« 이전계속 »
ends of justice. This authority must have been same objection arises to delegating this power given to the courts for some substantial and to the state authorities, as there does to in60*] beneficial *purpose. If the alterations trusting it to the courts of the United States. are limited to mere form, without varying the It is as much a delegation of legislative power effect and operation of the process, it would be in the one case as in the other. It has been useless. The power here given, in order to already decided, in the case referred to, that answer the object in view, cannot be restricted the 34!h section of the judiciary act has no apto form as contradistinguished from substance, plication to the practice of the courts of the but must be understood as vesting in the courts United States, so as in any manner to govern authority so to frame, mould and shape the the form of the process of execution. And all process, as to adapt it to the purpose intended. the reasoning of the court, which denies the
The general policy of all the laws on this sub application of this section to the form, applies ject is very apparent. It was intended to adopt, with equal force to the effect or extent and and conform to, the state process and proceed- operation of the process. If, therefore, Conings, as the general rule, but under such guards gress has legislated at all upon the effect of and checks as might be necessary to insure the executions, they have either adopted and limitdue exercise of the powers of the courts of the ed it to that which would have been given to United States. They have authority, there the like process from the supreme courts of fore, from time to time to alter the process, in the respective states, in the year 1789, or have such manner as they shall deem expedient, and provided for changes, by authorizing the courts likewise to make additions thereto, which nec of the United States to make such alterations essarily implies a power to enlarge the effect and additions in the process itself, as to give it and operation of the process. The exercise of a different effect. this power is, to be sure, left in the discretion To limit the operation of an execution now, of the court; but the object and purpose for to that which it would have had in the year which it is given is so plainly marked, that it 1789, would open a door to many and great inis hardly to be presumed the courts would omit conveniences, which Congress seems to have carrying it into execution, without some sub- .foreseen and to have guarded against, by givstantial reason. And, the better to insure this, ing ample powers to the courts, so to mould authority is given to this court, to prescribe to their process as to meet whatever changes the circuit and district courts such regulations might take place. And if any doubt existed on the subject as it shall think proper.
And whether the act of 1792 vests such power in the should this trust not be duly and discreetly ex- courts, or with respect to its constitutionality, ercised by the courts, it is at all times in the *the practical construction heretofore [*63 power of Congress to correct the evil by more given to it ought to have great weight in deter61*) specific legislation. But so long as *the inining both questions. It is understood that courts of the United States shall make such it has been the general, if not the universal alterations or additions in their process of exe. practice of the courts of the United States, so cution as only to reach property made subject to alter their executions as to authorize a levy to execution from the state courts, there would upon whatever property is made subject to the seem to be no just ground for complaint. When, like process from the state courts; and under therefore, the law of Kentucky made land sub- such alterations, many sales of land have no ject to executions, it was carrying into effect doubt been made, which might be disturbed if the spirit and object of the act of Congress, for a contrary construction should be adopted. the Circuit Court so to alter and add to the That such alteration, both in the form and ef. form of its execution, as to authorize the taking fect of executions, has been made by the Cirand selling the debtor's land.
