was applied in Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, L.R.A. 1915F, 829, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, where a California statute limiting hours of employment of women in specified occupations, including those in hotels, was upheld. The court said: "Dealing with practical exigencies, the legislature may be guided by experience. (Cal. 226 Pac. 914.) is claimed the Federal court did not squarely decide the question of whether or not ownership of shotguns and rifles by foreigners could be prohibited for other purposes, and the following excerpt from the opinion is quoted: "It will be time enough to consider whether the statute can be construed or upheld as precluding Italians from possessing a stock of guns for purposes of trade when such a case is presented. The act was passed for an object with which possession in the way of trade has nothing to do and well might be interpreted as not extending to it." Concerning the question of discrimination, the decision in Patsone v. Pennsylvania, supra, declared: "The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we start with the general consideration that a state may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one dependent upon experience. The demand for symmetry ignores the specific difference that experience is supposed to have shown to mark the class. It is not enough to invalidate the law that others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact, it is found that the danger is characteristic of the class named. . The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the legislature of Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming as its premise for the law that resident unnaturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil that it desired to prevent. Obviously the question so stated is one of local experience on which this court ought to be very slow to declare that the state legislature was wrong in its facts." It is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. 1. If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied." State v. Rheaume, supra, sustained as constitutional a statute requiring persons not citizens of the United States to make application for a permit to possess firearms. Petitioner, referring to the differentiation in the respective statutes as regulatory and prohibitory, says: "It will be noticed that in two essential respects it is radically different from the California law. In the first place, no attempt is made to deny to foreign-born residents of the state of New Hampshire the right to acquire or own property in firearms; and, in the second place, no attempt is made to prohibit such unnaturalized foreign-born residents from possessing such firearms, provided they comply with certain regulations regulations and procure permits therefor. From the foregoing it will be seen that the New Hampshire law merely regulates the possession and use of firearms. It makes no attempt to deny to anyone, resident within the state, the right to acquire or own property in such firearms. It does not even prohibit the possession of firearms by foreigners, but merely provides that any foreigner desiring to possess the same shall first submit to certain regulations and procure a permit for such purpose. The law, moreover, makes no attempt to dis This well-established principle turb the ownership of firearms by any class of persons who owned the same at the time the law took effect. The California law, on the other hand, at its very inception, seeks to deprive persons who owned firearms at the time of such enactment, of their property in such firearms. In this phase it is retroactive in its effect, and unquestionably deprives persons resident in the state of California of their property without due process of law. Under no circumstances does it permit any unnaturalized foreigner either to own or possess a firearm or firearms of the description denounced by the statute, and, in this respect, it unjustly, oppressively, and without reason, deprives the class of the population of the rights guaranteed them by the Federal Constitution." The point to that case is not whether the legislation was merely regulatory or prohibitory. It is conceded by amici curiæ for petitioner that firearms are the proper subject of the exercise of the police power. The question presented here is whether, in the exercise of the police power, the segregation of aliens constitutes an unlawful discrimination against that class. It was said in State v. Rheaume, supra: "Classifications distinguishing between citizens and aliens have not infrequently been the basis of regulations under the police powers of the states.. "Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes of American citizens. It therefore remains to be considered whether there is such a relation between the restriction as to the alien and the public safety as to warrant the classification in the present case. "That explosives and firearms are proper subjects of regulation is self-evident. The legislature was dealing with subject-matters of great inherent danger to the public. . It was an incident to such a system that a classification should be made based on domicil, allegiance, duty, habit, temperament, and other characteristics which distinguish the citizen and applicant for citizenship from the alien who has manifested no desire or intention to bind himself to support the government. "Citizens as a class have more settled domicils, and are better known to the local police officials, while the sojourn of aliens in this country, in theory, and usually in practice, is temporary, and their abode, while here, capricious and uncertain. Citizens by means of taxation bear the expense of the government and of police protection, while the alien does not necessarily pay taxes or share any part of the public burden. Native citizens are justly presumed to be imbued with a natural allegiance to their government which unnaturalized foreigners do not possess. The former inherit a knowledge and reverence for our institutions, while the latter as a class do not understand