conferring degrees, or otherwise, as they think fit, the public orator is to notify this intention to the person or persons concerned; and so in other

cases.

Another part of the public orator's business is to present young noblemen, or those who take honorary degrees, tanquam nobiles, to the vicechancellor this he does in a Latin oration, of which the subject is generally a defence of that particular statute which allows the sons of noblemen, and some few others, to proceed to degrees before what is called the statutable time. In doing this, encomiums are made upon the learning and virtue of the noble candidate; a view is taken of the dignity of his ancient house; the honor is mentioned which has accrued to the university from the accession of such a member; and the oration concludes with promising great credit from his future conduct, as well as benefit from the influence of his rank in the state. These circumstances are deemed sufficient grounds for exempting the sons of noblemen from that tedious course of study through which the sons of commoners must all pass before they be thought worthy of academical honors.

ORATORIO, in the Italian music, a sort of sacred drama of dialogues; containing recitativos, duettos, trios, ritornellos, choruses, &c. The subjects of those pieces are usually taken from Scripture. Oratorios are greatly used in Rome in the time of Lent, and are now common in England. Menestrier attributes the origin of oratorios to the crusades, and says that the pilgrims returning from Jerusalem and the Holy Land, &c., composed songs, reciting the life and death of the Son of God, and the mysteries of the Christian faith, and celebrating the achievements and constancy of saints and martyrs. Others, with more probability, observe that the oratorio was an avowed imitation of the opera, with only this difference, that the foundation of it was always some religious or moral subject. Crescimbeni ascribes its origin to St. Philip Neri, who, in his chapel, after sermons, in order to allure young people to pious offices, had hymns and psalms sung by one or more voices. Among these spiritual songs were dialogues; and these entertainments, improving every year, gave rise in the seventeenth century to oratorios, so called from the place of their origin.

ORATORY has been defined the art of speaking well upon any subject, in order to persuade. The terms rhetoric and oratory, having no other difference but that one is taken from the Greek language, and the other from the Latin, may be used synonymously; but the case is not the same with respect to the words rhetorician and orator. For, although the Grecians used the former, both to express those who taught the art, and those who practised it, yet the Romans afterward, when they took that word into their language, confined it to the teachers of the art, and called the rest orators. And there seems to have been a sufficient reason for this distinction, since the art was the same in both, and might therefore go by either name: but the different province of rhetoricians and orators made it not proper that they should be called by different names. Besides, anciently, before rhetoric was made a separate and distinct art from philosophy, the same persons taught both. And then they were called not only rhetoricians but sophists. But, because they often employed their art rather to vindicate what was false and unjust, than to support truth and virtue, this disingenuous conduct, by which they frequently imposed upon weak minds, brought discredit both upon themselves and their profession. And therefore the word sophist, or sophister, has been more generally used in an ill sense, to signify one skilled rather in the arts of cavilling, than qualified to speak well and accurately upon any subject.

The

History of oratory.-The invention of oratory is by the Egyptians and the fables of the poets ascribed to Mercury. Quintilian says faculty of speech we derive from nature; but the art from observation.' But no certain account can be given when, or by whom, this art first

began to be cultivated. We learn from Homer that the art was very early in high esteem among the Greeks, as that poet greatly celebrates Nestor and Ulysses for their eloquence. Quintilian says that afterwards Empedocles is the first upon record who attempted any thing concerning it. And he, by Sir Isaac Newton's account, flourished about 500 years after Troy was taken. Cicero says, Though some had spoken well before Corax and Tisias, yet none with order and method.' But Gorgias had a golden statue erected to him at Delphos, an honor conferred upon him only; and he is said to have been so great a master of oratory, that, in a public assembly, he would undertake to declaim immediately upon any subject proposed to him. He wrote, as Cicero informs us, in the demonstrative or laudatory way; which requires most of the sublime, and makes what Diodorus Siculus says of him the more probable, that 'he first introduced the strongest figures, members of periods opposite in sense, of an equal length, or ending with a like sound, and other ornaments of that nature.' And hence those figures which give the greatest force and lustre to a discourse were anciently called by his name. Cicero tells us farther that Thrasymachus and Gorgias were the first who introduced numbers into prose, which Isocrates afterwards brought to perfection. Quintilian likewise mentions Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Thrasymachus, as the first who treated of common places, and showed the use of them. Plato wrote an elegant dialogue upon this subject, which is still extant, entitled Gorgias.

