT. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. The Wilmington aid Weldon R. R. Decided Oct. 1875. Confederate Currency. Validity. Impairing contracts by State laws. In error to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The Railroad Company made a contract for wood with plaintiff's testatrix. By the terms of the contract the wood was to be paid for in Confederate currency. On the trial the State Court refused to instruct the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only the value of the currency stipulated to be paid, and charged that he was entitled to the value of the wood without reference to the value of the currency. CONDEMNATION. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED Semmes, Claimant, Piff. in Error, v. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. The Court made this ruling in obedience to the statute of the State, passed in March, 1866, which enacted-"That in all civil actions which may arise in courts of justice for debts contracted during the late war, in which the nature of the obligation is not set forth, nor the On the 7th of August, 1863. proceedvalue of the property for which such ings in rem were instituted, under the debts were created is stated, it shall be confiscation Act of the 17th of July, 1863 admissible for either party to show on against certain real property of the plainthe trial, by affidavit or otherwise, what tiff in error, and on the 5th of April, 1865, was the consideration of the contract, the property was condemned by default. and the jury, in making up their verdict, On the eleventh day of that month a writ shall take the same into consideration, of venditoni exponas was issued to the and determine the value of said contract Marshal to sell the property, a week later. in present currency, in the particular On the day of the sale he withdrew the locality in which it is to be performed, property and again advertised it for sale. and render their verdict accordingly." The ground of his action was that the best bid was not two-thirds of the appraised value of the property. Held, 1. Contracts, payable in Confederate money, not designed in its origin to aid the insurrectionary government, are not invalid between the parties. This is well settled. Two of the lots condemned belonged to another person, who applied to open the decree, and, the District Attorney 2. In determining contracts so to be consenting in writing, the decree was paid, evidence must be received, as to opened, for the purpose of enabling the the value of the notes at the time and petitioner to prove his title, and this he in the locality where the contracts did. The residue of the property was were made. In no other way can the sold, under the second advertisement of his property in case the sale by the Marshal is null and void. sale, and the purchase money paid by title the respondent to a restoration of the Marshal to the Clerk of the Court. In March, 1868, the respondent (below) having first suggested that the decree of Hed, 1. The preliminary defect is one condemnation had been opened, and that of form, and was amendable by the a portion of the property libeled had Circuit Court as fully as by this Court. never been condemned by any subsequent 2. The amnesty proclamation did not decree, moved the Court to set aside the dismiss the proceedings against the resdefault, and for leave to file his claim and pondent. That proclamation excepted answer. The purchaser appeared and "property with regard to slaves," and filed his exceptions to the rule, claiming "in cases of legal proceedings under the that his rights could not be so ques- laws of the United States." tioned, and offered in evidence the deed of the Marshal and the decree of condemnation, together with the writ of venditioni exponas. The rule was granted. The respondent succeeded in the litigation, and the United States removed the cause into the Circuit Court, where the decree of the District Court was reversed, and the respondent sued out his writ in this Court. The respondent urged, in objection to the decree of the Circuit Court: 1. The formal error; that the writ of error from the Circuit Court to the District Court was made returnable on the first Monday of December, instead of the first Monday of November, as it should have been; and because the writ of error was not returnable in accordance with the order allowing it, nor according to the citation. This property falls within the latter exception: 3. The decree was opened forthe special purpose of allowing the owner of the two lots to prove his title to them, and for that only, and the assignment of error on that point, is utterly destitute of merit. 