improvement ordinances were so situated that the public benefits for such improvements would be the same as the public benefits for this improvement. It may frequently happen in a municipality that public benefits for paving a certain street may be entirely out of proportion to the public benefits arising from paving another parallel street not over a block or two distant. Be that as it may, it was not the intention of the framers of the present constitution, or of the legislature in enacting the Local Improvement act, to provide that the requirements of the constitution as to uniformity and equality of tax should apply on the question of public benefits between different and distinct local improvements under separate ordinances. It is no proof of fraud on the part of the public authorities that the proportion taxed to the city for any given improvement is different from the percentage taxed to the city for a somewhat similar improvement in another part of the city.

The argument of counsel that the present statute permitting municipal authorities to be the final arbiters as to what proportion of the cost of the improvement should be taxed against the public leads to gross inequalities in taxation should be addressed to the legislature, as should the argument that in special tax cases, as well as in special assessment cases, the trial courts should be given the power to review the question as to what proportion of the cost of the improvement shall be paid by the public. This court cannot pass upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the present laws on this point unless they contravene some constitutional principle. We have held in a long line of decisions that these laws in this regard are not in conflict with the constitution.

Appellants also suggest in the briefs that the ordinance is unreasonable because it taxes the same amount for each square foot on all the property assessed. There was evidence in the record tending to show that there is a wide,

deep ravine within the limits of this improvement, and it is contended that it is unreasonable to suppose that property. in this ravine would be benefited the same as property on the level land. Under the present Local Improvement act this court has held that there might for various reasons be a great difference as to benefits as between various lots, yet if the special tax did not exceed the benefits it would be valid; that the unequal distribution of the cost of the improvement between different lots did not invalidate the tax if it was within the limits of the benefits conferred. (City of Peru v. Bartels, supra; City of East St. Louis v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. supra.) The question of the proportionate share of the cost of the improvement between the different lots cannot be raised in the courts in a special tax proceeding.

It is further urged that the ordinance is unreasonable because it provides for the paving of certain streets which are already improved and in good condition. The evidence in the record on this question was not in harmony. We are disposed to think, however, that the weight of the testimony tends strongly to uphold the contention of the city that the ordinance is not unreasonable in this regard. The fact that certain witnesses testified that an improvement was unnecessary and unreasonable would not, in itself, justify the court in substituting its discretion for that of the city authorities. (Jones v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 92.) There must be a clear abuse of the discretion. In order to justify the court in interfering with the determination of the city council as to the reasonableness of an improvement ordinance, ordinarily such abuse of power must appear upon the face of the ordinance itself. (Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Village of Elmhurst, 165 Ill. 148.) Even if this is a case in which it is allowable to look outside of the ordinance to decide that question, the facts disclosed by the present record are not such as to show that there has

been any such abuse of power as to make the present ordinance unreasonable.

We find no substantial error in the record. The judgment of the county court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff in Error, vs. THE WILLIAM HENNING COMPANY, Defendant in Error.

Opinion filed December 17, 1913.

1. PURE FOODS-object of section 11 of Pure Food act is to prevent imitation of cider vinegar. The provision of section II of the Pure Food act that "all vinegar made wholly or in part from distilled liquor shall be branded 'Distilled Vinegar' and shall not be colored in imitation of cider vinegar," was intended to prevent the imitation of cider vinegar, whether the coloring of the distilled vinegar is done by adding coloring matter, such as caramel, or by mixing the distilled vinegar with sugar vinegar.

2. SAME when sale of vinegar is a violation of the Pure Food act. The sale of vinegar composed of distilled vinegar and sugar vinegar mixed in such proportions as to produce the color of cider vinegar is a violation of section II of the Pure Food law, though the barrels containing the product are plainly branded, "A compound of White Distilled and Sugar Vinegar," as the provisions of section II relating especially to vinegar control that product, regardless of that part of section 9 of the act relating to the sale of products plainly branded as compounds and containing no poisonous or deleterious ingredient.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-courts will not hold a statute unconstitutional in a doubtful case. The presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, and courts will, if possible, give it such a construction as will sustain it and will hold it unconstitutional only when it is clearly so.

4. SAME-police power authorizes regulation to prevent fraud and deceit. Under the general police power of the State the legislature may make regulations to prevent fraud and deceit as well as for the public health, safety and comfort, and, in connection with the regulation of food products, may prohibit the use of coloring matter or the mixing of harmless ingredients of the same general nature in such a way as to deceive or mislead the public into accepting the compound for another product.

5. SAME-Section II of Pure Food act, relating to vinegar, is not unconstitutional. Section II of the Pure Food act, relating to vinegar, and intending, in part, to prevent fraud in selling as genuine cider vinegar another vinegar colored in imitation of cider vinegar, is not unconstitutional.

6. SAME-word "adulterated," used in title of Pure Food act, construed. The word "adulterated," used in the title of the Pure Food act, covers the mixing of distilled vinegar and sugar vinegar in such proportions as to produce a product having the color of cider vinegar, as the manufacture of such compound is contrary to the intent of section II, which provides that vinegar shall be held to be adulterated, within the meaning of the act, if it is manufactured contrary to its provisions.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. FREDERICK L. FAKE, Judge, presiding.

P. J. LUCEY, Attorney General, MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, (CHARLES F. MCKINLEY, ZACH HOFHEIMER, and EDMUND K. JARECKI, of counsel,) for the People.

LANNEN & HICKEY, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action of debt brought in October, 1912, in the municipal court of Chicago, to collect a fine for a violation of the Pure Food statute enacted in 1907, as amended in 1911. The trial court found defendant in error not guilty and entered judgment accordingly. From that judgment this writ of error was sued out.

It is,

The first, and perhaps chief, controversy is as to the proper construction of section II of said statute. however, further insisted by counsel for defendant in error that if the construction contended for by them is not correct, the statute is unconstitutional in so far as it is attempted to be enforced against their client.

Section II reads as follows: "All vinegar made by fermentation and oxidation without the intervention of distillation, shall be branded with the name of the fruit or

substance from which the same is made. All vinegar made wholly or in part from distilled liquor shall be branded 'Distilled Vinegar,' and shall not be colored in imitation of cider vinegar. All vinegar shall be made wholly from the fruit or grain from which it purports to be or is represented to be made, shall contain no foreign substance, and shall contain not less than four per cent, by weight, of absolute acetic acid. Any vinegar made or manufactured contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this act. Any vinegar which is not branded as herein provided shall be deemed to be misbranded within the meaning of this act." (Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 2215.)

The case was tried without a jury and various special findings of fact and propositions of law were presented to the court and held or refused.

From the record it appears that defendant in error, the William Henning Company, on or about March 13, 1912, sold and delivered to the Joliet Grocery Company of Joliet, Illinois, five barrels of vinegar, each containing about fifty gallons; that on the head of each barrel there was stenciled in large, plain, black letters the following: "William Henning Co.-A compound of White Distilled and Sugar Vinegar, Chicago." Said vinegar was composed of white distilled vinegar and sugar vinegar, the latter being sometimes known as molasses vinegar. The evidence showed it contained somewhere between ten and twenty-five per cent of sugar vinegar. It further appears that both distilled and sugar vinegar, or a compound of both, are wholesome and nutritious articles of food, and that this compound contained no poisonous or deleterious ingredients; that distilled vinegar is an almost colorless liquid, generally made from corn; that sugar or molasses vinegar is made from molasses, usually of a grade commercially known as "black strap," and is of a very dark-brown color; that cider vinegar has a distinct amber color, although it may