Reforming to Win: Partisanship and Anti-corruption Reform in Latin AmericaDuke University, 2006 - 756페이지 |
도서 본문에서
19개의 결과 중 1 - 3개
95 페이지
... actors . Each of these institutions determines the political costs of policy change . Lower executive decree power forces executives to pay the cost of negotiating with the legislature . A divided government further increases those ...
... actors . Each of these institutions determines the political costs of policy change . Lower executive decree power forces executives to pay the cost of negotiating with the legislature . A divided government further increases those ...
227 페이지
... actors in the political system . Argentina currently has a much greater diversity of anti - corruption preferences because of the inclusion of reformist / middle class parties than it did at the beginning of Menem's term . But sustained ...
... actors in the political system . Argentina currently has a much greater diversity of anti - corruption preferences because of the inclusion of reformist / middle class parties than it did at the beginning of Menem's term . But sustained ...
271 페이지
... actors in government remained stable , meaning that it was easier for the opposition to maintain anti - corruption reforms . If the PAN government would not cooperate in maintaining reforms , the opposition could defect on other issues ...
... actors in government remained stable , meaning that it was easier for the opposition to maintain anti - corruption reforms . If the PAN government would not cooperate in maintaining reforms , the opposition could defect on other issues ...
목차
Biography 378 | 1 |
Do We Really Know It When We See It? The Concepts | 16 |
Why Study Reform? | 31 |
저작권 | |
표시되지 않은 섹션 19개
자주 나오는 단어 및 구문
Alianza analyze anti-corruption institutions anti-corruption reform preferences Argentina attitudes about corruption campaign finance reform Carlos Menem Chile citizens coalitional Concertación corruption reform cosmetic reform countries cross-national democracy democratic depth and durability depth of anti-corruption durability of anti-corruption durability of reform economic performance Eduardo Duhalde election electoral fraud electoral payoff electoral reforms elites executive factions favor reform freedom of information FrePaSo funds governing party handling of corruption high electoral uncertainty high political transaction high uncertainty implementation increased issue Kirchner Latin America legislative level of corruption low electoral uncertainty low political transaction major anti-corruption reforms Menem Mexico moderate depth mutual sacrifice narco-trafficking neo-liberal opposition partisan preferences partisanship Peronist party political corruption political transaction costs politicians preferences for anti-corruption preferences for reform president priority of corruption reduce corruption reform depth reform durability reform outcomes result reversal strong Table theoretically Transparency International University of Salamanca variables voter demand Zedillo