cuit Court for the district of Kentucky, is cerIt is said, however, that this is the exercise tain from the case now before us, as, in 1789, of legislative power, which could not be dele- land in Kentucky could not be sold on execugated by Congress to the courts of justice. tion. If the court, then, had the power so to But this objection cannot
be sustained. There frame and mould the execution in this case, as is no doubt that Congress might have legislated to extend to lands, the only remaining inquiry more specifically on the subject, and declared is, whether the proceedings on the execution what property should be subject to executions could be arrested and controlled by the state from the courts of the United States. But it law. And this question would seem to be put does not follow, that because Congress might at rest by the decision in the case of Wayman have done this, they necessarily must do it, and v. Southard. The law of Kentucky, as has cannot commit the power to the courts of jus- been already observed, does not in terms protice. Congress might regulate the whole prac- fess to exercise any such authority; and if it tice of the courts, if it was deemed expedient did, it must be unavailing: An officer of the 80 to do; but this power is vested in the courts; United States cannot, in the discharge of his and it never has occurred to anyone that it duty, be governed and controlled by state laws, was a delegation of legislative power. The any farther than such laws have been adopted power given to the courts over their process is and sanctioned by the legislative authority of the no more than authorizing them to regulate and United States And he does not, in such case, act direct the conduct of the marshal, in the exe. under the authority of the state law, but under cution of the process. It relates, therefore, to that of the United States, *which adopts [*64 the ministerial duty of the officer; and partakes such law. An execution is the fruit and end no more of legislative power than that discre- of the suit, and is very aptly called the life of 62*] tionary authority intrusted *to every the law. The suit does not terminate with the department of the government in a variety of judgment; and all proceedings on the execucases. And, as is forcibly observed by the tion, are proceedings in the suit, and which are court, in the case of Wayman v. Southard, the l expressly, by the act of Congress, put under
the regulation and control of the court out of Cited-5 Pet. 210; 6 Pet. 659; 9 Pet. 359-361. 368. which it issues. It is a power incident to every 17, 815-617; 6 How. 330; 2 'Black. 440; 6 Wall. 194,
372; 13 Pet. 64 ; 14 Pet. 314; 1 How. 324, 325:2 How. court from which process issues, when deliv- 490 ; 1 Wood. & M. 132; 2 Wood. & M. 214; 1 Abb? ered to the proper officer, to enforce upon such 0. S. 480; Bald. 126, 275, 563, 564; 1 Story, 602 : 2 officer a compliance with his duty, and a due Story387; 3. Curt. 495: Abb. Adm. 429 : Hemp.
313, 325; 5 Mason, 38; 2 Paine, 257; 3 Sumn. 369, execution of the process, according to its com- 375'; 2 Blatchf. 88. mand. But we are not left to rest upon any implied power of the court, for such authority over the officer. By the 7th section of the act
SLAVE TRADE.] of the 2d of March, 1793 (3 L. U. S., 367), it is declared that "it shall be lawful for the several
THE ANTELOPE. courts of the United States, from time to time, as occasion may require, to make rules and THE VICE-CONSULS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, orders for their respective courts, directing the
Libelants. returning of writs and processes, &c., and to regulate the practice of the said courts respect
The African slave trade is contrary to the law of ively, in such manner as shall be fit and nature, but is not prohibited by the positive law of necessary for the advancement of justice, and Although the slave trade is now prohibited by especially to the end to prevent delays in pro- the laws of most civilized nations, it may still be ceedings.” To permit the marshal, in this who have not prohibited it by municipal acts or case, to be governed and controlled by the treaties. state law, is not only delaying, but may be en
The slave trade is not piracy, unless made so by tirely defeating the effect and operation of the the treaties or statutes of the nation to whom the execution, and would be inconsistent with the The right of visitation and search does not exist advancement of justice.
in time of peace. A vessel engaged in the slave Upon the whole, therefore, the opinion of trade, even if prohibited by the laws of the counthis court is, that the Circuit Court had au- alone, be seized on the high seas, and brought in thority to alter the form of the process of exe- for adjudication, in time of peace, in the courts of 65*) cution, so as *to extend to real as well another country. But if the laws of the other
country be violated, or the proceeding be authoras personal property, when, by the laws of ized by treaty, the act of capture is not in that Kentucky, lands were made subject to the like case unlawful. process from the state courts; and that the act session of Africans is not a sufficient evidence of
