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be collected from the debtor. Runnamaker, use, etc. v. Cordray, 54 Ill. 305.

"In Blackstone's Com. vol. 3, p. 395 it is said: 'Judgments are the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the record.' And at page 396 it is added, that a judgment 'is the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law and fact.' This is the definition given in Jacob's Law Dictionary. 2 Tidd's Practice at p. 841 says: 'Judgment is the conclusion of law, upon the facts found or admitted by the parties. It is an adjudication of the right of the parties in respect to the claim involved.'" Gould v. Hayes, 71 Conn. 93 (1898) quoting McNulty v. Hurd, 72 N. Y. 518, 521.

A judgment in its legal acceptation is the determination of some judicial tribunal created by law for the administration of public justice according to law, and is in strictness the determination of the law. Blood v. Bates, 31 Vermont 150.

A judgment is an adjudication of the rights of the parties in respect to the claim involved. McNulty v. Hurd, 72 N. Y. 521.

A judgment is the decision or sentence of the law, given by a court of justice, as the result of proceedings instituted for the redress of injury. Blaikie v. Griswold, 10 Wis. 241.

A judgment is the sentence of the law pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, as the result of proceedings ininstituted. Cooper v. Am. Central Inc. Co., 3 Colorado 321.

The conclusion of the law upon facts found or admitted by the parties. Thompson v. People, 23 Wend. N. Y. 587.

The remedy prescribed by the law, for the redress of injuries, the suit or action being the vehicle or means of administering such remedy. Zeigler v. Vance, 3 Iowa 530.

A judgment is a final decision, entered of record, in a book of judgments, under the signature of a judge. Evans v. Adams, 3 Green (N. J.) 383.

A judgment is the final and definite sentence or decision of the court by which the merits of a cause are settled

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or determined. Judge v. Powers, 156 Ia. 251.

The judgment in an action is the final determination of the rights of the parties. Lewis v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 97 Wis. 368.

Essentials.

It is of the essence of a judgment, conclusive as to any given question, that there shall be both jurisdiction and an actual decision of the question. Kamp v. The People, 141 Ill. 16.

Time as of Which Rendered.

A judgment is the sentence of the law declared by the court; it is an act done, and presumably, entered instanti. Ordinarily, the law does not take note of fractions of a day; judgments are therefore recorded as entered upon a certain day; and there is neither authority for, nor propriety in rendering one and the same judgment in the same cause upon two distinct days. At the common law all judgments related to, and were considered as entered upon the first day of the term, and the lien thereof dated from said first day; by the statute of this state, sec. 1, chap. 77, a judgment is a lien on real estate from the time when it is rendered; there being no priority, as to lien, among judgments rendered at the same term. Baldwin v. McClelland, 50 Ill. App. 658.

As Dependent Upon Court of Rendition.

While usually the word judgment denotes the determination of an action by a court of law, yet in a large sense it embraces the decision of any court. Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Webster's Dictionary; In the matter of Negus, 10 Wend. 34; In re Road, 103 Pa. St. 250; Patterson v. Scott, 33 Ill. App. 349.

In Rem.

A judgment or sentence upon or against a thing, determining its status or condition, ipso facto rendering it what the judgment declares it to be. In re Will of Storey, 20 Ill. App. 190.

Non Obstante Veredicto.

A motion for judgment non obstante veredicto can not be allowed when pre

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sented by the defendant. It is a privilege given solely to the plaintiff. "Judgment of non obstante veredicto is a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff without regard to the verdict obtained by the defendant." Bouv. L. Dic., title Judgment; Teehan v. Union Bridge Co., 84 Ill. App. 532; Shinn's Practice, sec. 984; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. White, 110 Ill. App. 27.

"When a plea confesses the action and does not sufficiently avoid it, judgment shall be given on the confession, without regard to a verdict for the defendant, which is called a judgment non obstante veredicto, and in such case a writ of inquiry shall issue." 2 Tidd's Practice, 920; Gauch v. Harrison, 12 Ill. App. 460.

"At common law a judgment non obstante veredicto could be entered only when the plea confessed the cause of action and set up matters in avoidance which were insufficient, although found true, to constitute either a defense or a bar to the action. In such a case the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in his favor, notwithstanding a verdict for the defendant." 11 Ency. of Pleading and Practice, p. 912, and authorities there cited; 2 Tidd's Practice, 920. In Walker v. Scott, 106 N. Car. 56, 62, it is held: "The granting judgment non obstante veredicto, is very restricted and is confined to cases where the plea confesses a cause of action and the matter relied on in avoidance is insufficient, and where the plea may be treated as a sham plea." Aldrich v. Mathias, 141 Ill. App. 591.

Nunc Pro Tunc.

