The Collector. 6 W. THE COLLECTOR. Wilmot, Claimant. 6 W. 194. In all proceedings in rem, on an appeal, the property follows the cause into the circuit court, and is subject to the disposition of that court. But it does not follow the cause into the supreme court, on an appeal to that court. After an appeal from the district to the circuit court, the former court can make no order respecting the property, whether it has been sold, and the proceeds paid into court, or whether it remains specifically, or its proceeds remain, in the hands of the marshal. It is a great irregularity for the marshal to keep the property or the proceeds thereof in his own hands, or to distribute the same among the parties entitled, without a special order from the court; but such an irregularity may be waived by the assent and ratification of all the parties interested, if there be no mala fides. APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for Maryland. The facts of this case were as follows: In the year 1807, the schooner Collector and cargo were libelled in the district court of the district of Maryland, as forfeited [*195] under the act of congress, prohibiting commercial intercourse with certain ports of St. Domingo. (2 Stats. at Large, 351, 421.) John Wilmot, the present petitioner and libellant, and the house of Tagart and Caldwell, claimed the whole property. Pending the proceedings in the district court, the vessel and cargo were sold under an order to "bring in the proceeds, subject to the future disposition thereof." The money, notwithstanding this order, was never paid to the clerk, nor was it ever deposited by him in any court, and the court never afterwards made any order respecting it. The property was condemned in the district and circuit courts, which latter decree was reversed by the supreme court, in the term of February, 1809, and the property libelled ordered to be restored. The mandate of the supreme court was filed below the 11th of May following. The present libel and petition was filed in the district. court the 8th of June, 1816, when a decree passed dismissing the same, which was afterwards affirmed by the circuit court, from whose sentence this appeal was taken. The object of the present appeal was to obtain the benefit of the decree of the supreme court, that is, restitution of the property, according to the rights of the respective claimants; the appellant insisting on one half of the proceeds of vessel and cargo, as joint owner, and also upon a lien on the other half as ship's husband, for advances made beyond his proportion of the outfits of the voyage, as well as for expenses in defending the vessel and cargo [*196] against the information which had been filed against them, and for this purpose prayed that the marshal might be ordered to bring in the proceeds, according to the interlocutory The Collector. 6 W. decree, and that the same might be restored, pursuant to the decree of the supreme court, preserving to the parties their respective rights, liens, &c., concluding with a general prayer for relief. From the petition of the appellant, the answer of the marshal, and the proofs in the cause, it appeared that the marshal, although he sold the schooner and her cargo, did not, in fact, bring the money into court. That for the moiety of the proceeds belonging to Tagart and Caldwell, an order was given by them in favor of Van Wyck and Dorsey, as early as March, 1807, in consequence of which order Van Wyck and Dorsey, who sold the property at auction, under the marshal's directions, were permitted to retain the part belonging to Tagart and Caldwell, upon an understanding to keep it, if the vessel and cargo were acquitted, but to return it in case of a different issue. That the other moiety of the proceeds was paid on the 6th of April, 1809, which was previous to the filing of the mandate in the court below, by the marshal, to the present appellant, as appears by his receipt of that date, and which expresses the sum therein mentioned, to be for his one half of the net proceeds of the sale of the schooner Collector and cargo. The marshal died pending the proceedings, and they were revived against his executors. Mitchell, for the appellant and claimant. Pinkney and Wheaton, contrà. LIVINGSTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, and [* 201 ] after stating the facts, proceeded as follows: This is, to say the least, a very novel and extraordinary proceeding. The marshal, probably, without any improper views, or an intention of making use of the proceeds of the vessel and cargo, disobeys the order of the judge, and instead of depositing them in the registry of the court, keeps them under his own control, and finally distributes them among the parties without any direction of the court on the subject. This was a great irregularity, but the owners of the schooner Collector and cargo have no right at this day to complain of it. They were early apprised of the situation of their property. Two of them gave an order on the marshal for their pro- [202] portion of the proceeds before any sale had taken place; and the other, who is the present appellant, received of the marshal his share before the sentence of reversal, which was pronounced here, had been made known to the court below. After this ratification, or sanction, on their part, of the irregular conduct of the marshal, neither of them ought now to be permitted to seek any other redress from The Collector. 6 W. him. Before any distribution of the proceeds by the marshal, they might have applied to the court to enforce obedience to its order, as it regarded the bringing of them into court, and then have had their respective pretensions adjudicated by the court itself. Not having proceeded in this manner, the district court, if it have jurisdiction of the case, could not now, without great danger of doing injustice, interfere in this business. Whatever notice it might have taken of the lien, which is now set up by the appellant, on a part of these proceeds beyond his moiety, if the proceeds were still in that court, it is by no means clear that the marshal ought now to be rendered liable to the appellant for them, there being nothing like satisfactory proof that he had notice of such a claim when the appellant took from him his moiety, nor until long after he had parted with the whole of the property. Under this view of the case, the court is of opinion that the appellant, under the particular circumstances of this case, is not entitled, on the merits, to any relief against the [203] marshal. But the court is further of *opinion that the proceeding on the present petition, and that in the district court, was coram non judice. By an appeal from the sentence of a district court to a circuit court, the latter becomes possessed of the cause, and executes its own judgment without any