Young v. Bryan. 6 W. at which the rations were delivered is not specially provided for in the contract; but that he has a right to show that the sum allowed by the secretary of war for those rations, is not a reasonable compensation. 3. That upon such proof the defendant is entitled to a reasonable compensation for those rations to be ascertained by the jury. 4. That the defendant ought to be permitted to claim a credit for the above sums due him in this suit. Certificate accordingly. 7 P. 18, 28; 10 P. 125; 15 P. 336; 4 H. 80; 8 H. 83. YOUNG V. BRYAN et al. 6 W. 146. The circuit court has jurisdiction of a suit brought by the indorsee of a promissory note, who is a citizen of one State, against the indorser, who is a citizen of a different State, whether a suit could be brought in that court by the indorser, against the maker, or not. No protest of a promissory note is necessary, by the common law. ERROR to the circuit court of the United States for Tennessee. This was an action of assumpsit, brought in the court below, by the defendants in error, citizens of Pennsylvania, against the plaintiff in error, a citizen* of Tennessee, as the indorser [* 147] of a promissory note drawn by another citizen of Tennes see, and indorsed to the plaintiffs. The only questions in the cause were, 1. Whether the court below had jurisdiction; and 2. Whether notice of protest was necessary to charge the indorser in this case. Judgment having been rendered against the defendant below, the cause was brought by writ of error to this court. Eaton, for the plaintiff in error. Sergeant, contrȧ. MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, that [*151 ] a suit may be brought in the circuit court by the indorsee against the indorser, whether a suit could be there brought against the drawer or not. In such a case, the indorser does not claim through an assignment. It is a new contract enter- [ * 152 ] ed into by the indorser and indorsee, upon which the suit is brought; and if the indorsee is a citizen of a different State, he may bring an action against the indorser in the circuit court. As to the other objection insisted upon by the plaintiff in error, all that was incumbent upon the holder was to give due notice to the indorser. The Bello Corrunes. 6 W. No protest of a promissory note or inland bill of exchange is necessary. Judgment affirmed. 9 W. 537; 11 P. 80; 16 P. 89; 2 H. 66; 5 H. 278; 13 H. 183. THE BELLO CORRUNES. The Spanish Consul, Claimant. 6 W. 152. A vice-consul, duly recognized by our government, is a competent party to assert or defend the rights of property of individuals of his nation, in a court of admiralty. In the absence of specific powers from competent authority, he has not the right to receive, in his public character, the proceeds of property libelled. A citizen of this country who has made a capture on the high seas, in violation of the laws of the United States, can not be allowed to claim as a captor in our courts, though he acted under a commission from a foreign belligerent power. Under the act of June 14, 1797, (1 Stats. at Large, 520,) it was unlawful for citizens of the United States to cruise against Spain, under a commission from one of the new South American States. Persons in possession of a vessel and cargo, neither as captors, nor under any authority derived from their owners, can not subject them to forfeiture for a breach of municipal law. Spoliation, smuggling, and even gross neglect, may cause a forfeiture of the right to salvage compensation. APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for Rhode Island. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. The Attorney-General, for the United States. Winder, for the appellants and captors. Webster and Wheaton, for the respondent and claimant, the Spanish consul. Wheaton, for the salvors. [ * 166 ] *JOHNSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This vessel was stranded on Block Island, in an alleged effort to reach a port of the United States. The vessel and cargo have been seized by the collector of Newport, for supposed violations of the trade laws of this country, and an information was accordingly filed to subject the whole to condemnation, in the district court for Rhode Island district. This claim of the United States has been opposed by [* 167] three classes of competitors. The vessel and cargo, it appears, are Spanish property, and were captured on the southwestern coasts of Cuba, by The Puyerredon, a private armed The Bello Corrunes. 6 W. brig, bearing the flag of the Buenos Ayrean Republic, and commanded by Captain James Barnes. Being armed, and well calcu lated for a privateer, she was manned with a complement of the privateer's men, about thirty in number, and her original commander, and all except four of the Spanish crew, removed. Thus equipped, it appears that she cruised, as a tender to The Puyerredon, for about two months, during which time another Spaniard was added to her crew, and on the 8th May, when in lat. 32 30, N. and long. 74, from London, the crew rose upon the officers, subdued them, put them on board the first vessel they met with, and steered their course for this continent. Thus circumstanced, Captain Barnes has libelled in behalf of the captors; the Spanish vice-consul in behalf of the original Spanish owners; and the crew of The Bello Corrunes have libelled for a compensation by way of salvage, to which they suppose themselves entitled, in the event of restitution being decreed to the original owners. To these several claims it is objected, on behalf of the United States, that restitution cannot be decreed to the Spanish vice-consul, because he is not, in that capacity, a competent party in court to assert the rights of individual subjects; nor, in favor of the captors, because the privateer was originally fitted out in the United States, and is still owned by American citizens; nor in favor of the salvors, because they have forfeited their claim to salvage, by spo- [* 168] liation and an attempt to smuggle. As these suggestions open the whole case, it shall be disposed of by considering them severally in their order, only remarking en passant, that though they were all sustained, it would avail the United States nothing; since, without evidence sufficient to sustain the criminal charge, it would only follow that the proceeds of the property libelled must lie in the registry of the court until a proper claimant shall make his appearance. On the first point made by the attorney-general, this court feels no difficulty in deciding that a vice-consul, duly recognized by our government, is a competent party to assert or defend the rights of property of the individuals of his nation, in any court having jurisdiction of causes affected by the application of international law. To watch over the rights and interests of their subjects, wherever the pursuits of commerce may draw them, or the vicissitudes of human affairs may force them, is the great object for which consuls are deputed by their sovereigns; and in a country where laws govern, and justice is sought for in courts only, it would be a mockery to preclude them from the only avenue through which their course lies to the end of their mission. The long and universal usage of the courts of The Bello Corrunes. 