aldermen of the city of Boston in relation to the administration of police and the appointment of watchmen and policemen in said city should be vested in the board of police commissioners.

Thus, it becomes the duty of the police commissioner to have charge of and direct the activities of the police of the city of Boston in the maintenance of order and in the enforcement of law, and to perform such other duties as are imposed upon him by the statute by which the office was created. By the provisions of that statute the salary of the police commissioner is established, and, subject to the approval of the Governor and Council, he is to be provided with rooms, suitably furnished, and convenient and suitable for the performance of his duties, the expense of which is to be borne by the city of Boston. He is also authorized to employ such clerks, stenographers and other employees as he may deem necessary for the proper performance of the duties of his office, and to appoint, establish and organize the police of said city, and to make all needful rules and regulations for its efficiency, subject only to the provision that he shall not appoint a greater number of police than the number authorized at the time of the passage of the act, nor change the compensation of such police except with the approval of the mayor: provided, however, that he is authorized, without such approval, to fix the salary of the police superintendent, which shall not exceed five thousand dollars per annum. There is no intimation in said statute that the police commissioner is to be in any way subject to the direction or control of the city council or the mayor in the performance of his duties.

I think it plain from the provisions of the statute creating the office and defining the duties of the Police Commissioner that he is a State official, responsible only to the Governor and to the Legislature, and that only by statute can additional duties be imposed or conferred upon him. Furthermore, it is my opinion that he is not warranted in assuming any duties other than those imposed upon him by statute.

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that it is beyond the power of the city council of Boston to impose any duties upon you other than those which incidentally arise from the responsibility that you are under to enforce the law, which necessarily includes the enforcement of valid ordinances to which penalties are attached.

Yours very truly,

HENRY C. ATTWILL, Attorney-General.

Bureau of Statistics - Certification of Town Notes - Repairs. Cities and towns are prohibited by law from issuing notes in payment for work in a schoolhouse unless it is for an addition to the building which increases its floor space.

Mr. GEORGE A. BACON, Director, Bureau of Statistics.

SEPT. 3, 1919.

DEAR SIR: You have requested an opinion as to your authority to certify notes of the town of Provincetown under the following article and vote:

To act upon the report of the committee appointed at the last annual town meeting to consider the matter of heating and ventilating the Governor Bradford Schoolhouse.

It was voted that the report of the committee recommending an appropriation of $6,000 be accepted.

It was voted that $2,000 of this money be paid in 1920, $2,000 in 1921 and $2,000 in 1922.

The report of the committee referred to in said vote shows that no work was contemplated except to make changes in sanitary conditions, heating and ventilation. The report does not refer to any addition to the building, although it is contended that additional floor space would be secured by reason of the changes in equipment.

The laws on municipal indebtedness are found in St. 1913, c. 719. Clause 4 of section 5 of said chapter 719, which applies to the case at hand, reads as follows:

Cities and towns may incur debt, within the limit of indebtedness prescribed in this act, for the following purposes, and payable within the periods hereinafter specified:

(4) For the construction of additions to schoolhouses or buildings to be used for any municipal purpose, including the cost of original equipment and furnishings, where such additions increase the floor space of said buildings to which such additions are made, twenty years.

It would appear that neither an addition to a municipal building nor an increase in floor space in such building, alone, comes within the provisions of the statute, but that there must be an addition as well as an increased floor space in order to come within the provisions of the law. This statute was obviously enacted in an attempt to prevent increasing town

debts for incidental or ordinary expenses, such as alterations and repairs, it evidently being deemed to be sound business policy to pay for such expenses out of the tax levy. This might possibly be accomplished by other language which would permit changes in equipment of an expensive or unusual nature, but in case language in the statute of a more general character were used, the purpose of the law might more easily be defeated. The Legislature having specifically expressed that additions are essential in order to entitle a town to the provisions of the "borrowing statute," it is my opinion that you may not properly certify the notes in question.

Very truly yours,

HENRY A. WYMAN, Attorney-General.

City of Boston

Mayor

Police Commissioner

- Police. St. 1885, c. 323, § 6, is still in force and applicable to the Police Commissioner for the city of Boston. In case of action by the mayor under its provisions, the internal administration and personnel of the police force remain solely under the direction and control of the Commissioner.

The mayor of Boston has no authority to direct the reinstatement of any police officer removed by the Commissioner.

