JOINT AND EQUAL

not treat a joint venture as identical with a partnership, it is so similar in its nature and in the contractual relationships created by such adventure that the rights as between themselves are governed practically by the same rules that govern partnerships. Goss v. Lanin, 170 Iowa 57.

JOINT AND EQUAL.

A direction that the subject of a gift shall "be distributed in joint and equal proportions" creates a tenancy in common. 2 Jarm. 257, citing Ettricke v. Ettricke, Amb. 656.

JOINT AND MUTUAL.

A will which is both joint and mutual is one executed jointly by two or more persons, the provisions of which are reciprocal, and which shows on its face that the devises are made one in consideration of the other. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 84.

JOINT COVENANT.

When the legal interest in a covenant and in the cause of action thereon is joint, the covenant is joint, although it may, in its terms, be several or joint and several. Capen v. Barrows, 1 Gray (Mass.) 379.

"No particular words are necessary to constitute a covenant of either kind [joint or several]. If two covenant generally for themselves, without any words of severance, or that they or one of them shall do such a thing, a joint charge is created; which shews the necessity of adding words of severalty where the covenantor's liability is to be confined to his own acts.'" Lord Halsbury, L. C., in White v. Tyndall, 13 App. Cas. 269, quoting Platt Covenants 117, and citing May v Woodward, Treem. 248; Robinson v. Walker, 1 Salk. 393.

JOINT LIABILITY.

"If several persons are jointly bound to perform a duty, they are jointly and severally liable for omitting to perform

JOINT STOCK COMPANY

or for performing it negligently. All persons who co-operate in an act directly causing injury are jointly liable for its consequences if they acted in concert, or united in causing a single injury, even though acting independent of each

other."

Consolidated Ice Machine Co. v. Keifer, 134 Ill. 481, citing 1 Shearm. & Redf. Neglig. § 122; Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596; Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen 31; Cooper v. E. T. Co., 75 N. Y. 116; 2 Thomp. Neglig. 1088; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Shacklet, 105 Ill. 364.

"The test seems to be, whether or not the negligence of each directly contributed in producing the injurious result." Consolidated Ice Machine Co. v. Keifer, 134 Ill. 481.

JOINT LIVES.

A gift to two or more for their "joint lives" and then over, will generally mean "for their joint lives and the lives or life of the survivors or survivor of them" and then over. Townley v. Bolton, 2 L. J. Ch. 25; 1 My. & K. 148; Smith v. Oakes, 14 Sim. 122; Moffat v. Burnie, 23 L. J. Ch. 591; Grant v. Winbolt, 23 L. J. Ch. 282.

JOINT STOCK COMPANY.

A joint stock company is defined in the text books to be "an association of individuals for purposes of profit, possessing a common capital, which is divided into shares, of which each member possesses one or more, and which are transferable by the owner. These associations, formed for business purposes, were at common law, and, as a general rule, still are considered merely as partnerships, and their rights and liabilities are in the main governed by the same rules and principles, which regulate commercial partnerships.” 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,-2d ed.,pp. 636, 637. While it is true, that many companies, called joint stock companies, have many of the essential characteristics of a corporation, yet there is a distinction between such companies and regularly organized corporations, so-called.

JOINT STOCK COMPANY

In 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,-2d ed., -p. 638, it is said: "In respect to their formation there is a broad distinction between a corporation, technically so called, which always owes its existence to the sovereign power of the state, and a joint stock company, which, being essentially a partnership, is brought into being by the contract of its members inter sese." In Robbins v. Butler, 24 Ill. 287, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Breese, said (p. 426): "These stock companies are nothing more than partnerships, and every member of the company is liable for the debts of the concern, no matter what the private arrangements among themselves may be, if they have not shifted their liability in the very mode pointed out in the articles of association." See also Pettis v. Atkins, 60 Ill. 454; Hodgson v. Baldwin, 65 Ill. 532. In Wadsworth v. Duncan, 164 Ill. 360, this court speaking through Mr. Justice Phillips, again said, endorsing the doctrine announced in Robbins v. Butler, supra, as follows: "The members of a joint stock association are partners, and each member is liable for the debts of the association, unless he has shifted his liability in the very mode pointed out in the articles of association." The People v. Rose, 219 Ill. 59, 60.

A joint stock company is an association of individuals possessing a common capital divided into shares, of which each member possesses one or more. These shares represent the interest of the members, and are transferable by the owners without the consent of the other members or the creditors of the association. Kossakowski v. The People, 177 Ill. 568.

Associations known as "joint stock companies," though unincorporated, have many features in common with corporations and for this reason have sometimes been called quasi corporations. Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 119.

A joint stock company is defined as an association of individuals for purposes of profit, possessing a common capital contributed by the members and commonly divided into shares of which each member possesses one or more which are

JOINT TENANCY

transferrable. Moore v. Hillsdale County Telephone Co., 171 Mich. 388.

Stock issued by a club incorporated under Mich. H. S., ch. 188, for yachting, etc., purposes, is not subject to levy and sale on execution under H. S. 7697, authorizing levy, etc., on shares of a bank, insurance or other joint stock company. Lyon v. Denison, 80 M. 371.