Isocrates was the most renowned of all Gorgias's scholars. Cicero extols him as the greatest master and teacher of oratory; 'whose school, like the Trojan horse, sent forth many great men?

Aristotle was chiefly induced to engage in this province from an emulation of his glory. Quintilian says they both wrote upon the art, though there is no system of the former extant. But that of Aristotle is esteemed the best and most complete of any in the Greek language. In this age the Grecian eloquence appeared in its highest perfection. Demosthenes was a hearer both of Isocrates and Plato, as also of Isæus (ten of whose orations are yet extant); and by his surprising genius, and indefatigable industry, made such advantage of their precepts, that he has been always esteemed by the best judges the prince of Grecian orators. His great adversary and rival Æschines, after his banishment, is said to have gone to Rhodes, and employed his time there in teaching rhetoric. Theodectes and Theophrastus, both scholars of Aristotle, imitated their master in writing upon the art. And from that time the Greek philosophers, especially the stoics and peripatetics, applied themselves to lay down the rules of oratory; which Socrates had before separated from the province of a philosopher. There is preserved à treatise upon this subject, which some ascribe to Demetreus Phalereus, though others, more probably, to Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Quintilian mentions several other rhetoricians in the following ages, who were likewise writers; as Hermagoras, Athenæus, Apollonius, Molo, Areus Cæcilius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Apollonius of Pergamus, and Theodore of Gadara. But of these nothing now remains upon the subject of oratory, except some tracts of Dionysius, who flourished in the reign of Augustus. But some eminent writers on this subject have appeared among the Greeks since the time of Quintilian, particularly Hermogenes, and Longinus, the author of the incomparable treatise of the Sublime.

It was long before the Romans cultivated this art, and not without difficulty at first. The reason was, that for several ages they were wholly addicted to military affairs. Therefore, so late as A. U. C. 592, when by the industry of some Grecians the liberal arts began to flourish in Italy, a decree passed the senate, by which all philosophers and rhetoricians were ordered to depart out of Rome. But in a few years after, when Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes, who were not only philosophers but orators, came ambassadors from Athens to Rome, the Roman youth were so charmed with the eloquence of their harangues, that they could no longer be stopped from pursuing the study of oratory. And, by a further acquaintance with the Greeks, it soon came into such esteem, that persons of the first quality employed their time and pains to acquire it. Seneca tells us, that Lucius Plotius, a Gaul, was the first who taught the art of oratory at Rome in Latin; which, Cicero says, was while he was a boy. Seneca adds, that this profession continued for some time in the hands of freed men; and that the first Roman who engaged in it was Blandus, of the equestrian order, who was succeeded by others; some of whose lives are extant, written by Suetonius, as many of the Grecians are by Philostratus and Eunapius. Quintilian likewise gives us the names of those Romans who wrote upon the art. The

first,' says he, 'who composed any thing upon the subject, was M. Cato the censor; and after him Antony the orator; which is the only work he has left, and that imperfect. Then followed some of less note. But he who carried eloquence to its highest pitch among us was Cicero; who has, likewise, by his rules, given the best plan both to practise and teach the art. Cornificius wrote largely upon the subject; Stertinius, and Gallio, the father, each of them something. But Celsus and Lenas were more accurate than Gallio: and in our times Virginius, Pliny, and Rutilius. Time has deprived us of most of the writers mentioned by Quintilian. But we have the less reason to regret this; inasmuch as, besides his Two Books of Invention, which Quintilian here calls his Books of Rhetoric, there are extant his Three Books of an Orator; one of Famous Orators; and another entitled The Orator; also his Topics, a preface concerning the best sort of Orators; and a treatise of the Parts of Oratory. Each of these treatises, whether we regard the justness and delicacy of the thoughts, the usefulness of the rules, or the elegance and beauty of the style, deserves to be frequently perused by all lovers of eloquence. But the four books to Herennius, which are published among Cicero's works, seem with good reason to be attributed to Cornificius.

