previous decisions of the Texas court, and is made in spite of the statutory definition that adverse possession must be an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CONTRACT TO SECURE TRAFFIC-VALIDITY.-DELAWARE, L. & W. R. Co. v. Kutter, 147 FeD. 51. Defendant railroad company entered into a contract with plaintiff to build up, develop, and conduct the business of the transportation of milk on its lines of road. Plaintiff was to have full charge of such business and was to receive as a compensation a percentage of the freights earned thereon. Held, that such a contract was not void as being in restraint of trade nor contrary to the anti-trust act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraint and monopolies.

The contracts prohibited by the anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, are simply those void under common law. U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso., 58 Fed. 58. And at the present day the mere fact that a contract to some degree restricts trade is not sufficient to avoid it. Central Shade Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353; Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15. In order to be illegal such contracts must involve an appreciable diminution of the number of the persons engaged in the trade or of the supply furnished. Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88; Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473. So that each particular case must rest upon its merits and all the surrounding circumstances must be considered in determining whether a contract will operate as a restraint injurious to the public. Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396; Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64.

REWARDS-Offer and AccePTANCE.-McClaughrey et al. v. King, 147 FED. 463.-Where defendant as sheriff of a county, offered a reward "for the arrest of each of the parties convicted" of a certain bank robbery and murder, Held, that the reward was not accepted merely by the giving of information concerning the whereabouts of the suspect, who was already under arrest in another state, but could only be accepted by the party assuming the personal danger and responsibility of either actually arresting the suspect or causing some other person to arrest him. Hook, J., dissenting.

As a general rule it may be stated that one who offers a reward may annex such conditions as he chooses, and one claiming the reward must prove a compliance with them. Amis v. Conner, 43 Ark. 337. And it has been held that a reward offered for the apprehension and conviction of each of the perpetrators of a crime is not earned by one who merely informs the governor of the state that one such person is in the penitentiary of another state, and who, without risk, responsibility, or expense to himself appears as a witness at the trial. Lovejoy v. A. T. and S. F. Ry Co., 53 Mo. App. 386. Nor is a reward offered for the capture of a thief earned by merely giving information to the sherriff which enables him to find and arrest him, Everman v. Hyman, 3 Ind. App., 459; and this, although the party giving the information went with sheriff as one of his posse, to make the capture. Juniata Co. v. McDonald, 122 Pa. St. 115.

SALES-Conversion of Goods by Carrier.—DUDLEY V. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. P. Ry. Co., 52 SOUTHEASTERN, 718-A quantity of apples was shipped with drafts on the buyer for their value according to a contract of sale attached to the bills of lading. On the arrival of the fruit at its destination the

railroad company permitted the buyer to inspect the apples without his producing bills of lading or showing any right or title to the apples. Finding them to be of inferior quality, the buyer refused to take them. Held, that the railroad company is not guilty of a conversion of the goods.

Sales-Right to Regulate RESALES and Price.-Hartman v. Jno. B. PARK & SONS Co. 145 Fed. 358 (Ky.) Held, that contracts between the manufacturer and wholesalers to sell at a certain price and only to retail dealers, designated by the manufacturer should be sustained. The court disposes of the defense that the contracts were unlawful, as in restraint of trade, by a holding that the restraint in order to be unlawful must be unreasonable.

SHIPPING VAlidity of ConDITIONS IN TICKET-LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY— THE MINNETONKA, 146 FED. 509-Held, conditions printed inconspicuously upon a steamship ticket, providing that the shipowner shall not be liable for any loss of passenger's baggage through theft or any act, neglect or default of the shipowner's servants or others, which were not known to such passenger are invalid, and constitute no defense to an action by him to recover jewelry stolen by one of the ship's employes.

As a general rule in the United States, a shipowner or other common carrier cannot, by stipulation in a contract of carriage, limit its liability for injury to goods of a passenger caused by the negligence or theft of its servants, on the ground of public policy. The Hugo, 57 Fed. 403; Armstrong v. Express Co., 159 Pa. 640. Yet a rule that carriers will not be responsible for baggage beyond a certain amount unless its value is reported to them and its carriage paid for, is reasonable and obligatory if known to or brought home to the knowledge of the passenger. Brown v. Eastern R. R., II Cush. 97, Brehme v. Dunsmore; 25 Md. 328. The carrier is under the same obligation, ordinarily, for the safety of luggage as of freight. Hannible Ry. Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall. 262. Merrill v. Grunell, 30 N. Y. 594. However, for such baggage as a passenger keeps in his own possession, a carrier is not liable as insurer but only for negligence. Steamship Co. v. Bryan, 83 Penn. St. 446; Whitney v. Pullman Co., 143 Mass. 243.

