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tration fees hefore driving them on the highCAMAS STAGE Co., Inc., V. KOZER, ways, or has been established by the evidence, Secretary of State,
the presumption is that the license fee is
reasonable. (Supreme Court of Oregon. July 29, 1922.)
8. Statutes em 214–Magazine article held not 1. Constitutional law 48Construction sup- authority as to meaning. porting validity of act preferred.
An article published in a magazine is not Where a statute is fairly susceptible of a authority by which the court can ascertain the construction sustaining the validity of the act meaning of a statute. and a construction rendering it unconstitution. la I Inonese
ution. 9. Licenses 7(2)-Graduate fee for operat. al, the former construction must be adopted. I
ing automobiles on highway held valid. 2. Statutes 184-Declared purpose con- Gen. Laws 1921, p. 707, as amended by trolling unless incompatible with effect. Gen. Laws (Sp. Sess.) 1921, p. 23, imposing a
The declared purpose of an act is to be ac- graduate automobile license fee dependent on cepted as true, unless incompatible with its the weight of the car, the revenue so demeaning and effect.
rived, being used for highway purposes and . 3. Commerce Cm10_Congress not having act.
being a privilege and not a property tax, is a
* valid enactment, for its object is to preserve ed, state automobile law, requiring registra
the highways and the public welfare. tion of interstate automobiles, valid.
Congress having passed no statute on the 10. Licenses Cum7(1)-Taxation en 193_Stat. subject, Gen. Laws 1921, p. 707, 88 4, 37, 51,' ute imposing privilege tax and exempting and section 25 as amended by Gen. Laws (Sp. property from ad valorem tax valid. Sess.) 1921, p. 24, § 3, requiring automobile Gen. Laws 1921, p. 707, imposing a privowners to pay registration fees before driv- ilege tax on automobiles, and section 26 thereing their cars on the highway, are not viola- of, exempting automobiles from paying an ad tions of Const. U. S. art. 1, § 8, authorizing valorem tax, is valid. Congress to regulate interstate commerce, as
1 11. Equity 66-Maxim one seeking equity applied to a nonresident corporation operating motor vehicles for hire between a point within
I must do equity applied. and a point without the state.
In an action to restrain the state from col.
lecting automobile registration fees, where 4. Constitutional law E 287—State automo- plaintiff admitted that there was some money
bile law, requiring registration, valid' exercise due to the state, the maxim one who seeks of police power.
equity must do equity applies. Gen. Laws 1921, p. 707, as amended by Gen. Laws (Sp. Sess.) 1921, p. 23, requiring
Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion Counowners of motor vehicles to pay registration fees before driving them on the highways, be
ty; George G. Bingham, Judge. ing an enactment within the state's police powl Action by the Camas Stage Company, Iner, is not violative of Fourteenth Amendment corporated, against Sam Kozer, as Secretary of the federal Constitution as applied to a of State of Oregon. Judgment for defendnonresident corporation.
ant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. 5. Corporations Com 642(1)-Foreign corpora.
This is a suit in equity. The plaintiff is a tion, operating bus line between point within and point without the state, held "doing busi.
corporation of the state of Washington, enness within the state."
gaged in operating motor vehicles carrying A foreign corporation. engaged in carrying passengers for hire within the state of Washpassengers for hire by motor vehicles between
ington and between the states of Washington a point within and a point without the state, and Oregon, and, while thus engaged, drives is doing business within the state within Gen. its motor vehicles over the highways of the Laws 1921, p. 734, 8 37, exempting nonresi- state of Oregon. Sam Kozer, the defendant, dents from paying automobile license fees, and is Secretary of State of Oregon, and, by virproviding that foreign corporations doing busi- tue of his office is required to enforce the ness within the state shall be considered resi
provisions of the Oregon Motor Vehicle Law. dents.
The purpose of this suit is to restrain the [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Doing
secretary of state from enforcing the proBusiness.]
visions of the Motor Vehicle Law in the mat
ter of collecting registration fees demanded 6. Licenses 35–Party claiming exemption by him. must present clear case.
