act does not expressly declare the intention of the legislature to bar such punishment. People v. McNulty, 93 Cal, 427.

The city of Sacramento was incorporated by act of March 26, 1851, (Stats. p. 391) and provision was made that it might sue and be sued under its corporate name. Under provisions of acts of April 26, 1853, (Stats. p. 117) and act April 10, 1854, (Stats. p. 196) it issued bonds payable in 1874. Under subsequent incorporation act, May 1, 1858, (Stats. p. 267) the city and county were consolidated as successor of the city of Sacramento, and this act provided that such corporation should not be subject to suit, nor its property liable for debt. Again under act of April 25, 1863, (Stats. p. 415) the city was incorporated with the same boundaries as under the act of 1851, and provision made that it might be sued on any bond or contract thereafter made. Held, that the holder of bonds issued under acts of 1853 and 1854 might have sued the corporation at any time after the maturity of the bonds prior to such suit being barred by statute of limitations, and that the charter provisions to the effect that said corporation should not be subject to suit was void, so far as it attempted to affect said bonds, as impairing the obligation of contract. Bates v. Gregory, et al., 89 Cal. 387.

An act of the legislature affecting the change of remedy, or the time within which it must be sought does not impair the obligation of a contract, provided an adequate and available remedy be provided. So held in regard to the amendment of section 1187 C. C. P. passed March 15, 1887. Mill and Lumber Co. v. Olmstead, 85 Cal. 81.

The insolvent act of 1880 discharges debts contracted in 1878, and is not thus unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts. Porter v. Imus, 79 Cal. 183.

Prior to amendment of March, 1885, section 3785 of Political Code did not require notice by purchaser at tax sale, of his intention to apply for a deed. Held, the amendment applied to all applications for deeds after it took effect, and such notice must be given by

the holder of a tax sale certificate where the sale was made in February preceding the taking effect of the amendment. Said amendment did not impair the obligation of a contract. Oulahan v. Sweeney, 79 Cal. 537.

The provisions of the act of April 24,1858, (Stats. p. 267) re-incorporating the city and county of Sacramento, for refunding the debt, issuing bonds and providing a fund to be raised by taxation to pay the bonds became a contract between the corporation and purchasers of the bonds, which could not be in any manner impaired by subsequent legislation. Bates v. Porter, 74 Cal. 224.

The legislature cannot, by amending a city charter, authorize payment of claims of a contractor for street work, to other persons than the contractor, without his consent, and where such payments would not have been authorized by the law in force at the time the contract was entered into. McGee v. City of San Jose, 68 Cal. 91.

The contract for grading Montgomery avenue required that the work should be completed in sixty days. The time expired before the work was completed, and subsequently the board of supervisors extended the time for completion. The act of the legislature of March 19, 1878, (Stats. p. 341) to ratify and confirm certain orders and resolutions of the supervisors, including the order extending time, Held, unconstitutional. The legislature by a subsequent act cannot give force or vitality to a contract that is dead. Fanning v. Schammel, 68 Cal. 428.

The repeal of a city charter does not impair the obligation of a contract made under the provisions of the charter prior to the repeal. Myer v. Porter, 65 Cal. 67.

A mortgage was executed in 1879 to secure payment of a promissory note in three years, and contained no special covenant as to payment of taxes. After the adoption of the present constitution, the mortgagor paid taxes to the amount of three hundred and ninety-five dollars which had been assessed against the mortgage interest, and in 1883 paid the

mortgagee the full amount of note and interest,less the said taxes. In an action to foreclose the mortgage for the three hundred and ninety-five dollars, Held plaintiff could not recover. There was no contract impaired because there was no contract between the parties by which the mortgagor agreed to pay the taxes assessed under the new constitution. (McCoppin v. McCartney, 60 Cal. 371.) Hay v. Hill, 65 Cal. 383.

