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under state law in a manner inconsistent with the decision of the federal court. Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177; Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 290 U. S. 602; Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415. The Court has also ruled that where the case contains local issues the determination of which might render unnecessary the resolution of the federal issues, or where an authoritative construction has not yet been made by the state courts, the three-judge court procedure should be stayed for a reasonable time until the state courts have acted, at which time the federal proceeding may be resumed if any federal questions remain. Railroad Comm. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496; Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101; A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582; Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U. S. 321.

Suits to enjoin enforcement of federal laws. A three-judge district court is also necessary when an attempt is made to obtain an "interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the United States." 28 U.S.C. $2282. Here, as under $2281 discussed immediately above, the constitutional question raised in the complaint must be a substantial one (Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171; California Water Service Co. v. Redding, 304 U. S. 252), and an initial showing of jurisdiction in the district court may be required. Osage Indians v. United States, 45 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C.) and cases cited.5 Once these conditions are satisfied, however, the jurisdiction of the three-judge court, as well as of the Supreme Court on appeal, covers all the other issues involved, even including questions of local law (California Water Service Co. v. Redding, supra). But unlike $2281, which includes certain attacks on state administrative orders (see pp. 2930, supra), §2282 does not apply to suits challenging the validity

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The Osage opinion, which does not seem entirely clear, reviews the prior authorities, which do not seem entirely uniform.

of federal administrative regulations or orders as such (Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, supra), but is confined to actions in which the constitutionality of a federal statute is assailed. An attack upon the validity of a statute as applied would doubtless be sufficient for the invocation of §2282. See p. 30, supra.

Section 2282 "does not provide for a case where the validity of an Act of Congress is merely drawn in question, albeit that question be decided, but only for a case where there is an application for an interlocutory or permanent injunction to restrain the enforcement of an Act of Congress." International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304 U. S. 243, 250. In other words, it is not enough that the validity of a federal statute be questioned as a matter of defense or in anticipation of a defense-although if, in any such suit to which the United States is a party, a single district judge holds a federal statute unconstitutional, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court would lie under $1252. The constitutional contention must be one of the bases for the application for the interlocutory or permanent injunction. It has been stated that a proceeding for what in substance is injunctive relief comes within the statute even though the suit is labeled as one for prohibition or mandamus' or declaratory judgment.

A direct appeal to the Supreme Court may then be had in this type of case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1253, from an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction. An order dismissing the cause of action would, of course, fall within that category. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75; Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752.

In the Jameson case, the Court considered the allegation that the administrative order could not be enforced because the underlying statute was invalid, but not questions as to the legality of the administrative action itself. 7 Rolls-Royce Inc. v. Stimson, 56 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C.)

8 United States v. 149 Gift Packages, 52 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y.).

Suits to enjoin enforcement of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the United States Maritime Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act. Chapter 157 of the 1948 Code, 28 U.S.C. §§2321-2325, which is derived from the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, provides for the use of a threejudge district court where an application is made for an "interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution, in whole or in part, of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission" ($2325) "other than for the payment of money or the collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures" (§2321).

Since a three-judge court is required in this type of proceeding, §1253 permits a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a decree granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction. But as to Commission orders involving the payment of money, or the collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures, or the determination of reparations, any district court review must be by a single judge, with no right to direct appeal to the Supreme Court under the foregoing provisions. See 49 U.S.C. §§9, 16; United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U. S. 426; see also United States v. Jones, 336 U. S. 641. Other limitations upon the jurisdiction of the three-judge courts are described in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125.

These provisions do not apply to appeals from orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in railroad reorganizations; such cases are heard by one-judge district courts sitting in bankruptcy, and appealed to the courts of appeals. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill), affirmed 320 U. S. 718.

of federal administrative regulations or orders as such (Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, supra), but is confined to actions in which the constitutionality of a federal statute is assailed. An attack upon the validity of a statute as applied would doubtless be sufficient for the invocation of $2282. See p. 30, supra.

Section 2282 "does not provide for a case where the validity of an Act of Congress is merely drawn in question, albeit that question be decided, but only for a case where there is an application for an interlocutory or permanent injunction to restrain the enforcement of an Act of Congress." International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304 U. S. 243, 250. In other words, it is not enough that the validity of a federal statute be questioned as a matter of defense or in anticipation of a defense-although if, in any such suit to which the United States is a party, a single district judge holds a federal statute unconstitutional, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court would lie under $1252. The constitutional contention must be one of the bases for the application for the interlocutory or permanent injunction. It has been stated that a proceeding for what in substance is injunctive relief comes within the statute even though the suit is labeled as one for prohibition or mandamus' or declaratory judgment.

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A direct appeal to the Supreme Court may then be had in this type of case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1253, from an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction. An order dismissing the cause of action would, of course, fall within that category. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75; Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752.

6 In the Jameson case, the Court considered the allegation that the administrative order could not be enforced because the underlying statute was invalid, but not questions as to the legality of the administrative action itself. "Rolls-Royce Inc. v. Stimson, 56 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C.)

8 United States v. 149 Gift Packages, 52 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y.).

Suits to enjoin enforcement of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the United States Maritime Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act. Chapter 157 of the 1948 Code, 28 U.S.C. §§2321-2325, which is derived from the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, provides for the use of a threejudge district court where an application is made for an "interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution, in whole or in part, of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission" (§2325) "other than for the payment of money or the collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures" ($2321).

Since a three-judge court is required in this type of proceeding, §1253 permits a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a decree granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction. But as to Commission orders involving the payment of money, or the collection of fines, penalties and forfeitures, or the determination of reparations, any district court review must be by a single judge, with no right to direct appeal to the Supreme Court under the foregoing provisions. See 49 U.S.C. §§9, 16; United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U. S. 426; see also United States v. Jones, 336 U. S. 641. Other limitations upon the jurisdiction of the three-judge courts are described in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125.

These provisions do not apply to appeals from orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in railroad reorganizations; such cases are heard by one-judge district courts sitting in bankruptcy, and appealed to the courts of appeals. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill), affirmed 320 U. S. 718.

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