Section referred to in Barton v. Kalloch, 56 Cal. 101.

SECTION 15. No judicial officer, except justices of the peace and court commissioners, shall receive to his own use any fees or perquisites of office.

Const. 1849, Art. VI, Sec. 13.

SECTION 16. The legislature shall provide for the speedy publication of such opinions of the Supreme Court as it may deem expedient, and all opinions shall be free for publication by any person.

Const. 1849, Art. VI, Sec. 14.

SECTION 17. The justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the Superior Court shall severally, at stated times during their continuance in office, receive for their services a compen sation which shall not be increased or diminished after their election, nor during the term for which they shall have been elected. The salaries of the justices of the Supreme Court shall be paid by the state. One-half of the salary of each Su perior Court judge shall be paid by the state; the other half thereof shall be paid by the county for which he is elected. During the term of the first judges elected under this constitution, the annual salaries of the justices of the Supreme Court shall be six thousand dollars each. Until otherwise changed by the legislature, the Superior Court judges shall re ceive an annual salary of three thousand dollars each, payable monthly, except the judges of the city and county of San Francisco, and the counties of Alameda, San Joaquin, Los Angeles, Santa Clara, Yuba and Sutter combined, Sacramento, Butte, Nevada and Sonoma, which shall receive four thousand dollars each.

Const. 1849, Art. VI, Sec. 15.

Salary and expenses of office are distinguishable. See Kinwood v. Soto, 87 Cal. 394.

SECTION 18. The justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the Superior Courts shall be ineligible to any other office or public employment than a judicial office or employment, dur ing the term for which they shall have been elected.

Const. 1849, Art. VI, Sec. 16.

SECTION 19. Judges shall not charge juries with respect to 119 169 matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law.

Const. 1849, Art. VI, Sec. 17.

A statement copied from Ram on Facts as to testimony of children, should not be given as an instruction to jury. Instruction given as to testimony of prosecutrix in case of rape approved. People v. Wessel, 98 Cal. 353.

The court properly refused to instruct that if the jury found that the prosecutrix in a seduction case had committed lewd or immodest acts, though not guilty of illicit intercourse, she was not then a woman of previous chaste character. Such instruction would have been charging upon matters of fact. People v. Samonset, 97 Cal. 448.

After making a statement of evidence, the court instructed the jury: "If these facts all appear to your minds as I have stated them, then your verdict will be for defendants." Held, not error. Jones v. Chalfant, 31 Pac. Rep. 257.

It is error for the trial court to charge a jury that, as a "general rule, the statements of the witnesses as to verbal admissions of a party should be received by the jury with great caution, as that kind of evidence is subject to much imperfection and mistake." Such conclusion being an inference of fact to be made by the jury from the peculiar circumstances of each particular case. Kaufman v. Maier, 94 Cal. 269. During a ruling upon the admissibility of certain evidence, the court said of defendant, in the presence of the jury, "she had contradicted herself several times in the record,' ," to which language defendant excepted. Whereupon the court reiterated the statement, adding, "that is the chief reason why I admit those letters in evidence." Held, the court should not have given its opinion to the jury that defendant had sworn falsely. People v. Willard, 92 Cal. 482.

A statement by the court of reasons for a ruling on evidence is not addressed to the jury, and if properly called forth by the offers of counsel, and contains

no reflection upon defendant, it is not improper. People v. McLean, 84 Cal. 481.

An instruction in which the court said, "My understanding was that that completed the contract," where the record shows that the court had just stated the materiality of the defendant's claim in evidence that the six hundred dollars was paid him as part of the purchase price, assumes the testimony of the party to that fact as true, and the court erred in instructing as to facts. Vulicevich v. Skinner, 77 Cal. 239. See also Hill v. Finigan, 77 Cal. 267.

Where the instruction declares that "the testimony in the case shows" certain facts which were prejudicial to defendant, the constitutional provision is violated. The People v. Casey, 65 Cal. 260.

Peo

The court may instruct that testimony has been introduced tending to prove a certain matter. ple v. Perry, 65 Cal. 568.

