(184 Iowa, 835, 169 N. W. 56.) Iowa, 327, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 691, 144 N. W. 1, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 511; Sterman v. Hann, 160 Iowa, 356, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 287, 141 N. W. 934; Union County Invest. Co. v. Messix, 152 Iowa, 412, 132 N. W. 823. The head of a family, within the meaning of the Exemption Law, is the one who conducts, supervises, and manages the affairs of the household. Blair v. Fritz, 162 Iowa, 716, 144 N. W. 611. And if the husband is under no disability as a matter of law, he is the head of the family. Van Doran v. Morden, 48 Iowa, 186. Property which cannot be levied upon is not subject to a judgment lien, though the provision forbidding levy is found in other than the regular exemption statutes. Turrill v. McCarthy, 114 Iowa, 681, 87 N. W. 667; Loring v. Small, 50 Iowa, 271. The decree of divorce was a finality as to the rights of plaintiff as against the property of defendant. Cole v. Cole, 139 Iowa, 609, 117 N. W. 988; Kwentsky v. Sirovy, 142 Iowa, 385, 121 N. W. 27; Roberts v. Playle, 150 Iowa, 279, 129 N. W. 945. Plaintiff took a general judgment for so much money, and with an execution issued thereon, she can levy upon nothing which would not be subject to levy by any other money creditor. Byers v. Byers, 21 Iowa, 268. The judgment is but a debt, and the plaintiff thereunder is not entitled to precedence or greater rights than would be the holder of any other judgment. Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 52 Iowa, 715, 2 N. W. 1000; Warner v. Cammack, 37 Iowa, 642; Johnson v. Butler, 2 Iowa, 535; Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 197; New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 37 Ν. J. L. 300; Dunsmoor v. Furstenfeldt, 88 Cal. 522, 12 L.R.A. 508, 22 Am. St. Rep. 331, 26 Pac. 518. Messrs. Sargent, Strong, & Struble, James C. Davis, and George E. Hise for garnishee. Weaver, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff, Belle Schooley, and the defendant, were formerly wife and husband. On January 9, 1912, in an action brought by the plaintiff against said defendant, and then pending in the district court of Woodbury county, a decree of divorce was entered. In the same pro ceeding the plaintiff secured judgment against defendant for a stated sum as alimony, payable in instalments during her life or until she marry again. She has not in fact contracted any marriage since the divorce. In December 10, 1913, the defendant married another woman, with whom he has ever since lived and maintained family relations in Woodbury county. Certain instalments of the judgment for alimony are past due and unpaid. For several years the defendant has been and still is employed in the service of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company at a stated salary or wages, payable monthly. In August, 1914, plaintiff caused an execution to issue upon such judgment for alimony, under which writ the railway company was garnished as a supposed debtor of the defendant; the purpose of such garnishment being to reach and subject to the payment of such judgment the wages earned by him in the company's service. Defendant appeared in such proceeding and moved to discharge the garnishee on the ground that his wages were exempt to him as a married man and head of a family. On the hearing upon this motion the court sustained the claim of exemption because of his status as a married man and head of a family, and ordered the discharge of the garnishee. In August, 1916, plaintiff caused another execution to issue and the railway company to be again garnished thereunder. The railway company answered, showing that at the date of the garnishment it was indebted to defendant in the sum of $166.91 for wages earned by him within the period of ninety days preceding. Again defendant appeared and moved to discharge the garnishee upon the same ground of exemption. This motion was also sustained, and the garnishee ordered discharged, and from such order and from judgment this appeal has been taken. The foregoing sufficiently indicates the one question presented for our consideration: May a divorced husband who has married again, and thus becomes the head of a family, avail himself of the exemption provided by Code, § 4011, against an execution issued upon a general judgment for alimony rendered in favor of his first wife? Counsel for appellant take the negative of the proposition, and in support of their position have filed a very well-prepared brief, marshaling the authorities on which they rely, and discussing very lucidly the principles which they believe to be applicable to the undisputed facts in this record. That some of the precedents cited do appear to hold substantially as counsel claim is to be admitted, but that they should be accepted by us as controlling authority we are not ready to concede. Taking the country over, there are perhaps no two states in which the exemption statutes