TIME-SOLAR OR STANDARD-Courts-ExPIRATION OF TERM-TEXAS TRAM AND LUMBER Co. v. HIGHTOWN, 96 S. W. 1071 (TEX.)-Held, that in limiting the time of the expiration of a term of court limited by statute to a certain day, solar time and not standard or railroad time, should be used, though the community has generally adopted standard time.

A civil day is the mean solar day used in ordinary reckoning of time beginning at midnight. Webster's Int. Dict. The only standard of time recognized by the courts is the meridian of the sun, and an arbitiary standard set up by persons in a certain line of business will not be recognized. 28 Am. and Eng. Ency. 2nd Ed., 210. The time to be used in determining he expiration of a policy on a certain date will, in the absence of statute or Custom be determined by the common or solar time unless it is shown that a different time was intended. Jones v. Ins. Co., 110 Ia. 75. The cases on the above point are very few brt it seems to be settled as a general rule that solar time is to be used and is so decided as a matter of law in Georgia. In Nebraska it is merely a presumption, while in Kentucky and Iowa, a matter of custom. Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co., IL. R A. (N. S.) 364.

TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-TITLE OF PUBLICATION. NEW YORK HERALD V. STAR Co. 146 Fed. 204.-Held, that complainant was entitled to protection in the trademark "Buster Brown," tital of a comic section of a newspaper, as having used it exclusively for such a length of time as to acquire a proprietary right therein.

A sign, symbol, word or device which indicates origin or ownership of articles manufactured or sold, or an arbitrary symbol to distinguish a vendible commodity is a legal trademark. Burton ข. Stratton, 12 Fed. 696 Gowans v. Aklbrn Bros., 4 Kulp. (Pa.) 31. This is true independent of any statute. L. H. Harris Stove Co. v. Stucky, 46 Fed. 624, La Croix v. May 15 Fed. 236. The title in the main case is not merely descriptive words, Spreker v. Lash, 102 Cal. 38; C. F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 93 Tenn. 84; and the right to its exclusive use does not rest upon any property right therein, but upon priority of use and application as in the manner used by complainant, Walton v. Crowley, Fed. cases No. 17,133. Still such use may give rise to property rights which the law protects, Clark v. Clark, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 76. A trademark is not essentially exclusive, Clark Thread Co. v. Armitage, 67 Fed. 904, only the particular application is protected, Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 57; and only at the residence of the user, Sarton v. Schoder, 101 N. W. (Iowa) 516. Registration may be rerequired for full protection. Whittier v. Dietz, 66 Cal. 78.

name.

TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-Names-UnFAIR TRADE-REPAIRS FOR UNPATENTED MACHINE.-EnterprISE MFG. Co. v. Bender, et AL., 148 FED. 313 (O.)— Complainant manufactured and sold an unpatented meat chopper called the "Enterprise," which name was registered as a trade-mark, and also parts for replacing those that had become worn, which were marked with complainant's Defendants also made such replacing parts, selling them in packages marked to show for what machine they were made and by whom, but the parts themselves were not identified by any mark. Held, that defendants, while having the right to make and sell the parts, were not entitled to do so without clearly marking the same to prevent their being mistaken by retail purchasers for those made by complainant for its own machines.

In the absence of a patent the freedom of manufacture cannot be cut down under the name of preventing unfair competition. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169. But in making such article the public must not be led to believe it the product of another, Schener v. Muller, 74 Fed. 225. It is enough that such similitude exists as would lead an ordinary purchaser to suppose that he was buying the genuine article and not the imita tion; and it is not necessary that the resemblance should be such as would mislead an expert. Shaw Stocking Co. v. Mack, 12 Fed. 707. The primary object and purpose of such mark, name or symbol is to distinguish each of the articles to which it is affixed from like articles produced by others, seems to be the clear consensus of all the cases which are authoritative, Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311; Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 460.

WATERS AND WATER COURSES-NAVIGABLE RIVERS-RIPERIAN RIGHTS.KINKEAD V. FURGESON, 109 N. W. (NEB.) 744.-Held, that where the Missouri river suddenly changes its course and abandons its former bed, the respective riparian owners are entitled to the possession and ownership of the soil formerly under its waters as far as the thread of the stream.