Under the provisions of Gen. St. 1919, c. 150, a war veteran is eligible to appointment to the police force of the city of Boston if he is a resident of this Commonwealth.

SEPT. 11, 1919.

Hon. EDWIN U. CURTIS, Police Commissioner for the City of Boston.

DEAR SIR: I have your letter requesting my opinion upon certain questions of law, and in reply thereto I beg to submit the following opinion.

In answer to your first inquiry, namely, whether the provisions of St. 1885, c. 323, § 6, are in force and applicable to the Police Commissioner, I am of the opinion that they are still in force and applicable to the Police Commissioner.

Your second question is whether the powers of the mayor and the duties of the Police Commissioner, as provided by St. 1885, c. 323, § 6, empower the mayor to control, direct or provide for the internal administration of the police force or its personnel under established regulations. In reply to this question I beg to advise you that in my opinion the internal administration of the police force of the city of Boston and its personnel remain under the control and direction of the Police

Commissioner alone, in case of action by the mayor under authority of this statute.

In reply to your further specific question as to whether the mayor may direct the reinstatement of officers removed from the police force by the Commissioner, in accordance with existing rules and regulations of the police department, I am of opinion that the mayor is without power to direct such reinstatement.

You ask my opinion as to whether, under the provisions of Gen. St. 1919, c. 150, a veteran, to be eligible for appointment to the police force of the city of Boston, must be a resident of that city, or whether he may be so appointed if a resident of the Commonwealth. I am of opinion that it is not necessary, in order for a veteran to be eligible for such appointment, that he be a resident of said city, but that it is sufficient if he is a resident of this Commonwealth.

In my opinion, your last request presents a question of fact which, in the first instance, at least, is to be determined by

you.

Very truly yours,

HENRY A. WYMAN, Attorney-General.

Constitutional Law - Right to withdraw Petition for Referendum. A completed petition for a referendum on Gen. St. 1919, c. 116, after it has been filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth cannot be withdrawn by one of its signers.

SEPT. 16, 1919.

Hon. ALBERT P. LANGTRY, Secretary of the Commonwealth.

DEAR SIR: You have requested my opinion upon the question of whether a petition asking for a referendum on Gen. St. 1919, c. 116, and requesting that the operation of such law be suspended, may now be withdrawn by one of the signers of such petition.

It appears from your communication and a copy of a letter which you enclosed there with that this petition has been completed by filing at your office the signatures of not less than 15,000 qualified voters within the time prescribed by the Constitution. The filing of these signatures had the effect of suspending the operation of this law, and made it the duty of the Secretary of the Commonwealth to submit the law to the people at the next State election. There is no provision in our

Constitution which provides for the withdrawal of a referendum petition after it has been completed, except where the law on which a referendum is asked has been repealed. The law under consideration, while it was modified in some respects by chapter 326 of the General Acts of the present year, has not been repealed.

Accordingly, I beg to advise that the answer to your question must be in the negative.

Very truly yours,

HENRY A. WYMAN, Attorney-General.

Fish and Game Laws

· Conviction for Violation
of Certificate.

Surrender

Under Gen. St. 1819, c. 296, § 12, the imposition of a fine on a plea of nolo contendere constitutes a conviction.

The filing of a case, with or without costs, upon a plea of nolo contendere, or upon a plea of guilty, or while an appeal from a conviction in a lower court is pending, does not constitute a conviction within the meaning of said statute.

SEPT. 22, 1919.

Mr. WILLIAM C. ADAMS, Chairman, Commissioners on Fisheries and Game. DEAR SIR: You request my opinion as to the interpretation of Gen. St. 1919, c. 296, § 12.

This section reads, in part, as follows:

The certificate of any person who shall be convicted of a violation of any of the fish and game laws or of any provision of this act shall be void, and his certificate shall immediately be surrendered to the officer who secures such conviction, and the officer shall forthwith forward the same to the commissioners, who shall cancel it and notify the clerk in whose city or town the certificate was recorded, of its cancellation; and no person shall be entitled to receive a certificate during the period of one year after the date of such conviction. A certificate issued to any person within one year after such a conviction shall be void, and shall be surrendered on demand of any officer authorized to enforce the fish and game laws.

The specific questions upon which you request my opinion are whether the following sets of facts amount to convictions, within the meaning of the law above quoted. The situations stated by you are as follows: