Under the proof we feel compelled to reverse the decree and remand the cause, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the original bill. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG having been of counsel in matters involved in this case took no part in the decision.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. CHARLES WARREN, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed October 28, 1913-Rehearing denied Dec. 5, 1913.

COURTS the legislature may confer concurrent jurisdiction in criminal cases upon municipal court. Under the constitution the criminal court of Cook county has jurisdiction of all criminal cases; but such jurisdiction is not exclusive, and the legislature may confer concurrent jurisdiction of certain classes of criminal cases upon the municipal court of Chicago.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. SHERIDAN E. FRY, Judge, presiding.

ROBERT E. CANTWELL, for plaintiff in error.

P. J. LUCEY, Attorney General, MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, and C. H. LINSCOTT, (ZACH HOFHEIMER, Of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in error was charged by an infornfation filed in the municipal court of Chicago with being a vagabond. Upon being arraigned in open court he entered a plea of not guilty. He signed a written waiver of his right to a trial by jury, and all questions, both of law and fact, were by agreement of parties submitted to the court. The court found plaintiff in error guilty and sentenced him to be im

prisoned at labor in the house of correction of the city of Chicago for the term of three months. To reverse this judgment the present writ of error has been sued out of this court.

The only reason urged for a reversal of the judgment is that section 271 of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional. Section 270 of the Criminal Code defines the offense of vagabondage. Section 271 makes it the duty of police officers of any county, town, village, city or other municipality to arrest, upon warrant, persons charged with the offense defined in section 270, and to bring them before the nearest justice of the peace or police magistrate, or, "if within the city of Chicago, before the municipal court of Chicago for the purpose of examination." The section further provides for a trial by jury unless the defendant shall waive his right to a trial by jury, and in case of conviction the section authorizes the justice of the peace, police magistrate or municipal court of Chicago to imprison the accused in the house of correction of any city having a contract with the county for the care of prisoners, for a term of not less than ten days and not exceeding six months.

As we understand the contention of plaintiff in error, he insists that section 271 is invalid because it purports to confer exclusive jurisdiction of this offense in the city of Chicago upon the municipal court. Section 271 does not purport to confer exclusive jurisdiction of this offense upon justices of the peace, police magistrates, and in Chicago upon the municipal court. Under the constitution the criminal court of Chicago has jurisdiction in all criminal cases. This jurisdiction the legislature cannot take away, but it can confer concurrent jurisdiction in certain classes of criminal cases upon the municipal court, and this is all that section 271 was designed to accomplish. The jurisdiction of the criminal court of Chicago is not exclusive. (Berkowitz v. Lester, 121 Ill. 99.) The circuit courts of Cook county undoubtedly, under the constitution, can ex

ercise criminal jurisdiction notwithstanding the apparent attempt of the legislature to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the criminal court of that county; but it has been settled in this State ever since the decision in Myers v. People, 67 Ill. 503, that the jurisdiction of circuit courts was not exclusive, and that the legislature had the power to confer concurrent jurisdiction in criminal cases upon county courts. The same reasoning applies to the municipal court of Chicago. People v. Jacobson, 247 Ill. 394.

The judgment of the municipal court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

MICHAEL E. AUSTIN et al. Appellees, vs. JOHANNA AUSTIN et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed October 28, 1913-Rehearing denied Dec. 5, 1913.

1. WILLS-laymen may express an opinion as to whether testatrix comprehended the nature and effect of her act. Whether the mind of the testatrix was so affected as to render her incapable of knowing the nature and effect of her act when she executed the will is a question upon which laymen are competent to express an opinion.

2. SAME―contestants must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that testatrix was of unsound mind. Persons who contest a will upon the ground that the testatrix was lacking in testamentary capacity must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will at the time she executed the instrument in question.

3. SAME the test of testamentary capacity. The test of testamentary capacity is whether the testator, at the time of executing the instrument purporting to be his will, had sufficient mind and memory to enable him to understand the particular business in which he was engaged, and if he was able to remember who were the natural objects of his bounty, recall to mind his property and make a disposition of it understandingly, according to some purpose or plan formed in his mind, he was possessed of testamentary capacity.

4. SAME-opinions of physicians on question of testamentary capacity are entitled to no greater weight than opinions of lay

men. Upon the question whether the testatrix, at the time she executed her will, had sufficient mental capacity to know and understand the effect of her act, the opinions of physicians are entitled to no greater weight than those of lay witnesses of good sense and judgment, whose opportunities for observing the testatrix from day to day were much better than those of physicians. 5. SAME when Supreme Court must set aside verdict in will contest case. Where the testimony as to the mental condition of the testator or testatrix is in serious conflict the Supreme Court is reluctant to disturb the verdict of the jury, but it is its duty to do so, and to reverse the decree, if the verdict is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM E. DEVER, Judge, presiding.

CANNON & POAGE, and JOHN B. HEINEMANN, for appellants.

SHEPARD, MCCORMICK & THOMASON, (John A. Rose, and WEYMOUTH KIRKLAND, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a consolidation of two appeals separately prosecuted by appellants from a decree of the superior court of Cook county in a suit brought by appellees to contest and set aside the will of Mary A. Corkery, deceased. The will was executed June 15, 1912, and testatrix died June 21 following. She was a widow and left surviving her no children or descendants of children. Her only heirs were Johanna Austin, her mother; Michael E. Austin, Lawrence Austin and John P. Austin, her brothers; Ella C. Austin, her sister; Leonore Magner, Daniel Magner, Lawrence Magner and Julia Magner, only children of a deceased sister; and James D. Austin and Lawrence Austin, only children of James Austin, a deceased brother. At the time of her death the testatrix owned but one piece of real estate, the value of which is not stated. Her estate amounted to about $440,000.

By the first clause of her will testatrix directed that all her debts, funeral expenses and costs of administration be paid. By the second clause she gave her niece Mary Agnes Austin, daughter of Lawrence Austin, (who is a Sister of Charity, known as Sister Mary Virginis,) her piano. By the third clause she gave her sister, Ella C. Austin, her furniture, plate, silverware, china, jewelry, automobile, books, pictures, paintings, wearing apparel, and all other household effects and property not otherwise disposed of by the will. By clause 4 she gave to the Corpus Christi Catholic Church of Chicago $5000, to be placed in the building fund of said church. Clause 5 gives to the trustee named in the will $35,000 to be held in trust, the net annual income on $10,000 of said trust fund to be paid to testatrix's nephew Lawrence Austin, son of her brother Lawrence, during his lifetime, and the net income on $25,000 of said trust fund to be paid to testatrix's niece Mary Agnes Austin, known as Sister Mary Virginis, during her lifetime. Upon the decease of Lawrence Austin or Mary Agnes Austin, or either of them, the trustee was directed to deliver and pay over his or her share of the principal of the trust fund to Leonore Magner, Lawrence Magner, Daniel Magner and Julia Magner, if living, in equal parts, and in the event of their death before distribution, leaving no descendants, the trust fund was to revert to and become part of the residuary estate. By clause 6 she gave her mother, Johanna Austin, $90,000. By clause 7 she gave her sister, Ella C. Austin, $90,000. By clause 8 she gave her brother John P. Austin $90,000. By clause 9 she gave Leonore Magner, Daniel Magner, Lawrence Magner and Julia Magner, children of her deceased sister, $22,500 each. By clause 10 she directed the executor and trustee to set aside a sufficient sum, in his discretion, to provide for the care and maintenance of her burial lot. By clause II she directed that all the remainder of her estate, real, personal and mixed, be divided into three equal parts, and one part given to her