Mergers and Acquisitions: Understanding the Antitrust IssuesAmerican Bar Association, 2004 - 869페이지 Since the publication of the first edition of Mergers and Acquisitions, the federal agencies and state attorneys general have continued an active merger agenda and have refined merger analyses through settlements, liquidated cases, and speeches. This second edition has been completely updated to capture the most important developments in this area. A comprehensive review of U.S. substantive merger law, Mergers and Acquisitions, Second Edition gives you indispensable guidance you can put into practice today. No other book gathers all of the resources, case law, and agency rulings you need in a single place. It is a fundamental reference to: the relevant case law; antitrust guidelines; policies and speeches, and; consent decrees on the subject. This valuable source guides you through the substantive analysis applied to transactions, including market definition and measurement; possible coordinated and unilateral effects arising from a transaction; potential mitigating factors, efficiencies, and defenses; joint ventures and vertical and conglomerate mergers; international transactions; and judicial relief and remedies. serve you again and again as you counsel your clients, help them understand the issues involved, and work more effectively to achieve your goals in the evaluation process and beyond. |
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목차
OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICABLE US ANTITRUST LAWS | 1 |
A Section 7 of the Clayton Act | 2 |
2 Section 7 Applies to Acquisitions of Less Than 100 Percent of Voting Securities | 6 |
3 Section 7 Applies to NotforProfit Corporations | 7 |
B Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act | 8 |
C Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act | 9 |
D State Antitrust Laws | 10 |
US ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE | 13 |
4 Joint Selling Arrangements | 271 |
5 Joint Buying Arrangements | 278 |
6 Network Joint Ventures | 281 |
E Operation of a Joint Venture | 286 |
1 Applicability of Section 1 | 287 |
2 General Principles Governing Collateral Restraints | 293 |
3 Restraints on Competition among the Joint Venture and Its Parents | 301 |
4 Restraints on Prices and Output | 305 |
B The History and Use of the Federal Merger Guidelines | 16 |
2 The Evolution of the Merger Guidelines | 18 |
c The 1984 Revisions | 20 |
e The 1997 Efficiencies Revision of the 1992 Merger Guidelines | 21 |
3 The Nonbinding Nature of the Merger Guidelines | 22 |
C Review of Reportable Transactions under the HartScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 | 26 |
D Review of Transactions by State Attorneys General | 32 |
2 Premerger Notification | 33 |
MARKET DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT | 35 |
1 The Product Market | 40 |
Price Movements Between Products | 41 |
2 Reasonable Interchangeability | 45 |
b The Merger Guidelines Hypothetical Monopolist Approach | 53 |
The Continuum Problem | 57 |
d The Cluster Markets Debate | 60 |
e The Submarket Debate | 64 |
f Innovation Markets | 70 |
g Production Substitutability as a Means of Defining a Market | 74 |
2 The Geographic Market | 77 |
a The Pragmatic Factual Approach | 80 |
b Analytical Approaches | 93 |
2 The ElzingaHogarty Test | 96 |
B Measuring Market Shares within a Defined Market | 97 |
1 Identifying Market Participants | 100 |
2 Calculating Market Concentration | 102 |
HORIZONTAL MERGERS PROVING LIKELY ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS | 107 |
A Market Share as a Measure of Anticompetitive Effects | 108 |
2 The 1992 Merger Guidelines and Lower Court Precedent | 111 |
B Coordinated Anticompetitive Effects | 116 |
C Unilateral Anticompetitive Effects | 126 |
REBUTTING THE STRUCTURAL INFERENCE | 141 |
B Proving Ease of Entry | 147 |
a Financial | 148 |
b Technical | 150 |
c Government Regulation | 151 |
d Brand Loyalty and Reputational Effects | 152 |
e Network Externalities | 153 |
2 Pre1992 Cases and Merger Guidelines | 154 |
3 1992 Merger Guidelines and Subsequent Cases | 156 |
The Power BuyerSophisticated Purchaser Debate | 160 |
D Proving the Difficulty of Collusion | 163 |
2 Recent Developments before the Agencies | 166 |
E Creating a Stronger Competitor | 168 |
F The Significance of Declining Industries | 171 |
EFFICIENCIES | 175 |
B Efficiencies and the Goals of Antitrust Laws | 177 |
C US Supreme Court Treatment of Efficiencies | 178 |
D Guidelines Treatment of Efficiencies | 181 |
2 Federal Health Care Statements | 183 |
3 State Enforcement Guidelines | 184 |
1 Judicial Approach | 185 |
2 Agency Approach | 189 |
F Proving Efficiencies | 191 |
b Agency Approach | 195 |
2 MergerSpecific Requirement | 197 |
b Agency Approach | 198 |
3 Standard of Proof | 199 |
