CHAPTER XV

The Diplomacy of the Consulates

EARLY RELATIONS WITH THE INSURGENTS

Charges of Bad Faith-Consular Activities-Wildman's Relations with Hong Kong Junta-Forbidden to Discuss Policies-Aguinaldo at Singapore-The Pratt-Dewey Cables-No Reference to Independence-Aguinaldo at Hong Kong-Minutes of Meeting of Junta-Aguinaldo Meets Dewey-Is Assisted with Arms-Organizes Army and Government-Dewey's StatementProclaims Independence-Origin of the Promise Myth-Filipino Claims -Bray and St. Clair-Aguinaldo's Report to the Junta-Summary-Filipino Plans and Policies-American Policy Unknown-No Promise Made and No Bad Faith.

According to Carl Schurz and other radical Anti-Imperialists, America's early relations with the Filipino insurgents make "a story of deceit, false pretense and brutal treachery to friends without parallel in the history of republics." The constant repetition of such charges has left a vague impression on the public mind that the government of the United States, President McKinley, President Roosevelt, Admiral Dewey and their subordinates in the Far East were guilty of acts of bad faith in their relations with the Filipino leaders and that there is a sort of moral cloud on our title to the Philippines.

Aguinaldo and his advisers claimed that the American government, through its authorized representatives, promised expressly and by implication, in return for his military cooperation, to assist in establishing an independent state in the Philippines. Their supporters in the United States have placed the stress on the implications said to result from a de facto alliance with the Filipino organization. The records of the American and Filipino governments and armies are now accessible and there is no

1 Bancroft, Reminiscences of Carl Schurz, III, p. 446. See Chap. XVII, infra.

reason for any further misunderstanding as to what actually occurred. The facts are no longer in doubt.2

The early relations with Aguinaldo had more effect upon sentiment in the United States than upon the actual military conditions in the Philippines. The importance and extent of the assistance rendered the United States by the insurgents have been greatly exaggerated. They were merely such as were incidental to their own operations. Manila lay defenseless under the guns of the fleet. All Dewey needed was men to garrison it. The city would have fallen had there been no insurgents and the Spanish troops would have become prisoners of war whether they were in Manila or in the provinces.3

1 2 The captured records of the insurgent government and army were deposited in the archives of the War Department at Washington. Captain (now Major) John R. M. Taylor was detailed to prepare an official history of the insurrection based upon these records. One volume of narrative and twosupplementary volumes of documents were prepared by him and printed, but Mr. Taft, then secretary of war, after reading the proofs, decided that while the government was cultivating friendly relations with the Filipinos, it would be contrary to public policy to publish the record of their cruelties and treachery. The type was therefore thrown down. Two copies of the galley-proofs were preserved and deposited, one in the War Department at Washington, and the other in the Department of Commerce and Police at Manila. I have made use of the Manila copy in preparing this chapter, but the references are to the War Department records. Major Taylor's text is cited under his name, followed by the numbers of the proof sheets. The documents are cited as Philippine Insurgent Records, with the file number or the exhibit number in the matter prepared by Captain Taylor.

A pamphlet edited by Captain Taylor entitled Telegraphic Correspondence of Emilio Aguinaldo, July 15, 1898, to November 28, 1899, annotated, was published in 1903.

A few of the insurgent records were printed in Taylor's Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and His followers (Washington, 1903).

3 For various opinions as to the value of the services rendered to the Americans by the Filipino army, see Century Magazine for May, 1899 (Gen. F. V. Greene); Sen. Doc. 62, p. 375 (Gen. Merritt).

Admiral Dewey in his testimony in 1902 was inclined to belittle the value of such services. In reply to questions he said: "I would like to say now, that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul Pratt and Consul Williams. I did not think they would do anything. I would not have taken them. I did not want them, I did not believe in them. They were assisting us. They were assisting us, but incidentally they were fighting their own enemies. It was their own idea coming over there. We could have taken the city on any moment we had the troops to occupy it." Sen. Doc. 25, pp. 37-31.

In his proclamations to the people Aguinaldo generally claimed to have an alliance with the Americans but in his reply to Paterno's Manifesto in favor of an alliance with Spain instead of the United States, Aguinaldo said: "Remember, Señor Paterno, that we make war without the help of any one