The Oregon Motor Vehicle Law provides Automobile owner, claiming an exemption
that from a statute imposing a license on automobiles, has the burden of proving the exemption, "Every owner of a motor vehicle. . and must present a clear case.
shall, * * * before he operates or drives
the same upon the highways of this state," 7. Licenses 7(9)-Fee presumed reasonable. I cause the same to be registered. Section 4,
Since nothing to the contrary appears on chapter 371, General Laws of Oregon, 1921. the face of Gen. Laws 1921, p. 707, as amended by Gen. Laws (Sp. Sess.) 1921, p. 23, re Section 25, chapter 371, General Laws of quiring owners of motor vehicles to pay regis- Oregon 1921, as amended by section 3, chap
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
ter & General Laws of Oregon, Special Ses- , tion 8, article 1, of the Constitution of the sion 1921, establishes the fees required to be United States, and for other reasons herepaid to the secretary of state upon registra- inafter noted. tion and before the issuance of license, as The defendant filed his demurrer, challengfollows:
ing the sufficiency of the complaint and the "Motor vehicles, except motor trucks, shall
jurisdiction of the court of the subject-matpay the following fees, based on the light
ter of the suit. The demurrer was sustained, weight of such vehicle, to wit:
and the suit dismissed. Plaintiff assigns Weighing 1,700 pounds or less.................. $15 00
error of the court in sustaining defendant's Weighing over 1,700 pounds and not over 2,100
demurrer and in rendering and entering a pounds ......
22 00 decree dismissing its amended complaint. Weighing over 2,100 pounds and not over 2,500 pounds
Dan E. Powers and F. E. Swope, both of Weighing over 2,500 pounds and not over 2,900 | Portland, for appellant. pounds .........................................
... 34 00
I. H. Van Winkle, Atty. Gen., and Grace Weighing over 2,900 pounds and not over 3,300
10.00 E. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent. Weighing over 3,300 pounds and not over 3,700 pounds .....
......... 47 00 BROWN, J. (after stating the facts as Weighing over 3,700 pounds and not over 4,100
55 00 pounda
There is a marked difference be ......................................... Weighing over 4,100 pounds and not over 4,500
tween the regulatory act designated chapter pounds
62 00 136, Laws of 1905, under which 218 automoWeighing over 4,500 pounds and not over 4,900
biles were registered and the regulatory law pounds ....... Weighing over 4,900 pounds and not over 5,300
in force in 1921, under which 118,615 motor pounds
79 00 vehicles were registered. The legislation of Weighing over 5,300 pounds and not over 5,700 this state, in providing millions upon milpounds ...
lions of dollars for the construction and reWeighing over 5,700 pounds.......
construction of highways, has kept pace with
the ever-increasing number of motor vehicles "Motor busses shall pay $4 for each passen used upon the roads of the state. The legisger, in addition to the fees prescribed accord- lative assembly, in the enactment of regula. ing to the weight of the motor vehicle, at the
tory laws, has declared the necessity for rated passenger capacity, allowing twenty inches of seating space for each passenger."
good roads in the successful operation there.
on of the motor vehicle, and likewise has The weight and seating capacity of each recognized the destructive character of such of plaintiff's motor vehicles so operated is as vehicles when driven upon the highways. follows: One White automobile, bearing
That we shall learn and give effect to Washington license No. 185087: weight 4,. the intention of the Legislature is a primary 500 pounds; seating capacity, 12 passengers. rule in the exposition of statutes. The Ore One White automobile, bearing Washington gon Motor Vehicle Law is the written exlicense No. 185086; weight 4,810 pounds; pression of the legislative will relating to seating capacity, 12 passengers. One White the regulation of certain vehicles that may automobile, bearing Washington license No. be operated upon the highways of this state. 185088; weight 5,415 pounds: seating ca- We have searched all the laws enacted by pacity, 12 passengers. One White automobile, our legislative assembly pertaining to the bearing Washington license No. 185089; regulation of motor vehicles, for the purpose weight 5.800 pounds: seating capacity. 15 of discovering the legislative will. passengers
The plaintiff asserts that this act, as apIf the provisions of the Oregon Motor plied to it, offends against the interstate comVehicle Law are enforced against the plain merce clause of the Constitution of the tiff, the company will be compelled to pay | United States. a respective license fee, or tax, of $110, $119,  A rule so commonplace that it requires $136, and $157, on the motor vehicles de- no citation of authority to sustain it is that scribed alove. Such "registration and li. where a statute is fairly susceptible of two cense fees imposed by this act ** shall constructions, one of which sustains the valbe in lieu of all other taxes and licenses" idity of the act while the other will render exacted by the state upon the vehicle so reg it unconstitutional, the construction that istered and licensed. Section 26, c. 371, Gen. I will support the validity of the law must be Laws, of Oregon, 1921.
