or deed, in such case the ratification is held to be a part of the original transaction and to be ineffectual. (Sayles v. Christie, 187 Ill. 420.) There is nothing to indicate that appellee had any knowledge as to the real value of the Kansas land until he visited it in August, 1908. He testified that he began to be suspicious of Barickman about the time he ordered the abstract, in May, 1908, and did not advise with him for some time before or after that with reference to what he would do in the matter. It appears that there was a court proceeding started in Kansas affecting the title to said quarter section, in which both appellee and appellant were made parties and which was settled previous to this litigation. Appellee did not defend that suit but appellant did. Barickman was called as a witness by appellant. While he was a cousin of appellee, it is possible to conclude from this record that he deceived both appellant and appellee with reference to this trade, but it is apparent from all the circumstances in proof that appellant knew that he was making the trade in such a way as to deceive the purchaser, and was willing to assent to such deception by following Barickman's suggestion to deed the farm to Beutke without any money being paid in advance and without himself communicating with Beutke. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that supports in any way appellant's contention that appellee knew that the $400 payment as a part of the cattle trade was understood by Moon to be a part of the "boot money" in the trade for the land or that he received any part of it. Both Moon and Barickman testified that the talk on that question was made out of appellee's presence. The master and the court found that appellee never legally ratified his deed to the Eureka property after he became of age. The evidence in the record supports this finding.

The master found that appellee should pay to appellant $250, holding that to be the amount expended by appellant for improvements on the Eureka property, less the rents

that had been received from said property from January 9, 1908, to the date of the filing of the report, December 20, 1910. The decree ordered that appellee should pay appellant $250, less the net rents from the Eureka property from the date of the master's report to the time of settlement. Appellant contends that if the deed is to be set aside appellee should be decreed to deed back the Kansas land and should pay back the amount appellant paid for repairs on the Eureka property, ($750,) apparently without taking into account the rents that he has received, or, at least, without taking into account the rent that had been collected by Barickman the first year the trade was made. He also contends that appellee ought to re-pay the $100 that he received from Barickman as a part of the commission, as he contends he has never been able to collect from Barickman any part of the purchase price of the Kansas land or any part of the money advanced as heretofore stated. While it appears that appellee, before the commencement of the suit, tendered to Beutke a deed to the Kansas land, and counsel for appellee in their brief state that appellee is still willing to re-convey the land, the decree does not find that appellee must re-convey to appellant whatever interest he has in the Kansas land in addition to the payment of the money found to be due by the court. The decree should have directed such re-conveyance to Moon. It is stated in the briefs that the Kansas land may have been sold for taxes. Appellee should only be required to give to Moon a quit-claim deed of whatever interest he may have in the quarter section.

The purchaser from an infant whose deed has been avoided is entitled to be allowed for the improvements placed upon the property by setting off the same against rents and profits, but it has been held that the infant can not be required to compensate the purchaser for improvements exceeding the rental value. (22 Cyc. 561; Sewell v. Sewell, 92 Ky. 500; Clark v. Tate, 7 Mont. 171.) To give effect to an infant's disaffirmance of his contract it is

not necessary that the other party be placed in statu quo, for if the law in every case required restitution of the consideration as a condition precedent to the disaffirmance of a contract, it would often result in accomplishing indirectly what it expressly says shall not be done directly, and the purpose of permitting infants to avoid their contracts might often be thus defeated. (16 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,-2d ed.-293, and cases cited.) Under these rules of law appellant is in no position to question the accounting. No cross-errors having been assigned, it is not necessary for us to inquire into the question as to whether there was a proper accounting on behalf of appellee.

The decree of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the circuit court to enter a decree requiring appellee to give appellant a quit-claim deed of whatever interest he may have in the quarter section of Kansas land. In all other respects the decree is affirmed. The costs in this court will be paid by appellant. Affirmed in part and reversed in part, with directions.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. IRVIN H. TURNER, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed October 28, 1913.

