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SCHEDULE TO WHICH THIS ACT REFERS.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY DECLARATIONS AND ENACTMENTS.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

SECTION I.-Degrees of Crime.

SECTION 2.-Of Incapacity to commit Crimes and Duress.

Article 1, Idiotcy; Art. 2, Insanity, &c.; Art. 3. Intoxication, &c.; Art. 4, 5, In-
fancy; Art. 6-8, Duress; Art. 9, Wife receiving, harbouring or concealing
her husband, or aiding his escape.

SECTION 3.-Of Wilful, Malicious, Negligent, and Accidental Injuries.

Article 1, What an injury; Art. 2, What an unlawful omission; Art. 3, When
an injury wilful; Art. 4, When malicious; Art. 5, 6, When negligent; Art. 7,
When accidental; Art. 8, 10, Exceptions.

SECTION 4.-Of Criminal Agency and Participation.

Article 1, Parties to a crime; Art. 2, Principals, who are; Art. 3-5, Principals
in respect of causing an act to be done otherwise than by a guilty agent; Art.
6, 7, Principals in respect of aiding or abetting the doing of a criminal act;
Art. 8-10, Accessories, who are; Art. 11, Accessories to a crime to be deemed
guilty of that crime, and every provision of this Act to apply to them as well as
to principals; Art. 12, Where persons unite in common design, the act of one
the act of all; Art. 13, Unless beyond the scope of common design; Art. 14,
Effect of withdrawal of any after several have united in common design; Art.
15, Where a party doing an act is justified or excused, so also are those acting
in his aid or assistance; Art. 16, 17, General rules; Art. 18, Rule where special
provisions of Act inconsistent with general ones.

SECTION 1.

Degrees of Crime.

THE crimes included within this Act are of three degrees: Treasons, Felonies, and Misdemeanors.

Treasons are the crimes in respect of which offenders incur the penalties of the Treasons. 1st Class. (a)

(a) The words of the Act of Crimes and Punishments are, "Treasons are the crimes hereinafter defined in Chapter II., Section 1;" but we think the above definition preferable, because, in the event of a new offence being declared to be treason, that term would, after the passing of the Digest, convey no correct idea of the punishment to be inflicted.

As the Act of Crimes and Punishments at present stands, the definition proposed by us would be objectionable, since the forgery of the Great and other Royal Seals is, although treason, punishable with transportation only. This objection no longer applies, as we recommend that that offence should cease to be treason (see note (c) to Article 20 of Treason, supra, p. 12), and have accordingly removed it from the Section of Treason and inserted it in the Section which relates to offences against the Queen's person, authority, or government, or against the constitution inferior to treason.

Felonies are the crimes in respect of which offenders incur the penalties of the Felonies. 2nd Class, or of any class of which transportation forms part of the penalties. (b)

(b) By the present law, every treason includes a felony; but this appears to depend upon the law of forfeiture, which we propose should be repealed. The reason will therefore no longer apply, and we think it will be more convenient that the definition of felony should exclude treason.

The definition of felony in the Act of Crimes and Punishments is made to include self-murder, but we propose that that offence should no longer be attended with penal consequences (see Section 6 of the Chapter of Homicide and other Offences against the Person, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 36). That portion of the definition is therefore become unnecessary.

All other crimes included within this Act are misdemeanors.

Misdemeanors.

K

Idiotcy.

Insanity, &c.

Intoxication, &c.

Infancy.

Duress.

Wife receiving, harbour

SECTION 2.

Of Incapacity to commit Crimes and Duress.
ART. 1.

No person shall be criminally responsible for any act or omission who, at the
time of such act or omission, is in a state of idiotcy.

ART. 2.

No person shall be criminally responsible for any act or omission who, at the time of such act or omission, by reason of unripeness or weakness of mind, or of any unsoundness, disease, or delusion of mind, wants the capacity, which the law otherwise presumes every person to possess, of discerning that such act or omission is contrary to the law of the land. (a)

(a) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, P.

9.

ART. 3.

Provided that no person shall be exempted from criminal responsibility by reason of any temporary incapacity which he shall have wilfully incurred by intoxication or other means. (b)

(b) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 11.

ART. 4.

Incapacity by reason of unripeness of mind, as in Article 2 of this Section is mentioned, shall be presumed to exist in the case of an infant under the age of seven years, and proof to the contrary shall not be admitted.

ART. 5.

Incapacity by reason of unripeness of mind, as in Article 2 of this Section is mentioned, shall also be presumed to exist in the case of an infant of the age of seven years, and under the age of 14 years, unless the contrary be proved.

ART 6.

Duress, inducing well-grounded present fear of death, shall be sufficient to excuse a person acting under such duress from penal consequences, except in case of treason and homicide (c)

(c) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 12.

ART 7.

Provided that in case of treason in "levying war against the King or Queen," or" adhering to the enemies of the King or Queen," duress shall be sufficient to excuse a person if such duress be a force upon the person accompanied by a wellgrounded present fear of death or of grievous bodily harm, at the time of such person's joining rebels or other enemies, and such force be a continuing force and such fear a continuing fear during all the time of his remaining with them, and provided that such person use every reasonable endeavour to resist or escape. (d) (d) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 12.

ART. 8.

