the dog for instance, whose bodily organization altogether, and whose skull and brain in particular, are much more different from man's, and yet who is not always inferior to the ape in "intelligence," if we may use the word. We must therefore suppose that something exists in man which does not exist in the animal, even in the gorilla, and as man and the gorilla are too nearly alike in body to allow the presence of this something in man, and its absence in the gorilla to be explained by the difference in their bodily conformation, we must suppose that the quality which makes man man, and distinguishes him essentially from the animal, is of a spiritual nature.1

I cannot discuss this subject here in all its bearings; I must confine myself to a few of the main points, and will specially consider what has been brought forward in favour of the statement connected with the pithecoid theory that in psychical matters also the difference between man and the animals is one of degree and not of essence, and that therefore the human soul may have been formed in a natural manner, by gradual perfecting from the animal soul.

Among the philosophers who have occupied themselves in modern times with the so-called animal soul, Frohschammer is one of those who place the psychical element in the animal at its highest. At the same time, he says unhesitatingly that the difference between the animal and man is one of quality and essence, not only of degree; not such as could be caused entirely by the richer, more complex organization of the human body." We cannot of course, he adds, directly observe and 1 Cf. Natur und Offenbarung, ix. 477. * Das Christenthum, p. 162.

VOL. II.

L

compare human souls and animal souls; we can only observe their workings and manifestations, and must draw our conclusions as to their causes and their nature from these observations. The question is, therefore, whether we find any assured facts which lead us to conclude that there is a decided, unchangeable, unsurmountable difference between the animal and the human soul. This will enable us to decide whether the difference is one of essence or of degree. "But," continues Frohschammer, "human life and human history furnish us with facts which at least give us perfect certainty that as a matter of fact there is between the psychical life and actions of man and those of the animal a very decided difference; yes, even a gulf which is practically impassable, so far as our experience goes. These facts are both well known and general, and on account of them the common sense of man believes in the essential difference between animal and human souls. One of the facts which strikes us first is this, that man has a language, that is, he is able to form connected series of tones, sounds, words (or other signs), in order by this means to express and impart his inward condition, feelings, thoughts, his experiences, and his opinions. Another fact which strikes us immediately, is that mankind has a historical consciousness, a consciousness of itself, its destinies, actions, and tasks, in which the whole animal world, and all kinds of animals, are deficient. In connection with this is the fact that each separate man is able to set himself a high inward either spiritual or ethical task, apart from the simply physical task of preserving life, whereas animals simply know nothing about such a task, and make the preservation and the

comfort of their physical existence the object of their actions. Besides the consciousness of a moral law, men are distinguished also by the feeling and idea of justice, and by the common system of law and the order of society, which are founded on this. Another quality which distinguishes man is the idea of God, and religious belief and worship, of which animals are entirely incapable. Lastly, man is the only creature who is capable of understanding the arts and sciences, while animals cannot accomplish any abstract thought or theory, or any practice founded on them."

I must refer you to the works of Frohschammer and other philosophers1 for further discussions on this point. As regards speech, the supporters of the pithecoid theory will only acknowledge a difference of degree, not of essence, between animals and men in this matter. Darwin mentions the case of an ape in Paraguay who, when he is excited, utters at least six different sounds, which excite similar emotions in other apes; and also the still more remarkable fact "that the dog, since being domesticated, has learnt to bark in at least four or five distinct tones. . . . We have the bark of eagerness, as in the chase; that of anger; the yelping or howling bark of despair, as when shut up; that of joy, as when starting on a walk with his master; and the very distinct one of demand or supplication, as when wishing for a door or a window to be opened." Darwin further says that only articulate language is peculiar to man, but he adds that "it is not the mere power of articulation that distinguishes man from other

1 Waitz, Anthropologie, i. 308. J. B. Meyer, Philos. Zeitfragen, p. 170. Huber, Zur Kritik, etc. p. 50.

animals, for, as every one knows, parrots can talk; but it is his large power of connecting definite sounds with definite ideas; and this obviously depends on the development of the mental faculties." 1

It is true that many animals can be taught to articulate words, but this is not speech, for the animals do not connect any ideas with these words. But the tones which the animals produce of themselves are not only not articulate, but are not speech at all, because by these sounds they only express emotions of pleasure or pain, as man himself also does instinctively, but they do not express ideas or thoughts, which man can do under certain circumstances—as in the case of the deaf and dumb for instance-even without articulate speech. We can distinguish, 1st, sounds which, although neither articulate nor rational, are yet the expression of a verbum mentale; 2nd, sounds which are articulate but not rational; 3rd, sounds which are rational but not articulate; 4th, sounds which are both rational and articulate; 5th, movements which do not express thought; 6th, movements which do express thought. The sounds made by apes and dogs, of which Darwin speaks, belong to the first category; the words spoken by parrots to the second; to the third belong sounds by which a man can express either his assent or his objections to a speech to which he is listening; the fourth category is speech, as it is found amongst all, even the lowest men; and the movements described in the sixth category are substitutes for speech where this is physically impos

1 Descent of Man, i. 54. Cf. Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube,

p. 199.

sible.1 "Animals do not speak," says Frohschammer rightly, "because they are mentally incapable of speech, that is, because they are not really able to think. Man's power of thought is the cause of his power of speech, not, as has been asserted, his power of speech the cause of his power of thought; although, of course, the power of thought is stimulated and developed by speech. For this reason a being incapable of thought can never be taught really to speak, although, parrot-like, it may imitate words; on the other hand, a being possessing real power of thought, if it fulfils even to a slight degree the primary conditions of the development of its spiritual powers, will form for itself some signs by which it can impart thought, even though, like the deaf and dumb, it cannot hear a human sound."2 There is a correct thought in the fact that the Greeks have only one word, λóyos, for reason and speech, and call the animals aλoya çŵa, mutum pecus; and, as Max Müller says, speech is the Rubicon which no animal will ever dare to cross.

It is too bad that, in the face of all this, Hæckel should literally say in his Generelle Morphologie,3 that "birds, parrots, with highly differentiated gullets and tongues, etc., can learn speech-—that is, the power of making articulate sounds—just as perfectly as man.' The fact that parrots can only learn a few words, and therefore cannot learn speech "as perfectly as man,' is only one part of the folly of this observation. Who

1 Quarterly Review, vol. cxxxvii. (July 1874) p. 43. (The article is probably by St. George Mivart.)

Das Christenthum, p. 165. Cf. J. B. Meyer, Philos. Zeitfragen, p. 160. Huber, Zur Kritik, etc. p. 50. H. Wedewer, Die neue Sprachwissenschaft und der Urstand der Menschheit, Freiburg 1867, pp. 7, 41.

3 ii. 430.