our customs or laws, or enter into the spirit of our social organization. Or, passing more directly to the use of firearms, the citizen has an obligation to defend the state, while the alien has none. The citizen is required to assist in maintenance of order, the enforcement of law, and the arrest of wrongdoers in some instances. It is clear that there exists a reasonable and substantial basis for the classification." Moreover, it is not strictly true that the legislation here in question is prohibitory to every class of firearms. Under the statute aliens may own or have in their possession firearms, provided they are not of a size capable of being concealed on the person. This would permit aliens to have shotguns, rifles, or (-Cal. - 226 Pac. 914.) other large weapons for all lawful purposes. The case of People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, L.R.A.1916D, 550, 108 N. E. 427, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1254, approves a similar classification of aliens. The statute there, known as the New York Labor Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 31), provided that in the construction of public works by a state, municipality, or by contractors, only United States citizens shall be employed, and that citizens of the state should be given preference. Numerous cases are cited therein in which the power of a state to descriminate in favor of citizens was sanctioned. Among these are McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248, where a state denied to aliens, and even to citizens of another state, the right to plant oysters or to fish in public waters, and Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 40 L. ed. 793, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 600, where the state restricted to its own citizens the enjoyment of its game. The principle that justified the discrimination in all these cases was held to be "that the common property of the state belongs to the people of the state, and hence that in any distribution of that property, the citizer may be preferred." It was said in People v. Crane, supra: "If the calling is one that the state, in the exercise of its police power, may prohibit either absolutely, or conditionally by the exaction of a license, the fact of alienage may justify a denial of the privilege... There must, however, be some relation in such cases between the exclusion of the alien and the protection of the public welfare." In Ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 42 Am. St. Rep. 129, 37 Pac. 402, a writ of habeas corpus was issued. The petitioner was held in custody. on a complaint charging him with a misdemeanor under § 626 of the Penal Code in unlawfully selling a quantity of deer meat, the meat having been cut from the carcass of a deer killed in Texas and brought into this state. Petitioner contended that as the above section did not prohibit the sale of deer meat lawfully taken without the state the charge did not come within the terms thereof. It was also argued that the act violates the Constitution of the United States in that it is an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. It was held in discharging the writ and remanding the prisoner that it is within the police power of the state, in the protection of the wild game thereof, to prohibit the sale of the meat of any wild game within the state, and that such a police regulation making it a public offense to buy and sell deer meat within the state, which was cut from an entire carcass brought from without the state, is not a violation of the Constitution of the United States as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. "The fact that a regulation may incidentally, and to a certain extent, affect commerce between the states, does not affect its validity. The au thority of Congress over any article of commerce imported into a state ceases 'when the importer has so acted upon it that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, which happens when the original package is no longer such in his hands,' and that thereupon the property becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the state, and affected and controlled by its regulations." A classification of aliens has been made with respect to procuring a license to hunt and fish upon payment of a fee. The Statutes of 1909, page 663, amending a similar act (Stat. 1907, p. 247), require every person in the state, who hunts, pursues, or kills any of the wild birds or animals, excepting predatory birds or animals, to first procure a license therefor. A license to citizens of the United States and resident in this state may be issued on the payment of $1; to any citizen of the United States, and not a resident of this state, on the payment of $10; to any person not a citizen of the United States, upon the payment of $25. In the Statutes of 1919, p. 119, a further classification was made allowing a license to be issued to a person who shall have declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States and who is a resident of this state, on the payment of $10, provided that the applicant take an oath that he has not claimed his citizenship in a foreign country as a basis for avoiding service in the armed forces of the United States. Fishing licenses, by Statutes 1913, p. 986, may be granted to citizens. and residents of this state on the payment of $1; to citizens of the United States and not residents of this state, on the payment of $3; and to persons not citizens of the United States, on the payment of $3. We do not find that these provisions have been made the subject of attack on the point of differentiation in the amount of the fee required. In Com. v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 81 N. E. 149, 11 Ann. Cas. 514, in holding constitutional that part of the act which provided that a license as a hawker and peddler shall be granted only to a person who is, or shall have declared his intention to become, a citizen of the United States, and referring to State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386, 47 Atl. 165, 15 Am. Crim. Rep. 