adopted. Section 37 of the act of 1921 provides for The Legislature declared that the "purthe exemption of nonresident owners, but pose, object and intent" of the Motor Ve. such favor does not include a foreign cor-hicle Law "is to provide a comprehensive poration conducting business in Oregon. system for the regulation of all motor and
Plaintiff avers that the Oregon Motor Ve other vehicles." hicle Law, in so far as it attempts to require  We hold that, it to pay an annual license fee, or tax, upon "The declared purpose of the act is to be each of its motor vehicles, is void, in that accepted as true, unless incompatible with its it is in contravention of subdivision 3, sec- meaning and effect.” White Dental Mfg. Co.
(209 P.) v. Commonwealth, 212 Mass. 35, 98 N. E. 1056, , able sums for the use of such booms in the Ann. Cas. 1913C, 805, 808, citing Hazen v. Es- floating of logs from a point within the state sex Co., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 475; Flint v. Stone to a point outside thereof, or vice versa. Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55
The case of Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. L. Ed. 389, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312.
S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222, affirmThe character of the registration fees may I ing 81 N. J. Law, 591, SO Atl. 453, L. R. A. be determined from the act.
1917B, 553, Ann, Cas, 1912D, 237, is illumiSection 51 of chapter 371, General Laws of
nating, instructive, and strictly in point. The Oregon 1921, enacts :
New Jersey statute (P. L. 1908, p. 615, $ 4)
provides, among other things, that: "The provisions of this act contained are declared to be an exercise of the police powers
“Every resident of this state, and every nonof the state of Oregon, and this act shall be resident, whose automobile shall be driven in known as the 'Oregon Motor Vehicle Law.'” this state, shall, before using such vehicle on
the public highways, register the same, and no While not absolutely controlling, the legis- motor vehicle shall be driven unless so regis.. lative designation is an important factor in tered.” determining the character of the tax im. Ko
Kane, a resident of the state of New York, posed, Portland v. Portland Ry, Light & while driving his automobile along the highPower Co., 80 Or, 271, 305, 156 Pac. 1058,
ways of the state of New Jersey on a journey citing Gray, Lim. of Tax. Power, p. 42;
from his place of residence to some point in Briedwell v. Henderson, 99 Or. 506, 514, 195 the state
the state of Pennsylvania, was arrested for Pac. 575,
violating the Motor Vehicle Law of New (3) Among the powers expressly granted
Jersey, charged with not having registered to the national government is the control of
his machine or paid the fee required for Interstate commerce. Article 1, § 8, of the
such registration. Prosecution for his ofConstitution, provides that
fense followed the arrest, resulting in his con"The Congress shall have power . . . to viction.
viction. The conviction was affirmed in the
The conviction was affir regulate commerce with foreign nations, and review of the cause in the Supreme Court, among the several states. * *
and by the Court of Errors and Appeals of Congress has exercised the power granted
the state of New Jersey. On a review of it in relation to interstate commerce in a
that case in the Supreme Court of the United variety of acts, but it has passed no statute
States, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in speaking for that in any way inhibits the exaction by the
the court, said: state of the fees in question by way of com "The moneys received from license and regispensation from the plaintiff for the privilege tration fees in excess of the amount required of driving its motor cars over the highways
for the maintenance of the Motor Vehicle Deof this state. State laws may affect inter
partment are to be applied to the maintenance
of the improved highways. * * The folstate commerce without conflicting with the
lowing facts were stipulated: Kane had been constitutional provision appealed to.
