ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

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5, note (s).—Add reference to post, 664, as to contracts in restraint of trade.

6, note (x).—Add reference to Bringloe v. Goodson, 5 Bing. N. C. 740; 8 Scott, 71. "A stranger who is no privy in estate is not estopped by a recital in a deed; Doe d. Marchant v. Errington, 8 Scott, 210; 6 Bing. N. C. 83.” 7, note (y).—Cox v. Cannon is reported in 6 Scott, 347; 6 Dowl. 625; and in 4 Bing N. C.

9, line 13.-For "deduced" read "reduced."

15, note (g).-Add "see per Lord Abinger, C. B.; Hopkins v. Logan, 7 Dowl. 366; infra."

16, note (g). For "Gothing" read "Guthing.'

16, line 10.-Add "so an agreement by A. to work only for B. without any engagement by B. to employ A., is not binding; Sykes v. Dixon, 1 P. & Dav. 463; post, 576."

17, line 18.-Add" and see other instances, per Parke, B.; Kennaway v. Treleavan, 5 M. & W. 500, 501." 18.-See Hopkins and Wife v. Logan, 5 M. & W. 241; 7 Dowl. 366. There the declaration stated that after the intermarriage of the plaintiffs, to wit, on the 1st October, 1838, an account was stated between the husband, on behalf of himself and wife of the one part, and the defendant of the other part, concerning monies by the wife whilst she was sole lent to the defendant and remaining unpaid before and after the time of the intermarriage. Upon the account so stated the defendant was found indebted to the plaintiffs in a large sum of money, and in consideration of the premises promised to pay the same on the 1st October then next ensuing. Plea, that the money in the declaration mentioned was secured to the wife before her marriage by bond conditioned for payment on the 10th April, 1840, and that the account was stated concerning the money

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for which the bond was given, and which was supposed at the time of the account to be due; whereas no part was due, and so the account was stated erroneously.

Held, that the declaration was bad: 1st, on the ground that the promise alleged was different from that implied by law 2nd, that it did not appear that the debt was due at the time the account was stated.

Held also, that the plea was an answer so far as it showed that the account was stated concerning a specialty debt not then due. Semble, that the allegation that the account was stated erroneously, rendered the plea bad for duplicity. Semble also, that the action was properly brought by husband and wife.

20, line 27.-But consignee not in general liable if no bill of lading, Coleman v. Lambert, 5 M. & W. 502.

"Upon payment," in a judge's order, does not raise a promise to pay; Price v. Philcox, 7 Dowl. 555.

21, note (k). For "Houghton" read "Voughton." 25, line 15.—And though an express contract be avoided by fraud, no implied one arises; Selway v. Fogg, 5 M. & W. 83.

33, line 5.-So the giving up a guarantee not clearly good in form, or unstamped, is a sufficient consideration to support a promise; Haigh v. Brooks, 2 P. & Dav. 477; 3 P. & Dav. 452; 4 P. & Dav., S. C.

36, line 23.-For "promises" read "premises."

36, last line.-Add, "There must have been some party who could have been sued. Instance of note given for the debt of a deceased person; Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795."

37, line 15.-For "defendant" read "plaintiff."

Consideration. Where a plaintiff discharges one of two joint debtors out of custody on a ca. sa., the other has a right to be discharged; and therefore a promise by a third person to pay the debt, in order to obtain the discharge of the defendant in custody, is void for want of consideration; Herring v. Dorell, 8 Dowl. 604.

38, line 11.-Add reference to Emmett v. Kearns, 7 Dowl. 630; 7 Scott, 687. The instance of a promise by an attorney in consideration of forbearance to his client, ante, 522.

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41, line 4.-Add reference to Gregory v. Harman, 1 M. & P.

209.

45.-Instance of agreement to give up a claim for mesne profits; Hey v. Moorhouse, 6 Bing. N. C. 52; 8 Scott, 156, S. C.

53." I hereby guarantee you the payment of the proceeds of the goods you have consigned to my brother, and also any future shipments you may make in consideration of 2s. 6d. paid me," is a good gaurantee, though it does not expressly disclose that the 2s. 6d. had been paid by the promisee, the inference being that it had been so; Dutchman v. Tooth, 5 Bing. N. C. 577.

55, note (z).-Add " 5 Ad. & E. 550, S. C."

61. As to the sufficiency of a past or executed consideration; Eastwood v. Kenyon, 3 P. & Dav. 282, 286.

62, note (k).—Add a reference to Eastwood v. Kenyon, 3 P. & Dav. 282.

62, note (e).-Add, after citing Hunt v. Bate, " recognized by Tindal, C. J. in Thornton v. Jenyns, 1 Man. & Gr. 188, 189."

63, line 3.-For "that" read "when."

63.-On an executed consideration the law implies a promise to pay immediately on request, and such consideration is not sufficient to support a promise to pay in futuro; Hopkins v. Logan, 5 M. & W. 241; 7 Dowl. 366, S. C.; ante, 877.