117, which declared a similar statute unconstitutional, the court said: "There is, however, an important question which was not much discussed in that case, whether the legislature, in the exercise of the police power, could discover a reason for withholding peddlers' licenses from aliens. The business of peddling furnishes such opportunities for the practice of fraud that it is a proper subject for legislative regulation. . If, in the same interest [protection of the public], the legislature deems it important that licenses shall be granted only to citizens of the United States, or to those who have declared their intention to become citizens, it can hardly be said that they have exceeded their constitutional right in passing a law to that effect. Indeed, the nature of their business is such that their possession of a domicil and citizenship in this country might be important to those seeking remedies for wrongs done in their business." Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 68 L. ed. 255, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15, involved the Alien Land Law of the state of Washington (Laws 1921, chap. 50), prohibiting the purchase or lease of land by any alien who has not declared his intention to become a citizen. In holding that the legislation was not repugnant to the 14th Amendment, the court approved the following statement from the decision of the district court in that case (274 Fed. 841): "It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an interest in, and the power to effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries. If one incapable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within the realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state might pass to the ownership of noncitizens." In Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 225, 68 L. ed. 278, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21, the court considered the right of a citizen to lease his land to a Japanese subject under the Alien Land Law of this state (Stat. 1921, p. lxxxiii), forbidding aliens ineligible to citizenship to acquire, possess, or enjoy agricultural land. It was said in upholding the legislation that "our decision in Terrace v. Thompson, supra, controls the decision of all questions raised here." Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U. S. 322, 68 L. ed. 321, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112, dealt with the right of a citizen to enter into a cropping contract with a Japanese subject living in Cali (Cal., 226 Pac. 914.) fornia as affected by the Alien Land Law. The court said: "The provision of the act which limits the privilege of ineligible aliens to acquire real property or any interest therein to that prescribed by treaty is not in conflict with the 14th Amendment. Terrace v. Thompson and Porterfield v. Webb, supra. Another case under the Alien Land Law is Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326, 68 L. ed. 323, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 116, which involved the ownership of stock by a Japanese subject in the Merced Farm Company, a corporation of this state. The court held that "the state has power, and the act evidences its purpose, to deny to ineligible aliens permission to own, lease, use, or have the benefit of lands within its borders for agricultural purposes. . It may forbid indirect as well as direct ownership and control of agricultural land by ineligible aliens." It may safely be assumed that in a general sense the reasons that induced legislation involved in the case at bar exerted an influence in the adoption of the enactments considered in the foregoing authorities. If rights in land may be denied to aliens by the state, there would seem no reason why, in the exercise of its police power, it might not also protect itself against the ownership, traffic in, and use of firearms by aliens. inhibition Constitutional law-denying aliens right to possess firearms. This might well tend to conserve peace and quiet, and, in times of war as well as of peace, serve to avoid the injection of such issues into the international relations of the Federal government. police power, to restrain dangerous practices (id. 916) and to regulate the carrying and use of firearms and other weapons in the interest of the public safety (id. 917). In our opinion the legislation constitutes a proper exercise of the police power, and ownership of power. is not invalid under -forbidding the 14th Amend-firearms-police ment. The purpose of the act is to conserve the public welfare, to prevent any interference with the means of common defense in times of peace or war, to insure the public safety by preventing the unlawful use of firearms. It cannot be assumed that the legislature did not have evidence before it, or that it did not have reasonable grounds, to justify the legislation, as, for instance, that unnaturalized foreignborn persons and persons who have been convicted of a felony were more likely than citizens to unlawfully use firearms or engage in dangerous practices against the government in times of peace or war, or to resort to force in defiance of law. To provide against such contingencies would plainly constitute a reasonable exercise of the police power. As to the point that different and more severe punishment is provided for the same offense by § 2 than § 5 of the act, it is to be noted that the respective sections prescribe different offenses. Section 5 provides it shall be a misdemeanor for any person within the state to carry concealed on his person or within any vehicle which is under his control or direction any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, without having a license to carry such firearm. The gravamen of that offense is for any person, citizen or otherwise, to have the possession of the kind of firearms described without a license. In Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583, 27 L. ed. 207, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 637, the court said: "Equality of protection" means that persons "shall not be subjected, for the same |