been said not to be illegal, that must be understood as being a voluntary strike and not a strike into which the members of the association have been coerced. (See per Lord Bramwell in the Mogul Case, infra 47, and Lord Lindley in Quinn v. Leatham, p. 541.) A strike may be a voluntary abstention from labour, or it may be the result of a resolution passed by an association, and while the result upon the employer is the same, the legal consequences are a matter of considerable importance. If all members of the association choose to agree to stop work, no one can complain unless by so doing they break their individual contracts with the employer (Krug Furniture Co. v. Berlin Union of Woodworkers, 5 O. L. R. 463). But if a strike is ordered by the committee of the association, that order cannot be enforced against members of the association who refuse to obey it, nor can they be expelled for refusing to abide by it, and the committee ordering it may become responsible to the employer for its action. The extent to which members of a combination, or even mere associates in work, can go with regard to each other is discussed by Lord Justice Vaughan Williams in Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation, [1903] 2 K. B. 545, at pp. 568, 569. The limits within which societies may act with regard to their by-laws and rules as to disciplining their members may be seen in the following cases: Rigby v. Connol (1880), 14 Ch. D. 489; Mineral Water Bottle, etc., Society v. Booth (1887), 36 Ch. D. 465; Swaine v. Wilson (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 252; Chamberlain's Wharf, Limited, v. Smith, [1900] 2 Ch. 605; and Parker v. Toronto Musical Protective Association, 32 O. R. 305.

Union Dealings with Outsiders.

But it is when an association or combination deals with those outside its own ranks, that more difficulties in ascertaining the true relations of the parties occur. Acts are done which injure others in their trade or business. These acts may or may not be maliciously done, but they cause damage. The question at once arises-How far are they legal, and who must bear responsibility for them. A familiar

instance of an invasion of legal rights may be recalled by the cases of Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q. B. 715, Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333. Those cases establish that if any person with knowledge of the existence of a contract of service between two other persons, the one to employ the other to render service, wilfully causes and induces the employee to break his contract, and an injury to the employer is the result of that breach, an action on the case will lie against him at the suit of the employer.

It may be noted that in Allen v. Flood (ante) Lord Halsbury (at p. 74), Lord Watson (at p. 107), Lord Ashbourne (at p. 113), Lord Morris (at p. 160), and Lord Davey (at p. 171), all accept the decision in Lumley v. Gye or the principle involved in it as sound, while Lord Herschell, Lord Macnaghten, and Lord Shand reserve their opinion regarding it. In Quinn v. Leatham (ante) Lord Macnaghten (p. 510) and Lord Shand (p. 513) have since given their adherence to Lumley v. Gye.

There are of course many other situations arising out of labour troubles which do not present such a clear cut point for decision. And it is not to be wondered at, if it appears that it has taken time, and not a little judicial discussion, to arrive at the solution of some of the problems evolved by the contending parties.

In considering the decisions regarding the actions of labou" organizations as to outsiders, there are three cardinal points which appear to stand out prominently. First, that malice in itself gives no cause of action, that is, it does not make that illegal and actionable which is otherwise legal. Second, that intentional injury inflicted upon another is not actionable provided there is good and sufficient cause for it, or where there is the possession of an equal legal right which is exercised in doing the thing complained of. Third, the absence of any intention to injure does not make that legal which is in itself illegal.

Malice as an Element.

The first point depends upon Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1, but the decision in that case must not be carried further