4. Properties condemned as forfeited to the United States, become the property of the United States from the date of the decree of condemnation. Therefore, whether the proceedings of the Marshal were regular or not, does not concern the respondent. "But it is well settled law that the Marshal, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may adjourn the sale in such a case to another day, and the circumstances disclosed in the record were of a character to fully justify the Marshal in the course he pursued." (5.) "The original decree of the Dis2. Aud to the merits: (a) That the trict Court was complete and correct, President had, by his proclamation of and the decree of the Circuit Court, reamnesty, dismissed all proceedings versing the second decree of the District against any person or his property, en- Court, and adjudging that the first decree gaged or in any manner implicated of the District Court should stand and in the rebellion. (b) That, the origi- remain in full force and effect, would nel decree having been opened, the have been sufficient without any decree property of the respondent could not be confirming the sale of the Marshal; but sold at all, as there was no subsisting decree of condemnation. (e) That the sale to the purchaser was null, because it was not made on the day specified in the writ. (a) That the Circuit Court had Complete jurisdiction of the cause was no authority to confirm the sale to the vested in the Circuit Court, by virtue of purchaser. (e) That the special pardon, the writ of error, and the Circuit Court as well as the amnesty proclamation, en- having reversed the second decree of even if the decree affirming the sale be regarded as an act of supererogation, it cannot render invalid what would have been valid without it. the District Court, might "proceed to of the laws, and of equal privileges and pass such decree as should have been immunities. passed" by the subordinate Court, and it follows, that if a decree confirming the sale was necessary, it was entirely competent for the Circuit Court to pass such a decree." Judge Krekel's Charge: The defendants are indicted for conspiring together and going in disguise on the highway, and on the premises of one Lucas and others, for the purpose of depriving of their being colored citizens of the them, as a class of persons, and because United States of African descent, of the (6.) "Such proceedings under the Confiscation Act in question are justified as an exercise of belligerent rights against a public enemy, and are not in the nature of a punishment for treason. Consequently, equal protection of the laws, and of equal confiscation being a proceeding distinct privileges and immunities under the law, from and independent of the treasonable to which they are entitled. guilt of the owner of the property confiscated, pardon for treason will not restore rights to property previously condemned and sold in theexercise of belligerent rights, as against a purchaser in good faith and for value." (7.) All the proceedings of the District Court, three years subsequent to the condemnation, which was regular, to restore the land, were wholly unauthorized and void. The judgment though bad as the two lots, was good to extent that it was authorized by law. At the present stage of the proceedings the indictment must be treated not only as charging an offense against the United States, but as doing so in due form of law. No inquiry or suggestion as to the constitutionality of the law will therefore be proper. In the first place, the indictment charges a conspiracy, which is a combination of two or more persons to commit the crime charged upon the defendants, the crime charged being the depriving of colored citizens as a class, and because they are colored citizens, of the protection of the law and of equal privileges and immunities to which they are entitled. "The special pardon contained the provision that the respondent should not "by virtue thereof " claim any property, or the proceeds of any property that had been sold by the order, judgment, or Direct proof is not necessary to prove decree of a court under the confiscation the conspiracy. It may be inferred. It laws of the United States. A pardon may be inferred from such acts of the may be special in its character, or sub-parties, in which two or more of them ject to conditions and exceptions." unite, indicating a common design for Decree affirmed. a common illegal purpose. Opinion by Mr. Justice Clifford. CRIMINAL LAW. CONSPIRACY AGAINST COLORED VOTERS, &C. United States v. Blackburn et al. Evidence. Presumption. Indictment for conspiracy to deprive colored citizens of the equal protection The jury must be satisfied, from the evidence, that the conspiracy was against the persons named in the indictment as a class, and because of their being colored citizens. The defendants cann ot, under this indictment, be found guilty, however criminal the acts charged may be, unless they were committed with the purpose and design to deprive the colored persons named in the indictment, or some of them, because of their being colored, of the protection of the law, or of equal privil eges and immunities which the law guar- ants in this case, or two or more of them, antees to them. is to deprive the persons so interfered Crime such as these parties are with of equal privileges and immunicharged with, when committed without ties, and if such interference was with any design to affect a particular class of the intent to solely affect the colored citizens, are punishable under State persons named in the indictment as a laws. class and on account of their color, the The law guarantees equal protection charge in the indictment is made out. to all. If it shall appear to the satisfaction of The allegation that the colored per- the jury, from the evidence, that the colsons named in the indictment were ored people of the township in which the charged with illegal conduct,is no defence colored persons named in the indictment in this case. If they were guilty