Provided also that duress shall be sufficient to excuse a person in respect of supplying money, provisions, stores or any other thing whatsoever to be used in furtherance of any treasonable design or purpose, if such duress be a continuing force accompanied by a continuing well-grounded fear of death or of grievous bodily harm, to the time of supplying such money, provisions, stores or other thing.

ART. 9.

No woman shall be liable to conviction in respect of any act of receiving her ing or concealing her hus- husband, or of receiving any other person in his presence and by his authority, or band, or aiding his escape. of harbouring or concealing her husband or any other person in his presence and by his authority, or of aiding the escape of her husband from justice. (e)

(e) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 12.

SECTION 3.

Of wilful, malicious, negligent, and accidental Injuries.

ART. 1.

AN injury shall be deemed to consist in any harm, damage or other evil con- What an injury.
sequence caused to any person or thing or other subject matter of public or
private right.

ART 2.

What an unlawful omis

An injury resulting from an omission does not subject the person causing it to punishment unless such omission be unlawful, being a breach of some duty sion. imposed by the law directly or indirectly. Such duty is imposed indirectly where the person omitting has, by his own conduct, rendered the doing of an act necessary for the prevention of injury.

ART. 3.

An injury shall be deemed to be wilfully caused whensoever the person from When an injury wilful. whose act or omission such injury results, either directly intended it to result from

his act or omission, or, believing that it was in any degree probable that such injury would result from his act or omission, incurred the risk of causing such injury. (a)

(a) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 16.

ART. 4.

An act shall be deemed to be maliciously done or omitted, and an injury shall be When malicious. deemed to be maliciously caused, whensoever such act or injury shall be wilfully

done or omitted or caused respectively, without justification or excuse. (b)

(b) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating

the Criminal Law, p. 16.

ART. 5.

An injury shall be deemed to be negligently caused whensoever it is not When negligent. wilfully caused, but results from want of reasonable caution, in the undertaking and doing of any act, either without such skill, knowledge or ability as is suitable to the occasion, or without due care taken to ascertain the nature and probable consequences of such act, or where it results from the not exercising reasonable caution in the doing of any act, either as regards the means used or the manner of using them, or from the doing of any act without using reasonable caution for the prevention of mischief, or from the omitting to do any act which a person using reasonable caution would not have omitted to do. (c)

(c) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 16.

ART. 6.

Provided that no person shall be punishable in respect of a negligent act or omission who would not have been punishable had such act or omission been wilful. (d)

(d) A provision of this kind is necessary, or special provisions would be requisite in particular cases, e.g. Libel.

ART. 7.

An injury shall be deemed to be accidentally caused whensoever it is neither When accidental. wilfully nor negligently caused. No person shall be punishable in respect of any

accidental injury, except as is hereinafter in this Act mentioned. (e)

(e) See the note to Article 6, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 16.

ART. 8.

Provided that where an injury which would have been wilful if caused to one Exceptions. person shall through mistake or by accident be caused to another person, such

injury shall be deemed to be wilfully caused to such other person.

ART. 9.

Provided also that where a person intending an injury to fall, or believing it to be in any degree probable that an injury will fall on some other person, but not on any person in particular, causes such injury to any other person, such injury shall be deemed to be wilfully caused to the person on whom it falls.

ART. 10.

An injury shall be deemed to be wilfully caused, although it take effect in a manner not intended or believed to be probable by the party causing it, provided it take effect on the person intended or the person upon whom the party causing it believed it to be in any degree probable that such injury would fall.

Parties to a crime.

Principals, who are.

Principals in respect of

causing a criminal act to be done otherwise than by a guilty agent.

Principals in respect of aiding or abetting the doing of a criminal act.

SECTION 4.

Of Criminal Agency and Participation.

ART. 1.

PARTIES to a crime are either principals or accessories. (a)

(a) See the note to this Article, Second Report of the Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, p. 19.

'ART. 2.

Every one is a principal in respect of a criminal act who either does it or causes it to be done otherwise than by a guilty agent; or who is one of several who so jointly do such act or cause it to be done; or who is present aiding in or abetting the doing of such act.

ART. 3.

A party shall be deemed to cause a criminal act to be done within the meaning of the last preceding Article who wilfully causes it to be done, by means of any mechanical device or contrivance, or by any innocent person (whether such innocent person act unconsciously or under compulsion, or be or be not the person to whom injury is done), or by such means combined, and whether such party be present or absent when the means used take effect, and although accidental circumstances conduce to render the means used effectual for the doing of the criminal act intended.

ART. 4.

Where several distinct acts are essential to any crime, every one who either singly, or jointly with any other person or persons, does any of such acts in order to the commission of such crime, is a principal within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of this Section. And where any injury is essential to a crime, and several persons wilfully cause that injury, either by joining in the same act, or by jointly or severally doing distinct acts, each of such persons is also a principal within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of this Section.

ART. 5.

Every one is a principal in respect of a criminal omission, who being bound, as in Article 2 of Section 3 is mentioned, either solely or jointly with jointly with any other person or persons, to perform any duty, unlawfully omits to perform that duty.

ART. 6.

A party shall be deemed to be present, aiding in or abetting the doing of a criminal act within the meaning of Article 2 of this Section who shall be near enough to lend any help to the person who does or persons who do the act, or to encourage such person or persons with the expectation of help, and who shall by consent or any other means help or encourage such person or persons in the doing of such act.

ART. 7.

Provided that no person shall be deemed to be present aiding or abetting within the meaning of the last preceding Article, who, having agreed with any other

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