than its terms warrant. It has not displaced malice as a factor, where the state of mind is the deciding element in the case, and that is probably why, although urged in several cases to do so, the Courts have hesitated to consider an action of slander or libel and an action for injury to business as exactly alike. But the undoubted similarity between them may be useful provided the analogy is not pushed to too great an extreme. In both cases the act done is an invasion of a legal right-one to carry on business, the other to have one's reputation left unassailed. In the case of injury to business, the legal right which is relied upon to justify the act must be an actual existing legal right. In a case of libel and slander the right which gives rise to what is called privilege, is the actual possession of an interest or duty which must be had, ' and not merely supposed to exist, in the person asserting the privilege. (See Roberts v. Climie, 46 U. C. R. 264). It may be either a legal or a moral right, as was pointed out in Stuart v. Bell, [1891] 2 Q. B. 341, but when it is put forward, it is, if allowed by the Court, an answer to the injury done. It is quite true that a moral right is not a legal right, but it is as fully recognized by the law as if it were so. Malice in either case can only be of consequence as sapping the foundation of the right alleged to be exercised. Lord Herschell in Allen v. Flood (p. 126) distinctly opposes the notion that malice constitutes an element of the tort known as libel or slander. Indeed when the defendant's position in a slander or libel action comes to be probed to the bottom, it is seen that the indirect or improper motive, as it is called, or "malice," is used to actually displace and negative the legal or moral right or duty, so as to satisfy the Court that there never was, in fact, any exercise of that right or duty. In other words, none existed, for its presence is disproved. In an action for injury to trade, if the Court came to the conclusion that the defendant was not, as a matter of fact, exercising his right, and that, while pleading trade competition or such like, he was, in truth, merely setting it up untruly as a cloak or excuse for what he had done, it might properly hold that the legal right did not, for the purpose of that case, exist in fact or in law. But the diffi

culty in following the analogy to the bitter end is two-fold. In libel and slander the occasion may be privileged, but its value to the defendant may be lost by his manner of exercising his right at the time complained of. He is therefore refused the benefit of privilege because he has wantonly abused it. Abusing the occasion is using it wrongly, but it is using it all the same. Such a state of affairs can hardly be said to be possible in a labour dispute. Then again, it is most difficult to say that if the legal right, whereby business or trade is injured, be used either more oppressively than need be, or with an improper and indirect motive, such method or reason (which is malice) would detract from the right in question. It must be a right in being, and its exercise depends upon acts and not merely upon words. Consequently, what is actually said or . the manner in which the act is done are not important in actions for injury to business. Those elements, as we have seen, affect the action of slander or libel because questions as to the state of the mind of the defendant may either acquit or convict him. This is because a moral or ethical aspect has been given weight to in determining whether the mind was actually imbued with a sense of duty.

But in an action for injury to business the right possessed. which gives good cause, must be an actual legal right. The motive for putting into operation that legal right is of no importance. It may be exercised by a man in a malicious. frame of mind or in a benevolent state of mind. The simplest illustration is this. If a wealthy man, who has been offended by a tradesman, chooses to establish a similar store next door to the offender, for the express purpose of taking away his trade and ruining him, he would not be responsible-his state of mind is of no account.

Lord Watson in Allen v. Flood (p. 98) said that he was unable to appreciate the loose logic which confounds internal feelings with outward acts and treats the motive of the actor as one of the means used by him.

Legal and Illegal Boycotts.

The second point involves very much the whole solution of the relative rights of capital and labour. In the case of

Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., [1892] A. C. 26, the plaintiffs were vessel owners, trading to ports in China and Hong Kong. The defendants were several firms of vessel owners trading to the same ports who formed a combination. The defendants notified all the shippers at the Port of Hankow that if they found cargo for the plaintiffs' vessels the defendants would not allow them the agreed rebate of 5 per cent., and threatened to dismiss certain agents if they loaded plaintiffs' ships. This was in effect a tradeboycott, and undoubted injury was inflicted upon the plaintiffs. The Court however held that, although the intention to injure existed, and the damage actually took place, yet, as it had been done with the lawful object of protecting and extending the defendants' trade and increasing their profits, and was in fact trade competition in which no unlawful means were employed, the defendants were not liable. It is just there that we get an understanding of the difference between a boycott such as that and the one disclosed in Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] A. C. 495. The result in both cases was the same, injury to business, but in the latter case the injury was occasioned not by the exercise of equal trade rights in lawful trade competition, but by concerted acts done with the purpose of punishing and injuring the plaintiffs. They were not in furtherance of trade nor in the exercise of a legitimate legal right. This is in reality the fundamental difference between the two cases. The right to injure must depend upon the exercise of an equal legal right. It may be the right to carry on a trade in competition with others, or it may be the right to abstain from working, or the right to further the interests of a class in a legal way, but, whatever it is, the existence or such a right is necessary to protect the actor if injury is inflicted upon another.

Absence of Intention to Injure.

The third point, which seems to be a complement of the first, is really a natural sequence of the second. It depends upon the result of the case of Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation, [1903] 2 K. B. 545. In that case the intention to injure, or rather to interfere with others, was against the middlemen who sold the coals raised