of such resided were, under the law, by virtue of acts, they were enttled to a trial, and the number of children of suitable age, Courts are established for that purpose. entitled to have a public school, and that The failure to resort to the Courts, tends the defendants, or any two or more of strongly to show that the pretended them, conspired by illegal means to deoffences were private and not public prive them, as a class, and on account of wrongs. And that the charges were their color, of such school, either by invented to justify or palliate the outrages charged in the indictment. driving them off or by intimidating them, in order to prevent them from availing By the protection of the law is meant themselves of the benefit of the law, that the ordinary means and appliances such acts tend to show, in the language which the law has provided shall be used of the indictment, that their object was and put in operation in all cases of vio- the depriving them, as a class of persons, lation of law. If the outrages and and because of their being colored, of crimes charged in this case were well their legal rights. known to the community at large, and that it and the officers of the law wilfully failed to employ the means provided by law to ferret out and bring to trial the offenders, because the victims were colored, that is depriving them of equal protection of the law. DEFENCE. NEW YORK SUPREME Court-GENERAL Smith, Respt., v. The Mayor, etc., of Appeal from judgment entered on The indictment also charges that the colored persons named were deprived of equal privileges and immunities under the law. The privileges and immunities here spoken of are properly defined to be such as "belong to citizens of all "free governments and which have, at "all times, been enjoyed by the citizens "of the several States, and comprehend "the enjoyment of life, liberty and the Plaintiff is the assignee of one Nelson "right to acquire property of every Smith, who was employed by the Cor"kind, and to pursue and obtain happi-poration Counsel during the years 1865 "ness and safety." The enjoyment of and 1866, to collect certain personal taxes life and liberty implies safety to person then unpaid for the years 1862-3-4 and and property. The illegal and criminal 5 (under secs. 12 and 13 of Act 11, chap. interference with either by the defend-230 of Laws, 1843). Over $50,000 was Answer. General denial. appropriated for the expenses of the law of their business. He was to receive, department in 1866, of which a surplus among other things, a certain commisremained at the end of the year. It was argued on appeal sion on the gross profits of this department. For a balance claimed to be due 1. That plaintiff's assignee had never on these commissions plaintiff sued and been employed by defendant. 2. That no appropriation had been made as required by sec. 28, chap. 446, Laws of 1857. 3. That proceedings could not properly be brought in 1866, to collect taxes due from 1862-3, and that charges for such services are erroneous. alleging ignorance of the exact amount sold and various other details, petitioned the Court at Special Term for an order requiring discovery of defendant's books. Defendants' claim, and they are not contradicted, that during the different years of the employment, they furnished plaintiff with semi-annual accounts and weekly statements, and that free access was always allowed him to the books. On appeal. Held, That by secs. 1 and 18 of the Revised Ordinances, the Corporation Counsel may employ counsel to assist him. Since over $50,000 was appropriated in 1866 Held, That inspection of books and for the expenses of the law department, papers is not a matter of right, but a and a surplus remained therefrom at the privilege which is only given in extreme end of the year, even if it were less than cases, when the refusal may involve the the claim, the defence of insufficient ap- loss of a claim or defence. In this case propriation could not prevail, for the the books do not appear to be necessary, right to compensation for services directed since plaintiff has statements made from under a sufficient appropriation ought them and accounts rendered, which not to be defeated by its expenditure should contain all the information he for other purposes. seeks to obtain, unless they are false, which plaintiff does not allege. All charges for services rendered in 1866 to compel the payment of taxes of 1862 and 1863 were improper, as, by the terms of the statute, the time for enforcing such collection had expired after one year from the default, and such charges should be deducted from the judgment, which should then be affirmed. Opinion by Daniels, J.; Davis, P. J., and Daniels, J., concurring. DISCOVERY OF BOOKS, &c. dren." "Heirs." Rule in Shelly's case. This was an action of ejectment. One C. was the common source of title. In his will he devised the real estate in question to his son, Peter, "during his natural life, and after his decease to his lawful children." The will was executed in 1804, prior to the Revised Statutes. Plaintiff claims that the will gave the Plaintiff was employed by defendants, testator's son, Peter, only a life estate, to take charge of one of the departments and a life estate to his lawful children, Right. Accounts rendered. Appeal from order directing discovery of books and papers. |