Samuel (1 Wheat. Rep., 9), and The Hoppet (7 Cranch, 389), it was observed by this court, that technical niceties of the common law, as to informations, which are unimportant in themselves, and stand only on precedents, are not regarded in admiralty information; the material inquiry in the latter cases being, whether the offense is so set forth, as clearly to bring it within the statute upon which the information is founded.

3. The objection raised to the jurisdiction of the District Court of Alabama is principally grounded upon the 9th section of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, which provides, "that the district courts shall have exclusive original cog402*] nizance *of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the sea, by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts, as well as upon the high seas." It is contended that the seizures in these cases were not made upon the high seas, or upon waters within the district of Alabama, and, therefore, the jurisdiction was not conferred on that court. The section above recited, marks out, not only the general jurisdiction of the district courts, but that of the several district courts in relation to each other, in cases of seizures on waters of the United | States, navigable from the sea, by vessels of a particular burthen. If made within the waters of one district, the jurisdiction attaches to the court of that district, and the suit must be there prosecuted. The jurisdiction, in these cases, is given to the court of the district, not where the offense was committed, but where the seizure is made. But where the seizure is made on the high seas, the jurisdiction is conferred upon no particular district court, and it may, therefore, be exercised by the court of any district into which the property is carried, and there proceeded against. In like manner, if the seizure be made within the waters of a foreign nation, as was done in these cases, cognizance of the cause is given, under the general expressions of the section, as to civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to the court of the district into which the property 403*]*is conducted, and on which the prosecution is instituted. The illegality of the service in this latter case has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction, as was decided by this court in the case of The Richmond. (9 Cranch, 102.)

4. The last objection involves the merits of these causes. In the case of The Constitution, the counsel for the appellees rely upon the first and fourth counts in the information; and, in the two other cases, on the second count. But, we think that the first count, in the first of these cases, must be put out of view; because, although it charges a violation of the act of 1794, it states the offense within the words of the act of the 10th of May, 1800, and yet it alleges it to have been committed contrary to the form of the act of 1794, the title of which is specially recited. This was, no doubt, a mistake of the proctor; but it partakes too much of substance to be the foundation of a sentence of condemnation, in a case so highly penal as this is. But, that count is not, in the opinion of the court,

material to the decision of that case, because, we are all of opinion that the fourth count is fully supported by the evidence in the cause, and warrants the sentence of condemnation pronounced by the inferior court. This count is strictly within the 4th section of the act of 1818; and so is the second count in the informations against the Merino and Louisa, and their cargoes.

The argument relied upon by the counsel for the appellants was, that the policy of our laws, from the year 1794 down to the latest act of legislation, had been confined to the suppression of the slave trade, and to prevent, as [404 far as could be done, the bringing into bondage those persons who were free in their own country; and, that since the condition of persons already slaves cannot be changed or made worse, by their removal from one slave-holding country to another, the acts of 1800 and 1818, ought not to be so construed as to prohibit citizeus of the United States being concerned in such removals.

It may well be doubted, whether even the act of 1794, the first which passed upon this subject, can fairly receive the narrow construction which is contended for, since it prohibits the fitting of vessels within the United States, not only for the purpose of procuring from any foreign kingdom the inhabitants thereof, to be transported to some foreign country, to be disposed of as slaves, but also for the purpose of carrying on any trade or traffic in slaves, to any foreign country, apparently embracing the two cases of free persons of color, whose condition is changed by being brought into a state of slavery, and also persons already slaves, and intended to be used as subjects of traffic. Be this as it may, the language of the acts of 1800 and 1818 leaves no reasonable doubt that the intention of the legislature was to prevent citizens of, or residents within, the United States, from affording any facilities to this trade, although they should have no interest or property in the slaves themselves, and although they should not be immediately instrumental to the transportation of them from their native country. By the former of these laws, the offense is made to consist *in the employment [*405 of a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, or to persons resident within the same, in carrying slaves from one foreign country or place to another, no matter for what purpose. By the latter, it consists in the taking on board, or transporting from Africa, or from any foreign country or place, any negro, &c., in any vessel, for the purpose of holding or disposing of such person as a slave, or to be held to service, &c., where those acts are performed by citizens of, or residents within the United States.

It cannot be questioned, but that the case of The Constitution, as stated in the information, and proved by the evidence, is literally within the provisions of the latter act. The slaves seized in that vessel, were taken on board of her by a citizen of the United States, in one foreign place, for the purpose of their being held to service or labor. The court do not feel themselves justified in restraining the general expression of this law, upon the ground of a supposed policy, the reality of which, to say the most of it, is very questionable. The sentence, therefore, of the court below, in the

This vessel, with her lading, found on board at the time of seizure, were libeled for an infraction of the laws prohibiting the African slave trade.

