would call the power of articulating words which parrots acquire by training real speech? "The most important step," Hæckel goes on to say, "in the development of real men from real apes, was the differentiation of the gullet, which resulted in the development of speech, and by this means produced the power of plain communication and historical tradition." It would be an interesting task for a historian to collect the historical traditions of their race from the parrots, who, as Hæckel assures us, can learn our language just as perfectly as a Frenchman can learn German.

I must do Hæckel the justice to say that in his History of Creation he does not bring forward with quite so much assurance this argument for similarity between man and brutes drawn from the parrots. But he has not omitted to add an equally ingenious argument, and he says, "Very many wild tribes can count no further than 10 or 20, whereas some very clever dogs have been made to count up to 40, and even beyond 60. And yet the faculty of appreciating number is the beginning of mathematics;" so that, I suppose, Hæckel means to imply that dogs will probably be able at some time or other to accomplish fractions and the rule of three. In the latest edition of the History of Creation, Hæckel repeats the following naïve assertion, “"If, as is usually done, we divide the different emotions of the soul into three principal groups, sensation, will, and thought, we shall find in regard to every one of them that the most highly developed birds and mammals are on a level with the lowest human beings, or even decidedly surpass them.

1 P. 597.

The will is as distinctly and strongly developed in higher animals as in men of character. . . . The affections of the higher animals are not less tender and warm than those of man. The fidelity and devotion of the dog, the maternal love of the lioness, the conjugal love and connubial fidelity of doves and love-birds are proverbial, and might serve

amples to many men. thought, .

as ex

this much may with certainty be in

ferred, that the processes of thinking here follow the same laws as in ourselves. . . . In all cases, as in man, it is the path of induction and deduction which leads to the formation of conclusions." 1

In the Generelle Morphologie Hæckel points to the fact that "the beginnings and sometimes the more. perfect stages of all matters of government and society are found amongst animals, often even in animals far removed from men, as, e.g., among the insects, the ants;" for which reason he recommends to statesmen, teachers of political economy, and above all to historians, the study of comparative zoology, if they

1 P. 653. In the Gen. Morphologie, ii. 435, Hæckel states all this even more plainly, and adds, "There are men who are even lower than the higher animals, because of the imperfect development of their reason. This holds good not only of the lower races of men, but also of many individuals of the highest races, even of those in whom one would suppose that the mass of acquired knowledge had sharpened the powers of thought. In this respect some of the numerous assertions made by opponents of the theory of descent are specially interesting; they show to a perfectly astounding degree a want of natural, clear, decided form and connection of thought, which certainly places them amongst the more reasonable dogs, horses, and elephants. As these animals are generally not warped by the mountains of dogmas and prejudices which pervert the thoughts of most men from their youth up, we often find that their judgments are more correct and natural than those of socalled 'savants.'"

would attain to a true and scientific understanding of the corresponding human institutions.

Hæckel even seems quite to disregard the fact, which in this matter is fatal to the pithecoid theory, that our nearest relatives, the apes, are as regards speech very much behind parrots and ravens; and as regards "the institutions of government and society," clearly far behind ants and bees; whereas according to the pithecoid theory, they should approach man as much in these points as in bodily organization.

The arguments brought forward by K. Vogt in support of the theory that the difference between man and the animals with regard to spiritual things is one of degree and not of essence, are so unspeakably absurd, that in justice to him we must suppose that he does not believe them himself. What can we think of Vogt's assertion, that the cuffs which the old bears give the younger ones show distinctly that animals are not devoid of the ideas of parental authority and filial obedience, that is, of the "fundamental ideas of human and Christian morality." Or to his concluding from the fact that even the most courageous dog will show senseless fear in the presence of strange appearances of which his nose can give him no warning, that the dog is evidently afraid of ghosts; and then proceeding to see in this "fear of the supernatural, of the unknown," the germ of religious ideas "which are found developed in a high degree in our intelligent domestic animals the dog and the horse, and which men only develops farther, and forms into a system of faith.”1 I need scarcely say that we find similar statements 1 Vorlesungen, i. 294. Cf. J. B. Meyer, Philos. Zeitfragen, p. 393.

in the works of Büchner1 and men like him. But even Darwin hardly rises above Vogt and Hæckel in this matter. "Animals," he says, "manifestly feel emulation. They love approbation or praise; and a dog carrying a basket for his master exhibits in a high degree self-complacency and pride. There can,

I think, be no doubt that a dog feels shame, as distinct from fear, and something very like modesty when begging too often for food. A great dog scorns the snarling of a little dog, and this may be called magnanimity. . . Monkeys certainly dislike being laughed at; and they sometimes invent imaginary offences. The idea of property is common to every dog with a bone, and to most or all birds with their nests. No one supposes that one of the lower animals reflects whence he comes or whither he goes, what is death or what is life, and so forth. But can we feel sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and some power of imagination, as shown by his dreams, never reflects on his past pleasures in the chase? and this would be a form of self-consciousness. It is often difficult to judge whether animals have any feeling for each other's sufferings. Who can say what cows feel when they surround and stare intently on a dying or dead companion? I agree with Agassiz that dogs possess something very like a conscience. They certainly possess some power of self-command, and this does not appear to be wholly the result of fear. . . . A dog will refrain from stealing food in the absence of his master.. What a strong feeling of inward satisfaction must impel a bird,

1 Sechs Vorlesungen, etc. p. 187.

so full of activity, to brood day after day over her eggs," etc. etc.1

Many of the observations on which Darwin and others rest their description of the spiritual life of animals have been made not by themselves, or by other capable inquirers, but belong to the category of animal stories, which as far as authenticity is concerned may be ranked with hunting stories. Those observations which are really trustworthy partly only show us what human training can do with animals, and partly assume quite another aspect, if we do not humanize the animal; that is, if we do not call the actions of animals, which outwardly have a certain likeness to human actions, by names taken from human actions, and thus disregard the difference between the instinct of the animal and the conscious, free action of the man. With reference to this there is this very important fact, which Darwin himself lays stress on, namely, that man has to learn his skill by practice, whereas the beaver builds his canal, and the bird his nest, quite, or very nearly as well, the first time he tries it as when he is old;" and also that animals make no progress in this respect, on the contrary they build their nests and catch their prey just as they did hundreds of years ago; that even the tamed and trained animals if left to themselves go back to their former state, and that the dog's son does not learn from his father the tricks which the latter was taught.3

If on the one hand, in order to bring man and the

1 Descent of Man, i. pp. 42, 52, 62, 76, 78, 79.

2 Ibid. 1.

3 Huber, Zur Kritik, p. 50.