In Black on Judgments, vol. 1, section 133, the author says: "The rule that a judgment may be entered nunc pro tunc, when such action is necessary in order to save a party from being unjustly prejudiced by a delay caused by the act of the court in course of legal procedure, must be taken with an important restriction, viz., that such an entry is not proper unless the case was in such a condition, at the date to which the judgment is to relate back, that a final judgment could then have been entered immediately. As it has been said, 'A judgment nunc pro tunc in case of death is proper only when

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a party dies after hearing while the case is under advisement or after the case has proceeded so far that judgment can be entered, if not as a merely formal act, at least without the need of further inquiry or evidence into matters of fact involved in the controversy.'" Hazard v. Durant, 14 R. I. 25; McReynolds v. Brown, 121 Ill. App. 265, 266.

By Default.

A judgment by default is correct form only where there has been no appearance. It is a judgment in default of appearance. Fanning v. Russell, 94 Ill. 386. These forms, however, are technical, and the failure to observe them produces mere irregularities, and seldom become harmful errors, for which a judgment should be reversed. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Bozarth, 91 Ill. App. 73.

De Bene Esse.

A partial or annual account of an administrator is only a judgment de bene esse, often rendered ex parte, and only prima facie correct. Marshall v. Coleman, 187 Ill. 569.

Distinguished from Order.

"Lord Justice Cotton in a case of Ex parte Chinery (12 Q. B. D. 342, 345) says: 'in legal language, and in acts of Parliament, as well as with regard to the rights of the parties, there is a well-known distinction between a "judgment" and an "order." No doubt the orders under the Judicature Act provide that every order may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment, but still judgments and orders are kept entirely distinct. It is not said that the word "judgment" shall in other acts of Parliament include an "order." That is exactly in point. As the Lord Justice points out, the orders under the Judicature acts are merely our own domestic orders. They cannot of course affect the courts of [any other country]." North, J. in In re Howe Machine Co., 41 Ch. D. 123.

Criminal Case.

The time when a sheriff shall execute the sentence of the court is not an essen

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tial part of the judgment in a criminal case, and the judgment is not erroneous if no time is fixed for such execution of sentence. Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 477.

As applied to a criminal case a judgment is the formal and final pronouncement of the court by which the prosecution is brought to an end, leaving nothing to be done except to carry such judgment into execution in case there has been a conviction. State v. Hortman, 122 Iowa 104.

As an Estoppel.

There is a well founded distinction, laid down in the books, between "the effect of a judgment, as a bar or estoppel, against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or cause of action, and its effect, as an estoppel in another suit, between the same parties, upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action concluding parties, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or point controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Riverside Co. v. Townshend, 120 Ill. 18.

It is well settled by the decisions of the supreme court of the United States and of this court, that, where a former adjudication is relied upon as an absolute bar, there must be, as between the actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. But it is

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also well settled that, when the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue, or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. Theological Seminary v. The People, 189 Ill. 443.

As a Contract.

In Bidleson v. Whytel, 3 Burrow's Rep., 1545-48, it was decided in an opinion delivered by Lord Mansfield that "a judgment is no contract, nor can be considered in the light of a contract; for judicium redditur in invitum." Following that decision, the supreme court of this state, in the early case of Williams v. Waldo, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 264, 269, said: "A decree or judgment at law is not a contract. Contracts are made between the willing; decrees judgment and are rendered against the unwilling, and they extinguish the contract."

In Rae v. Hulbert, 17 Ill. 572, the question arose, under the provisions of an existing statute providing that a defendant "in any action brought upon any contract or agreement, either express or implied, having claims or demands against the plaintiff, may set up the same and have them allowed him upon the trial," whether a judgment could be set off by the defendant in an action against him, and it was held that it could not be. The court said (p. 579): "We cannot agree with counsel that a judgment is a contract, within the meaning of the statute. It is the conclusion of the law upon the rights of the parties, and it is not very common that it is entered up by the agreement of the unsuccessful party, but the reverse is generally the case. A judgment is no more a contract than is a tort. In one sense it is true that every member of society impliedly agrees to pay all judgments which may be regularly rendered against him; and, in the same sense, does he impliedly agree to make amends for all torts which he may commit." Brown v. Gerson et al., 182 Ill. App. 185.

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Allowance of Claim Against Estate.

The allowance of a claim against the estate of a decedent is a judgment conclusive upon the creditors and all other parties, so far as the personal property is concerned. Ford v. First, etc., Bank, 201 Ill. 128.

Recognizance.

A recognizance is considered a judgment. Shattuck v. People, 5 Ill. 483.

A recognizance, when forfeited, is made absolute and has all the force and effect of a judgment. Young, J., dissenting opinion Shattuck v. People, 5 Ill. 482.

Debt.

A judgment which is evidenced by matter of record. Cohen v. Toy, etc., Co., 172 Ill. App. 345.

Roll.

The record of a judgment, at common law, was known as the "judgment roll," and included the pleadings, process, as "signing judgment." Vail v. Inglehart, 69 Ill. 334.

The term "judgment roll" is applicable to civil causes only, and no fees therefor can be charged by the clerk on removal of a criminal case to another county. Green Lake Co. v. Waupaca Co., 113 Wis. 425.

