"A. I had never seen her drive a car, no, sir. father did not have a car; nor any of her people. "Q. You didn't get out and walk, did you? "A. No.

* * *

Her

"Q. You stuck by the hind seat, didn't you? "A. Yes, sir. She took hold of the wheel and we proceeded. We hadn't gone very far until she tipped us over, about three blocks as near as I can imagine.'

Plaintiff was injured. Of the cause of the accident plaintiff expressed the opinion that "she turned out too far" and said

"She turned back into the road again to pass this large car and she turned out again and back into the road and when she turned back into the road the second time the car overturned."

Defendant's negligence was said to be the permitting the girl, inexperienced in driving, to drive the automobile. When plaintiff rested, counsel for defendant made a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that no actionable negligence had been shown and that, in any event, plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. A verdict was directed and judgment for defendant entered. This, plaintiff says, was error.

The record and the testimony quoted show that just after passing another automobile and turning back into the road, and while the girl, said to be without experience in driving, was driving, an accident happened, but they do not show that the driving of the girl, so permitted by defendant, was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury-do not bring the cause of the accident out of the realm of conjecture. Defendant's liability may not be assumed merely because an accident happened while this girl was driving. No presumption of negligence is raised by the mere happening of an accident or proof of injury resulting

217 Mich.-17.

therefrom. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Park, 197 Mich. 142; Burghardt v. Railway, 206 Mich. 545.

It is said that defendant made the statement that he was at fault for letting the girl drive the car. But this is an admission of a rule of law which the court is not bound to accept if satisfied that no right of action appears. See City of Detroit v. Beckman, 34

Mich. 125.

Rulings as to admission of evidence are questioned, but we find no reversible error.

Judgment affirmed.

FELLOWS, C. J., and STONE and SHARPE, JJ., concurred with CLARK, J.

MOORE, J. (dissenting). I do not agree with the conclusion reached by Justice CLARK. It is doubtless true that the modern automobile is one of the most wonderful and useful inventions of the age. No one agency has so contributed to the pleasure and enjoyment of so many people. In the hands of a competent, experienced driver it can be relied upon, ordinarily, to go where the driver wants it to go. It will not get frightened and shy. When in good order It will not back

it will not balk and refuse to go. unless the driver desires it to do so. Its speed can be absolutely controlled when it is in good condition. It can be slowed down so as to accommodate itself to the exigencies of travel. It can be relied upon to travel rapidly when that is a desirable thing to do. On the other hand, the immense power which may be developed under the hood of the automobile makes it, in the hands of a reckless driver, a very dangerous machine. It is nearly as dangerous in the hands of an inexperienced person as when driven by a reckless driver. One cannot read his morning paper thoroughly without being impressed by the number of people

who are daily maimed for life, or who are ushered out of this life into the next because of the improper use of these powerful machines. It is probable that more serious injuries and deaths are caused by the reckless and incompetent use of automobiles and automobile trucks than by all other accidents combined. It ought to go without saying that, when the owner of an automobile, carrying a passenger for hire, turns the driving of the machine over to one who has never driven an automobile before, the very height of negligence is shown. See Berry on Automobiles (3d) Ed.), pp. 15-17; People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. at p. 121 (102 N. E. 530, 46 L. R. A. [N. S.] 977, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 161); Lauson v. Town of Fond du Lac, 141 Wis. at p. 59 (123 N. W. 629, 25 L. R. A. [N. S.] 40, 135 Am. St. Rep. 30); Scott v. O'Leary, 157 Iowa, at p. 230 (138 N. W. 512); Savoy v. McLeod, 111 Me. 234 (88 Atl. 721, 48 L. R. A. [N. S.] 971); Schoepper v. Hancock Chemical Co., 113 Mich. at p. 586; Woods v. Chalmers Motor Co., 207 Mich. at p. 569.

When under these circumstances the machine, within three blocks, leaves the road twice and finally turns turtle, it is not difficult to trace the effect back to the cause, to wit, the inexperienced driver.

We now come to the other question: Was the plaintiff, who had agreed to pay the defendant $1.50 for a ride to Grand Rapids, guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, because she did not leave the machine? She was 27 miles from home. She was 5 miles from her destination. Should she get out and walk, or might she assume that, as the owner of the machine had been warned of the inexperience of the girl, he would heed the warning, or that he would sit by the side of her with his hands on the wheel so that the automobile would not get out of her control? I think the question of the negligence of the owner of the machine was for the jury. I also think

the question of contributory negligence was for the jury.

In my opinion the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs in favor of the plaintiff. WIEST, BIRD, and STEERE, JJ., concurred with MOORE, J.

In re SALSBURY.

1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISBARMENT-REINSTATEMENT OF COURT.

The right of the court disbarring an attorney to reinstate him is inherent in such court.

2. SAME VACATION OF ORDER OF DISBARMENT REINSTATEMENT— NONRESIDENT.

On petition of a disbarred attorney for reinstatement, upon a showing of high moral character and that he has fully expiated the fault and offense for which he was disbarred, the Supreme Court will vacate the order of disbarment as of this date, but because he is no longer a resident of this State his petition for reinstatement must be denied.

Petition by Lant K. Salsbury for reinstatement as an attorney at law. Submitted October 4, 1921. (Calendar No. 19,406.) Denied February 8, 1922.

Charles E. Ward, for petitioner.

Clarence A. Lightner, contra.

WIEST, J. April 7, 1903, petitioner was disbarred

by an order of this court. He now petitions the court to reinstate him and alleges that in September, 1904, he became a resident of the city of Memphis in the State of Tennessee, where he has been since that date and is now engaged in business other than the practice of law. He avers good moral character and full expiation of the fault and offense for which he was disbarred. He also states that he does not expect to resume the practice of law in this State or elsewhere. Upon the filing of the petition we requested the State board of law examiners to file a brief and such brief has been filed and it is contended therein that the petitioner cannot be reinstated as a member of the Michigan bar until he has complied with the statute relative to admission to the bar in the first instance; citing In re Newton, 27 Mont. 182 (70 Pac. 510, 982).

The right of the court disbarring an attorney to reinstate him is inherent in such court and has long been exercised. To reinstate a disbarred attorney means to again invest him with the right to practice; it is not a revocation of the order of disbarment, neither does a reinstatement relate back in point of time to the disbarment but merely clothes him with the rights and duties and obligations of an attorney from the date of reinstatement.

This is a proceeding upon a showing that, since such disbarment, the petitioner has by a life of rectitude demonstrated that he is possessed of moral character sufficient to again be a member of the bar. The right to reinstate being inherent in the court we think the practice is well stated in the Matter of John A. King, 54 Ohio St. 415 (43 N. E. 686):

"When a member of the bar of the State has been, upon proper proceedings, disbarred, and the judgment remains in full force and unreversed, the only remedy of the party is, at the proper time and on a proper