ferent counts, and also erred in not requiring the State's attorney to elect, before the commencement of the trial or during the taking of evidence, upon which count a conviction would be asked. Counts for burglary and larceny and for larceny and receiving stolen goods may be joined in the same indictment, and a motion to quash could not be sustained on the ground alleged. Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271; Bennett v. People, 96 id. 602.

The conviction was procured by the testimony of the defendant Sam Horwitch, corroborated, to some extent, by testimony of other witnesses. The defendants were born in Russia, and Horwitch claimed to be a relative of Moeller's first wife. Moeller was a peddler of dry goods, millinery, fancy goods and clothing on the installment plan, in the city of Chicago. Horwitch testified that he worked for a time for the Edison Electric Company, in Chicago, at $100 a month, and left that employment in the late spring of 1912 because of a refusal to raise his salary; that he met Moeller some time in June, 1912, and devoted most of his time thereafter, until October 8, 1912, in committing burglaries of the building of Kriger, who was a manufacturer and dealer in raincoats; that Moeller proposed making easy money and took him into the establishment of Kriger on the pretext of getting a coat; that while there Moeller pointed out a skylight, and that night they went up on the roof and Moeller removed the glass from the skylight and replaced it; that from that time they went to the store repeatedly at night and entered through the skylight, and each time took a number of raincoats,--from fifteen to twenty at a time, and did them up in a bundle; that Moeller would go on top of the roof and pull the bundle up by a rope, and that Moeller took the raincoats and gave him money for them, amounting in all to $325. Kriger having discovered that raincoats were being stolen, put a watchman in the building, and on the night of October 8, 1912, Horwitch came down through the skylight and after having

packed up some coats was arrested by the watchman. It was proved that Horwitch was in the habit of peddling raincoats about the city, carrying them on his arm.

The effort of the defendant Moeller was to prevent the admission of evidence of more than one act of entering the building, under the established rule that a defendant can not be tried for more than one felony at the same time. If the transactions had been distinct and unconnected the rule would have applied, but that was not the case. The test of admissibility of evidence is the connection of the facts proved with the crime charged, and whatever testimony tends directly to show the defendant guilty of the crime charged is competent, although it tends to show him guilty of another offense. (Andrews v. People, 117 Ill. 195; People v. Jennings, 252 id. 534.) If Moeller originated the plan, showed Horwitch the skylight, removed the glass, and did the other acts testified to, they tended to prove him guilty of the crime with which he was charged. It was proper that the jury should have the whole history of the case, and the court did not err in refusing to require an election before the close of the evidence.

Sam Horwitch was an accomplice of Moeller, and Moeller contradicted him as to everything about which he testified, but there was testimony tending to corroborate him. The watchman who arrested Horwitch testified that he heard some person walking on the roof at the time, which showed that there was an associate of Horwitch in the burglary. That testimony did not tend to identify Moeller as the confederate, but five raincoats were found in the residence of Moeller when he was arrested and they were identified as having been stolen from Kriger's place of business. Moeller said that he bought five raincoats from Horwitch, one for himself, one for his brother, one for his wife, and two large sizes, and paid two dollars each for them, and that Horwitch told him that as he was a peddler he could sell those coats. He denied that the rain

coats identified by the officers were the same which he bought, but the conclusion of the jury, and of the court which denied the motion for a new trial, depended on the credibility of the witnesses, and we cannot say that it was manifestly wrong.

The court denied a motion for a new trial made by the defendant Moeller on the ground of newly discovered evidence, consisting of affidavits of a number of persons who were connected with a savings and loan association, that he attended a meeting of said association on the evening of October 8, 1912, and was present during the whole of the meeting, from 9 o'clock in the evening until 11:20 o'clock, which would cover the time of the burglary. There were also affidavits of other persons that at the preliminary hearing of the charge against Moeller and Horwitch before a judge of the municipal court, Horwitch testified that he committed many burglaries of the premises and stole raincoats with the defendant Moeller but that Moeller was not with him on the night of October 8, 1912. The parties making the affidavits stated, in each of them, that they did not impart the information to Moeller's attorneys until after his conviction. But the facts stated by them were within the knowledge of Moeller at the time of the trial. He knew the fact that he was at the meeting of the loan and savings association, if it was a fact, and that as a trustee he turned in about $30 in collections for dues of different members at that meeting, and he necessarily knew what Horwitch testified to on the preliminary hearing. The evidence was important, but the affidavits did not show such diligence on his part as the law requires to sustain a motion for a new trial.

