Syllabus 133 C. Cls. Same; 90-day limitation of Contract Settlement Act.—The decision of the Appeal Board affirmed the agency's findings on plaintiff's claim under Section 17 (a) of the Contract Settlement Act, and the 90-day limitation began to run from the date of the Board's decision. Same; applicable provisions of statute.—The provisions of Section 12 (c) (2) of the Act are not applicable. Section 13 (c) (2) sets out how an appeal may be brought from the agency either to the Appeal Board or directly to the Federal Courts. The instant case on the Section 17 (a) claim is for review of the Board's action, not an apeal from the agency directly to the court, and hence is governed by Section 13 (d) (2). The decision in Arlington Trust Co. v. United States, 124 C. Cls. 309, is distinguished. United States 74 (16) Same; administrative remedies.—If plaintiff bases its action under Section 17 (b) of the Act, it is held that the petition is defective for failure to allege sufficient facts. Furthermore, plaintiff has not exhausted its administrative remedies for claims under Section 17 (b). Same; contract with Navy Department.-Paragraph 11 of plaintiff's petition is based on a contract with the Navy Department on June 29, 1940, which was terminated on November 2, 1945, for the convenience of the Government. On January 3, 1947, plaintiff and the Government entered into a settlement agreement under the Contract Settlement Act. It is held that under the provisions of the agreement, which released all rights and liabilities which the parties had under the contract, the claim set forth in paragraph 11 of the petition is barred. United States 74 (16) Same; contract with War Production Board.-Paragraph 12 of plaintiff's petition is based on a contract with the War Production Board, dated June 14, 1944, and amended September 17, 1944, for experimental work. A claim submitted to the agency and denied was on appeal denied by the Appeal Board February 13, 1947, without opinion. It is held that the time limit on the right to bring suit in the Court of Claims is based solely on the decision by the Appeal Board and is not conditioned on whether the Board makes findings itself or merely affirms the findings of the agency. Same; general jurisdiction.-In the instant case there is no allegation of breach of contract which would bring the case within the general jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Courts 463 Opinion of the Court Mr. Stanley Suydam for the plaintiff. Messrs. Herbert Wilson Smith and Walter M. King were on the briefs. Mr. Paris T. Houston, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Warren E. Burger, for the defendant. JONES, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff's petition was filed December 10, 1948, and amended on October 14, 1949. Paragraphs two through nine, which were based on the War Contracts Hardship Claims Act, also known as the Lucas Act, 60 Stat. 902 (41 U.S. C. 106 note 1946 Ed), were dismissed on the defendant's previous motion for summary judgment, 127 C. Cls. 714. Defendant now moves the court for summary judgment in its favor on the remainder of the claim. Paragraph 10 of plaintiff's petition is a claim arising out of a contract with the Signal Corps, United States Army, designated W28-003-SC-1079 and dated October 9, 1944. Under the contract the plaintiff was to build six 4 H. P. lightweight military gasoline engines, one of which was to be delivered for experimental tests before the others were delivered, for the sum of $25,100. It is alleged, and for the purposes of this motion admitted, that at the defendant's request plaintiff expended $104,416.57 in executing this contract. Plaintiff has been paid $25,100 for the contract. Defendant terminated the contract for the convenience of the Government. Plaintiff filed claims in the amount of its expenditures under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 649 (41 U. S. C. 101 et seq. 1946 Ed.). These claims came before the Appeal Board, Office of Contract Settlement, as Proceeding No. 159. The Board rendered a decision in this proceeding on April 30, 1947. The opinion of the Board, of which we take judicial notice, in part was as follows: Appellant did not seriously contend on this appeal that it had a valid claim under section 17 (a) of the Act. Appellant does take the position that the contract did not provide for fair compensation for termination because it did not fully compensate appellant for its expenditures, and that section 6 (g) of the Act therefore places a duty upon the Board or respondent to amend the contract to provide for such compensation. Respondent contends that the Board has no jurisdiction to decide this issue since the findings from which the appeal Opinion of the Court 133 C. Cls. was taken, were based solely on a claim under section 17 (a). The Board's jurisdiction is limited to appeals from a contracting agency's findings (or failure to make findings after written demand therefor) with respect to claims under section 17 of the Contract Settlement Act and termination claims, as defined in section 3 (h). A finding under section 17 (a) is not a finding on a termination claim, and the Board cannot on appeal from a section 17 (a) finding consider such a claim. If the Board has jurisdiction under section 6 (g) to amend a contract to provide for fair compensation-a question we do not decide such jurisdiction can only be exercised as an incident of its power to decide a termination claim where an appeal has been properly taken. Here appellant has appealed from findings under section 17 ̊ (a), and therefore is precluded in this proceeding from asserting a termination claim or, as an incident thereof, a claim under section 6 (g) for an amendment of the contract to provide for fair compensation. The findings of the War Department denying appellant's claim under section 17 (a) of the Contract Settlement Act are affirmed, without prejudice to the presentation of a termination claim. Lawrance Aeronautical Corporation v. War Department, 1 App. Bd. OCS No. 159] tion Termination claims are defined in section 3 (h) of the Contract Settlement Act as "any claim or demand by a war contractor for fair compensation for the termination of any war contract and any other claim under a terminated war contract, which regulations prescribed under