An instruction that "proof of the possession of property in the hands of defendant recently after the same property was stolen out of the shop of Vestal, unless the possession of the same is satisfactorily accounted for by the defendant, raises a presumption of guilt against the defendant," violates the constitutional provision_against charging the jury with respect to facts. People v. Mitchell, 55 Cal. 236.

An instruction that flight of a person accused of crime is a strong circumstance of guilt, is an instruction upon facts, as such presumption is not declared by law. People v. Wong Ah Ngow, 54 Cal. 151.

As to what is a proper occasion for giving the instruction relative to the testimony of an accomplice, under subdivision 4, section 2061, C. C. P.,(commenting on Kauffman v. Maier, 94 Cal. 282, and People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171.) People v. Bonney, 98 Cal. 278.

A judge cannot be too cautious in a criminal trial in avoiding al' interference with the conclusions of the jury upon the facts. (Approving, People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 147.) People v. Gordon, 88 Cal. 422, 427.

Further examples of improper instruction are given in People v. Chen Sing Wing, 88 Cal. 268, where it is

added: "This provision is violated whenever a judge so instructs as to force the jury to a particular conclusion upon the whole or any part of the case," etc., quoting from People v. Ybarra, 17 Cal. 171. When all the evidence in the case showed that the offense was committed in the night time, no error was committed by the court, saying the evidence as to a burglary showed it had been committed about three or four o'clock in the morning. People v. McGregar, 88 Cal. 140. And see People v. Murray, 86 Cal. 31; Low v. Warden, 77 Cal. 95; Wheaton v. Insurance Co., 76 Cal. 417, 428; People v. Phillips, 70 Cal. 61, 68; Weiderkind v. Tuolumne C. W. Co., 65 Cal. 431; People v. McDowell, 64 Cal., (dissenting opinion of Sharpstein, J.) 468; People v. Ah Oon et al., 56 Cal. 188, 193.

SECTION 20. The style of all process shall be, "The People of 118 483 the State of California," and all prosecutions shall be conducted in their name and by their authority.

Const. 1849, Art. VI, Sec. 18.

An order of arrest signed by the judge in compliance with section 483 C. C. P., is not a process to be issued in the name of the people, etc. Dusy v. Helm, 59 Cal. 188.

This provision was in the old constitution and has never been construed to apply to the warrant by which prisoners are held after conviction. A certified copy of the judgment is the only warrant or authority necessary to justify or require its execution. (Section 463 Criminal Practice Act, section 1213 Penal Code.) Ex parte Ahern, opinion filed July 25, 1894.

The district attorney in the prosecution of criminal cases, acts by the authority and in the name of the people of the state, though in other matters he may be largely under the control of and subordinate to the supervisors of the county. County of Modoc v. Spencer & Raker, opinion filed August 6, 1894.

SECTION 21. The justices shall appoint a reporter of the decisions of the Supreme Court, who shall hold his office and be removable at their pleasure. He shall receive an annual sal

ary not to exceed twenty-five hundred dollars, payable monthly.

There being no act in force providing for compensation of Supreme Court reporter between January 1 and July 1, 1880, it was competent for the legislature in 1883 to pass an act providing compensation for said officer during that period. Smith v. Dunn, 64 Cal. 164.

SECTION 22. No judge of a court of record shall practice law in any court of this state during his continuance in office.

SECTION 23. No one shall be eligible to the office of justice of the Supreme Court, or to the office of judge of a Superior Court, unless he shall have been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the state.

SECTION 24. No judge of a Superior Court nor of the Supreme Court shall, after the first day of July, one thousand eight hundred and eighty, be allowed to draw or receive any monthly salary unless he shall take and subscribe an affidavit before an officer entitled to administer oaths, that no cause in his court remains undecided that has been submitted for decision for the period of ninety days.

It is not intended by this section that a judge should forfeit his salary upon failure to decide all cases within ninety days, but it withholds the salary until cases submitted for ninety days have been decided. Meyers v. Kenfield, 62 Cal. 512.

ARTICLE VII.

PARDONING POWER.

SECTION 1. The governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, pardons, and commutations of sentence, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions, and with such restrictions and limitations as he may think proper, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons. Upon conviction for treason, the gov ernor shall have power to suspend the execution of the sen tence until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its next meeting, when the legislature shall either pardon, direct