duly licensed as a driver under the laws of In Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 both New York and New Jersey. He bad reg. U. S. 691, 699, 2 Sup. Ct. 732, 27 L. Ed. 584, istered his car in New York but not in New it was held that a state may erect or au- Jersey. *
When arrested he was on his thorize the construction of wharves along way from New York to Pennsylvania. The the banks of its navigable rivers which are aggregate receipts from license and registraused for commerce between the states, and
ation fees for the year exceeded the amount re
quired to defray the expenses of the Motor charge, or authorize to be charged, wharfage
Vehicle Department, so that a large sum befees for the privilege of receiving and land
came available for maintenance of the iming terba passengers and Treight which proved roads of the state. Kane contended come from other states, without infringing that the statute was invalid as to him, a nonupon the commerce clause of the Constitution resident, because it violated the Constitution of the United States.
and laws of the United States regulating interIn Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543. 7 Sup. state commerce and also because it violated Ct. 313, 30 L. Ed. 487, it was held that a
the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * state may construct locks in such rivers in
"The power of a state to regulate the use
of motor vehicles on its highways has been reorder to improve the navigation thereof,
cently considered by this court and broadly and charge reasonable tolls to persons using
sustained. It extends to nonresidents as well such locks while engaged in interstate com as to residents. It includes the right to exact merce.
reasonable compensation for special facilities In Lindsay & Phelps Co. v. Mullen, 176 afforded, as well as reasonable provisions to U. S. 126, 20 Sup. Ct. 325, 44 L. Ed. 400, it
insure safety, and it is properly exercised in was held that a state may construct or au
imposing a license fee graduated according to thorize the construction of booms for the
the horse power of the engine. Hendrick v. purpose of increasing the facilities with
Maryland, 235 U. S. 610. • . It is clearly
within the discretion of the state to determine which the business of floating and gathering whether the compensation for the use of its logs may be conducted thereon, and lawfully highways by automobiles shall be determined by charge, or authorice to be charged, reason- way of a fee, payable annually or semi-annual
ly, or by a toll based on mileage or otherwise., U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, * * * In Hendrick v. Maryland, it appeared | 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, Ann, Cas. 1916A, only that the nonresident drove his automobile 18; Mononga hela Nav, Co. v. United States, into the state. In this case it is admitted that 148 u
at 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L, Ed.
s he was driving through the state. The distinc- | tion is of no significance."
463; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154
U. S. 204, 209, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087, 38 L. Ed. In the case of Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 | 962; Huse v. Glover, supra; Trans. Co. y. U. S. 610, 622, 624, 35 Sup. Ct. 140, 142 (59 Parkersburg, supra; Lindsay & Phelps Co. L. Ed. 385) Mr. Justice McReynolds, in ex-v. Mullen, supra. pressing the opinion of the court, said: L [4The plaintiff invokes the protection of "The movement of motor vehicles over the
w the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu- • highways is attended by constant and serious
tion. That amendment does not offer the dangers to the public, and is also abnormally plaintiff a refuge from the demands of the destructive to the ways themselves. Their Motor Vehicle Law, which is an enactment success depends on good roads, the construc- within the police power of the state. tion and maintenance of which are exceedingly The Supreme Court of the United States expensive; and in recent years insistent de- has frequently declared that the limitations mands have been made upon the states for bet
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment ter facilities, especially by the ever-increasing
were not designed to limit, or in any way innumber of those who own such vehicles. As is well known, in order to meet this demand and terrere with, the
nd | terfere with, the state's exercise of its poaccommodate the growing traffic the state of lice power. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. Maryland has built and is maintaining a system 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923; Jones v. of improved roadways. Primarily for the en- | Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 17 Sup. Ct. 282, 41 L. forcement of good order and the protection of Ed. 677; L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. those within its own jurisdiction the state put
587, 596, 20 Sup. Ct. 788, 44 L. Ed. 899; into effect the above described general regula
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 53, 25 tions, including requirements for registration
Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133. and licenses. A further evident purpose was to secure some compensation for the use of
In Barbier V. Connolly, supra, Mr. Jusfacilities provided at great cost, from the class | tice Field wrote: for whose needs they are essential and whose
