for an immediate suspension of hostilities preliminary to negotiations for a treaty of peace.

There was some delay in Paris, occasioned by the absence of the president of the Republic and the unwillingness of the minister of foreign affairs to assume the responsibility of instructing M. Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, to act on behalf of Spain. This lack of enthusiasm on the part of the French minister irritated Almodovar, who fully appreciated the value of time, and the ambassador at Paris was instructed to say that the request did not admit of delay. In fact, extreme haste was necessary, as the loss of even a few hours might be of the gravest consequence to Spain. The capitulation of Manila might occur at any time, and additional victories would probably result in greater claims being advanced by the United States.1

Without further delay M. Cambon was directed to represent the interests of Spain, and on July 26 he presented a communication which expressed a desire to learn from the president upon what basis the political status of Cuba could be established and the war thus brought to an end. The request was so worded as to imply that the future of Cuba was the only question at issue between Spain and the United States. During the conversation which followed Secretary Day, in the presence of President McKinley, stated that he understood that Spain desired to know also upon what conditions it would be possible to terminate hostilities at all points where they then existed, and M.

1 Duke of Almodovar to Señor Leon y Castillo, Sp. Dip. Corr. and Docs. (1896-1900), p. 200.

The documents and correspondence relating to the war and the treaty of peace will be found in Foreign Relations, 1898; Spanish Red Book, Negociácions diplomaticas desde el principio de la guerra con los Estados Unidos hasta la firma del protocolo de Washington (1898); Conferencia de Paris y tratado de paz de 10 de diciembre de 1898 (1899), and the volume published by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Negociations pour la paix entrez l'Espagne et les Etats-Unis (1898). The formal record of the Conference is in Senate Doc. No. 62, 55 Cong. 3rd Sess, Part I. The instructions of the president and the cable correspondence were printed as Sen. Doc. No. 148, 56 Cong. and Sess. The matter is the same as For. Rel. 1898. See an article entitled "Revelations of a Senate Document" in the North Am. Rev. for June, 1901. For the question of the debts, see Magoon's Repts. (1902), pp. 180-183. For Mr. Reid's private letters to the president, see Olcott's Life of McKinley, II, Chap. XXVIII.

Cambon replied that such seemed to be the effect of the Spanish communication.

Before a formal reply could be made M. Cambon received a despatch from the Duke of Almodovar stating that Spain would accept any conditions which would result in the pacification of Cuba, whether they involved absolute independence, independence under a protectorate or annexation to the United States. The latter was preferred, as it would guarantee security for the lives and property of Spaniards who were established in Cuba.2

It was assumed that the United States would demand something by way of indemnity, but on that subject M. Cambon was instructed to "maintain reserve." Spain did not want to be held responsible for the expenses of military expeditions undertaken against territory remote from Cuba, as, according to Almodovar's theory, the war should have been localized. What he feared was that the United States might hold the islands she had captured on what may be called collateral expeditions as indemnity for the expenses of their capture. M. Cambon was directed particularly to ascertain the disposition of the president toward Porto Rico and the Philippines, and if he was found reasonable from the Spanish point of view, to press for the immediate suspension of hostilities.

Spain thus opened the negotiations for peace with a proposal to abandon Cuba, with the expectation-not expressed, however -that something would have to be done toward indemnifying the United States for the expenses of the war, but hoping to save Porto Rico. It is hardly probable that she then seriously feared that she would lose all of the Philippine Islands, as the Americans at that time had done nothing in that part of the world except destroy the Spanish fleet.

On July 30 Almodovar was informed that the United States, as a condition of the suspension of hostilities, would require:

"First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the island.

2 For. Rel., 1898, p. 819.

"Second. The president, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, would not at that time make any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he could not be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to the claims of American citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States of the islands of Porto Rico and the other islands then under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

"Third. On similar grounds the United States was entitled to occupy and would hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

From these terms there was never thereafter any material departure. The word possession originally used in the paragraph relating to the Philippines was changed to disposition, on the earnest representation of M. Cambon that it would when translated into Spanish carry a meaning which would make it impossible for the negotiations to proceed.

M. Cambon struggled desperately to secure some material modification of these terms, particularly as regards the demand for Porto Rico, which he characterized as evincing a spirit of conquest inconsistent with the declaration of disinterestedness with which the United States had commenced the war. The temper manifested is illustrated by his statement that in making this claim for the cession of Porto Rico and one of the Ladrones, the United States evidently considered as a definite conquest all territory "upon which the fortune of arms has permitted an American soldier to set his foot," thus ignoring the fact that the islands had been demanded, not on the theory of conquest, but in lieu of a money indemnity. The provision relating to the Philippines he charged must have been inserted for the purpose of putting an end to the present negotiations, as Madrid would certainly construe it as casting doubt upon her present and future sovereignty in the Archipelago. Such charges of bad faith and insincerity were not well calculated to secure modifications

3 For. Rel., 1898, p. 820. These terms were drafted by the president personally, Olcott's Life of McKinley, II, p. 67.

of the well-considered terms which the president had offered to Spain.

"You will observe," replied the president, "that my demands set forth in the first two articles do not admit of any discussion. I leave to negotiations the task of resolving the question of the Philippines. If the American forces have remained until now in their positions, it is in obedience to a duty with respect to residents and strangers and the progress of affairs imposed on me."

M. Cambon had another interview with the president and secretary of state on August 3, when he pressed for an expression of intention as regards the Philippines. What then occurred is important, as the Spanish commissioners, during the negotiations at Paris, asserted that the United States had never until then expressed in concrete form the idea understood to be conveyed by the phrase, “control, disposition and government of the Philippines." They claimed that the demand for the cession of the entire Archipelago was a surprise. It is evident from what we now know that the surprise was purely technical.

During the interview on August 3 M. Cambon stated to the president that the provision was so drawn as to imply no restrictions upon the demands which the United States might make, and thus created grave apprehensions on the part of Spain as to the fate of her future sovereignty. The reports of this conference made by Cambon and Secretary Day differ in some respects, but both make it clear that the president declared his purpose to leave to the negotiators of the treaty the most ample freedom with reference to the Philippines."

According to M. Cambon's report the president said that he did not want any misunderstanding on this subject and that the "negotiators of the two countries must be the ones to decide what should be the permanent advantages that we shall demand

4 See despatch from the American commissioners from Paris, dated November 19, 1898.

5 For. Rel., 1898, p. 955. See also Sen. Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3d Sess., Part I, p. 132. This document will be hereafter cited as Sen. Doc. 62.

in the Archipelago, and finally the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

Secretary Day, in his memorandum of the conversation, says that the ambassador called attention to the statement in the note of July 30, that the possession of the city, bay and harbor of Manila should be retained during the pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be done with them afterward. "That," said the president, "must depend upon the terms of the treaty." The ambassador then inquired whether the United States had prejudged the matter of the Philippines and the rights to be acquired therein by the United States. The president replied that the case had not been prejudged; that the whole matter would be left to the commissioners for negotiation to be settled by the treaty of peace.

M. Cambon persisted, and presented a communication from the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, dated August 7, which came near bringing the negotiations to an abrupt close. The conditions contained in the first and second paragraphs of the proposal were accepted subject to the approval of the Cortes; the third paragraph was described as quite indefinite, but nevertheless was accepted with an accompanying interpretation and reservation. The positions taken in this note were maintained by the Spaniards to the end of the chapter.

"On one hand," wrote the duke, "the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor and the City of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, can not be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native army supported and provided for by the American admiral, Manila still holds its own and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole Archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the Treaty of Peace shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philip6 For. Rel., 1898, pp. 822-3.