Anderson v. Dunn. 6 W. same house as aforesaid, and he the said defendant so being *such sergeant-at-arms of the same house as aforesaid, and [208] the said congress, so being assembled and sitting as afore- said, heretofore and before the said time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, to wit, on the seventh day of January, in the year aforesaid, at Washington aforesaid, in the county and district aforesaid, it was, in and by the said house, for good and sufficient cause to the same appearing, resolved and ordered, pursuant to the tenor and effect of such standing rules and orders so ordained and established as aforesaid, and according to the force and effect of such laws and customs as aforesaid, that the said John had been guilty of a breach of the privileges of the said house, and of a high contempt of the dignity and authority of the same; wherefore, it was then and there, in and by the said house, further resolved and ordered, in the like pursuance of such standing rules and orders as aforesaid, and of such laws and customs as aforesaid, that the said speaker should forthwith issue his warrant, directed to the sergeant-at-arms, commanding him to take into custody the body of the said John, wherever to be found, and the same forthwith to have before the said house, at the bar thereof, then and there to answer to the said charge, &c., as by the journal, record, and proceedings of the said resolutions and order in the said house remaining, reference being thereto had, will more fully appear. Whereupon, the said Henry Clay, so being such speaker as aforesaid, in pursuance of such standing rules and orders as aforesaid, and according to such laws and customs as aforesaid, did, for* the execution of the resolutions and [* 209 ] order aforesaid, afterwards, and before the time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, to wit, on the said seventh day of January, in the year aforesaid, at Washington aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, as such speaker as aforesaid, duly make and issue his certain warrant, under his hand and seal, duly directed to the said Thomas, the defendant, as such sergeant-at-arms as aforesaid, (to whom, so being such sergeant-at-arms as aforesaid, the execution of such warrant then and there belonged,) and by the said Thomas Dougherty, so being such clerk as aforesaid; in and by said warrant, reciting that the said house of representatives had, that day, resolved and adjudged, that the said John Anderson had been guilty of a breach of the privileges of the said house, and of a high contempt of its dignity and authority; and that the said house had thereupon ordered the said speaker to issue his warrant, directed to the said sergeant-at-arms, commanding him, the said sergeant, to take into custody the body of the said John Anderson, wherever to be found, and the same forthwith to have before the said house, at Anderson v. Dunn. 6 W. the bar thereof, then and there to answer to the said charge; there fore, it was required that the said Thomas, the defendant, as such sergeant as aforesaid, should take into his custody the body of the said John Anderson, and then forthwith to bring him before the said house, at the bar thereof, then and there to answer to the charge aforesaid, and to be dealt with by the said house, according to the constitution and laws of the United States; and said [* 210 ] * Henry Clay, so being such speaker as aforesaid, then and there, and before the said time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, delivered the said warrant to the said Thomas, so being such sergeant as aforesaid, to be executed in due form of law. By virtue, and in execution of which said warrant, the said Thomas, as such sergeant as aforesaid, afterwards, to wit, at the said time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, at Washington aforesaid, in order to arrest the said John, and convey him in custody to the bar of the said house, to answer to the charge aforesaid, and to be dealt with by the said house, according to the constitution and laws of the United States, in obedience to the resolutions and order aforesaid, and to the tenor and effect of the said warrant, so issued as aforesaid, went to the said John, and then and there gently laid his hands on the said John to arrest him, and did then and there arrest him by his body, and take him into custody, and did then forthwith convey him to the bar of the said house, as it was lawful for the said Thomas to do for the cause aforesaid; and thereupon such proceedings were had, in and by the said house, that the said John was then and there forthwith duly examined, and heard in his defence, before the said house, at the bar thereof, touching the matter of the said charge; and that such examination was, in and by the said house, and by the resolutions and orders of the same, duly adjourned and continued from day to day, from the said time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, until the sixteenth day of January, in the year [* 211 ] * aforesaid; which said examinations were then so adjourned and continued, as aforesaid, from necessity, in order to go through and conclude the examination and defence of the said John, touching the matter of the said charge, before the said house; neither the said examination, nor the said defence, having been finished or concluded before the day last aforesaid; during all which time, to wit, from the said time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, until the day last aforesaid, it was, in and by the said house, duly resolved and ordered, from day to day, as the said examination was adjourned and continued as aforesaid, that the said John should be remanded, kept, and detained in the custody of the Anderson v. Dunn. 6 W. said Thomas, as such sergeant as aforesaid, by virtue and in execution of the said warrant, in order to have such his examinations and defence finished and concluded, in due form; and the said Thomas, as such sergeant as aforesaid, afterwards, to wit, at and from the said time when, &c., in the introduction of this plea mentioned, until the said sixteenth day of January, in the year aforesaid, did, in pursuance of the last-mentioned resolutions and orders of said house, and by virtue, and in execution of the said warrant, keep and detain the said John in custody as aforesaid, and him did bring and have, from day to day, during the said time, before the said house, at the bar thereof, in order to undergo such examinations as aforesaid, and to be heard in his defence aforesaid, touching the matter of the said charge, to wit, at Washington aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, as it was also lawful for him, the said * Thomas, to do for the cause aforesaid; and