"But neither the amendment (Fourteenth operations over them are peculiarly injurious. | Amendment1-broad and comprehensive as it "In the absence of national legislation cover
is-nor any other amendment, was designed to ing the subject a state may rightfully prescribe
interfere with the power of the state, someuniform regulations necessary for public safety times termed its police power to prescriberec and order, in respect to the operation upon its
ulations to promote the health, peace, morals, highways of all motor vehicles--those moving in
education, and good order of the people, and to interstate commerce as well as others. And
legislate so as to increase the industries of to this end, it may require the registration of
the state, develop its resources, and add to its such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers,
wealth and prosperity.” charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the horse power of the engines-a
In the case of Union Fishermen's Co. v. practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the po
Shoemaker, 98 Or. 659, 674, 193 Pac. 476, 481, lice power uniformly recognized as belonging
this court defines "police power" as follows: to the states and essential to the preservation " . A concise statement, which emphaof the health, safety and comfort of their citi-l sizes the thought that the field within which zens; and it does not constitute a direct and the police power may be exerted is very broad. material burden on interstate commerce. is found in State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89, 105, * * The amount of the charges and the | 114 N. W. 137. 126 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 15 method of collection are primarily for deter
| Ann. Cas. 408, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 229, where mination by the state itself; and so long as it is said: “It is the power to make all laws they are reasonable and are fixed according to which in contemplation of the Constitution prosome uniform, fair and practical standard, they | mote the public welfare. constitute no burden on interstate commerce. "The police power embraces the whole sum Trans. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 699;
of inherent sovereign power which the state Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 548, 549; Mo
possesses, and, within constitutional limitations, nongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.
may exercise for the promotion of the order, S. 312, 329, 330; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of U. S. 352, 405; and authorities cited. **
society. 12 C. J. 904; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 The statute is not a mere revenue measure and
Or. 519, 531, 139 Pac. 743, Ann. Cas. 1916A, a discussion of the classifications permissible | 217. L. R. A. 1917C. 944; Mill Creek Coal & under such an act would not be pertinent."
Coke Co. v. Pub. Service Com. (W. Va) 100
S. E. 557, 7 A, L. R. 1081.". If it be a fact that the enforcement of this act in the case at issue may incidentally af. The term “police power" has sometimes fect interstate commerce, such regulations been defined and used in a narrow sense, will not be for that reason declared invalid. embracing merely regulations for the presThey are lawful until Congress acts. Kane ervation of the order, peace, health, morals, V. New Jersey, supra; Hendrick v. Mary- and safety of the community. More recentland, supra; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 ly, however, it has been extended to embrace
(209 P.) a larger welfare. The police power of the motor vehicles upon the highways of this state is not, and, in the nature of things, state. It is not a tax upon property. It is a cannot be, a fixed and rigid quantity. charge upon privilege. That such a tax is Changed conditions require different regula- constitutional has been so well established tions.
by judicial decision that there can be no (5, 6] The plaintiff asserts exemption from doubt as to its validity. The Oregon Motor the payment of the fees established by the Vehicle Law does not tax the property of act, and avers that it is not doing business plaintiff one dollar. It does, however, exact in this state within the meaning of section 37 compensation for the privilege of operating thereof. Plaintiff transacts some substantial | its cars upon the highways of the state. part of its ordinary business in Oregon. 14a 2 Cooley on Taxation (3d Ed.) at pp. 1123, C. J. 88 3977, 3992. In the conduct of its 1126, says: business it carries passengers for hire, byl "There are some cases in which levies are motor vehicle, from the state of Washing- made and collected under the general designaton to Portland, Or., and likewise carries tion of taxes or some term employed in rev. passengers for hire from that point in the enue laws to indicate a particular class of taxstate of Oregon over the highways of Oregon es where the imposition of the burden may fair. to the state of Washington. We hold that ly be referred to some other authority than to plaintiff's claim is without merit. Moreover,
that branch of the sovereign power of the state
under which the public revenues are apporit is a rule of frequent application that he
tioned and collected. The reason is that the who would shelter himself under an exemp.