Celsus, whom Quintilian places among the best rhetoricians, is also said to have taught oratory. His eight books of Medicine are yet extant, written in so beautiful a style as plainly shows him a master of eloquence. But Quintilian himself excelled all who went before him in diligence and accuracy as a writer. His Institutions are so comprehensive, and written with such exactness and judgment, that they are generally allowed to be the most perfect work of the kind. There were some other orators in the following ages, whose works are extant; but, as they contain nothing of moment, it is unnecessary to enumerate them. The archbishop of Cambray gives it as his opinion, that the method of forming the system of oratory is to collect it from the finest precepts of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longinus, and other celebrated authors of antiquity.

Objects and divisions of oratory.-The business of oratory is to teach us to speak well; which, as Cicero explains it, is to speak justly, methodically, floridly, and copiously.

It consists of four parts; invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation. Every one who aims to speak well and accurately upon any subject, pursues such thoughts as seem most proper to explain and illustrate the thing upon which he designs to discourse. And, if the nature of it requires that he should bring reasons to confirm what he says, he not only seeks the strongest, and such as are like to be best received, but prepares to answer any objection which may be offered to the contrary. This is invention. After this he considers how he can best arrange those arguments which have occurred to his mind, that they may appear in the plainest light, and not lose their force by disorder and confusion. This is disposition. His next care is to give his thoughts an agreeable dress; by selecting the

most proper words, clearest expressions, smooth and harmonious periods, with other ornaments of style, as may best suit the nature of his subject, brighten his discourse, and render it most entertaining to his hearers. This is elocution. 'The last thing is to deliver what he has thus composed with a just and agreeable pronunciation. And daily experience convinces us how much this contributes both to engage the attention, and impress what is spoken upon the minds

of the hearers.

PART I.

OF INVENTION.

I. Of invention in general; and particularly of common places, and the state of a cause.-Invention, in general, is the discovery of such things as are proper to persuade. To attain this end, the orator proposes three things: 1. To prove or illustrate the subject upon which he treats; 2. To conciliate the minds of his hearers, and to engage their passions in his favor; and, 3. As these require different kinds of arguments or motives, invention furnishes him with a supply for each of them. An argument, as defined by Cicero, is a reason which induces us to believe what before we doubted of. And, as different kinds of discourses require different arguments, rhetoricians have considered them two ways; in general, under certain heads, as a common fund for all subjects; and, in a more particular manner, as they are suited to demonstrative, deliberative, or judicial discourses.

Extensive knowledge is the noblest fund of invention. An orator, therefore, should be furnished with a stock of important truths, solid maxims, and a variety of knowledge, collected both from observation and acquaintance with the liberal arts; that he may not only be able to express himself in the most agreeable manner, but likewise to support what he says with the strongest and clearest arguments. But, as all have not the same opportunity to cultivate their minds with learning and knowledge, art has prescribed a method to lessen in some measure, these difficulties, and help every one to a supply of arguments upon any subject. And this has been done by common places, which Cicero calls the seats or heads of arguments, and, by a name from the Greek, topics. They are of two sorts, internal and external.

