Jury, charged with the important function which you are at present called upon to exercise.

What should be deemed sufficient "overt acts," of the particular head and species of treason, "of compassing and imagining the death of the king,"-In other words, what acts properly amount to legal evidence of the existence of such a purpose, in the mind of the person charged therewith, has been occasionally, heretofore, the subject of dispute and controversy. Long, however, before the passing of the late Statute of the thirty-sixth of his present Majesty, this, at least, had been judicially settled, by the most grave and revered authorities of the law, that all measures adopted for the deposing of the king from his royal state and dignity, all measures of force directed against his royal person, either for the taking possession thereof, or subjecting it to restraint and imprisonment, are impressed with the heinous character and stamp of this denomination of treason, and entitled to be received as the strongest and most cogent evidence thereof.

It has also been settled by the like high authorities, that any consultations and meetings of persons, in order to effectuate the above purposes, although nothing should be ultimately done thereupon, and although the whole scheme and plan should prove ineffectual and abortive, that any agreement or assent given to overtures or proposals of that kind (and which assent is to be collected in this case, from the same circumstances of approbation or acquiescence, from which it is properly capable of being collected in all other cases) are all of them competent overt acts, of that species of high treason, which consists in compassing and imagining the death of the king. All pretence, however, for doubt upon a subject, which, from its superior importance, deserved well that it should be cleared of any remaining shades of uncertainty, which might even erroneously be supposed to cloud and obscure it, has been, for all succeeding times, distinctly removed and obviated, by the prudent provisions of the late Statute of the thirty-sixth

of George III. cap. 7. which, amongst other things, enacts, that, if any person or persons whatsoever, during the natural life of the King (and for a limited time afterwards) should compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend death or destruction, or any bodily harm, tending to death or destruction, maim, or wounding, imprisonment, or restraint, of the person of the King, &c. every such person or persons, so offending, should be deemed to be a traitor and traitors, and should suffer and forfeit, as in cases of high treason."

To compass and imagine, therefore, the imprisonment, or personal restraint of the king, is now, by the express letter of a clear and positive Statute, placed as a substantive act of treason, upon exactly the same ground with the compassing and imagining. of the natural death of the King, as that crime stands under the very letter and terms of the Statute of the twenty-fifth of Edward III. itself. The same indeed may be said of all the other treasons, which are specifically enacted in the Statute of the thirty-sixth of George III. and I only select, by way of instance, those of "compassing, imagining, devising, and intending, the imprisonment, and restraint of the person of the King," because it is probable, that the descriptions of treason I have mentioned, together with that of compassing and imagining his death, will be those to which your attention will be more particularly called, by the evidence about to be submitted to your consideration.

I have already stated to you, that such acts as sufficiently indicate an intention to commit any particular species of treason, and conduce to its execution, are properly overt acts of high treason.

All overt acts which are meant to be given in evidence against the prisoner, are justly and humanely required by the seventh of William III. cap. 3. to be expressly laid in the indictment against him, in order that he might thereby be apprised of the substance of the charge which he is called upon to answer; but the numerous particulars into which such a charge

will naturally and unavoidably branch and extend itself in point of proof, need not be detailed and spread out on the face of the indictment.

It is enough that the nature of the overt act relied upon, be specified with reasonable and convenient certainty; and, when this is done, the various other circumstances, with which the overt act is immediately and necessarily connected in point of fact, and the different means employed for effecting the same, need be no further stated. Indeed, the several other matters may properly be considered as being only so many parts, appendages, and results of that which is before stated, and as virtually included therein.

I have said thus much in respect to the form of alledging the overt act in an indictment for high treason, in the hope of affording you some assistance towards the more clearly understanding the real substance and form of that indictment, which will presently be laid before you, couched of course, in the technical language used on such occasions; and that you may also be the better enabled to judge whether it is accompanied by the competent kind and degree of proof, which ought to be adduced in support of it. I will further suggest, for your information (in case it may be necessary) what the law requires on this head. In the first place, the law requires that the crime be tried by a Jury of the county within which it has been, in the whole, or in part, committed. Some one overt act of the particular species of treason, charged in the indictment, that is to say, of the compassing and imagining the death of the king, or of levying war against him, or the like, must be proved by some one witness, to have been committed within the limits of that county, in which the indictment is to be preferred, and by a Jury of which the trial is to take place. For example, some one meeting or consultation for the purpose of forwarding the objects of the treason, must, upon this occasion, be proved by some one witness, to have been held, or some other act done by the party or parties, meant to be affected thereby, at some place within this county. This, you will observe, is

merely necessary for the purpose of investing you, the Jurors of this county, with legal competence to enquire of the offence charged. When this proof is made out, any other act, in prosecution of the same species of treason, wheresoever committed, whether within or without this county, and by whatever witness proved, either the same or a different one, may be received in evidence without objection: I mean as far as respects the locality of such acts.

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The law also requires, in the finding of indictments by the Grand Jury, in the first instance, as well as upon the trial of them afterwards by another Jury, to whom that province belongs, that proof of overt acts shall be made by the oath of two witnesses, either both of them to the same overt act, or one of them to one, and the other of them to another overt act, of the same species of treason, If, however, the overt act charged, should be "of any direct attempt," that is, of any attempt actually made against his majesty's person, whereby his life might be endangered, or his person suffer bodily harm," in that case, by the express and very necessary provision of a late Statute of the thirty-ninth and fortieth year of his present majesty, the person charged with such direct attempt, 66 may be indicted and tried in the same manner, and according to the same course and order of trial in every respect, and upon the like evidence, as if such person stood charged for murder." I am not, however aware, that any such direct attempt is likely to become the subject of consideration upon the present occasion, or under this Commission.

It is unnecessary for me to suggest any thing further to you as to the frame of the indictment, or the number or nature of the witnesses by whom, according to any subsisting provisions of law, it is required to be supported, I will, however, trespass on your attention for a few moments longer, upon another subject, to which it has not been hitherto drawn. I mean, as to the probable nature and quality, and the proper legal effect of those acts and circumstances, which are now about to be laid before you in evidence,

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It is the natural and usual effect of guilt, so far to blind and infatuate the understandings of those who are busily occupied in the contemplation of its projects, and who have long brooded over the means of its execution, as to produce in them a confident persuasion, that there exist in other minds feelings and inclinations congenial to their own, which dispose them to receive with favour, and to forward with zeal and alacrity, even the wildest objects of their own detestable machinations.

This persuasion often generates such a degree of rashness and indiscretion in the overtures and communications made by guilty men towards others, whom they seek to associate, or believe that they have already in part associated, to their own designs, as leads to discoveries, by which the public safety is frequently redeemed and rescued from its immediately impending peril. But the greatest part of that disclosure, which most effectually developes the secret and hidden springs of action, and the most dark and fatal designs in every conspiracy, can, in the nature of things only be obtained (as it has in all times past hitherto generally been obtained) from those to whom the facts disclosed, were, by a participation of the same counsels previously known, that is, from some of the conspirators themselves, from persons combined and confederated in the actual execution of the same dangerous designs and enterprises.

The evidence of accomplices, although unquestionably competent, is at all times to be received and acted upon with a just and sober degree of jealousy and caution; and, unless the testimony derived from this source, be of such a nature as to carry internal evidence of its own truth along with it, or be confirmed by other evidence of a less exceptionable description, it affords no safe and satisfactory ground for conclusions, by which the lives, fortunes, and honour of others, is to be materially affected. In weighing, therefore, the evidence of accomplices, a Jury, charged with a determination of those important issues in their final and decisive result (which, how