it be not a case in equity, it is to be brought to this court upon writ of error, although the proceeding may not be technically one at law, as distinguished from equity." In this case there had been a jury trial of certain issues of fact, but the same rule as subsequently applied to a case in which the court had acted without a jury (Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478). In view of the historical development of probate jurisdiction, which originally belonged primarily to the ecclesiastical courts with their civil law jurisprudence and procedure, including appeal as the invariable method of review, the decision in these two cases seems to be an exception to the tendency to avoid jurisdiction. In other proceedings pertaining to what is usually called probate jurisdiction a different rule is followed, as shown by the case of Kenaday v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606. This was a controversy raised by objections to an executor's final account. The court held that this was "in its nature of equitable cognizance," and that the decree was "properly reviewable on appeal rather than on writ of error." The appellant in this case first sued out a writ of error and then obtained the allowance of an appeal, the order reciting "that the practice in cases exactly of the character of the present one has not been established by precedent." The other party moved to dismiss the appeal because of the previous issue of the writ of error, and to dismiss the writ of error because the proper remedy was by appeal. denied the first motion and considered the case on the merits, and the second motion thus became of no consequence. for the construction of a will is also reviewable by appeal (Cruit v. Owen, 203 U. S. 368). The court A suit The somewhat anomalous result is thus reached that a decree granting or refusing probate of a will can be reviewed on the law only, while a controversy over its construction or over the accounts of its executor may be reviewed on the facts also. Proceedings for the condemnation of real property have been held to be analogous to an action at law and hence reviewable by writ of error only (Metropolitan R. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322). Proceedings by mandamus and prohibition are also deemed to be at law and are therefore reviewable by writ of error (Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U. S. 543; Lowry v. Allen, 203 U. S. 476; Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167). If trial by jury is ever introduced into the Philippines the ruling in the cases of Elliott v. Toeppner, 187 U. S. 327, and Grant Shoe Co. v. Laird Co., 203 U. S. 502, will doubtless apply, namely, that even in bankruptcy proceedings, if a trial by jury is had as a matter of right, it must be regarded as "a trial according to the course of the common law," and the judgment thereon "revisable only on writ of error." From the cases examined the following tentative classification may be made of the proper remedies to obtain a review of Philippine judgments and decrees subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court by reason of finality and of the questions or amount involved. Proceedings analogous to ordinary civil actions at law. Criminal prosecutions. Condemnation proceedings. Proceedings by mandamus and pro hibition. Proceedings to prove a will. Suits of an equitable nature. Matrimonial actions. Accountings in courts of probate jurisdiction. Habeas corpus proceedings. Proceedings in admiralty. Proceedings in bankruptcy (without jury trial). Writ of error. Appeal. In all cases where there is any uncertainty, the course followed in Kenaday v. Sinnott (supra) may be adopted, and both remedies used. In such a case it would be a wise precaution to take an order allowing the appeal and reciting the uncertainty, and also to have a record so made up as to be sufficient under either form of review; that is to say, containing all the evidence to allow full review upon the appeal, and also a proper bill of exceptions, duly allowed by the trial judge, to present such questions as may be raised upon the writ of error. Doubtless in time precedents will be created which will cover most of the categories of legal proceedings and establish rules of procedure approximately certain until disturbed by further legislation. It would seem that Congress might easily have established some test, appropriate to the prevailing procedure in the Philippines, and as simple as that applied to ordinary territorial appeals, or might have provided for a uniform method of review, by writ of error in all cases, as in the early days of the Supreme Court, or by appeal in all cases, with such limitations as to the return of evidence and review of facts as might be deemed advisable. But Congress has not done so, and the system must now be worked out at the expense of those litigants whose counsel are not fortunate enough to foresee the United States Supreme Court's decision as to the particular category, under one system of legal terminology, to which to assign a given proceeding