Rendition.

The rendition of a judgment is the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law upon the facts in controversy as ascertained by the pleadings and verdict. Phelps v. Hunter, 195 Ill. App. 181.

Entry.

The entry of a judgment is a ministerial act which consists in spreading it upon the record or writing it at large in a docket or other official book. Phelps v. Hunter, 195 Ill. App. 182.

Where the entry of the clerk does not state, by implication even, that it was found, ordered, considered, or adjudged by the court that the one or the other party should have or recover anything of the other, or does not state by whose or

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by what authority a judgment was rendered, or fails to state in whose favor or against whom it was rendered, and does not award an execution, such an entry is not a sufficient judgment. Metzger v. Morley, 184 Ill. 84.

Clerk's Minutes.

Minutes made by a clerk of the order of the court to enter a judgment are not of themselves the judgment. Abramowitz v. Langknecht, 195 Ill. App. 489.

Judge's Minutes.

The announcement of the court or the judge's minutes are no part of the judgment proper, and cannot be so considered; they merely serve as indicators for the correct recording of the judgment and sentence in the record by the clerk. The People v. Lee, 185 Ill. App. 454.

In Accordance with Award.

A judgment of the circuit court "in accordance" with the award of the Industrial Accident Board, under the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act, Part III, § 13, How. 2nd Ed., § 3981, means that it should recite and follow the award. Brown v. George A. Fuller Co., 193 Mich. 214.

When Effective.

While the final order or decree of a court of chancery does not become effective until it is prepared by the solicitor of the party in whose favor it is announced, approved by the chancellor and filed with the clerk (Horn v. Horn, 234 Ill. 268; Cameron v. Clinton, 259 Ill. 599), an entirely different rule has always prevailed with reference to judgments rendered by a court of law. A judgment at law being, as defined by Blackstone, "the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the record," becomes effective as soon as it is pronounced by the court, and the duty at once devolves upon the clerk to enter the judgment, as pronounced by the court, upon the records of the court. contemplation of law the clerk performs this duty at once, but in actual practice the judge makes a memorandum of the

In

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en

a

judgment pronounced upon his docket and the clerk from this memorandum afterwards enters the judgment, and it frequently happens that the clerk does not enter the judgment upon the records until several days after it has been pronounced. In every such instance, however, the judgment dates from the time it was pronounced by the court, and not necessarily from the time it was tered upon the records by the clerk. The following from Black on Judgments (sec. 106) is generally regarded as correct exposition of the law in such cases: "In the nature of things a judgment must be rendered before it can be entered; and not only that, but though the judgment be not entered at all, still The it is none the less a judgment. omission to enter it does not destroy it, nor does its vitality remain in abeyance until it is put upon the record. The entry may be supplied, perhaps after the lapse of years, by an order nunc pro tunc. But it must not be supposed that this proceeding is required to give existence and force, by retrospection, to that which before had none. There are certain purposes, however, for which a judgment is required to be duly entered before it can become available or be attended by its usual incidents. Thus, as above remarked, this is a prerequisite to the right to appeal.

And so a judgment must commonly be docketed before it can create a lien upon land, and in some of the states (though not all) the priority among different liens is determined by their respective dates of docketing. And again, the record entry of a judgment is indispensable to furnish the evidence of it, when it is made the basis of a claim or defense in another court. But with these exceptions a judgment is independent of the fact of its entry." Chicago G. W. R. R. v. Ashelford, 268 Ill. 91, 92.

Of Sale for Taxes.

Section 191 of the Revenue Act provides that the court shall give judgment for such taxes and special assessments as shall appear to be due, and it is to be a judgment against the tracts or lots of land for the sum annexed to each, and the

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court is to direct the clerk to make out and enter an order for the sale of such real property, substantially in the form given in that section. The judgment in this case is as follows: "And thereupon it is ordered that judgment of sale be and is hereby entered against the property of said objectors in favor of the people of the state of Illinois, and it is further ordered that the property of said objector be sold as the law directs, to satisfy the amount of said judgment." This is nothing more than an order of sale, which does not conform to the requirements of the statute. It is not a judgment, as required by the law to be entered. Gage v. People, 163 Ill. 39; McChesney v. People, 171 III. 267; McChesney v. The People, 174 Ill. 51.

It

To constitute a valid judgment both the amount of the tax and a description of the property to be sold must be made certain by the judgment, either by being set forth in the judgment or by reference to other papers and records in the case by which the same can be made certain. has repeatedly been held that one of the essential requisites of such judgment is that it show the amount of the judgment, and that a judgment failing to show the amount of tax or special assessment is fatally defective. People v. Chicago Title & Tr. Co., 266 III. 227.

A "judgment for sale" under the Revenue Act for whatever is due is not a judgment for a definite and fixed amount, the statute contemplating a judgment against the property and an order for the sale of the same to satisfy the judgment, and the entry of such a judgment is rather an order for the enforcement of a judgment than the judgment itself. Gage v. People, 205 Ill. 551.