eral F. V. Greene, U. S. V., on July 17, and a third under Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., with which came Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., the commander of the Department of the Pacific, on July 25. A camp was established on the beach south of Manila, near the present polo grounds. As the water was shallow and the position within easy range of the Spanish guns in Fort Antonio de Abad, it was necessary to land the troops from the transports by means of cascos and steam launches. The Spanish guns, overawed by the guns of the fleet, remained quiet as the American soldiers waded ashore and went into camp, preparatory to marching against the defenses.

The camp, which was large enough to care for about five thousand men, covered practically all the land in the vicinity that during the rainy season was above the level of the rice swamps. Here the troops remained for twenty-six wet and weary days while the chiefs were arranging the stage for the battle of Manila.

It was the rainy season, and nothing but the inherent good temper and patience of the intelligent American soldier made the life endurable. Granted the privilege of grumbling and explaining the shortcomings of those in authority to his comrades and the folks at home, he could manage to await the course of events. But he had traveled ten thousand miles for the purpose of fighting the Spaniards and could not quite see why there should now be so much delay. True, there were not more than four thousand troops in camp, and in front of them were thirteen thousand perfectly-armed and equipped Spanish troops, protected by ancient but massive fortifications of the Vauban type surrounded by almost impassable moats. There was also a line

Infantry, two Batteries Utah Light Artillery, and twenty-eight men from the Regular Engineers, in all three thousand five hundred men. Of these the China carried thirteen hundred, the Senate about nine hundred, and the Zealand and Colon about seven hundred each.

The third expedition, under the command of Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur consisted of one hundred ninety-seven officers and four thousand six hundred fifty men.

of Spanish blockhouses and trenches on a semicircle which enclosed the various villages which clustered about the city.

Just outside of the Spanish lines the insurgents had taken possession of all the roads and connected them by small trenches, in which they had a fluctuating force of about ten thousand men. Between the American camp and the city of Manila, about three miles away, lay the villages of Malate and Ermite, each with its plaza and huge stone church. Malate was nearest the American camp, and at its southern limit, at the water's edge on the point of a peninsula formed by a small stream that flowed diagonally southward through the city, was a strong stone fort known as San Antonio de Abad, which mounted good modern artillery. Opposite this fort the stream was spanned by a bridge with stone parapets backed by sand-bags. Starting at this bridge, which was but a few feet from the fort, and extending about one thousand yards inland to a blockhouse, was a strong line of trenches about five feet high and eight feet thick, with heavy traverses at intervals of a few yards. From this blockhouse, which commanded one of the roads, the line of defense turned to the north and, as it appeared to the Americans, "disappeared in the bamboo thickets."

General Anderson had brought instructions from Major-General Merritt, who had been assigned to the command of the Eighth Army Corps, not to attack Manila before he arrived unless he was certain of success. Admiral Dewey did not wish to risk his ships until the monitors Monterey and Monadnock arrived and with their heavy guns silenced the shore batteries. Under the circumstances it was thought best to await the arrival of General Merritt. In the meantime General Anderson and General Greene carefully studied the ground and prepared plans for an attack. The former favored moving to the right across the lowlands to the high ground back of the city, near the village of San Pedro Macati, on the Pasig River, while Greene was in favor of advancing along the shore of the bay and driving the Spaniards out of the fort and trenches.

When General Merritt arrived, on July 25, he approved Gen

eral Greene's plan, but manifested a disappointing lack of enthusiasm for an immediate advance on either line. Admiral Dewey had for some time been carrying on negotiations with the Spaniards through the Belgian Consul27 André, and had become convinced that the city could be induced to surrender without loss if a plan could be devised whereby the Spaniards could be given an opportunity to protect their "military honor," which, in the language of the Orient, means, "saving face."

Admiral Dewey gives a carefully guarded account of the arrangements.28

"When the negotiations with the Captain-General tending to a surrender were again broached it was M. André who acted as intermediary, transmitting all messages (always verbal ones). from the Captain-General to me and from me to the CaptainGeneral. I was almost alone in believing in the sincerity of these negotiations. General Merritt was skeptical, but ready to defer to my judgment, and so were my Chief of Staff and my flag lieutenant. Nevertheless I felt confident of the outcome, in which I considered I was fully justified by later events. André continued with General Jaudenes the negotiations begun with Don Basilio. These progressed with varying success and numerous side issues, but always with the stipulation on the part of the Spaniards that if they surrendered the insurgents should be kept out of the city. Finally, without making any definite promise, General Jaudenes agreed that, although he would not surrender except in consequence of an attack upon the city, yet, unless the city was bombarded, the Manila batteries would not

27 "The negotiations by which it was attempted to secure a surrender without resistance was carried on through Mr. André, the Belgian consul. His method was to go to the governor-general and get a statement, which he wrote down in a memorandum book. Then he would go to General Merritt and Admiral Dewey and get a statement from them, which he would carry back to the governor-general. This was apart from some formal correspondence. After the surrender André translated to me the notes in his memorandum book, for they were written in Spanish. The substance of the agreement seemed to be that if the fleet did not throw shells into the walled city on the Spanish part of Manila, the Spanish artillery would not open on the fleet. There was no agreement, as the agreement was read to me, that our land forces would not be fired on. On the contrary there was a statement that the honor of Spain required that there should be resistance, or that under the Spanish Army Code their officers surrendering without resistance or giving a parole would subject themselves to court-martial. Accordingly we were fired on from the trenches and back through the streets of the city." Anderson, in North Am. Rev., CLXX, p. 213.