"Joint stock companies in modern times are nothing but commercial partnerships, which have taken the form of corporations for the greater facility of transacting business and to prevent a dissolution of the concern by those numerous events which are so liable to work a dissolution in a partnership composed of a great number of individuals." Fougeray v. Card, 50 N. J. Eq. 200, quoting Pratt v. Pratt, 33 Conn. 446.

JOINT TENANCY.

A joint tenancy is where two or more persons have any subject of property, jointly, in which there is unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time and unity of possession. 2 Blackstone's Com. 180. At common law a grant or devise to two or more persons without limitations created a joint tenancy. Aveling v. Knipe, 19 Ves. 441; Freeman on Co-tenancy, sec. 118. Words or circumstances of negation were necessary to avoid this result. The chief characteristic of joint estates is the doctrine of survivorship. Blackstone's Com. 184. The doctrine of survivorship is not in accordance with the genius of our institutions, hence this incident of estates has been generally abolished in the United States except in a few instances, and in those jurisdictions where joint estates are still recognized they are very much restricted by statutes. Burnett v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 557; Warvelle On Abstracts of Title, sec. 247; Gaunt v. Stevens, 241 Ill. 546, 547.

2

JOINT WILL

tenancy and tenancy in common the only similarity that exists is, therefore, the unity of possession. A tenant in common is, as to his own individual share, precisely in the position of the owner of an entire and separate estate. Mittel v. Karl, 133 Ill. 69.

"The distinguishing feature of joint tenancy is the right of the survivor to take the whole estate." Melte v. Feltgen, 148 Ill. 371.

Where husband and wife are tenants by entireties, a decree absolute of divorce makes them joint tenants they ceasing to be one person-and the woman is entitled to an account of rents and profits as from the date of the decree. Thornley v. Thornley (1893), 2 Ch. 229.

A joint tenancy is not confined to real estate but may exist in personal property. Erwin v. Felter, 283 Ill. 36.

JOINT WILL.

Mu

A joint will contained in a single instrument is the will of each of the makers, and at the death of one may be probated as his will and be again probated at the death of the other as the will of the latter. Wills may be joint or mutual or both joint and mutual. A joint will is one where the same instrument is made the will of two or more persons and is jointly signed by them. It is not necessarily either mutual or reciprocal. tual wills may be defined as the separate wills of two persons which are reciprocal in their provisions. A will that is both joint and mutual is one executed jointly by two or more persons, the provisions of which are reciprocal, and which shows on its face that the devises are made one in consideration of the other. These several classes of wills have some characteristics that distinguish them one from the other. A joint will which is not reciprocal is simply the individual personal will of each of the persons signing the same and is subject to the same rules that would apply if the will were several. Mutual wills, that is, where two persons execute wills reciprocal in their provisions but separate instruments,-may or may

JOINT WILL

not be revocable at the pleasure of either party, according to the circumstances and understanding upon which they were executed. To deprive either party of the right to revoke such mutual will it is necessary to prove, by clear and satisfactory evidence, that such wills were executed in pursuance of a contract or a compact between the parties, and that each is the consideration for the other; and even in cases where mutual wills have been executed in pursuance of a compact or agreement between the parties, the law appears to be well settled that either party may, during the lifetime of both, withdraw from the compact and revoke the will as to him. A joint and mutual will is revocable during the joint lives of either party, so far as relates to his own disposition, upon giving notice to the other, but it becomes irrevocable after the death of one of them if the survivor takes advantage of the provision made by the other. 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 621, and cases cited; 1 Redfield on Wills, 182, 183; Walpole v. Orford, 3 Ves. Jr. 402; Schouler on Wills, sec. 455, et seq.

When mutual or joint wills first came up for consideration, the courts of England, both common law and spiritual, pronounced against them, and the same unfavorable position was taken by some of the earlier American cases, but the later and better opinions in both countries now sustain such wills where they have been executed with the necessary formalities and have not been revoked by some later instrument. Schouler on Wills, 456, and cases there cited. The leading case in England on this subject is Dufour v. Pereira, 1 Dick. 419. In that case it was held that a joint and mutual will might be revoked by both jointly or that it might be revoked separately, provided the party intending it had given notice to the other of such revocation, but that neither of them could, during their joint lives, revoke it secretly, nor could it be done by the survivor after the death of the other; that such wills constituted a mutual contract between the parties which could not be rescinded by the survivor after the death of one, on the theory that

JOINTLY

the first that dies carries his part of the contract into execution. In such a case the courts will not permit the other party to afterward break the contract. The doctrine of this case has been approved in a number of well considered cases in this country. Allen v. Boomer, 86 Wis. 364; Edson v. Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555; Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76; Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289; Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 84, 85.

JOINTLY.

