check our sympathy, if so urged by hard reason, without deterioration in the noblest part of our nature." How noblest? According to Mr. Darwin, a virtuous instinct is a strong and permanent one. There can be, according to his views, no other elements of quality than intensity and duration. Mr. Darwin, in fact, thus silently and unconsciously introduces the moral element into his "social instinct," and then, of course, has no difficulty in finding in the latter what he had previously put there. This, however, is quite illegitimate, as he makes the social instinct synonymous with the gregariousness of brutes. In such gregariousness, however, there is no moral element, because the mental powers of brutes are not equal to forming reflective, deliberate, representative judgments. The word "social" is ambiguous, as gregarious animals may metaphorically be called social, and man's social relations may be regarded both beneficentially and morally. Having first used "social" in the former sense, it is subsequently applied in the latter; and it is thus that the really moral conception is silently and illegitimately introduced. We may now sum up our judgment of Mr. Darwin's work on the "Descent of Man"—of its execution and tendency, of what it fails to accomplish, and of what it has successfully attained. Although the style of the work is, as we have said, fascinating, nevertheless we think that the author is somewhat encumbered with the multitude of his facts, which at times he seems hardly able to group and handle so effectively as might be expected from his special talent. Nor does he appear to have maturely reflected over the data he has so industriously collected. Moreover, we are surprised to find so accurate an observer receiving as facts many statements of a very questionable nature, as we have already pointed out, and frequently on second-hand authority. The reasoning also is inconclusive, the author having allowed himself constantly to be carried away by the warmth and fertility of his imagination. In fact, Mr. Darwin's power of reasoning seems to be in an inverse ratio to his power of observation. He now strangely exaggerates the action of "sexual selection," as previously he exaggerates the effects of the "survival of the fittest." On the whole, we are convinced that by the present work the cause of "natural selection" has been rather injured than promoted; and we confess to a feeling of surprise that the case put before us is not stronger, since we had anticipated the production of far more telling and significant details from Mr. Darwin's biological treasurehouse. A great part of the work may be dismissed as beside the point-as a mere elaborate and profuse statement of the obvious fact, which no one denies, that man is an animal, and has all the essential properties of a highly organized one. Along with this truth, however, we find the assumption that he is no more than an animal-an assumption which is necessarily implied in Mr. Darwin's distinct assertion that there is no difference of kind, but merely one of degree, between man's mental faculties and those of brutes. We have endeavored to show that this is distinctly untrue. We maintain that while there is no need to abandon the received position that man is truly an animal, he is yet the only rational one known to us, and that his rationality constitutes a fundamental distinction-one of kind and not of degree. The estimate we have formed of man's position differs therefore most widely from that of Mr. Darwin. Mr. Darwin's remarks, before referred to, concerning the difference between the instincts of the coccus (or scale insect) and those of the ant--and the bearing of that difference on their zoological position (as both are members of the class insecta) and on that of man-exhibit clearly his misapprehension as to the true significance of man's mental powers. For in the first place zoological classification is morphological. That is to say it is a classification based upon form and structure--upon the number and shape of the several parts of animals, and not at all upon what those parts do, the consideration of which belongs to physiology. This being the case we not only may, but should, in the field of zoology, neglect all questions of diversities of instinct or mental power, equally with every other power, as is evidenced by the location of the bat and the porpoise in the same class, mammalia, and the parrot and the tortoise in the same larger group, sauropsida. Looking, therefore, at man with regard to his bodily structure, we not only may, but should, reckon him as a member of the class mammalia, and even (we believe) consider him as the representative of a mere family of the first order of that class. But all men are not zoologists; and even zoologists must, outside their science, consider man in his totality and not merely from the point of view of anatomy. If then we are right in our confident assertion that man's mental faculties are different in kind from those of brutes, and if he is, as we maintain, the only rational animal; then is man, as a whole, to be spoken of by preference from the point of view of his animality, or from the point of view of his rationality? Surely from the latter, and, if so, we must consider not structure, but action. * Now, Mr. Darwin seems to concede that a difference in kind would justify the placing of man in a distinct kingdom, inasmuch as he says a difference in degree does not so justify; and we have no hesitation in affirming (with Mr. Darwin) that between