28 Autobiography, pp. 273, 274.

open on our ships. Moreover once the attack was begun he would if willing to surrender, hoist a white flag over a certain point in the walled city from which it could be seen both from Malate and from the bay."29

General Merritt on his arrival was convinced by Admiral Dewey that the plan was practicable. The motives which prompted the adoption of this plan of procedure were beyond praise, but as events unfolded it seems that a number of American soldiers lost their lives unnecessarily. It might have been better to have allowed the Spanish officers to stand trial according to the barbarous military code under which they were serving 30 A few shells sent into the city would have forced a prompt surrender without the loss of a single American soldier. Instead of adopting this course the rank and file of the army were left to believe that they were to engage in a serious struggle against a superior force strongly entrenched. They believed that they were risking death in their country's service, when the fact was that they were about to engage in a sham battle with ball-cartridges.

The brigade commanders were not informed of what was being arranged and proceeded with the work of preparation. The insurgents were between the American camp and the Spanish lines, and before an advance could be made it was necessary that they be removed. The task under the circumstances was difficult. General Merritt had given imperative orders that there must be no rupture with the natives and that only pacific and diplomatic means must be used.31 Nevertheless, he directed General Greene that he must get the Filipinos out of the way.

29 Soon after the naval battle of May 1, Governor-General Don Basilio Augustin intimated through the British consul that he was willing to surrender the city. A request to Madrid for authority to make the surrender resulted in Augustin's being directed to turn over his office to General Firmin Jaudenes. Don Basilio was then permitted by Admiral Dewey and General Merritt to sail from Hong Kong on a German vessel.

30 There was reason for the solicitude of the Spanish officers. After their return to Spain Admiral Montojo and General Jaudenes were confined under the most humiliating conditions in cells in the prison of San Francisco, Madrid. A military tribunal convicted and sentenced them to forced retirement and inability in the future to discharge any public duties. Their offense was inability to accomplish the impossible.

31 Merritt's orders were: "No rupture with insurgents; this is imperative;

A polite request to vacate and permit the Americans to man the trenches and install better artillery was referred to Aguinaldo, who expressed a desire to have the request in writing. This suggestion was brushed aside with the statement that such formal matters could be arranged later. In the meantime General Greene needed the trenches, and soon got them.32

New and more substantial trenches were now constructed much nearer the enemy's lines. The Spaniards did not observe or

can ask insurgents' generals for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force." War Dept. Rept., 1898, I, Part 2, p. 73.

32 A great deal has been made of this incident. General Greene gives the following account:

"General Merritt arrived on July 25, and after examining the ground the following day promptly decided two points: First, that the attack would be made along the shore, and second, that it was necessary to get the insurgents off to one side so as to give us the right of way. He was very anxious to avoid any entangling alliances with Aguinaldo, with whom he had no direct communication. He therefore sent his chief of staff on the afternoon of July 28 with a verbal message directing me to persuade the insurgents, if possible, to evacuate a portion of their trenches, but I was to do this on my own responsibility and without intimating that I had instructions to this effect from him. I had previously met General Noriel, who commanded the brigade of insurgents nearest the beach, and on receiving General Merritt's message, I sent my orderly, who spoke Spanish fluently, to find this general and give him a most polite message that I desired to see him on matters of common interest. At the same time the orderly was instructed not to come back without him. He returned in about an hour with General Noriel and his young Adjutant-General Arevolas, both wearing handsome uniforms and equipment. I explained to him that the antique six-inch columbiads which he had in his trenches were of an obsolete pattern and very ineffective against the Spanish artillery, and that if he would give up the trenches for about four hundred yards from the beach I would place in them the fine modern pieces of field artillery which we had brought and which would be much more effective against the Spaniards. He received the idea favorably, but said he could do nothing without consulting Aguinaldo, and I requested him to do this by telegraph (Aguinaldo's headquarters being about eleven miles in the rear) and give me an answer during the night. He promised to do so. About half-past two in the morning his adjutant-general arrived, having been obliged to ride back through the rain and mud to Bacour to see Aguinaldo, as the answer by telegraph was not satisfactory. He said Aguinaldo had given his consent provided I would make the request in writing. I told him that I had no objection to this, but in order to save time I would post troops in the trenches early in the morning and send the written request as soon thereafter as possible. This arrangement was carried out." Century Magazine, XXXV, p. 916.

Millet (The Expedition to the Philippines, p. 83) says: "On the afternoon of the 28th, General Greene received a verbal message from General Merritt suggesting that he juggle the insurgents out of part of their lines, always on his own responsibility, and without committing in any way the Commanding General to any recognition of the native leaders on opening up the prospect of an allaince. This General Greene accomplished very cleverly, dealing with the natives exactly in accordance with their own methods."