The word "jointly," found in the devise, cannot be accepted as sufficient to show, clearly and explicitly, that the testator intended that the estate devised should possess the attribute of survivorship. Tenants in common or coparceners hold the estate "jointly" until a severance is effected. Davis v. Smith, 4 Harr. 68; Billingslea v. Baldwin, 23 Md. 115. It is entirely consistent with the use made by the testator of this word "jointly" to construe it as indicating only an intent to devise the estate to both devisees, and as it cannot be construed to declare, explicitly and clearly, the intent that the estate, as an entirety, should inure to the survivor of the devisees, it cannot avail to take the devise out of the operation of the statute. The statute must be given effect and the estate devised declared to be an estate in tenancy in common. Mustain v. Gardner, 203 Ill. 286, 287.

A gift to two or more "jointly and between them" is a tenancy in common. Perkins v. Baynton, 1 Bro. C. C. 118; Richardson v. Richardson, 14 Sim. 526.

JOINTURE.

"What is a jointure? I think according to the common acceptation of the word both popularly and by legal writers, it means a provision made for the wife after the death of the husband. *

In 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 137, there is this statement: 'A jointure, which strictly speaking signifies a joint estate, limited to both husband and wife, but in common acceptation extends also

JUDGE

to a sole estate, limited to the wife only, is thus defined by Sir Edward Coke,-"a competent lively-hood of freehold for the wife, of lands and tenements; to take effect, in profit or possession, presently after the death of the husband; for the life of the wife at least." The same definition is to be found in 2 Bacon's Abridgment, 744." Stirling, J. in In re De Hoghton (1896) 2 Ch. 392, citing also Co. Litt. 36b; Burton Compend. 8th ed., 125; Sugd. Powers, 8th ed. 484.

JOS.

A public officer appointed to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice; the chief member of a court, charged with the control of its proceedings and the decision of questions of law or discretion. Moline v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 262 Ill. 56.

The tangible, living oracle of the court, who speaks and acts for it, and is in law its only accredited agent. Bowman v. Venice, etc., R. Co., 102 Ill. 459; .U. S.. etc., Co. v. Shattuck, 57 Ill. App. 385.

A person whose office is to administer justice in courts held for that purpose, a public officer authorized by law to hear and determine causes and who holds courts statedly for that purpose. Foot v. Stiles, 57 N. Y. 405.

JUDGE OF INFERIOR COURT OF RECORD

A judge is a public officer, lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. Lawyees Tax Cases, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 650.

"Judge" [as used in an act declaring that the 'court or judge' shall declare, etc.] must mean one who in himself constitutes the court, and not a judge sitting at Nisi Prius." Bramwell, B., Wilson v. Hood (1864), 3 H. & C. 152.

Justices of the Peace.

Justices of the peace are judges in the legal sense of the word, having power to decide upon the rights of others by authority of law; and the place in which a justice exercises his power by adjudicating and deciding as a justice is a court. 3 Bl. Com. 23; The People v. Wilson, 15 Ill. 391.

JUDGE OF AN INFERIOR COURT OF RECORD.

The judge of a city court is a "judge of an inferior court of record" within the meaning of section 5 of the Fees and Salaries Act. Wolf v. Hope, 210 III. 65.

JUDGE OF ANY COURT.

The word "judge," used in section 11 of article 5 of the Constitution of 1848, prescribing the qualifications for a "judge of any court in this state," is used in a restricted sense, and does not include all who may properly be called judges of courts in this state, as, for example, the recorder of the city of Chicago, and includes only such as are made judges, or recognized as such by the Constitution. People v. Wilson, 15 Ill. 391.

JUDGE OR COURT.

It was not the intention of the Eminent Domain Act, by the use in several of its sections of the expression "judge or court," to provide two tribunals for the hearing of condemnation cases, one the judge, sitting as an individual, and the other the court, as a judicial tribunal, so that a petition under the act should be made returnable to the court. Hartshorn

At common law a judgment was defined as the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the record. 3 Blackstone's Com. 395. Freeman, in his work on Judgments, after mentioning the fact that the authorities were not all in harmony, says: "I think that from the cases this general statement may be safely made: That whatever appears upon its face to be intended as the entry of a judgment will be regarded as sufficiently formal if it shows (1) the relief granted, and (2) that the grant was made by the court in whose record the entry is written. In specifying the relief granted, the parties against and to whom it is given must, of course, be sufficiently identified." 1 Freeman on Judgments,-4th ed.,-sec. 50. This court has said that no particular form is required in proceedings in court in order to constitute a judgment. Wells v. Hogan, Breese 337; Foster v. Jared, 12 Ill. 451; Minkhart v. Hankler, 19 Ill. 47; Faulk v. Kellums, 54 Ill. 188; City of Alton v. Heidrick, 248 Ill. 76; Stein v. Meyers, 253 Ill. 218, 219.

A judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the rights of the parties. Ambler v. Whipple, 139 Ill. 318.

A judgment is a judicial sentence or decision and not a creature of legislative enactment. Fulton County v. Boyer, 116 Ill. App. 390.

The conclusion of law upon facts found, or admitted by the parties, or upon their default in the course of the suit. Magruder, J., dissenting opinion Siddall v. Jansen, 143 Ill. 548.

A debt of record created by operation of law, in which the original demand, whether evidenced by oral testimony or specialty, is merged. Woodworth Paine, 1 Ill. 376.

V.

It is only the finding by a court, that one person owes another a certain specified sum of money, and a sentence that it