The causes of forfeiture alleged in the libels comprise all those contained in the 1st section of the act of 1794, and those of the 2d section of the act of 1818, with the exception of the offense of being laden for the prohibited trade. 410*] *The claims filed to this libel were, 1. That of one Vinente, a Spanish subject, who alleges her to be a regularly documented Spanish vessel, engaged in traffic sanctioned by the laws of Spain. This claim goes both to vessel and cargo.

2. Of certain seamen, who demand compensation for their wages from the proceeds of the vessel.

3. And, lastly, of several material men, who claim the payment of their bills, alleging the vessel to be foreign, and their being employed in her equipment and repairs by the captain, and one Strike, as his agent.

The court below condemned the vessel, but restored the cargo, and from that decree the Spanish claimant has not appealed. The fate of the vessel, therefore, is irrevocably fixed; but the United States having appealed from the decree of restitution in favor of the cargo, that appeal gives rise to a complicated inquiry.

The court below repelled every other charge against the vessel, except that of having been caused to sail," with a view to be employed in the prohibited traffic. But being caused to sail" is not among the offenses enumerated in the latter part of the 2d section of the act of 1818, under which alone the lading of the vessel is subjected to forfeiture. That offense is among those enumerated in the enacting clause of the section, but in the forfeiting clause it is dropped; and if, therefore, the case of this vessel exhibits no other offense than that which 411*] in the decree below was made the ground of her condemnation, the decree restoring the cargo would be well sustained; hence it becomes necessary to review the whole case. One John Gunn, it appears, built and equipped this vessel in the port of Norfolk, as a packet, intending her for sale; but falling in debt, it became necessary to raise a sum of money upon her hull, and he accordingly took her to Baltimore for that purpose. When there, he addressed himself to one Maher, who advanced him the money, and instead of an hypothecation in ordinary form, Gunn executed a bill of sale to Maher, admitted, on all hands, to have been intended to serve only as the means of enabling Maher to expedite the vessel on a voyage to Čuba, there to be sold, and to account with Gunn for the proceeds, as well of freight as of sale.

This purpose Maher appears soon to have abandoned, for an enterprise of a very different nature. The vessel was put up for freight, and various applications ensued; but Maher undertook himself to load her for St. Jago de Cuba, and Gunn left Baltimore under the persuasion that her destination was fixed. Some time, however, having elapsed, and not hearing of her sailing, he writes to Maher on the subject, and is then informed that he had dispatched

care of Strike, a personage who, from that time, makes a conspicuous figure in the res gesta. For no sooner does she arrive at St. Jago, than she is colorably conveyed to Vinente, but still under the absolute control of Strike; and without having *shipped an article, [*412 appears at once with a valuable cargo on board, the property also of Strike, furnished with a Spanish coasting license, on a voyage to Havana, thence to Matanzas, where a part of her cargo is sold, and she is completely equipped, colorably a Spaniard, but really an American, for the African trade.

On her voyage thence to the coast of Africa, she is pursued by hostile vessels, and in the chase sustains damage, which compels her to put into Baltimore to refit. There she encounters Gunn, her original and equitable owner, but who finds in her nothing of her original character, but what served to identify his vessel, and expose to him how his confidence had been abused, and his property forfeited, through his own indiscretion, in conveying her to Maher. In the present cause, his interests are out of the question, and he appears only as a witness, on behalf of the prosecution.

It is immaterial to inquire whether this vessel was in the inception of her voyage, “laden for the illegal purpose for which she was caused to sail. The court below has attached much importance to the omission of this allegation; and, certainly, as a substantive offense, the vessel could not have been condemned for that cause, unless comprised among the allegations in the libel.

But as to the liability of the lading, found on board at the time of the seizure, to forfeiture under the act, that consequence is made to depend upon the liability of the vessel herself to condemnation; and, although this court is not prepared to carry that forfeiture be- [*413 yond the limits of an intimate connection with the prohibited voyage, they are of opinion that, in this case, that connection is so intimate as to leave no doubt of its liability, to the full extent of the liability of the vessel. If, then, the evidence will sustain any one of the offenses alleged in the libel, which offense is made a ground of forfeiture by law, the cargo must share the fate of the vessel.

One of those allegations is, that she was fitted out; and, contrary to the opinion of the court below, we think the evidence establishes that she was fitted out for the prohibited trade. This conclusion we place on the ground assumed in the cases of The Emily and Caroline, decided at the present term. The general purposes of the enterprise, in its inception, are affirmed by the ground on which the court below founded its sentence against the vessel, and are fully made out by her subsequent conduct. This point being established, it follows that acts, which otherwise would be indifferent, and might be intended as well for an innocent as a prohibited enterprise, become offenses with a view to their purpose. Besides these, the utter improbability that this voyage could have been undertaken from Baltimore to St. Jago, without many acts which would amount to a fitting out, we have the positive words of Maher himself, the dux facti in the transaction, in his letter of the 28th of October, to Gunn, in which,

when speaking of having dispatched the 414*] *vessel to St. Jago, he says: "Mr. Strike has an account of all her expenses in fitting out."