pe imposition has not for its object the raising of tion clause must present a clear case, tree revenue, but looks rather to the regulation of from all reasonable doubt, as such laws, be- relative rights, privileges and duties as between ing in derogation of the general rule, must individuals; to the conservation of order in the be strictly construed as against the person political society, to the encouragement of inclaiming the exemption and in favor of the dustry. * * * The one is made for regulapublic. 17 R. C. L. 522; Northwest Auto
|tion and the other for revenue. Co. v. Hurlburt (Or.) 207 Pać. 161; Wallace
There is a diversity of expression by the v. Board of Equalization, 47 Or. 584, 86 Pac.
courts as to the term applied to the exac365. In the enforcement of the law under
tions in regulatory measures. In Northwest consideration, the collection of a fee for reg
Auto Co. v. Hurlburt, supra, Mr. Justice MCistration is the rule and exemption the ex
Bride wrote: ception; therefore the burden of establishing it is upon him who claims it. 1 Cooley, "The courts in speaking of financial exacTaxation (30 Ed.) p. 456.
tions of the character herein discussed have Under the facts in the case at bar, our
sometimes called them "licenses,' and some
1 times "privilege taxes.' Again, they are some. holding is not inconsistent with the follow
times spoken of as 'license fees' or license ing cases decided on a different set of facts: taxes,
taxes. But, by whatever name they may be
But by what Hacheny v. Leary, 12 Or. 40, 7 Pac. 329; Ber called, they partake of the nature of a tax in tin & Lepori v. Mattison, 69 Or. 470, 139 Pac. many respects, and the designation given in the 330; Spaulding v. McNary, 64 Or. 491. 130 statute is immaterial, the courts being interest. Pac. 391, 1128; Vermont Farm Machine Co.
ed in the substance, rather than in the name.
In Briedwell v. Henderson (99 Or. 506, 195 v. Hall, 80 Or. 308, 156 Pac. 1073; Deardorf
Pac. 575), we held it to be properly called a v. Idaho Nat. Harvester Co., 90 Or. 425, 177 privilege tax.'". . Pac. 33; Endicott, Johnson & Co, v. Multno
mab Co., 96 Or. 679, 190 Pac. 1109; Major (10) The legislative assembly was empow. Creek Lumb. Co. v. Johnson, 99 Or. 172, 195 ered to enact a law requiring a tax on priviPac. 177.
lege, and exempting such property from pay(7) Nothing to the contrary appearing up- ing an ad valorem tax. on the face of the law itself or having been In Briedwell v. Henderson, 99 Or. 506, 195 established by evidence, we assume that the Pac. 575, we quoted with approval the fol. amount of the license fee is reasonable. lowing: Huddy on Automobiles, p. 120; Vernor v. Sec- “What classes of property shall be taxed and retary of State, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N. W, 338, what shall be exempted except as restricted by Ann. Cas. 1915D, 128; Berry on Automobiles, the Constitution is a question that rests with p. 111.
the discretion of the Legislature. It is within [8, 9] The plaintiff avers that the fee de legislative authority to exempt from other manded by the law for registration is, in
forms of taxation, property which pays a spepart, a property tax, and offers in support of
cific tax, whether or not the tax is levied on his contention an article published in a
the property itself or on the right to use it in
a certain way." Jasnowski v. Board of Assesmagazine. This article printed in plaintiff's
sors, 191 Mich. 287, 157 N. W. 891. brief is not authority by which we may ascertain the meaning of the law.
Again, in Briedwell v. Henderson, supra, The Oregon Motor Vehicle Law, by its ex- we designated the registration fee a tax on press terms, exacts a fee frequently called privilege and supported the statement with by the courts a "privilege tax" for operating the following: