king in council. For the purpose of hearing these appeals, as well as all colonial and other appeals to the king in council, a committee was constituted in the following year, to be called "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," and to consist of all members of the council who held for the time being, or had previously held, the office of president of the council, or one of the leading judicial offices, such as Lord Chancellor or chief of a common law court, and also of two other privy councillors appointed by the king. The committee were to make a report or recommendation upon the appeals to the king in council for his decision, as previous committees had done. The king was also authorised to refer to the Judicial Committee such other matters as should seem expedient, and they have accordingly been invested with certain powers in reference to copyrights and patents. By a later Act, every archbishop or bishop on the Privy Council was to be a member of the Judicial Committee, for the purpose of hearing ecclesiastical appeals; and when these came before it, at least one archbishop was to be present. And the appointment of salaried members of the committee was authorised in 1871.

Central Criminal Court.-In 1834 a new court, called the Central Criminal Court, was established for the trial of offences committed in London and Middlesex, and certain portions of Essex, Kent, and Surrey. The judges who usually sit in this court are the common law judges and the recorder, common serjeant, and judge of the Sheriffs' Court of London. The establishment of this court, which may at first sight appear inconsistent with the decentralising policy adopted as to civil matters by the erection of the county courts in recent times, was primarily rendered necessary by the enormous growth of the metropolis and its suburbs.

Probate and Divorce Court.-Up to within a recent date the ecclesiastical courts possessed exclusive jurisdiction over testamentary and matrimonial matters, subject only to the interference of Parliament, which occasionally granted a divorce between parties by special private Act. But in 1857 all jurisdiction in these matters was transferred to the Crown, and a Court of Probate and Divorce was constituted to deal with them.

Parliament.-The conflict between the House of Commons and the courts of law in the case of Stockdale v. Hansard, has been already noticed (p. 152). In an action which grew out of it the power of the Lower House to inflict imprisonment was distinctly recognised. The action was brought by Stockdale's attorney, Howard, for assault and wrongful imprisonment, against Mr Gosset, the serjeant-at-arms, who, by order of the House, had taken him into custody. The Court of Queen's Bench decided in Howard's favour, but this decision was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber, and Baron Parke (afterwards Lord Wensleydale), in delivering the judgment of the court, affirmed what had before been laid down by Lord Camden, namely, that "the House of Commons is a part of the High Court of Parliament, which is, without question, not merely a superior, but the Supreme Court in this country, and higher than the ordinary courts of law" (Gosset v. Howard, in error, 10 Q. B. 456).

The power of punishment has, however, of late been very sparingly exercised by Parliament. In 1838, for a much grosser libel on the House of Commons than many for which members had in former times suffered imprisonment, O'Connell was merely reprimanded in his place in the House by the Speaker.

Contempt.-Akin to the right of Parliament to punish offences connected with itself is the power, which

the superior courts of law and equity have always possessed, of punishing by fine and imprisonment what is called contempt of court (see p. 45). This offence may be committed either by disobedience to the orders of the court, or by speaking or writing in derogation of its authority, or even by publishing, while a cause is in progress, comments upon it calculated to prejudice the course of justice. One of the most notable recent instances of it occurred in January 1873, in connection with the trial of the claimant to the Tichborne estates for perjury, which was then impending.

Supreme Court of Judicature.—In 1873 an Act was passed, which was to come into operation on the 2d November 1874, and which consolidated, as from that date, the Court of Chancery, the three common law courts, the Courts of Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty, and the London Court of Bankruptcy, into one Supreme Court of Judicature. This Court was to consist of two divisions: one of which, called "Her Majesty's High Court of Justice," was to deal with such matters as would previously have come before the different courts which were to be now consolidated, or before the Courts of Common Pleas of Lancaster and Durham, or the circuit courts. The old distinctions between the courts were to be so far maintained, that the High Court of Justice was to be divided into five divisions, corresponding to and bearing the names of the consolidated courts (the Court of Bankruptcy being, however, merged in the Exchequer division). But all the divisions were to have concurrent jurisdiction to try any cause brought before them; except that certain specified matters, which had formerly been within the exclusive province of one of the old courts, were by the Act specially assigned to the corresponding division of the new court. The other division of the

Supreme Court was to be called "Her Majesty's Court of Appeal," and was to hear appeals from the decisions of the High Court of Justice, just as the appellate Courts of Chancery and Common Law, and the Judicial Committee of Privy Council, had previously heard appeals in equity, common law, admiralty, and lunacy matters. Moreover, to this division was to be transferred the jurisdiction of the Stannaries Court (see p. 85), and also that of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in ecclesiastical matters, provision being made for the attendance of some of the archbishops and bishops as assessors to the judges when such matters were to be tried. It was further provided, that the remaining jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee might, if it seemed expedient, be transferred to the Court of Appeal. There was to be no further appeal from this new Court of Appeal, either to the House of Lords, Privy Council, or any other tribunal. The Lord Chancellor and Master of the Rolls, and the three chiefs of the old common law courts, were to retain their former titles and precedence; but the other judges were to be called judges of her Majesty's High Court of Justice, or Lords Justices of Appeal, according as they were appointed to the first or second division of the Supreme Court.

The main object of thus consolidating the courts was to produce a complete fusion between the systems of law and equity as previously administered in the Common Law and Chancery Courts respectively, and provisions to effect this fusion were inserted in the Act; but the mode in which it was to be carried out, as well as other details of the practice and procedure in the new court, were left to be laid down by rules of court to be drawn up by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice, and other judges, during the interval between the passing of the Act and its coming into operation. The Act also empowered

It likewise directed

the queen, by order in council, to establish district registries throughout the country in connection with the Supreme Court, and to confer on other inferior courts a similar jurisdiction in equity and admiralty matters to that possessed by the county courts. the appointment of official referees, and enacted that the court might, under certain circumstances, refer cases to them or to special referees, and might act upon their report, instead of deciding the question itself. Another alteration consisted in the abolition of the old legal division of the year into terms, it being left to the rules of court to determine the times and duration of the vacations (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66).

CHAPTER IX.

THE EXECUTIVE.

1. Power of the King. The executive power of the Crown has been always more absolute and less subject to control than its legislative and judicial powers. It has never, like the judicial functions of the sovereign, been delegated to distinct bodies, with whose action he has no right to interfere. The position occupied by subjects with respect to it has ever been that of counsellors and agents; and though the sovereign cannot now put forth executive power except with their advice, and through their instrumentality, yet they are absolutely incapable of exercising it independently of the person who, whether as king or regent, is for the time being invested with royal authority. It is the Crown which appoints, and may at any time dismiss, the officers to whom it entrusts the administration of state affairs and the command of the national forces. Through them the sovereign enforces