the instinctive powers of the coccus and the ant there is but a difference of degree, and that, therefore, they do belong to the same kingdom; but we contend it is quite otherwise with man. Mr. Darwin doubtless admits that all the wonderful actions of ants are mere modifications of instinct. But if it were not so -if the piercing of tunnels beneath rivers, etc., were evidence of their possession of reason, then, far from agreeing with Mr. Darwin, we should say that ants are rational animals, and that, while considered from the anatomical stand-point they would be insects, from that of their rationality they would rank together with man in a kingdom apart of "rational animals." Really, however, there is no tittle of evidence that ants possess the reflective, self-conscious, deliberate faculty; while the perfection of their instincts is a most powerful argument against the need of attributing a rudiment of rationality to any brute whatever. We seem then to have Mr. Darwin on our side when we affirm that animals possessed of mental faculties distinct in kind "Descent of Man," vol. 1. p. 186. should be placed in a kingdom apart. And man possesses such a distinction. Is this, however, all that can be said for the dignity of his position? Is he merely one division of the visible universe co-ordinate with the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms? It would be so if we were intelligent and no more. If he could observe the facts of his own existence, investigate the co-existences and successions of phenomena, but all the time remain like the other parts of the visible universe a mere floating unit in the stream of time, incapable of one act of free self-determination or one voluntary moral aspiration after an ideal of absolute goodness. This, however, is far from being the case. Man is not merely an intellectual animal, but he is also a free moral agent, and, as such, -and with the infinite future such freedom opens out before him-differs from all the rest of the visible universe by a distinction so profound that none of those which separate other visible beings is comparable with it. The gulf which lies between his being as a whole, and that of the highest brute, marks off vastly more than a mere kingdom of material beings; and man, so considered, differs far more from an elephant or a gorilla than do these from the dust of the earth on which they tread. Thus, then, in our judgment, the author of the "Descent of Man" has utterly failed in the only part of his work which is really important. Mr. Darwin's errors are mainly due to a radically false metaphysical system in which he seems (like so many other physicists) to have become entangled. Without a sound philosophical basis, however, no satisfactory scientific superstructure can ever be reared; and if Mr. Darwin's failure should lead to an increase of philosophic culture on the part of physicists, we may therein find some consolation for the injurious effects which his work is likely to produce on too many of our half-educated classes. We sincerely trust Mr. Darwin may yet live to furnish us with another work, which, while enriching physical science, shall not, with needless opposition, set at naught the first principles of both philosophy and religion. Blackwood's Magazine. THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE LOIRE CAMPAIGN. On the morning of the 14th November last, a wild rumor spread through Versailles; the lazy inhabitants of that lazy town grew almost excited, and, probably for the first time in their lives, actually ran to tell each other the great news, "The Prussians are going away." By twelve o'clock a crowd-at least what is called a crowd in the metropolis of Seineet-Oise—had assembled near the Prefecture, waiting eagerly and patriotically for the announced departure of the hated conqueror. The enthusiasm of its members grew from hour to hour as details of the royal packing-up began to circulate: the mayor told his private friends that King William's boxes were loaded in the four gons, spies came breathless from the Ombrages to say that the Crown Prince's baggage was being brought out on to the carriage-drive, while old ladies from the Rue de Provence and the Rue Neuve hurried up with the intelligence that out of their fifth-floor windows they had seen Count Bismark and Generals Moltke and Roon clearing out their papers. And all this was true; headquarters were positively going to a safer place-to Ferrières or Lagny, or perhaps further still. The prudent Germans did not like the look of things out westwards, and, though they told no one the reason why, they had decided to evacuate Versailles. The day wore on, however, and they did not go; the patient mob which had lined the pavement of the Rue des Chantiers, waiting to see the Royal Staff disappear, went home to dine. Night came and the sun rose again, but the black and white flag still waved over the Prefecture. The 15th was another anxious day; the Prussians themselves did not know what was going to happen, beyond the fact that all the staffs were ordered to be in readiness to leave, and that the baggage was loaded in the vans. No officer could give one word of information: they said gloomily, "There must be something wrong with Von der Tann," and then, like the people in the streets outside, they waited. The 16th brought desolation to the French and joy to Germany; before nine o'clock out came the order to unpack; boxes went up-stairs again, and the wearers of spiked helmets assured their acquaintan ces that it was