This charge, therefore, we consider as established against her; and this is one of the enumerated offenses which subject vessel and lading to forfeiture.

The court below having subjected the vessel to forfeiture, and the proceeds being in the registry, was then called on to distribute those proceeds among the various claimants, the seamen and material men. Among the former, it dismissed all except that of Pietro Rosso. From the decree, as to those whose claims are dismissed, there is no appeal, and the Court is not called on to pass an opinion upon the grounds of the decision as relates to their claims. But the decree in favor of Pietro Rosso is appealed from by the United States, and it becomes necessary to examine that part of the decree which awards him both his account, and precedence in payment of it.

We think it erroneous, and that it must be reversed, since it is impossible to believe that he entered this vessel without a perfect knowledge of her character and destination. Spanish masters, in common with all others, may commit infractions of the act of 1818, within the ports of the United States; and it is easy to conceive, that engaging a crew, as well as many other acts of preparation for this trade, may be committed by a vessel coming lawfully into the ports of this country. If the plea of stress of weather, and other incidental embarrassments, be set up, as taking a vessel 415*] *out of the action of the laws against the slave trade, it is incumbent on the party who claims benefit of the excuse, to establish it. In the present instance, this seaman was engaged in the port of Baltimore, and so far was the vessel from a want of seamen, that we find the master actually refusing recruits, when offered by Strike to be put on board his vessel. If one seaman may be engaged, why may not a crew? the offense is the same in essence, though not in magnitude. The general policy of the law is, to discountenance every contribution, even of the minutest kind, to this traffic in our ports; and the act of engaging seamen, is an unequivocal preparatory measure for such an enterprise. This part of the decree, therefore, must also be reversed.

The next question arises on the claims of the material men, or rather of those whose claims were sustained in the court below. From those which were rejected there is no appeal.

On this point, the material facts are these: That this vessel, although appearing under the character of a foreign vessel, was, in reality, in her home port; and this, whether considered as the property of Gunn, or of Maher and Strike. The questions then arise, on what does the privilege of material men depend? On the state of facts, or on their knowledge or belief of facts? On the actual absence of a vessel from her home port, or the power given to the ship-master, in another port, to subject his vessel to admiralty process and implied lien, in favor of material men? And, lastly, whether 416*] the prior forfeiture of the *vessel to the United States precludes their general rights,

and places them on the footing of subsequent purchasers, whether with or without notice of the forfeiture.

These questions are all solved by a reference to the nature, origin, and objects of maritime contracts. The precedence of forfeiture has never been carried further than to overreach common law contracts entered into by the owner; and it would be unreasonable to extend them further. The whole object of giving admiralty process and priority of payment to privileged creditors, is to furnish wings and legs to the forfeited hull, to get back for the benefit of all concerned; that is, to complete her voyage.

There are two considerations that fully illustrate this position. It is not in the power of anyone but the ship-master, not the owner himself, to give these implied liens on the vessel; and, in every case, the last lien given will supersede the preceding. The last bottomry bond will ride over all that precede it; and an abandonment to a salvor will supersede every prior claim.

The vessel must get on; this is the consideration that controls every other; and not only the vessel, but even the cargo, is sub modo subjected to this necessity.

For these purposes, the law maritime attaches the power of pledging or subjecting the vessel to material men, to the office of ship-master; and considers the owner as vesting him with those powers, by the mere act of constituting him ship-master. The necessities of commerce require, *that when remote from his [*417 owner, he should be able to subject his owner's property to that liability, without which, it is reasonable to suppose, he will not be able to pursue his owner's interests. But when the owner is present, the reason ceases, and the contract is inferred to be with the owner himself, on his ordinary responsibility, without a view to the vessel as the fund from which compensation is to be derived. From this view of the subject, this court will be best understood when it speaks of the home port of the vessel, an epithet which, it is very easy to preceive, has no necessary reference to State or other limits. And from this view of the subject it results, both that the forfeiture does not ride over the rights derived under maritime contracts, whether they be called liens or privi leges, and that the real owners of a vessel, who have themselves contributed to give her a foreign aspect or character, hold out the foreign captain to material men, as one legally authorized to exercise the rights and powers over his vessel which appertain to a foreign vessel. They are thus precluded by their own act from denying her foreign character. In case of wreck and salvage, it is unquestionable that forfeitures would be superseded; and we see no ground on which to preclude any other maritime claim, fairly and honestly acquired.

We concur, then, in the opinion of the court below, that the fair claims of seamen, and subsequent material men, are not overreached by the previous forfeiture; and that, even in the home port, a vessel may be subjected to the liabilities of *a vessel in a [*418 strange port, by being falsely held up as foreign by her owners. And the question will now be