are so nearly identical that the construction and effect given to one in one jurisdiction may be said to be satisfactory precedent for the construction and effect of another in another jurisdiction. Again, there is no uniform policy of the courts in general with respect to these laws. In some they are construed and applied with great liberality in favor of the debtor and his family, while in others the tendency is to the opposite extreme, and the debtor gets little which is not assured to him by the strict and technical letter of the statute. Exemptions being strictly creatures of the statute, the question when the right exists, and the scope of such right, resolves itself, in final analysis, into one of construction of the legislative language, and in such matters the courts of each state ordinarily adhere to their own views of the expressed legislative intent. Our exemption statute (Code, § 4008) first provides that, "if the debtor is a resident of this state and the head of a family, he may hold exempt from execution" certain specified items of personal property, varying to some extent as it shall appear that the debtor is a farmer, mechanic, lawyer, or teamster, etc. Code sections 4009 and 4010 exempt pension money and homes bought with pension money. Section 4011 of the Code is as follows: "The earnings of a debtor, who is a resident of the state and the head of a family, for his personal services, or those of his family, at any time within ninety days next preceding the levy, are exempt from liability for debt." In the case before us the divorce had effect to restore the husband and wife to the status of unmarried persons, with full and unrestricted right to each to marry again the same as if their marriage relation had never existed. So long as he retained that status defendant's wages were, of course, subject to garnishment, because he was not one of the protected class, for while he was a resident of the state, he was not the head of a family. But when he married, as he legally might, a woman having the legal right to take him as her husband, and established their home in the county, he became literally and undisputably the head of a family and a resident of the state, and his right to the ex wages for alimony. emption of his Exemptionwages is too clear judgment for argument, unless he is to be excluded therefrom upon the theory advanced by counsel and to which we shall now give attention. The point so made is that the language of the statute is that "the earnings of a debtor who is a resident of the state and the head of a family, for his personal services, are exempt from liability for debt," and it is argued that this does not include exemption from liability for payment of a judgment for alimony, because an allowance of alimony is not in a legal sense a "debt." Cases are cited which do draw a distinction between a claim for alimony and debt, but very few will be found holding that a claim for alimony which has been reduced (184 Iowa, 835, 169 N. W. 56.) to final judgment is not the debt of him against whom debt-judgment it is rendered. On the contrary, the great weight of authority is decidedly the other way. Speaking of the entry of a decree for alimony, the Supreme Court of the United States says: "When this is done it becomes a debt of record." Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 595, 16 L. ed. 230. Speaking of absolute and limited divorces, the Massachusetts court says: "The judgment for alimony in either case creates a debt of record in favor of the wife." Chase v. Chase, 105 Mass. 388. A debt is something due or payable from one person to another, and may be created by contract or judgment. Summit Silk Co. v. Kinston Spinning Co. 154 N. C. 421, 70 S. E. 820, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 897; Arbaugh v. Shockney, 34 Ind. App. 268, 71 N. Ε. 232, 72 Ν. E. 669; Anniston v. Hurt, 140 Ala. 394, 103 Am. St. Rep. 45, 37 So. 220; Lothrop v. Parke, 202 Mass. 104, 88 Ν. Ε. 666; Ex parte Kinsolving, 135 Mo. App. 631, 116 S. W. 1071; Re Van Orden (D. C.) 96 Fed. 88; Mertz v. Berry, 101 Mich. 32, 24 L.R.A. 789, 45 Am. St. Rep. 379, 59 N. W. 445. Our own cases are quite in harmony with this view. See Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 52 Iowa, 718, 2 N. W. 1000. In this last-cited case, the wife obtained a general judgment for alimony and afterwards sought to enforce it against the husband's homestead. This was denied, the court saying: "The judgment is but a debt, and the plaintiff thereunder is not entitled to precedence or greater rights than would be the holder of any other judgment." See also Byers v. Byers, 21 Iowa, 268. Indeed, we think we need look no further than to the statute itself to see that the words "debt" and "debtor" are used in their more general and less technical sense, and that the statute provides for exemption from execution issued upon every and any general judgment against the head of a family for the payment of money. In Code, § 4008, which is the section providing the general list of exemp for alimony. 11 A.L.R.-8. tions, the word "debtor" is repeatedly employed. The exemptions are expressly made in favor of the "debtor," if a resident of the state. It is the "debtor's" wearing apparel, trunks, shotgun, family Bible, portraits, church pew, burial lot, tools, implements, team, etc., which are secured from seizure under execution or attachment, and if the appellant's theory be correct that a judgment rendered against a litigant upon any other claim than that of a debt by contract, in its restricted technical sense, is not a debt within the meaning of this statute, then the door is opened to stripping the impoverished debtor and his family of every earthly possession, save perhaps the clothes upon their backs, in favor of any person who may happen to recover judgment against him upon any cause of action not originating in contract. We feel very sure that such is not the legislative intent. One against whom a judgment for the payment of money is rendered is universally known and spoken of as a "judgment debtor," and the claim against him is recognized as a "judgment debt." It is, to use the language of the cases already cited, a "debt of record," or, as called by some, "a judicial debt of record." It is a debt-a binding obligation to pay a stated sum of money fixed by judicial determination. If before judgment the plaintiff's claim was unliquidated, and the obligation to pay was imperfect, that condition ceased with the judgment entry. What was before uncertain is now certain. A writ of execution is nothing less or more than a process by which such debt may be enforced against the judgment debtor's property, if any he has, which is subject to seizure, and property so levied upon is taken for that purpose, i. e., for the payment of his debt. The protection against such seizure which the Statute of Exemption provides is in favor of residents of the state who are married and are heads of families. Mr. Bouvier says that debts arise or are proved by matters of record (as judgment debts), by bonds, and by simple con-tract. "The word 'debt' is of large import, including not only debts of record or judgments, and debts by specialty, but also obligations arising under simple contract. To a very wide extent, and in its popular sense, it includes all that is due to a man under any form of obligation or promise." Gray v. Bennett, 3 Met. 526. "Debt" means a liability to pay a sum certain, and it makes no difference how the liability arises, whether by contract or whether it be imposed by law without contract. Rhodes v. O'Farrell, 2 Nev. 61. See also Webster's Int. Dict.; Rapalje & L. Law Dict. The Constitution of North Carolina provides for the exemption of homesteads from sale under execution for any debt, and this has been held to include exemption from levy under execution on a judgment rendered in an action ex delicto. Dellinger v. Tweed, 66 N. C. 210. The proposition would also seem to have been finally settled for this court as far back as the case of Johnson v. Butler, 2 Iowa, 535-545. There the plaintiff sued at law upon a judgment rendered in Illinois in an action ex delicto. The suit was brought and an attachment sued out in this state, on the theory that the action on the judgment was ex contractu. The trial court ruled in effect that the action upon the judgment must be treated as partaking of the nature of the original action, that is, ex delicto. This court overruled the trial court, saying: "But when a judgment has been recovered for tort, it then is fixed and certain. It is a debt as much as if it were recovered upon a promise." The same proposition is reiterated in Warner v. Cammack, 37 Iowa, 642. Other authorities of like character could be multiplied quite indefinitely. If the plaintiff were now standing in court, asking an allowance of alimony, it could well be admitted that her action in that respect was not ex contractu, or rather that such claim is not a debt in the restricted meaning of that word. And yet marriage is a civil contract between the parties, a contract which implies an obligation for support, and it is in recognition of such implied contract that alimony is allowed. It remains unliquidated, however, until the court has fixed it by judgment, but thereafter it would seem that Contractit must be regarded Judgment for as a debt by contract as well as by judgment. alimony. Much is said in argument of the injustice of such results in cases like the one at bar, and that defendant ought not to be allowed to clothe himself with such right of exemption by marrying again. If it should be admitted that the statute could well have been made to accord with appellant's contention of absolute justice, it is sufficient to say that it was not so made. The marriage relations of the parties were severed at the option of the plaintiff. It was in accordance with her prayer that the divorce was granted, and she was given her freedom from the bonds of matrimony with a general judgment for specified amount of alimony. She ceased to be a member of his family, and the only relation thereafter existing between them was that of judgment creditor and judgment debtor, and as a judgment creditor she became vested with the same rights to enforce collection of her claim which the law gives to all other creditors of that class. a purpose of laws. It is not to be overlooked that the Exemption Laws are not intended simply for the protection of the debtor, but primarily for the protec- Exemption tion and support of his family, and to that end the statute will be liberally construed. The defendant is the head of a family of which the plaintiff is not a member. The woman who married him is his lawful wife, and it would be a law of at least doubtful justice which would deprive her of the protection of the statute for the benefit of the former wife, who, in accepting a general judgment in her favor, must be held to have impliedly consented to take it subject to all legal limitations upon her right to enforce it. The statute, so far, at least, as relates to the exemption of the debtor's earnings, is too clear and certain to permit of construction. To repeat, the defendant is a resident of the state, a married man, and the head of a family, and is, therefore, within the literal description of the exempt class. The statute provides no exception from its terms. The earnings garnished were within the ninety-day period. The trial court could not have done otherwise than it did without repealing the statute by judicial construction, or by ingrafting thereon an exception for which the legislative language affords no foundation whatever. (184 Iowa, 835, 169 N. W. 56.) The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Preston, Ch. J., and Evans and Gaynor, JJ., concur. Salinger, J., dissenting (October 25, 1918): case. I. In my opinion, the fact that the statute gives exemption to no one but a "debtor" does not decide this That none but debtors have an exemption is a limitation upon who may claim exemption, rather than a declaration that, all debtors may claim it. I think that all accomplished by limiting exemption rights to "debtors" is that, if an alimony judgment is not a "debt," there is no exemption as to such a judgment, and that using the word "debtor" does not settle whether such judgment is or is not a debt. If it is not a debt, then, as exemptions bar nothing but the collection of "debt," there is here no exemp tion. Concede it is a general rule that a judgment is "a debt of record," no matter what the basis of the judgment is, yet such concession does no more than meet one of the arguments of appellant, to wit, that "debt" is created by contract only. But, though a judgment is ordinarily "a debt of record" without reference to its basis, the courts may look into the record behind the judgment to ascertain whether it is an allowance of alimony. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 49 L. ed. 390, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174, 2 Ann. Cas. 265; Boynton v. Ball, 121 U. S. 457, 30 L. ed. 985, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 981. It is permitted to show that the judgment itself lacks some essential attribute of "debt." One such attribute is certainty as to amount and maturity. The order at bar provides a monthly allowance. The total and the maturity depend upon how long appellant shall live, when, if at all, she remarry, and how long the minor child shall live. Thus, both amount and maturity are uncertain. It is held in Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757, that a discharge in bankruptcy is no bar to enforcing an agreement to pay an annuity to a divorced wife during her life, or until she remarries, because there is a substantial impossibility of estimating the value of the contingency of a remarriage. Unlike most judgments, certainty is lacking, because the alimony order remains in court, and is subject to being canceled or changed at any time. Wetmore v. Markoe, supra; Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 51 L.R.A. 351, 56 Ν. Ε. 636; Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 45 L. ed. 1009, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736; Andrew v. Andrew, 62 Vt. 495, 20 Atl. 819. In the Audubon Case, the Supreme Court of the United States approves Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 352, 45 L.R.A. 806, in holding that "the allowance of alimony is not in the nature of an absolute debt. It is not unconditional and unchangeable. It may be changed in amount even when in arrears, upon good cause shown to the court having jurisdiction." la. Passing that there is no debt, because the requisite certainty is lacking, I next contend that the treatment of alimony allowances by the courts demonstrates that such an allowance is not a "debt," be cause: (a) It is universally held that such a judgment is not a debt within prohibitions of imprisonment for debt. Bronk v. State, 43 Fla. 461, |