Although the Spanish "policy of attraction" was making some headway among the Tagalogs, the Filipinos generally were no more loyal to Spain than they had been before the pact of Biakna-bató. The reforms which they had been told were to result from the banishment of their leaders had not materialized and in certain parts of the country the fires of revolt had again been lighted. But the leaders were discouraged and hopeless. It was inevitable that a declaration of war against Spain by the great Republic of the West, the traditional friend of the South American colonies and the champion of Cuba Libre, would revive the hopes of the insurgents. But Aguinaldo failed to grasp the situation and left Hong Kong at the time when it was most important for the Philippine leaders to be within reach of Manila.* What the insurgents could have accomplished without Aguinaldo is, of course, mere conjecture. Some inspiration came from the widely advertised claim that there was an "alliance" with the Americans. Without Aguinaldo, Luna the soldier, and Mabini the politician, might have organized a formidable movement against Spain, but the probabilities are that Aguinaldo was the only Filipino then capable of consolidating the factions. He showed no particular capacity as a general or as a constructive politician. Other men planned his campaigns, fought his battles, wrote his proclamations and organized his government. He was at that time only twenty-nine years old and almost pathetically not even the North Americans; but no! We have the help of God, who is eternally allied with great and just causes such as that which we defend against Spain, our own beloved independence." Paterno's Manifesto and Aguinaldo's reply are published in full in Foreman's The Philippine Islands, pp. 438-445 (1906). The insurgent newspaper, La Independencia, for November 22, 1899, concedes that "America has aided us indirectly by the blockade of Manila," but does not claim that the Filipinos had in any way assisted the United States.

4 Major Taylor says (Taylor, I, 42, F.Z.): "In fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the conditions and opportunities which were about to open before the Hong Kong junta for, although war between Spain and the United States was imminent and the United States squadron was at Hong Kong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly concerned in finding how to avoid losing the money which had been received from the Spanish Government as the price of his surrender. The importance of his presence near the Philippines in case of war did not occur to him or, if it did occur to him, anything which he could obtain there from the United States seemed for the moment of little consequence compared with escaping from his wrangling companions with enough money to live on in Paris."

ignorant of the world beyond the island of Luzon, where he had spent his life. He knew nothing of books and little of men and events beyond the islands. He was, nevertheless, a born leader of men. He was dignified, ambitious and personally honest, and nature had endowed him with those undefinable qualities which induced men of much greater ability and intelligence to accept his leadership. He and the members of the Hong Kong junta were the leaders of the movement for independence. Had they not been brought back to the islands the insurgents might have continued the contest against the Spaniards, but it is very doubtful whether there would have been a revolt against the United States, as the leadership would probably have fallen to more conservative men.

The initial responsibility for injecting Aguinaldo and the Hong Kong junta into American affairs rests with certain United States consular officials in the Far East. When the SpanishAmerican War began our commercial interests were represented at Manila by Oscar G. Williams, at the British port of Hong Kong by Rounceville Wildman and at Singapore in the Straits Settlements by E. Spencer Pratt. The position of American consul at Manila had been of slight importance. Williams, judged by his official correspondence, was a typical old-fashioned consul who wrote rhetorical despatches in which he did not always discriminate nicely between rumors and ascertained facts." When the crisis came he performed his duties well and was commended by Admiral Dewey and the State Department. He was called to Hong Kong to report on the condition of the Spanish defenses and was thus enabled to return to Manila with the fleet

5 On August 5, 1898, Consul Williams wrote the State Department soliciting an appointment in the Philippines as either general commissioner of customs, general commissioner of agriculture, superintendent of public instruction, or lighthouse inspector.

"For many years," he wrote, "I have made a special study of tariff and economic questions; have translated the Philippine tariff, and so have a measure of fitness. Then I was reared a farmer and my business interests having always been along such lines, I have kept fully abreast of agricultural matters. I am a graduate of Cornell University and for about twenty years was a teacher, lecturer, and author." Sen. Doc. 62, Part 1, 55 Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 332.

and observe the battle from the bridge of the Olympia. His relations with the Filipinos were friendly and sympathetic. He assumed from the first that the islands would be conquered and annexed to the United States and that the Filipinos would gladly accept such a solution of their difficulties. The desirability of securing the military cooperation of the insurgents was to him self-evident.

Wildman, at Hong Kong, seems to have been fairly well qualified for his duties. He had lived among the Malays of the Straits Settlements and had some knowledge of Malay character. His sympathies were with the insurgents and he believed that they desired the annexation of the islands to the United States.

E. Spencer Pratt had been minister to Persia, but when he was selected for the post of consul at Singapore it is improbable that his qualifications for diplomacy were carefully investigated. He proved to be an ambitious busybody who, by meddling with matters which were beyond the scope of his official duties, succeeded in putting his country in a false light before the world. Williams had slight opportunity to muddle things and so did fairly well. Wildman maintained improper relations with the Filipino exiles before the war and improperly assumed to control their actions after war was declared. Pratt was incompetent, had no sense of official propriety, misconceived the nature of his duties and was guilty of indiscreet acts and conduct which enabled the insurgents to claim with color of truth that he had entered into a formal agreement with Aguinaldo and that Dewey had approved it. He at least was

6 Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, May 12, 1898, Sen. Doc. 62, p. 327. On May 12 Williams wrote that from the naval battle "must come the acquisition of these islands, many times more extensive, more populous, and more valuable than Cuba." On June 16 he wrote, "I expect that on July 4 we will celebrate in Manila under the folds of Old Glory and write in living letters a page of history that this magnificent insular empire has become a part and parcel of the United States of America." On July 2 he expressed the ill-advised hope that 10,000 American workmen and artisans would during the year settle in the islands. On August 5 he wrote: "Presumably when Manila falls and the Philippines become a part of our national domain," etc. Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 330, 332.