thereupon [*212 ] afterwards, to wit, on the said last-mentioned sixteenth day of January, in the year aforesaid, such further proceedings were had in and by the said house, that it was then and there finally resolved and adjudged, in and by the said house, that the said John was guilty, and convicted of the charge aforesaid, in the form aforesaid; and that he be forthwith brought to the bar of the said house, and there reprimanded by the said speaker, for the outrage by the said John committed, and then that he be forthwith discharged from the custody of the said sergeant-at-arms; and thereupon the said John was then and there, in pursuance of the last-mentioned resolutions, order, and judgment, forthwith reprimanded by the said speaker, and then forthwith discharged from the arrest and custody aforesaid; as by the journals, record, and proceedings of the said resolutions, orders, and judgment in the said house remaining, reference being thereto had, will more fully appear; which are the same several supposed trespasses in the introduction of this plea mentioned, and whereof the said John hath, above in his said declaration, complained against the said Thomas, and not other or different; with this, that the said Thomas doth aver that the said John, the now plaintiff, and the said John Anderson, in the said resolutions, orders, warrant, and judgment respectively mentioned, was, and is, one and the same person; and that at the said several times in this plea mentioned, and during all the time therein mentioned, the said congress of the United States was assembled and sitting, to wit, at [213] Washington aforesaid, in the county aforesaid; and this the said Thomas is ready to verify; wherefore he prays judgment, if the said John ought to have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him, &c. Anderson v. Dunn. 6 W. Hall, for the plaintiff in error, made three points. 1. That the house of representatives had no authority to issue the warrant. 2. That the warrant is illegal on the face of it. 3. That in either case, it is no justification to the officer who executed it. The Attorney-General, and Jones, contrà. [* 224 ] [* *JOHNSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court. Notwithstanding the range which has been taken by the plaintiff's counsel, in the discussion of this cause, the merits of it really lie in a very limited compass. The pleadings have narrowed them down to the simple inquiry, whether the house of * 225] representatives can take cognizance of contempts committed against themselves, under any circumstances? The duress complained of was sustained under a warrant issued to com pel the party's appearance, not for the actual infliction of punishment for an offence committed. Yet it cannot be denied, that the power to institute a prosecution must be dependent upon the power to punish. If the house of representatives possessed no authority to punish for contempt, the initiating process issued in the assertion of that authority must have been illegal; there was a want of jurisdiction to justify it. It is certainly true, that there is no power given by the constitution to either house to punish for contempts, except when committed by their own members. Nor does the judicial or criminal power given to the United States, in any part, expressly extend to the infliction of punishment for contempt of either house, or any one coördinate branch of the government. Shall we, therefore, decide that no such power exists? It is true that such a power, if it exists, must be derived from implication, and the genius and spirit of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of implied powers. Had the faculties of man been competent to the framing of a system of government which would have left nothing to implication, it cannot be doubted that the effort would have been made by the framers of the constitution. But what is the fact? There is not in the whole of that admirable instrument, a * grant of powers which does not draw after it others, not [* 226] expressed, but vital to their exercise; not substantive and independent, indeed, but auxiliary and subordinate. The idea is utopian, that government can exist without leaving the exercise of discretion somewhere. Public security against the Anderson v. Dunn. 6 W. abuse of such discretion must rest on responsibility, and stated appeals to public approbation. Where all power is derived from the people, and public functionaries, at short intervals, deposit it at the feet of the people, to be resumed again only at their will, individual fears may be alarmed by the monsters of imagination, but individual liberty can be in little danger. No one is so visionary as to dispute the assertion, that the sole end and aim of all our institutions is the safety and happiness of the citizen. But the relation between the action and the end, is not always so direct and palpable as to strike the eye of every observer. The science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if, indeed, that can be called a science which has but few fixed principles, and practically consists in little more than the exercise of a sound discretion, applied to the exigencies of the state as they arise. It is the science of experiment. But if there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others, in the practical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers which the people have intrusted to them. The interests and dignity of those who created them require the exertion of the powers indispensable to the attainment of the ends of their creation. Nor is a casual conflict with the rights of particular individuals any [* 227 ] reason to be urged against the exercise of such powers. The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is no less certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for his security. The unreasonable murmurs of individ uals against the restraints of society, have a direct tendency to produce that worst of all despotisms, which makes every individual the tyrant over his neighbor's rights. That "the safety of the people is the supreme law," not only comports with, but is indispensable to, the exercise of those powers in their public functionaries, without which that safety cannot be guarded. On this principle it is, that courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates, and, as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. It is true, that the courts of justice of the United States are vested, by express statute provision, with power to fine and imprison for contempts; but it does not follow, from this circumstance, that they would not have exercised that power without the aid of the statute, or not in cases, if such should occur, to which such statute provision |