all right once more. Lookers-on at Versailles or elsewhere did not suspect that the issue of the war was virtually decided during these two days, and that what seemed, at the moment, to be only a question of the posi tion of the Prussian King's headquarters, involved in reality the failure or success of the siege of Paris. This fact began to clearly show itself during the three ensuing weeks, but it was then only provable by results; its causes could not be distinctly traced. The coming publication of two French histories of the Loire campaign, the proofs of which have been most obligingly communicated for the purposes of this article, enables us at last to see exactly why King William was so nervous at Versailles on the 14th and 15th of November, and why the fate of Paris may be said to have then been settled. One of these histories is by General Chanzy, who, after commanding the 16th Corps on the Loire, became Commanderin-Chief in succession to General d'Aurelles de Paladines; the other, by far the most interesting of the two, is by M. de Freycinet, who was delegate of the Minister of War at Tours, under M. Gambetta. Both books will be widely read as soon as they appear. Shortly after the investment of Paris, General von der Tann was sent westwards to look for the much-talked-of French army of the Loire, and to cover the besiegers in that direction. He took with him his Bavarians and a couple of Prussian brigades, some 20,000 men in all. A division of cavalry was sent after him, as fine a troop of horsemen as ever sat in saddle; those who saw them reviewed at Satory on the 2d of October, before they rode to Orleans, will remember the gallant show they made. They included a white regiment of Cuirassiers, the Augusta Dragoons, and a regiment each of brown and green hussars. France had no soldiers ready to stop the march of Von der Tann. He entered Orleans on 13th October, almost without firing a shot, and took Chateaudun on the 18th. By the end of the month, however, General d'Aurelles's army had assumed a form which enabled him to act, and it was agreed that he should begin to move forward from Blois on the morning of the 29th October, with the intention of driving back the Bavarians, and then trying to reach Paris. But at the last moment he changed his mind; he telegraphed to Tours on the night of the 28th to say that the weather and the roads were bad, the equipment of part of the Garde Mobile very insufficient, and that it was consequently imprudent to attempt an action. It came out afterwards (as M. de Freycinet remarks) that the news of the capitulation of Metz had become known to General d'Aurelles that very afternoon, some hours before the Tours Government heard of it, and that it was the main cause of his decision not to move. This decision appears to have caused much disappointment at Tours, where it was immediately recognized that the Red Prince's army, suddenly set free, would come westward as fast as possible-and that it was indispensable to relieve Paris before its arrival, which was expected to take place about the 16th or 18th of November. But instead of hastening forward, the Loire army was delayed by "various circumstances, which it is difficult to determine with precision," amongst which, however, the current reports that an armistice had been concluded appear to have had much influence on General d'Aurelles, and to have disposed him to stop where he was. M. de Freycinet shows that the hesitations of the Commander-in-Chief were the object of continual correspondence between that officer and the Ministry of War; but, however strong may have been the pressure employed, it was not till the 7th of November, ten days after the date originally fixed, that the French army at last marched forward. Its total number had risen to 110,000 men. While this was going on along the Loire, the Prussians had decided to send reinforcements to General von der Tann. Some 30,000 men had therefore been detached from the army before Paris, and had been sent towards him under the orders of the Duke of Mecklenburg. But before they could reach their destination the French had got so close to Orleans that the Bavarians were obliged to march out to meet them. Von der Tann had to leave a garrison in Orleans, and could therefore bring out only about 15,000 men to face the whole of General d'Aurelles' force. "The natural consequence was, that when the two armies met round Coulmiers on the morning of 9th November, the Bavarians, after a good fight, got completely beaten. They owned themselves that if they had been pursued, every one of them, from the general to the last camp-follower, would inevitably have been taken prisoner. Having marched all night to come into action, they had to march all the next night to get away from it; and it was with stupefaction that the exhausted Bavarians discovered on the 10th that General d'Aurelles was not attempting to come after them. And this was not their only surprise. On the 11th the Duke of Mecklenburg met Von der Tann at Toury; and the latter was proposing arrangements to unite their two armies, so as to make a stand against the victorious French and cover Paris, when, to his, bewilderment, instructions were telegraphed from Versailles to abandon the direct line of defence, and to immediately march northwest to Dreux (leaving D'Aurelles to do what he liked), in order to stop another French army which was said to be march- • ing straight on Versailles from Argentan and Laigle. Looking back at all this by the light of history, it seems incredible that the clever Prussians should have been so utterly taken in by the fear of an army which did not exist, that they left the road to Paris wide open before D'Aurelles; and more incredible still, that the Tours Government should have failed to profit by the prodigious opportunity which was offered to them by this mistake of General Moltke. As the Prussians keep their own secrets, no one knew at Versailles, and no one knows now, why another imaginary French army was expected to appear at Dreux; but, thanks to General Chanzy and M. de Freycinet, we can see why the Bavarians were not pursued, and why the opportunity of raising the siege of Paris which was offered by their defeat was not utilized. It appears that when the fight began on the morning of the 9th, General Reyau, with ten regiments of cavalry and some batteries of horse-artillery, was ordered to cover the French left wing and to turn the German right; but that, “instead of doing so, he opened his guns on the Ger . man batteries," and reported "at two o'clock that his artillery had lost heavily in men and horses, and had no more ammunition, and that his cavalry had met with serious resistance everywhere. He seemed to expect that the enemy would out-flank him, and said he thought he should have to fall back." These are General Chanzy's own words. He goes on to say: "At five o'clock General Reyau again sent word that a column of infantry was appearing before him at Villamblain, and that he considered it indispensable to return to his encampment of the previous night. It was soon discovered that the column in question was composed of our own francs-tireurs ; but, unfortunately, the cavalry had already fallen back, night was coming on, and it was impossible to get the regiments forward again." So that, when the battle was won by the centre and right, no cavalry was up to pursue the victory, or to ascertain the movements of the retreating Germans. The French slept on the field, but it began to rain and snow: the night was bad, there was no wood for fires, and the supplies of food and ammunition were got to the front with much difficulty. When day broke, Admiral Jauréguiberry sent his own escort, forty-five men, in pursuit of the Bavarians, and they took two guns, 130 prisoners, and quantities of baggage and ammunition. If forty-five hussars could do this, what would General Reyau's ten regiments have effected? General d'Aurelles does not seem, however, to have even thought of following up his victory, though he must have had 90,000 men still in fighting condition, against the united 50,000 of Mecklenburg and Von der Tann. "The following days," says General Chanzy, "were employed in organizing convoys, in completing the artillery, and in procuring clothes for the soldiers." Day followed day, and the French did not move; their outposts advanced, but the army remained inactive. Von der Tann left a few troops in Etampes, and marched away with the rest to join the Duke of Mecklenburg at Chartres; so that, by the 14th, there were not 5,000 Germans between D'Aurelles and Paris. With these facts before us, it is easy to comprehend the terrors of Versailles. General Moltke knew that nothing would stop D'Aurelles if he marched resolutely on by Etampes to the Seine; he feared that Mecklenburg would not get into position between Chartres and Dreux in time to paralyze the other imaginary army, which was supposed to be driving on Versailles in that direction; so that, on 14th and 15th November, the German headquarters expected to be attaked behind from Rambouillet, and to be cut off from their line of communications eastward by D'Aurelles. It is not strange that they should have packed up their boxes; it seemed impossible to the energetic Prussians that their enemy would not rush at them instantly and make a desperate attempt to break the line of investment south of Paris before Prince Frederic Charles could reach it; but when they learnt, on the night of the 15th, that D'Aurelles had made no sign -that the Red Prince's outposts had reached the line of which Montargis is the centre-and that no French army had shown itself beyond Dreux-they took courage, stopped where they were, and so evaded the grave moral consequer.ces which would have ensued on an evacuation of Versailles. While the German headquarters were in this critical position, a conference had taken place, on 12th November, between the French generals and M. Gambetta, who had come up from Tours to congratulate the troops on the victory of Coulmiers. General Borel, a most able officer, who has since been chief of the staff to Marshal MacMahon during the Communist siege of Paris, proposed to march straight to the Seine, but General d'Aurelles would not have that at all; "not only did it seem to him impossible to continue the offensive, but he considered it was dangerous even to remain at Orleans. He said the enemy would be back on him directly; that M. Thiers" (who had just returned from Versailles) "had seen 80,000 Prussians marching down from Paris; that he was certain to be attacked in a day or two, and that his army was unfit to stand the shock." Finally, he proposed to immediately evacuate Orleans, and to return to his old position at Salbris. M. Gambetta, M. de Freycinet, and General Borel energetically opposed these arguments; but all they could obtain from General d'Aurelles was, that instead of abandoning Orleans, the army should retrench itself round the town: no forward movement should be made, for the moment at least; but it was admitted |