1. Internal topics arise from the subject upon which the orator treats; and are therefore distinguished from external, which he fetches from without, and applies to his purpose. Cicero and Quintilian make them sixteen; of which three comprehend the whole thing they are brought to prove, namely, definition, enumeration, and notation; of the remaining thirteen, some contain a part of it, and the rest its various properties and circumstances, with other considerations relating to it; these are, genus, species, antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, conjugates, cause, effect, contraries, opposites, similitude, dissimilitude, and comparison. Definition explains the nature of the thing defined, and shows what it is. Enumeration takes in all the parts of a thing. And from this we prove, that what

agrees to all the parts agrees to the whole. Notation, or etymology, explains the meaning or signification of a word. Genus contains under it two or more species of things, differing in nature. Species is that which comprehends under it all the individuals of the same nature. Antecedents are such things, as, being once allowed, others necessarily, or very probably, follow. Consequents are such things, as, being allowed, necessarily or very probably infer their antecedents. Adjuncts are separable properties of things, or circumstances that attend them. These are very numerous, and afford a great variety of arguments. They do not necessarily infer their subject; but, if fitly chosen, render a thing credible, and are a good ground for assent. Conjugates are words deduced from the same origin with that of our subject. By these the habit is proved from its acts. A cause is that by the force of which a thing does exist. There are four kinds of causes, matter, form, efficient, and end, which afford a great variety of arguments. The way of reasoning from them is to infer the effect from the cause. An effect is that which arises from a cause, therefore the cause is proved by it. Contraries are things, which, under the same genus, are at the utmost distance from each other; so that what we grant to the one we deny the other. Opposites are things, which, though repugnant to each other, yet are not directly contradictory: as, To love and to injure, to hate and to commend. They differ from contraries in this, that they do not absolutely exclude one another. Similitude is an agreement of things in quality. Dissimilitude is a disagreement of things in quality. Comparison is made three ways; for either a thing is compared with a greater, with a less, or with its equal. This, therefore, differs from similitude on this account, that the quality was considered in that, but here the quantity. From this account of common places, as laid down by the orators of ancient Greece and Rome, it is easy to conceive what a large field of discourse they open to the mind upon every subject. One who had no other aim,' says Dr. Blair, but to talk copiously and plausibly, by consulting them on every subject, and laying hold of all that they suggested, might discourse without end; and that too, though he had only the most superficial knowledge of his subject. But such discourse could be no other than trivial. What is truly solid and persuasive must be drawn from a thorough knowledge of the subject, and profound meditation on it. They who would direct students of oratory to any other sources of argumentation, only delude them; and, by attempting to render rhetoric too perfect an art, they render it, in truth, a trifling and childish study.'

2. External topics are all taken from authorities, and have one general name, Testimony. All testimonies may be distinguished into two sorts, divine and human. A divine testimony, when certainly known to be such, is incontestable, and admits of no debate. Human testimonies, considered as furnishing the orator with arguments, may be reduced to three heads; writings, witnesses, and contracts. The occasion of dispute respecting written testimonies, which may afford

the orator an opportunity of displaying his abilities, may arise from five circumstances, viz. ambiguity, disagreement between words and intention, contrariety, reasoning, and interpretation. Of these it would be superfluous to give · examples.

3. Of the state of a controversy.—The ancients, observing that the principal question or point of dispute in all controversies might be referred to some particular head, reduced those heads to a certain number, that both the nature of the question might thus be better known, and the arguments suited to it be discovered with greater ease. And these heads they call states. The number of these states both Cicero and Quintilian reduce to three; and tell us that three things may be enquired into in all disputes: Whether a thing is? what it is? and how it is? II. Of arguments suited to demonstrative discourses. These consist either in praise or dispraise; and, agreeably to the nature of all contraries, one of them will serve to illustrate the other. Either persons or things may be the subjects of praise.

1. In praising or dispraising persons, rhetoricians prescribe two methods: 1. To follow the order in which every thing happened that is mentioned in the discourse; 2. To reduce what is said under certain general heads, without a strict regard to the order of time. i. In pursuing the former method, the discourse may be very conveniently divided into three periods. The first of which will contain what preceded the person's birth; the second the whole course of his life; and the third what followed upon his death. ii. The other method is to reduce the discourse to certain general heads, without regarding the order of time. As if any one, in praising the elder Cato, should propose to do it, by showing that he was a most prudent senator, an excellent orator, and most valiant general.

