9. Coloring Matter, when added to any article of food (except butter and cheese), shall be clearly indicated on the front of the package by the words "Artificially Colored," Vegetable Coloring," etc.

IO. Extracts made of more than one principle must be labeled with the name of each or else simply with the name of the inferior. In all cases where an extract is labeled with two or more names, the type used is to be similar in size, and the name of any one of the articles used is not to be given greater prominence than another. The word compound cannot be used.

II.

Artificial Extracts must be labeled "Artificial."

12. Wagons, cans and bottles from which milk is sold shall be conspicuously marked with the name of the dealer.

13. Each can or vessel containing milk from which any part of the cream has been removed shall be plainly and conspicuously marked with the words "skimmed milk."

14. Jelly, jam, fruit butter or preserves containing glucose and added color shall be distinctly and durably labeled imitation jelly, jam, fruit butter or preserves.

15. All soaked or bleached goods, or goods put up from products dried before canning shall be plainly marked, stamped or labeled as such with the words "soaked" or "bleached goods" in letters not less than two-line pica in size, showing the name of the article and the true name and address of the packer or dealer who sells the same.

This ruling is not intended to apply in the case of substances which are always put up soaked, as "Baked Beans."

16. All vinegar made wholly or in part from distilled liquor shall be branded "distilled vinegar."

17. Preservatives, other than household preservatives, when used in food, shall be indicated by the label on the front of the package, stating the kind and amount used.

18. Deceitful and suggestive names and designs shall not be used. No design representing a superior ingredient, its source, or a process of its manufacture, shall appear on the label unless the inferior ingredients are likewise so represented in an equally prominent manner.

19. Every tierce, bucket, pail, package or other vessel, wrapper or label in or under which is sold any lard or any article intended for use as lard which contains any ingredient but the pure fat of healthy swine, shall bear on the top or outer side thereof, in letters not less than one-half inch in length, and plainly exposed to view, the words "Compounded Lard" or "Lard Compound.'

20. Catsup containing other vegetables than tomatoes shall be labeled with the names of all the vegetables present, or shall be labeled "Vegetable Catsup" or "Compound Catsup" or "Catsup Compound.' 21. Edible oils shall not be sold as 'Salad Oil" unless the term "Salad Oil" is accompanied by the name of the ingredients.

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INSTRUCTIONS TO INSPECTORS.

In sending in samples for analysis to this department of any manufactured product, the following information must be given of each sample:

Name and location of manufacturer and dealer. If bought of jobber, the firm name and location. Be particular as to this, and write name plainly. Brand or name of article, any representation by seller as to quality or character of goods.

To enable correct analysis to be made not less than the following quantities of each article should be sent:

Cheese, not less than six ounces.

Butter, not less than eight ounces.

Milk, not less than four ounces.

Cream, not less than four ounces.

Lard, not less than four ounces.

Baking powder, not less than one small can.

Vinegar, not less than one pint.

Honey, not less than eight ounces.

Spices, not less than four ounces.

Jellies, not less than one-half pound, or small original package.

Jams, not less than one-half pound, or small original package.

Preserves, not less than one-half pound, or small original package.
Beer, not less than one pint.

Wine, not less than one pint .

Liquor, not less than one pint.

Olive oil, not less than four ounces.

Maple syrup, not less than one pint.

Candy, not less than eight ounces.

Maple sugar, not less than one pound.

Cocoa and chocolate, one small original package.

Cream of tartar, one ounce.

Extracts, not less than two ounces.

Wheat flour, not less than eight ounces.

Buckwheat flour, not less than eight ounces.

Molasses and syrup, not less than one pint.

Sugar, not less than eight ounces.

Foods should be procured in original package when put up in packages containing not more than two pounds solid or one-half gallon liquid measure.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

The following compilation of Supreme Court decisions is given that the rules for construing food laws may be understood and that the public may know what protection they have, and dealers may know to what extent and when they are liable under the laws, as construed by courts of last resort, and the first to be considered and the one most frequently presented is the question of intent.

IGNORANCE OF FACT OF ADULTERATION DOES NOT EXCUSE DEALER.

That a dealer may not know that an article sold or offered for sale is adulterated and yet be liable to punishment for selling or offering the same for sale, when selling or offering for sale, or having in possession with intent to sell, is prohibited by statute, I think well settled, as will be seen by an examination of the compilation of authorities hereinafter set forth and the rules as well as the reason therefor will be found in the case of State vs. Kelly, 54 O. S., 166, as follows:

At page 177 the Court states that the law under which the prosecution was brought, it being the first section of the Act of March 20, 1884 (Sec. 8805-1, rev. statutes), "That no person shall, within this State, manufacture for sale, offer for sale or sell any drug or article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this Act."