There is no error which calls for a reversal of the judgment, and it is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

VINCENT J. REINKE, Appellee, vs. THE SANITARY DISTRICT OF CHICAGO, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 28, 1913-Rehearing denied Dec. 4, 1913.

I. EVIDENCE-when copy of a claim, and testimony supporting it, are too remote in time. In an action against the Sanitary District of Chicago for damages to land caused by overflow, resulting from turning the waters of the district into the Illinois river in the year 1900, a copy of a claim, and of the testimony supporting it, for damages resulting to a small portion of the same land from the construction of the dam in the Illinois river at Henry in the year 1871 are too remote in point of time and not admissible.

2. SAME-the market value of land-how shown. In an action against the Sanitary District of Chicago for damages for permanent injury to land from overflow, a witness who has stated what the land in controversy was worth, as a whole, may properly be asked to state the value of the different portions of the land as divided into farm land, slough and wood land.

3. SAME--rule where land is owned by different persons. A question as to the fair cash market value of land or interests owned by different persons should be limited to the particular interest of the person in the land concerning which the witness is testifying.

4. SAME models, maps and diagrams are admissible as illustrative of testimony. It is proper to receive in evidence models, maps and diagrams designed to give more accurate information concerning objects or places which cannot be conveniently shown or described to the jury, or which tend by graphic representation to enable the jury to more clearly understand the testimony.

5. SAME when a tabulation tending to show duration of overflow is admissible. In an action for damages from overflow of lands it is proper to admit in evidence a tabulation showing the duration and extent of the overflow on the cultivatable lands in controversy for certain years, based upon government records of gauge readings taken from the United States weather bureau, which records had been previously received in evidence.

6. SAME--contour maps of government survey are admissible in an action for overflow of lands. Contour maps of the government survey showing the elevation of a particular piece of land in controversy are admissible in evidence in an action for damages for an overflow, subject to proof of the incorrectness of those

maps or that there had been a material change in the elevation of the land since the maps were made.

7. SAME-expert testimony as to overflowed lands is admissible. In an action for damages resulting from the overflow of lands by reason of the opening of the channel of a sanitary district, expert testimony is admissible as to what land would be covered by water at a given time, based upon contour maps, rainfalls, gauge readings, and other data of like nature which it is a part of the business of a skilled engineer to understand, although the witness is not personally familiar with the condition of the land on the various dates in question; but the admission of testimony of this character rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case.

8. SAME objection to evidence must be specific. An objection to the question, "What, in your opinion, was the fair cash market value on that date for any purposes for which you think it was reasonably adapted?" upon the ground that the question contemplates a use of land other than the witness has been asked about, does not raise the point that the question assumes that the plaintiff owns the fee, including fire clay and coal underlying it.

9. INSTRUCTIONS-measure of damages for overflow of lands. The true measure of damages in an action for permanent injury to land, caused by opening the channel of a sanitary district, is the difference between the fair cash value of the land immediately before and after the water was turned in, and an instruction which does not limit the fair cash market value of the land is erroneous.

10. SAME when instruction as to right to overflow lands is not misleading. In an action for damages for overflowing lands by the Sanitary District of Chicago, an instruction which states that the defendant had "no right to cause to flow on plaintiff's land any water that would not flow thereon in a state of nature" is not misleading, though the act under which the defendant was organized authorizes it to overflow lands but makes it liable for damages from such overflow.

II. SOLICITORS' FEES—allowance should be usual charge under all circumstances. In taxing attorney's fees in an action against a sanitary district the court should exercise its own judgment, based on its own knowledge and experience in such matters, and is not necessarily governed by the opinions of attorneys as to the value of the services, and the allowance should be the usual charge for services between the parties under like circumstances, and not what is reasonable or proper for a given attorney in a particular case.