b Agency Approach | 200 |
POSSIBLE DEFENSES | 203 |
Elements of the Defense | 205 |
a Imminent Business Failure | 206 |
b No Other Available Purchasers | 207 |
c Dim Prospects of Reorganization | 208 |
2 Federal Agency Interpretation of the Failing Company Doctrine | 209 |
3 The Failing Division or Subsidiary | 212 |
4 Weakened Firm and General Dynamics Defenses | 213 |
B State Action Doctrine | 217 |
C Antitrust Exemptions through Regulation | 221 |
2 Energy | 222 |
b Electric Power | 223 |
3 Transportation | 224 |
b Air Transportation | 225 |
4 Communications | 228 |
D Specific Industries | 232 |
2 Defense | 233 |
3 Newspapers | 235 |
JOINT VENTURES | 239 |
A Antitrust Statutes Applicable to Joint Ventures | 241 |
B Antitrust Agency Guidelines Applicable to Joint Ventures | 242 |
C Per Se or Rule of Reason Treatment | 248 |
D Types of Joint Ventures | 254 |
2 Research and Development Joint Ventures | 259 |
3 Production Joint Ventures | 267 |
5 Territorial and Customer Restraints | 310 |
6 Restraints on Access to the Joint Venture | 313 |
POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE | 321 |
A Origins of the Potential Competition Doctrine | 324 |
B General Requirements of the Potential Competition Doctrine | 327 |
1 A Concentrated Oligopolistic Target Market | 330 |
2 The Acquiring Firm as One of Only a Few Potential Entrants | 332 |
C The Essential Preconditions of the Actual Potential Competition Theory | 334 |
2 The Likelihood of Deconcentration or Other Procompetitive Effects | 339 |
D The Necessary Elements of the Perceived Potential Competition Theory | 340 |
E The Treatment of Potential Competition Mergers under the Merger Guidelines | 343 |
VERTICAL MERGERS | 347 |
A Historical Perceptions of Vertical Mergers | 348 |
1 Early Cases | 349 |
2 The 1950 Amendments to the Clayton Act | 350 |
B Brown Shoe and Vertical Foreclosure | 351 |
C Chicago School Criticism of Brown Shoe | 353 |
D Effect of Criticism on Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy | 356 |
2 Changes in Enforcement Policy and Agency Case Selection | 357 |
E PostChicago Treatment of Foreclosure | 360 |
F Examples of Recent Vertical Merger Enforcement Activity | 361 |
1 Raising Rivals Costs and TwoLevel Entry | 362 |
2 Facilitating Coordinated Interaction | 364 |
3 Media Mergers | 366 |
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS | 371 |
A Evaluative Criteria for Judging Conglomerate Mergers | 374 |
B Competitive Concerns | 376 |
2 Reciprocity | 380 |
3 Tying | 383 |
4 Multiple Market Strategies | 384 |
APPLICATION OF MERGER LAWS TO MULTINATIONAL TRANSACTIONS | 389 |
1 Sherman Act | 390 |
a Import Trade | 392 |
b Nonimport Trade | 393 |
2 Clayton Act | 394 |
3 FTC Act | 397 |
C Justice Department and FTC Enforcement Policy | 402 |
2 What Kind of Remedy Will Be Sought | 407 |
D International Cooperation Agreements | 409 |
1 The 1991 USEU Cooperation Agreement | 411 |
2 The 1995 USCanada Cooperation Agreement | 414 |
3 The 1994 International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act | 415 |
E Investigations of Transnational Mergers | 416 |
F Special Defenses | 421 |
2 Act of State | 424 |
3 WebbPomerene Act | 426 |
JUDICIAL RELIEF AND REMEDIES | 428 |
A Preliminary Relief | 430 |
a Statutory Authority | 431 |
b Private Party Standing | 434 |
1 Competitor Standing | 436 |
2 Target Standing | 441 |
3 Consumer Standing | 443 |
c The Requirements for Preliminary Injunctive Relief | 445 |
b ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS | 446 |
2 Factors | 449 |
b LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS | 454 |
c BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES | 463 |
d PUBLIC INTEREST | 468 |
3 Standard of Review | 469 |
2 Hold Separate Orders | 471 |
B Permanent Relief | 475 |
3 Rescission | 481 |
4 Damages | 482 |
5 Disgorgement | 483 |
SHERMAN ACT | 485 |
CLAYTON ACT | 487 |
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT | 497 |
NATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ACT OF 1993 | 505 |
NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION ACT | 513 |
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT | 517 |
WEBBPOMERENE ACT | 525 |
1984 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES | 529 |
1992 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES | 541 |
1995 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONA... | 579 |
1995 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECT... | 625 |
1996 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEA... | 663 |
1993 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL | 755 |
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS | 787 |
SELECTED HARTSCOTTRODINO STATISTICS FY 1998 2002 | 831 |
833 | |
기타 출판본 - 모두 보기
자주 나오는 단어 및 구문
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