Further on, at page 178, the Court reasons:

The Act is not a provision for the punishment of those who sell adulterated foods or drugs, because of any supposed turpitude prompting such sales. Its purpose is indicated by its title. It is "An Act to provide against the adulteration of food and drugs." It is a plan devised by the General Assembly to protect the public against the hurtful consequences of the sales of adulterated foods and drugs, those consequences being in no degree increased by the vendor's knowledge or diminished by his ignorance of the adulteration of the articles which he offers for sale. The provisions of the Act are appropriate to the purposes indicated by its title. It would have been inconsistent with that purpose to provide for the trial of such immaterial issues as the object of the vendor in making a sale or of the extent of his knowledge touching the quality of the article sold. Those who produce the adulterated articles whose sale is forbidden may live without the State. Purpose and knowledge, except when they are indicated by the character of the forbidden act, are, in most cases, insusceptible of proof. If this statute had imposed upon the State the burden of proving the purpose of the vendor in selling an article of food or his knowledge of its adulteration, it would thereby have defeated its declared purpose. Since it is the duty of courts to so construe doubtful statutes as to give effect to the purpose of the Legislature, they cannot in case of a statute whose provisions are unambiguous and whose validity is clear, defeat its purpose by construction.

The Court further along, citing cases, reasons:

In Commonwealth vs. Farren, 9 Allen, 489, in construing a statute which provides that "whoever sells or keeps or offers for sale adulterated milk or milk to which water or any foreign substance has been added" shall be punished as provided. It was held that it is not necessary either to allege or prove that the accused knew that the milk he offered for sale was adulterated. With respect to a similar statute the same conclusion was reached in State vs. Smith, 10 R. I., 258. If knowledge of the adulteration were an element of the offense, it would be incumbent upon the State to establish it; but since it is not, the defendant could derive no advantage from any evidence tending to show the absence of such knowledge.

And the Court concluded this decision on page 180 with the following language:

In the enactment of this statute, it was the evident purpose of the General Assembly to protect the public against the harmful consequences of the sales of adulterated food and drugs, and, to the end that its purpose might not be defeated, to require the seller at his peril to know that the article which he offers for sale is not adulterated, or to demand of those from whom he purchases indemnity against the penalties that may be imposed upon him because of their concealment of the adulteration of the articles.

It is a well settled principle of law, estbalished by an almost unvarying current of authorities both in this country and England, that guilty knowledge on the part of the seller need not be averred and proved, unless it is an essential element in the offense charged. In the opinion just delivered by the circuit court of Summitt county, in David Meyer vs. The State, 10 C. C. R., 226, Hale, J., says: "It may be fairly inferred that the legislature of the state intended by this positive enactment to prohibit absolutely the sale of adulterated wine, and that knowledge by the accused of its adulteration is not an essential element of the crime. It must be conceded that the object and purpose of this statute, if not wholly subverted, would be weakened to that extent that it would in nowise accomplish the results intended by its enactment, if the accused may go acquit by simply showing that he did not know the nature of the article sold. Food is sold to be consumed. The purchaser is under no obligation to analyze the article purchased for that purpose, to ascertain whether it contains substance injurious to health, nor would it be practicable for him to do so, and it should be no answer to his complaint that the seller had no knowledge of the impurity; nor should it be a defense to the seller when called to account by the state to answer that he was ignorant of the substance he was selling. We see no injustice in holding the seller of food products responsible for what he sells, and in casting upon him the burden of knowing whether the food does, or does not, fall within the prohibition of the statute, with that care and honesty which is incumbent on the seller of such products."

In People vs. Kibler, 106 N. Y., 321, the defendant was charged with selling adulterated milk. The defendant was not permitted by the trial court to show an absence of criminal intent, or to go to the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge which made his intent wholly immaterial, and his guilt consists in having sold the adulterated article, whether he knew it or not. Finch, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

"As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no element of the offense." This legislation is justified on the ground that use of the inhibited "articles used for food and drink by man," is injurious to the public health; and particularly because the adulterated articles of food and drink cannot be easily distinguished from the genuine, and are so readily substituted for it, as to work a fraud upon all the people who actually use and consume such articles and things, as well as upon purchasers of the counterfeit food, in place of the genuine food and drink.

Any article of food or drink either manufactured or sold as being what it is named, would indicate to the public that it is a genuine article of its kind and species, which, if not pure and free from adulteration of every kind, would fairly come within the spirit and object of the Act, without reference