The common law rule was that on navigable rivers the riparian proprietor's ownership extended merely to the high-water mark and the test of navigability was the ebb and flow of the tide. 3 Kent. 521; Middleton v. Pritchard, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 510. Some of the courts in this country have accepted this test of navigability and hold that in all rivers in which the tide does not ebb and flow the riparian proprietor's ownership extends to the thread of the stream. Jackson v. Hathaway, 17 Mass. 288; Gavit v. Chambers, 3 Ohio, 495. Other jurisdictions, however, have insisted upon a broader test as to navigability and maintain that where rivers are in fact navigable the riparian proprietor's ownership extends only to high-water mark. Elder v. Burrus, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 358; Pollard v. Hogan, 3 How. (U. S.) 212.

WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-HUSBAND AND WIFE.-BIANCHI ET UX V. DEL VALLE, 42 SOUTHERN 148 (LA.).—Held, that a husband cannot be a witness for or against his wife in a matter affecting her paraphernal rights.

At early common law husband and wife were unable to testify for or against each other, this being based principally on public policy. Wilson v. Sheppard, 28 Ala. 623.

The common law disability has been removed and to-day a husband may be a witness for his wife in many cases. Laudy v. Kansas City, 58 Mo. App. 141; Evans v. Evans, 15 Pa. 572. However, it has universally been held that a husband cannot testify for wife when the suit concerns her separate estate. Berlin v. Cantrell, 33 Ark. 611; Palmer v. Henderson, 20 Ind. 297.

WRONGFUL DEATH-ACTION BY NON-RESIDENT ALIEN.-ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. FAJARDO, ET AL., 86 PAC. 301.-Held, that non-resident parents can recover for death of son under Kansas statute, Code Civ. Proc., Section 422, granting right of action to personal representative for wrongful death of the deceased if the latter could have maintained an action had he lived.

Unless the statute in plain terms excludes non-resident beneficiaries they are entitled to sue as if they were residents. 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 905. An administrator appointed in Colorado can sue for wrongful death in Kansas. Kan. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Cutter, 16 Kan. 569 (1876). Resident of Missouri can recover for wrongful death of husband, a resident of Missouri, in Kansas. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Mills. 57 Kan. 687 (1897). Similar statute entitles resident of Itaty to bring an action. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. v. Naylor, 73 Ohio St. 115. A non-resident alien can bring an action for wrongful death. Szymanski v. Blumenthal, et al., 52 Atl. 347 (Del.); Alfson v. Bush Co., 75 N. E. 230. A resident of another state can sue. Denick v. Central R. Co., 103 U. S. 11; Higgins v. Central New Eng. & W. R. Co., 24 N. E. 534; Jeffersonville, Madison, etc., R. Co. v. Hendricks, Admr., 41 Ind. 48. Exemption to " every person who has a family" may be claimed by a non-resident. Sproul v. McCoy, 26 Ohio St. 577. A statute purporting to apply to everyone may be taken advantage of by non-resident aliens. State v. Smith, 12 Pac. 121.

REVIEWS.

The Law of Carriers. By Dewitt C. Moore of the New York Bar. Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, 1906. Law canvas. Pages 1171.

The author of this work is no stranger to the legal profession at large. The prominent part which he took in the preparation of Nellis' treatise on "Street Railroad Accident Law" brought his name prominently before the public and compelled his recognition as a legal writer of no mean ability. In the preparation of the work under discussion the author was actuated, as he says, by the desire "to furnish suitors with a practical guide in this class of legislation by as full a presentation as possible of the established principles and rules governing the various and varying phases in which controverted questions have been and may be presented for judicial adjustment.'

It is perhaps fortunate that the success of the venture does not rest entirely upon its literary value and its recognition as a contribution to legal literature. In no sense can it be called a literary masterpiece. The text constitutes but a small proportion of the book and consists apparently of a sort of digest of the various decisions affecting this branch of the law arranged in narrative form. There is almost a complete absence of original theories and in comparatively few cases has the author departed from the rules laid down in the cases and advanced ideas and suggestions of his own. As a work of reference the book is, however, no less valuable on this account and does undoubtedly furnish a clear and concise statement, in most cases, of the holdings of various courts on any particular subject connected with the law of carriers. A suprisingly large number of cases are cited, about nine thousand in all, including substantially all the recent cases of any importance illustrating the principles and rules adopted by the English and Canadian courts as well as by the American in regard to this subject.

A comparatively short chapter, considering the relative importance of the subject, is given up to the discussion of Interstate Transportations and a presentation of the important decisions of the courts upon this branch of the subject. In only a few instances has the author attempted to foretell the probable attitude of the courts in regard to the Railway Rate Act the text of which is given in the succeeding chapter. Following the Rate Bill there is an index of remarkable completeness which should prove of great assistance in determining the law upon any particular phase of the subject.

The subject of carriers, their duties and obligations, their rights and privileges is daily becoming of greater interest particularly that branch involving Interstate Transportation. A work like the one under discussion comprising within a com