under a totally different system. FEBRUARY, 1907. Howard Thayer Kingsbury. Published monthly during the Academic year, by students of the Yale Law School. If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of his subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a continuation of the subscription is desired. GOVERNMENT LAW SCHOOL OF SIAM. Siam has a government law school, under the control of the ministry of justice, such as formerly existed in Japan. Graduates are generally appointed at once either judges of minor courts or public prosecuting officers. In 1904-5 it had one hundred and ten students, but in 1905-6 only ninety-eight. Most Siamese law students are educated here, but it is evident either that the instruction is inadequate, or the standard for the final examinations exceedingly high, since of one hundred and ninety-five who were examined in January, 1906, only twelve passed. The previous year one hundred and seventy-seven were examined and ten passed. PRACTICING MEDICINE. WHAT CONSTITUTES. The Supreme Court of New York in the recent case of State v. Allcutt (not yet reported) holds that one who assumes the prefix "Dr.," displays in the window of his residence his name. followed by the words "Mechano Neural Therapy," receives, examines and treats patients by touching them with the tips of his fingers, and gives direction as to diet, receiving compensation for his services, is engaged in practicing medicine within the purview of the Statute making it a penal offense so to do without a license. The defendant neither administered nor recommended drugs of any kind, but simply claimed that all ailments were attributable to defective circulation, which his treatment restored to a normal state. Such restrictive statutes are constitutional, being a valid exercise of the police power of the state. State v. Webster, 41 L. R. A., 212, and cases cited at page 217. The purpose of the legislation is to protect an unwary public from the evils of charlatanism and empiricism, ignorance and quackery; and in this day and age there can be no denying the fact that it is of the most salutary description. People are continually ready to be imposed upon, and there are countless persons ready to prey upon their credulity. The statutes on this subject vary greatly, and therefore the same state of facts will, in different states, call for different results. It is quite generally the case that the legislative body has defined what constitutes practicing medicine within the provisions of the act, but in the absence of such, a much greater latitude is accorded to the courts, and the question is necessarily involved of whether the phrase is used with its common general meaning or a technical sense. On this the courts are variant. Bragg v. State, 134 Ala. 165. If the former, then its scope is much more restricted. But it is safe to assert that in no court does the rule still obtain that the administration of drugs is the sine qua non of practicing medicine. It is a progressive science, and as such, views as to treatment are now recognized that a century ago would not only have been discountenanced but ridiculed, and vice versa. So the courts neither attempt to nor can they lay down any hard and fast rule on the subject. People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6. The main case by clear inference adopts the view that a diagnosis is an essential and integral part. This is to be regreted, as it opens the door to many an impostor and quack. Magnetic healers, (Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211); cancer doctors, (Musser v. Chase, 29 Ohio St., 577); opthalmologists, (State v. Yegge, 103 N. W. 17 S. D.); one who engages to cure alcoholism, (Springer v. Dist. of Col., 23 App. D. C., 59), or the opium habit, (Benham v. State, 116 Ind. 112); an obstetrician, (State v. Welch, 129 N. C. 529) have all been held to be within the statute. A druggist who applied lotions to a lacerated finger, the other party believing him to be a physician, was held to be practicing medicine under a statute defining it as "to treat, operate on, or prescribe for any physical ailment." Matthei v. Wooley, 69 Ill. App. 654. It is to be lamented that the lines cannot be drawn more closely as to Christian Scientists, as imposition in its worst form is perpetrated under the shield and cloak of religion. They have offices, receive patients, style themselves in many cases "practitioners," and receive compensation for their services. They attempt to cure nearly every disease that flesh is heir to. This is a dual paradox, and it is by reason of it that they are immune from the operation of the ordinary statute. They attempt to cure, and yet they do not claim to do so per se but by invoking Divine interposition. They deny all disease, and yet they endeavor as above to alleviate or cure the physical or mental abnormalities that can only be predicated on it. It appears that no such play upon words should relieve the case from its true construction, therefore the Nebraska Court has held it to be the practice of medicine under a usual statutory |