intervention of the former. It is fit, therefore, that the proceeds of the property, if it have been converted into money, should follow the appeal into the circuit court, and be deposited in such bank, or other place, as it may direct, there to remain, subject to the disposition and direction of the circuit court. And if the property, at the time of the appeal, remain in specie in the marshal's custody, and any order or direction shall become necessary for its sale or preservation after an appeal, such order must emanate from the circuit court. But if a further appeal be had to the supreme court, the property or its proceeds will still continue in the circuit court, because the supreme court in such cases does not execute its own judgments, but sends a special mandate to the circuit court to award execution thereon. The proceeds, therefore, of The Collector and cargo, at the time of filing the present petition and libel, even if the order of the district court in relation to them had been complied with, could not, after the appeal, be regarded as in or under the control of the dis trict court, which was, therefore, incompetent when this petition was filed to make any order respecting them. Sentence affirmed, with costs. Anderson v. Dunn. 6 W. ANDERSON v. DUNN. 6 W. 204. The house of representatives has jurisdiction to punish for a contempt. A warrant of arrest under the hand and seal of the speaker, attested by the clerk, and directed to the sergeant-at-arms, is legal, though it does not show on its face on what evidence it was founded, nor set forth specially in what the alleged contempt consisted. ERROR to the circuit court of the District of Columbia. [204] This was an action of trespass, brought in the court below, by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error, for an assault and battery, and false imprisonment; to which the defendant pleaded the general issue, and a special plea of justification. The plaintiff demurred generally to the special plea, which [* 205 ] was adjudged good, and the demurrer overruled; and judgment upon such demurrer was entered for the defendant, and a writ of error brought by the plaintiff. The question arising upon the demurrer will be best explained by giving the defendant's plea at large, as pleaded and adjudged good upon general demurrer in the circuit court, namely: And the said Thomas, by the leave of the court here first had, further defends the force and injury, when, &c. And as to the coming with force and arms, or whatsoever is against the peace; and also as to the assaulting, beating, bruising, battering, and ill-treating of the said John, in manner and form as the said John, in his said declaration, hath above supposed to be done, the said Thomas saith that he is not guilty thereof; and of this he, as before, puts himself upon the country. And as to the imprisonment of the said John, and the keeping and detaining him in confinement, at the time in the said declaration mentioned, to wit, on the said eighth day of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, and for the space of two months in the said declaration mentioned, the said Thomas saith that the said John ought not to have or maintain his action aforesaid against him, because he saith that long before and at the said time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, and during all the time in the said declaration mentioned, a congress of the United States was holden at the city of Washington, in the county of Washington, and District of Columbia aforesaid, and was then and there, * and during all the time [* 206 ] aforesaid, assembled and sitting; and that long before and at the time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, and during all the time in the said declaration mentioned, he, the said Thomas was, and yet is, sergeant-at-arms of the house of representatives, (then and there being one of the houses whereof the Anderson v. Dunn. 6 W. said congress of the United States consisted,) and by virtue of his said office, and by the tenor and effect of the standing rules and orders ordained and established by the said house for the determining of the rules of its proceedings, and by the force and effect of the laws and customs of the said house, and of the said congress, was then and there, and during all the time aforesaid, and yet is duly au thorized and required, amongst other things, to execute the commands of the said house, from time to time, together with all such process issued by authority thereof, as shall be directed to him by the speaker of the said house; and that long before, and at the time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, and during all the time in the declaration mentioned, one Henry Clay was, and yet is, the speaker of the said house of representatives, and by virtue of his said office, and by the tenor and effect of such standing rules and orders as aforesaid, and by the force and effect of such laws and customs as aforesaid, then and there, and during all the time aforesaid, was and yet is, amongst other things, duly authorized and required to subscribe with his proper hand, and to seal with his seal, all writs, warrants, and subpoenas issued by order of the said house; and that [* 207 ] long before and at the time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, and during all the time in the said declaration mentioned, one Thomas Dougherty was, and yet is, the clerk of the said house of representatives; and by virtue of his said office, and by the tenor and effect of such standing rules and orders as aforesaid, and by the force and effect of such laws and customs as aforesaid, then and there, and during all the time aforesaid, was and yet is, amongst other things, duly authorized and required to attest and subscribe with his proper hand, all such writs, warrants, and subpoenas issued by order of the said house; and that long before, and at the time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, and during all the time in the said declaration mentioned, and ever since, it was and yet is, amongst other things, ordained, established, and practised, by and under such standing rules and orders as aforesaid, and such laws and customs as aforesaid, that all writs, warrants, subpœnas, and other process issued by order of the said house, shall be under the hand and seal of the said speaker of the said house, and attested by the said clerk of the said house; and so being under the hand and seal of the said speaker, and attested by the said clerk as aforesaid, shall be executed, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the same, by the said sergeant-at-arms; and the said Thomas, the defendant, further saith, that the said Henry Clay, so being such speaker of the said house of representatives as aforesaid, and the said Thomas Dougherty, so being such clerk of the |