1. In praising things, all beings inferior to man may be proper subjects for praise or dispraise; whether animate or inanimate; whether ideal or real; as virtues, vices, countries, cities, &c. But what chiefly claim the attention of the orator, as subjects of praise or dispraise, are the actions of men.

III. Of arguments suited to deliberative discourses. This kind of discourse must have been very ancient; since, doubtless, from the earliest period of men conversing together, they deliberated upon their common interest, and offered their advice to each other. But neither those of the laudatory nor judicial kind could be introduced till mankind were settled in communities. The early practice of suasory discourses appears from sacred writ, where we find that, when Moses was ordered upon an embassy into Egypt, he would have excused himself for want of eloquence. And Homer represents the Greeks at the siege of Troy, as anxiously running to hear their generals harangue them. Nor is this part of oratory less conspicuous for its usefulness to mankind than for its antiquity; being highly beneficial either in councils, camps, or any societies of men. How many instances have we upon record, where the fury of an enraged multitude has been checked and appeased by the

prudent and artful persuasion of some particular person! The story of Menenius Agrippa, who pacified the commons of Rome, when they withdrew from the senators, and retired out of the city, by his fable of the Belly deserted by the other members, is well known. And how often have armies been fired to the most dangerous exploits, or recalled to their duty, when ready to mutiny, by a moving speech of their general!

The principal heads of argument proper for advice are those taken from the nature of the thing under consideration. 1. Pleasure often affords a very cogent argument in discourses of this nature. 2. Profit or advantage has no less influence upon mankind than the former; and, when it respects things truly valuable, it is a very just and laudable motive. 3. Honor, than which no argument will sooner prevail with generous minds, or inspire them with greater ardor.

But although a thing, considered in itself, appear beneficial if it could be attained, yet the expediency of undertaking it may still be questionable; in which case the following heads, taken from the circumstances which attend it, will afford proper arguments to engage in it :1. The possibility of succeeding may sometimes be argued as one motive to this end. 2. But an argument founded upon probability will be much more likely to prevail. 3. But as even probability is not a motive strong enough with many persons to engage in the prosecution of a thing which is attended with considerable difficulties, it is often necessary to represent the facility of doing it, as an additional reason. If the thing advised can be shown to be in any respect necessary, this will render the motive still much stronger for undertaking it. 5. To these heads may be added the consideration of the event, which in some cases carries great weight with it. As when we advise to the doing of a thing from this motive, That whether it succeed or not, it will yet be of service to undertake it.

4.

These are the principal heads which furnish the orator with proper arguments in giving advice. But no small skill and address are required in giving it. For since the tempers and sentiments of mankind, as well as their circumstances, are very various, it is often necessary to accommodate the discourse to their opinions and prejudices. And therefore the weightiest arguments are not always the most proper and fittest to be used on all occasions. Cicero, in treating upon this subject, distinguishes mankind into two sorts; the ignorant, who always prefer profit to honor; and such as are civilized, who prefer honor and reputation.

IV. Of arguments suited to judicial discourses. —In judicial controversies there are two parties; the plaintiff or prosecutor, and the defendant or person charged. The subject is always something past, and the ends proposed by them Cicero calls equity or right; the former of which arises from the laws of the country, and the latter from reason and the nature of things.

All judicial causes are either private or public. Private causes, or civil causes, relate to the right of particular persons. Public causes are those which relate to public justice and the government of the state; which are also called