6 W. the United States has sanctioned the exercise of this right, and it is impossible that any evil or inconvenience can flow from it. Whether the powers of the vice-consul shall in any instance extend [*169] to the right to receive, in his national character, the proceeds of property libelled and transferred into the registry of a court, is a question resting on other principles. In the absence of specific powers given him by competent authority, such a right would certainly not be recognized. Much, in this respect, must ever depend upon the laws of the country from which and to which he is deputed. And this view of the subject will be found to reconcile the difficulties supposed to have been presented by the authorities quoted on this point. Considering, then, the original Spanish interest as legally represented, the questions are, whether that interest is not forfeited to the United States, or superseded by the superior claims of the capturing vessel. This is not the ordinary case of a capture made under the taint of an illegal outfit. The decision of this court must rest upon a very different principle. In those cases the national character of the claimant is immaterial. He has violated the neutrality of this country, and cannot shelter himself under his commission, or his allegiance, however unquestionable his right, individual or national, would have been otherwise. But can a citizen of this country who has violated its laws, ever be recognized in our courts as a legal claimant of the fruits of his own wrong? We are of opinion he cannot, and it therefore becomes material to determine what is the national character of the claimants under the capture made by The Puyerredon. At the time of this vessel's first sailing from Baltimore, she was unquestionably American owned and commanded. During [*170] the time of her cruising * under the name of The Mangoree, it is not pretended that she changed owners. The legality of her conduct at that period has been defended altogether on the ground of her taking the flag of Buenos Ayres, being commissioned in a foreign state, and her commander, Barnes, assuming the character of a citizen of the power that had commissioned him. It is not until her arrival at Buenos Ayres, in 1817, that any change of property in the vessel has been set up in proof. At that time, it is contended, she was set up at auction, and changed owners, passing into the hands of a Mr. Higginbotham, a citizen of the United States, married and domiciled at Buenos Ayres. If this fact had been satisfactorily made out in evidence, it would have drawn this court into the consideration of some questions of great nicety, which have never yet received a solemn adjudication in The Bello Corrunes. 6 W. this court. But the evidence to support this pretended change of property is so wholly unsatisfactory, that the court rejects it; for the ordinary solemnities of such transfers are too well known to admit the belief that, in this instance, the change of property, had it been real, would not have been effected or commemorated by written documents. This court, then, proceeds upon the assumption that The Puyerredon is still, in reality, American owned, and they are also of opinion that she must be held to be American commanded; since, even if the doctrine could be admitted, that a man's allegiance may be put off with his coat, it is very clear that Mr. Barnes's citizenship is altogether in fraud of the laws of his own country. His family has never been removed from Baltimore, and his home has [*171 ] been always either there or upon the ocean. The question then is whether, thus circumstanced, the claim, in be half of the owners and mariners of The Puyerredon, can be sustained. We are decidedly of opinion it cannot. By the 2d section of the 14th article of the treaty with Spain, "citizens, subjects or inhabitants" of the United States are strictly prohibited from taking "any commission or letter of marque, for arming any ship or vessel to act as privateers against the subjects of his Catholic Majesty, or the property of any of them, from any prince or state with which the said king shall be at war." And it is further provided, "that if any person of either nation shall take such commissions or letters of marque, he shall be punished as a pirate." Whatever difficulties there may exist under the free institutions of this country, in giving full efficacy to the provisions of this treaty, by punishing such aggressions as acts of piracy, it is not to be questioned that they are prohibited acts, and intended to be stamped with the character of piracy; and to permit the persons engaged in the open prosecution of such a course of conduct to appear and claim of this court the prizes they have seized, would be to countenance a palpable infraction of a rule of conduct declared to be the supreme law of the land. Some doubts have been suggested on the use of the words, "state at war" with Spain. This court would not readily lean to favor a restricted *construction of language, as ap- [* 172 ] plied to the provisions of a treaty, which always combines the characteristics of a contract as well as a law; but it is not necessary to examine the grounds of these doubts as applied to the present case; because this treaty has been enforced by the provisions of the act of congress of the 14th of June, 1797, so as to leave no doubt of its extension to the case of cruising against |