this Act authorize to be asserted and settled in connection with any termination settlement." Section 17 claims are defined by section 17 (a) and (b) of the Contract Settlement Act as: Sec. 17. (a) Where any person has arranged to furnish or furnished to a contracting agency or to a war contractor any materials, services, or facilities related to the prosecution of the war, without a formal contract, relying in good faith upon the apparent authority of an officer or agent of a contracting agency, written or oral instructions, or any other request to proceed from a contracting agency, the contracting agency shall pay such person fair compensation therefor. (b) Whenever any formal or technical defect or omission in any prime contract, or in any grant of authority to an officer or agent of a contracting agency who ordered 1 Opinion of the Court any materials, services, and facilities might invalidate the contract or commitment, the contracting agency (1) shall not take advantage of such defect or omission; (2) shall amend, confirm, or ratify such contract or commitment without consideration in order to cure such defect or omission; and (3) shall make a fair settlement of any obligation thereby created or incurred by such agency, whether expressed or implied, in fact or in law, or in the nature of an implied or quasi contract. Plaintiff filed its petition in the Court of Claims on December 10, 1948. Defendant urges that the petition was filed too late because not filed within 90 days of the Board's decision. Defendant relies principally on section 13 (d) (2) of the Contract Settlement Act, which provides, in part: If the war contractor is aggrieved by the decision of the Appeal Board or panel (other than an order remanding the case to the contracting agency under subsection (c) (3) (iii) of this section), then within ninety days after such decision he may bring suit on the claim or unsettled part thereof in accordance with subsection (b) (2) of this section. *** Upon failure of the war contractor so to sue within such period, the decision of the Appeal Board or panel shall be final and conclusive. Defendant also contends that insofar as plaintiff's claim under paragraph 10 is a termination claim it is barred because plaintiff already has received an amount not less than the total contract price. In support of this defendant cites section 6 (d) of the act which reads, in part: (d) Except as hereinafter provided, the methods and standards established under subsection (b) of this section for determining fair compensation for termination claims which are not settled by agreement shall be designed to compensate the war contractor fairly for the termination of the war contract, taking into account (3) reasonable accounting, legal, clerical, and other costs and expenses incident to termination and settlement of the terminated war contract; and (4) reasonable costs and expenses of removing, preserving, storing and disposing of termination inventories; and Opinion of the Court 133 C. Cls. The aggregate amount of compensation allowed in accordance with this subsection (excluding amounts allowed under paragraphs (3) and (4) above) shall not exceed the total contract price reduced by the amount of payments otherwise made or to be made under the contract. Plaintiff argues that the period of limitation did not begin to run at the time the Appeal Board rendered its decision because the Board had no jurisdiction in general, and particularly had no jurisdiction to consider a termination claim in an appeal from an agency's findings on a claim under section 17 (a). Moreover, plaintiff stresses that the Board made no findings and claims that under section 13 (c) (2) of the act1 and our opinion in Arlington Trust 1 The relevant portions of section 13 of the Contract Settlement Act provide: "(a) Whenever the contracting agency responsible for settling any termination claim has not settled the claim by agreement or has so settled only a part of the claim, (1) the contracting agency at any time may determine the amount due on such claim or such unsettled part, and prepare written findings indicating the basis of the determination, and deliver a copy of such findings to the war contractor, or (2) if the termination claim has been submitted in the manner and substantially the form prescribed under this Act, the contracting agency, upon written demand by the war contractor for such findings, shall determine the amount due on the claim or unsettled part and prepare and deliver such findings to the war contractor within ninety days after the receipt by the agency of such demand. ✦ ✦ ✦ "(b) Whenever any war contractor is aggrieved by the findings of a contracting agency on his claim or part thereof or by its failure to make such findings in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, he may at his election "(1) appeal to the Appeal Board in accordance with subsection (d) of this section; or "(2) bring suit against the United States for such claim or such part thereof, in the Court of Claims or in a United States district court, "(c) Any proceeding under subsection (b) of this section shall be governed by the following conditions: "(1) When any contracting agency provides a procedure within the agency for protest against such findings or for other appeal therefrom by the war contractor, the war contractor, before proceeding under subsection (b) of this section (1) in his discretion may resort to such procedure within the time specified in his contract or, if no time is specified, within thirty days after the delivery to him of the findings; and (ii) shall resort to such procedure for protest or other appeal to the extent required by the Director, but failure of the contracting agency to act on any such required protest or appeal within thirty days shall operate as a refusal by the agency to modify its findings. * * "(2) A war contractor may initiate proceedings in accordance with subsection (b) of this section (1) within ninety days after delivery to him of the findings by the contracting agency, or (ii) in case of protests or appeal within the agency, within ninety days after the determination of such protest or appeal, or (iii) in case of failure to deliver such findings, within one year after his demand therefor. If he does not initiate such proceedings within the |