criminal, because by them crimes are prosecuted, whether capital, or of a less heinous nature. We need only take the heads of the arguments from this last kind, because they are more copious, and easy to be illustrated; whence such as agree to the former will sufficiently appear. 1. The conjectural state. When the accused person denies the fact, there are three things which the prosecutor has to consider: whether he would have done it, whether he could, and whether he did it. And hence arise three topics; from the will, the power, and the signs or circumstances which attended the action. The affections of the mind discover the will; as passion, an old grudge, a desire of revenge, a resentment of an injury, and the like. The second head is the power of doing a thing; and there are three things which relate to this, the place, the time, and opportunity. The third head comprehends the signs and circumstances which either preceded, accompanied, or followed, the commission of the fact. So threats, or the accused person being seen at or near the place before the fact was committed, are circumstances that may probably precede murder; fighting, crying out, bloodshed, are such as accompany it; paleness, trembling, inconsistent answers, hesitation, or faltering of the speech, something found upon the person accused which belonged to the deceased, are such as follow it. These are the topics from which the prosecutor takes his arguments. The business of the defendant is to invalidate these. Therefore such as are brought from the will, he either endeavours to show are not true, or so weak as to merit very little regard. And he refutes those taken from the power, by proving that he wanted either opportunity or ability; as, if he can show, that neither the place nor time insisted on was at all proper; or that he was then in another place. In like manner he will endeavour to confute the circumstances, if they cannot be directly denied, by showing that they are not such as necessarily accompany the fact, but might have proceeded from other causes, though nothing of what is alleged had been committed; and it will be of great service to assign some other probable cause. 2. The definitive state, which is principally concerned in defining and fixing the name proper to the fact; though orators seldom use exact definitions, but commonly choose larger descriptions, taken from various properties of the subject or thing described. The heads of argument in this state are much the same to both parties. For each of them defines the fact his own way, and endeavours to refute the other's definition.

3. The third state is that of quality, in which the dispute turns upon the justice of an action. And here the defendant does not deny he did the thing he is charged with; but asserts it to be right and equitable, from the circumstances of the case, and the motives which induced him to it.

4. Lastly, a fact is sometimes rather excused than defended, by pleading that it was not done designedly, or with any ill intent. This is called concession; and consists of two parts, apology

and intreaty. The former represents the matter as the effect of inadvertency, chance, or necessity. V. Of the character and address of an orator. Having considered and explained the first part of invention, which furnishes the orator with such arguments as are necessary for the proof of his subject, we are next to show what are the proper means to conciliate the minds of his hearers, to gain their affection, and to recommend both himself and what he says to their good opinion and esteem. This is by Quintilian called propriety of manners. And he adds, it is necessary that every thing appear easy and natural, and the disposition of the speaker be discovered by his words.' There are four qualities said to be suited to the character of an orator, which should appear in his discourses, to render what he says acceptable to his hearers; and these are, wisdom, integrity, benevolence, and modesty. It is the orator's business to consider the various characters and circumstances of life, with the different bias and way of thinking they give to the mind; that he may so conduct himself in his behaviour and manner of speaking as will render him most acceptable, and gain him the good esteem of those whom he addresses.

VI. Of the passions.-As it is often highly necessary for the orator, so it requires his greatest skill, to engage the passions in his interest. Where persons will neither be convinced by reason, nor moved by the authority of the speaker, the only way left to put them upon action is to engage their passions. The passions may be separately referred, either to demonstrative, deliberative, or judicial discourses; though they are not confined to any of them. 1. To the demonstrative kind we may refer joy and sorrow, love and hatred, emulation and contempt. 2. To deliberative discourses may be referred fear, hope, and shame. 3. To judicial discourses may be referred anger and lenity, pity and indignation.

These are the passions with which an orator is principally concerned. In addressing which, not only the greatest warmth and force of expression is often necessary, but he must likewise first endeavour to impress his own mind with the same passion he would excite in others. A man may convince, and even persuade others to act, by mere reason and argument. But that degree of eloquence which gains the admiration of mankind, and properly denominates one an orator, is never found without warmth or passion. Passion, when in such a degree as to rouse and kindle the mind, without throwing it out of the possession of itself, is universally found to exalt all the human powers. It renders the mind more enlightened, penetrating, vigorous, and masterly, than it is in its calm moments. A man actuated by a strong passion becomes much greater than he is at other times. He is at no loss for words and arguments. He transmits to others, by a sort of contagious sympathy, the warm sentiments which he feels; his looks and gestures are all persuasive; and nature here shows herself infinitely more powerful than art.