Section 325 C. C. P. as amended in 1878, and providing that adverse possession of land for five years is ineffectual to establish title unless it is also shown that the land has been occupied and claimed during that period continuously and that the claimant has paid all taxes, etc., is not retroactive, hence, in an action tried after the amendment, but where adverse possession for five years prior to the amendment was established, it was error to require proof of payment of taxes. Sharp v. Blankenship, 59 Cal. 288.

The act of March 26, 1851, (Stats. p. 307) known as the "Water Lot Act," and defining the line of the water front of San Francisco, did not create a contract between the state and owners of water front lots, in the sense of irrevocably establishing the line of water front. One asserting such contract rights must make out a clear case, free from all reasonable ambiguity, and bringing them fairly and fully within that clause of the federal constitution which prohibits a state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Floyd v. Blanding, 54 Cal. 41.

SECTION 17, [Art. I.] Foreigners of the white race, or of African descent, eligible to become citizens of the United States under the naturalization laws thereof, while bona fide residents of this state, shall have the same rights in respect to the acquisition, possession, enjoyment, transmission, and inheritance of all property, other than real estate, as native born citizens; provided, that such aliens owning real estate at the time of the adoption of this amendment may remain such owners; and provided further, that the legislature may, by statute, provide for the disposition of real estate which shall hereafter be acquired by such aliens by descent or devise. Amendment ratified at election Nov. 6, 1894.]

Section 671 C. C. provides: "Any person, whether citizen or alien, may take, hold, and dispose of property, real or personal, within this state, and section 672: “If a non-resident alien takes by succession he must appear and claim the property within five years," etc. Section 4 article IX of this constitution does not limit the power of the legislature to declare that aliens may be heirs. (Lyons v. State, 67 Cal. 380; People v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 160; Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427; same estate, 65 Cal. 593.) State v. Smith, 70 Cal. 153.

A non-resident alien may assign property in this state inherited by him, and the assignee is entitled to appear and claim the property. Carraseo v. State, 67 Cal. 385.

SECTION 18. Neither slavery nor involuntary se rvitude, unless for the punishment of crime, shall ever be tolerated in this state.

Const. 1849, Art. I, Sec. 18.

SECTION 19. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.

Const. 1849, Art. I, Sec. 19.

The legislature has power to authorize a person to be searched for lottery tickets. Sections 1523, 1524,

Penal Code. Collins v. Lean, 68 Cal. 284.

SECTION 20. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the evidence of two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court.

Const. 1849, Art. I, Sec. 20.

The word "convicted" as used in this constitution

and numerous sections of the codes means a finding that the accused is guilty, either by a verdict of a jury or by some other mode mentioned in section 689, Penal Code. Ex parte Brown, 68 Cal. 177.

SECTION 21. No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.

The sufficiency of a complaint in an action to recover taxes from a railroad company must be tested by the provisions of C. C. P., relating to pleadings, and not by sections 3668-3670 Political Code, which attempt to declare what will be a sufficient complaint for such purpose. See notes under subdivisions 3, 10, 13, 20, section 25, article IV. People v. C. P. R. R., 83 Cal. 393.

An ordinance of a board of supervisors purporting to levy license tax upon all sheep pastured in the county, but exempting therefrom those persons who list their sheep as taxable property in the county and pay taxes on them as such, is in effect a tax upon property although denominated a license tax on business, and is a discrimination against the property of the citizen of this state, which is not applied to others of his class, and grants an immunity to the same class of persons in the county adopting such ordinance which is not given to one falling within the provisions of the ordinance. The owner of the sheep pastured in one county, but upon which he pays taxes in another county where he resides, is discriminated against. Lassen Co. v. Cone, 72 Cal. 387.

An ordinance of the supervisors of Mono county imposing a license tax at the rate of fifty dollars per one thousand head of sheep upon the business of pasturing and herding sheep in that county, and declaring a violation of the ordinance a misdemeanor, held valid. Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365, distinguishing Lassen Co. v. Cone, supra.

An ordinance of the city of Modesto prohibiting