I. CRIMINAL LAW-jury must fix term of imprisonment for incest. As the statute specifying the punishment for incest fails to fix a minimum term of imprisonment the jury must fix the punishment, and it is reversible error for the court to impose an indeterminate sentence under the Parole law.

2. SAME-what does not show that the grand jury was illegal. A certificate by the county clerk stating that there was no request, in writing, by at least one-third of the members of the board of supervisors requesting a meeting in December does not show that a grand jury selected at the December meeting was illegal, where the certificate is silent as to whether there was an adjournment of the regular September meeting to December.

3. SAME when allowance of a motion to amend is within discretion of court. Where a general motion to quash the indictment has been made and overruled, a plea of not guilty entered and two continuances had on motion of the accused, it is within the discretion of the trial court to allow the plea of not guilty to be withdrawn and the motion to quash amended so as to specify the grounds therefor.

4. SAME-proof of complaint by the victim is limited to the offense of rape. The rule permitting proof, in a prosecution for rape, of immediate complaint by the woman assaulted does not extend to other offenses, but is merely an exception to the rule which forbids hearsay evidence.

5. SAME what does not amount to proof of complaint in a prosecution for incest. Where one defense in a prosecution for incest is that the defendant's daughters and their aunt have conspired to send him to the penitentiary and secure his property, it is competent to show that the aunt came to Illinois and assisted in the prosecution after receiving a letter from the daughter written after the occurrence charged in the indictment, and such proof does not amount to proof of a complaint, there being no evidence of the contents of the letter nor that any complaint was made.

6. SAME-the proof of previous acts of incest is admissible. Where the State's attorney has elected to rely for a conviction upon the act of incest charged as occurring on a certain date, it is not error to permit the wronged daughter to testify to the frequent repetition of the same acts covering a period of four and one-half years prior to the date relied upon, as the logical connection between the series of acts is such that one tends to establish another, and all are admissible.

7. SAME-proof of three acts of incest on same date does not require further election of offenses. Where the State's attorney has elected to rely for a conviction upon an act of incest committed on a certain date, proof that on that date there were three different acts of incest does not require the State's attorney to make a further election as to which particular act he will rely upon for a conviction, as the repetition of the acts on the same date does not make them distinct felonies.

8. SAME-daughter cannot be an accomplice to crime of incest committed upon her. Under the Illinois statute concerning incest the daughter is regarded as the victim and not an accomplice and cannot be indicted for the offense, and it is error to give instructions concerning the weight to be given her testimony, based upon the ground that she was an accomplice to the crime, even though

her testimony might be construed to indicate that she was a willing participant in the act.

9. SAME-test in determining whether person is an accomplice. An accomplice is one who is associated with another in the commission of a crime, and the test is whether he or she could be indicted for the offense.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. T. M. HARRIS, Judge, presiding.

C. F. MORTIMER, EVAN WORTH, BEACH & TRAPP, and HUMPHREY & ANDERSON, for plaintiff in error.

PATRICK J. LUCEY, Attorney General, EVERETT SMITH, State's Attorney, and KING & MILLER, for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

Irvin H. Turner, the plaintiff in error, was found guilty by a jury, in the circuit court of Logan county, of the crime of incest with his daughter, Grace B. Turner, and was sentenced by the court to imprisonment in the penitentiary.

The court failed to observe that the punishment for incest is imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding twenty years, so that the Parole law, which provides that the term of imprisonment shall not be less than one year, does not apply. The jury did not fix the term of imprisonment, and the sentence was for an indeterminate period under the provisions of that law. For that error the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for another trial. People v. Hartsig, 249 Ill. 348; People v. Afton, 258 id. 292.

The assignment of errors includes numerous other alleged grounds for a reversal of the judgment, some of which cannot arise upon another trial and others probably will not, but some of them must be considered and decided, either because sustaining them would be fatal to the prose