Reforming to Win: Partisanship and Anti-corruption Reform in Latin America

Alianza analyze anti-corruption institutions anti-corruption reform preferences Argentina attitudes about corruption campaign finance reform Carlos Menem Chile citizens coalitional Concertación corruption reform cosmetic reform countries cross-national democracy democratic depth and durability depth of anti-corruption durability of anti-corruption durability of reform economic performance Eduardo Duhalde election electoral fraud electoral payoff electoral reforms elites executive factions favor reform freedom of information FrePaSo funds governing party handling of corruption high electoral uncertainty high political transaction high uncertainty implementation increased issue Kirchner Latin America legislative level of corruption low electoral uncertainty low political transaction major anti-corruption reforms Menem Mexico moderate depth mutual sacrifice narco-trafficking neo-liberal opposition partisan preferences partisanship Peronist party political corruption political transaction costs politicians preferences for anti-corruption preferences for reform president priority of corruption reduce corruption reform depth reform durability reform outcomes result reversal strong Table theoretically Transparency International University of Salamanca variables voter demand Zedillo