63, division 3.-In laying mutual promises, "had then promised" sufficient; Thornton v. Jenyns, 1 Man. & Gr. 188,

189.

64, line 12. Add reference to Granger v. Collins, 6 M. & W. 458. There the declaration on promises stated that whereas before and at the time of making the agreement thereinafter mentioned, the defendant held the house and premises thereinafter mentioned for the residue of a term of years, and thereupon afterwards, to wit, on &c. agreed to let to the plaintiff, who then agreed to take of the defendant the said house and premises at a certain rent, and in consideration of the premises the defendant promised the plaintiff that he should quietly hold and enjoy the said house and premises during the said term without any

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eviction from the parties entitled to the reversion; and it was held on demurrer, that the declaration was bad, inasmuch as the plaintiff having declared on the simple relation of landlord and tenant, no such duty as that laid as the defendant's promise arose from that relation. 70.-As to form of agreement under Statute of Frauds, see Chapman v. Bluck, 5 Scott, 575; 4 Bing. N. C. 187, where a demise was made by letters. And see Thomas v. Derring, 1 Jurist, 211; Gosbell v. Archer, 4 Nev. & Man. 485; 2 Ad. & E. 500; 1 H. & Wol. 31, S. C. 72, note (m).-Add reference to Baker v. Derring, 8 Ad. & E. 94, S. C.; and see per Tindal, C. J., Hyde v. Johnson, 2 Bing. N. C. 780.

73, note (2).—For "Elgin" read " Eglin.”

80.-Agreement to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat; Hallewell v. Morrell, 1 Scott, New R. 309.

81, line 8.-Add reference to Ackland v. Lutley, 1 P. & Dav. 636; post, addenda to 347. As to meaning of term "stage waggon," Reg. v. Ruscoe, 8 Ad, & E. 386.

83.--Mercantile Contracts. Custom in corn trade; Johnston v. Usborne, 3 P. & Dav. 236.

As to the meaning of terms "good" and "fine" barley, see Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 540. The construction is for jury; id.

87, note (u).-Read " Beswick v. Swindells."

88, note (b).—Line v. Stephenson affirmed in error, 7 Scott, 69. 96, line 4.--But such a demise may enure for the life of the

grantor or grantee, according to circumstances; Doe d. Pritchard v. Dodd, 2 N. & M. 838; 5 B. & Ad. 689. The habendum will assist in construction; id.

98.-What a personal engagement; Wentworth v. Cock, 2 P. & Dav. 251.

Implied attributes: "By the grant of anything conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa haberi non potest;" as if one grant his trees, the grantee may enter upon his land to cut and carry them; Hinchcliffe v. Earl Kinnoul, 6 Scott, 661; 5 Bing. N. C. 24.

98, note (b).-For " 4 Maule & Sel." read "2."

For "Marles" read "Quarles."

101, line 5.-For "principle" read "principal."

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105, line 22.-Add reference to "Doe d. Hiscocks v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363, per Lord Abinger, C. B."

109.-A warranty may be proved by parol, though a receipt be given for the price; Allen v. Pink, 4 M. & W. 140.

Tenancy on terms of written rules, but the length of term agreed on orally; the determination of the term may be shown without producing the rules; Hey v. Moorhouse, 6 Bing. N. C. 52.

110, note (1).-For "4 M. & G." read "4 M. & Scott;" and add "10 Bing 482, S. C."

111. In addition to the cases cited in support of the proposition that parol evidence is not admissible to alter or vary the effect of an agreement required to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds, the following may be referred to: Stead v. Dawber, 2 P. & Dav. 451; 10 Ad. & E. 57, S. C.; and Marshall v. Llynn, 6 M. & W. 109. It seems, therefore, that the principles laid down by Lord Ellenborough in Cuff v. Penn (see page 111), cannot be supported.

112, line 24.-For "rerum quodque" read " unum quodque." 117, Stamp. A resolution of a company or association entered in their books for the appointment of a clerk at a certain salary, or for the acceptance of a tender for work to be done for the company, is not an agreement or a minute or memorandum of an agreement that requires a stamp; Vaughton v. Brine, 1 Scott's New R. 258; Lucas v. Beach, 1 Scott's New R. 350.

120, line 9.—Add "It would be sufficient; Pearce v. Cheslyn, 5 Nev. & Man. 652."

120, last paragraph.-An instrument in this form, "John Mason,

14th February, 1836, borrowed of Mary Ann Mason, his sister, the sum of 147. in cash as per loan in promise of payment; of which I am truly thankful for, and shall never be forgotten by me. John Mason, your affectionate brother; 147.;" is a promissory note, and requires a stamp; Ellis v. Mason, 7 Dowl. 598.

"Settled all accounts of law business up to this day, and will give a receipt in full of all demands when called for; J. T." stamped with agreement stamp, admissible without a receipt stamp; Tebbutt v. Ambler, 9 C. & P. 60.