*It seems that in case of such a seizure, pos- [*67 of the general assembly of Kentucky does not property, and that the onus probandi is thrown operate upon, and bind, and direct the mode in upon the claimant, to show that the possession which the renditioni erponas should be enforced was lawfully acquired. by the marshal, so as to forbid a sale of the privateer, fitted out in violation of our neutrality:
Africans who are first captured by a belligerent land levied upon, unless it commanded three or by a pirate, and then recaptured and brought fourths of its value, according to the provisions into the ports of the United States, under a reaof the said act; and that, of course, the return trade acts was intended, are not to be restored
sonable suspicion that a violation of the slave of the marshal is insufficient, and ought to be without full proof of the proprietary interest : for quashed. This renders it unnecessary to in- in such a case the capture is lawful. quire into the constitutionality of the law of to be decreed at all, was a question on which ihe
And whether, in such a case, restitution ought Kentucky
court was equally divided. CERTIFICATE.—This cause
Where the court is equally divided, the decree of
came on to be the court below is of course affirmed, so far as the heard on the transcript, &c., and the points on point of division goes. which the judges of the Circuit Court of the Although a consul may claim for subjects unUnited States for the seventh circuit and dis known of his nation, yet restitution cannot be detrict of Kentucky were divided in opinion, and cried without specific proof of the individual prowhich were, in pursuance of the act of Congress in that case made and provided, ad. AP
PPEAL from the Circuit Court of Georgia. journed to this court, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this court vice-consuls of Spain and Portugal, claiming
These cases were allegations filed by the is of opinion, that the act of the general as, certain Africans as the property of subjects of sembly of Kentucky, referred to in the said questions, cannot operate upon, bind and di- their nation. The material facts were as folrect the mode in which the said venditioni ex. lows: A privateer, called the Columbia, sailponas should be enforced by the marshal, and ing under a Venezuelean commission, entered forbid a sale of the land levied upon, unless it the port of Baltimore in the year 1819; clancommanded three-fourths of its value when es destinely shipped a crew of thirty or forty timated according to the provisions of the said men; proceeded to sea, and hoisted the Arte act; and that this opinion renders it unneces- gan flag, assuming the name of the Arraganta, sary to decide whether the said act is, or is 66*] *not, repugnant to the constitution of
NOTE.-Slave Trade.-Congress has the constituthe United States. All which is directed to be tional power to probibit the foreign slave trade. certified to the Circuit Court of the United U.S. v. Gould, 8 Am. Law Reg. 525. What constiStates for the seventh circuit and district of tutes a violation of the laws against the slave trade.
The Plattsburg, post, 133; U. S. y. The Garome, 11 Kentucky
Pet. 73; The Caroline, 1 Brock. Marsh. 384; U. S. v. 1.--In the case of the Bank of the United States, as one that was to issue permanently from the v. January, also certified from the Circuit Court of courts of the United States, whenever it was in Kentucky, the process was a capias, to which the use, at the epoch contemplated by those acts, as a acts of 1789 and 1792 extend in express terms. state process. A certificate was directed accordThis court, therefore, determined, that Congress ingly. must be understood to have adopted that process
and prosecuted a voyage along the coast of the marshal, according to the law of the UnitAfrica, her officers and the greater part of her ed States, as being the fair proportion of the crew being citizens of the United States. Off twenty-five proved to have been taken from an the coast of Africa she captured an American American vessel. vessel, from Bristol, in Rhode Island, from The Attorney General for the appellants, which she took twenty-five Africans; she capt- stated that the cases of the respective allegaured several Portuguese vessels, from which tions of the Spanish and Portuguese consuls, she also took Africans; and she captured a upon which distinct appeals had been taken, Spanish vessel, called the Antelope, in which which had been separately docketed in this 68*] she *also took a considerable number of court,' were so blended together, that it was Africans. The two vessels then sailed in com- thought most proper to bring on the hearing pany to the coast of Brazil, where the Arra- in both cases at the same time. ganta was wrecked, and her master, Metcalf, and a great part of his crew, made prisoners;! Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL stated that the the rest of the crew, with the armament of the appellants, in the argument of No. 12, might Arraganta, were transferred to the Antelope, refer to the evidence in No. 13; they might inwhich, thus armed, assumed the name of the voke it into this cause, so far as it was necesGeneral Ramirez, under the command of John sary for their purpose, and the court would Smith, a citizen of the United States; and on take notice *of the facts which appeared [*70 board this vessel were all the Africans which in the other transcript; but that the two causes had been captured by the privateer in the must come on separately, and in their order. course of her voyage. This vessel, thus But it has been thought most expedient to refreighted, was found hovering near the coast port the two arguments together. of the United States, by the revenue cutter The reasons assigned in the appellants' case, Dallas, under the command of Captain Jack for reversing the decrees of the court below son, and finally brought into the port of Sa- were as follows: vannah for adjudication. The Africans, at 1. That the possession of these Africans by the time of her capture, amounted to upwards the claimants, before the capture by the privaof two hundred and eighty. On their arrival, teer, affords no presumption that they were the vessel, and the Africans, were libeled, and their property; that they must show a law enclaimed by the Portuguese and Spanish vice- titling them to hold them as property. consuls reciprocally. They were also claimed 2. That if these Africans are to be considerby John Smith, as captured jure belli. They ed as having been in a state of slavery, when were claimed by the United States, as having in the Spanish and Portuguese vessels from been transported from foreign parts by Ameri- which they were taken, aud if the court shall can citizens, in contravention to the laws of consider itself bound to restore them to the conthe United States, and as entitled to their free- dition from which they were taken, this can be dom by those laws, and by the law of nations. done only by placing them in the hands of Captain Jackson, the master of the revenue those who shall prove themselves to have been cutter, filed an alternative claim for the bounty the owners; and that this purpose cannot be given by law, if the Africans should be ad- answered by restoring them to the consuls of judged to the United States; or to salvage, if Spain and Portugal. the whole subject should be adjudged to the 3. That if some of these Africans were the Portuguese and Spanish consuls.
property of the claimants, yet some were not; 69*] *The court dismissed the libel and and failing to prove which were theirs, the declaim of John Smith. They dismissed the cree is erroneous, in determining by lot a matclaim of the United States, except as to that ter which the claimants were bound to estabportion of the Africans which had been taken lish by proof. from the American vessel. The residue was Mr. Key, for the appellants, argued that the divided between the Spanish and Portuguese facts of the case presented the question to be claimants.
considered in a point of view, peculiarly favorNo evidence was offered to show which of able *to the appellants. A piratical ves- [*71 the Africans were taken from the American sel was found hovering near our coast, apparvessel, and which from the Spanish and Por. ently meditating a violation of our laws. It tuguese; and the court below decreed that, as was brought, with the persons on board, into about one-third of them died, the loss should the custody of the court, by an act of seizure, be averaged among these three different classes; not only lawful, but meritorious towards the and that sixteen should be designated, by lot,
1.-The Spanish case as No. 12, and the Portuguese from the whole number, and delivered over to as No. 13.
Libby, 1 Wood. & M. 221; U. S. v. Catherine, 3 146. The district courts have jurisdiction under Law Hep. 255; The Wanderer, 1 Sprague, 515; 8. C. slave trade acts to determine who are the actual 13 Law Rep. N. S. 139: U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. captors under the law of Louisiana of March 13, 460; The Emily, 9 Wheat. 381; The Slavers, 2 Wall. 1818. The Josefa Segunda, post. 312. 383; U. 8. v. La Coste, 2 Mas. 129; U.S. v. Morris, 14 The African slave trade, abstractedly considered, Pet. 464; The Alexander, 3 Mas. 175; U. S. v. Cather- is inconsistent with che law of nations; and a claim ine, 2 Paine, 721; The Porpoise, 2 Curt. C. C. 307; U. founded upon it may be repelled in any court S. v. Hann, 8 Am. Law Reg. 663: U. S. v. Isla de where it is asserted, unless the trade be legalized by Cuba, 2 Sprague, 26; 9 Op. Att-Gen. 282; U. 8. v the nation to which the claimant belongs. U. S. v. Westervelt 5 Blatchf. 30: Strohm v.U.S. Taney. 413; | La Jeune Eugenie, 2 Mas. 409. Williamson v. Daniel, 12 Wheat. 568.
Slaves captured in time of war and brought into The African slave trade is an offense against the the United States, will not be condemned as prize, municipal laws of most nations in Europe. 1 Kent's nor will the court consider them as prisoners of Com. 191,
war; the disposition of them is matter of state in For a history of the legislation on this subject, which it is not for the judiciary to determine. Alsee 1 Kent's Com. 192 to 200; Woolsey Int. Law s. meida v. Certain Slaves, 5 Hall's Am. L. Journ. 459.
claimants, since it rescued what they claim as probandi upon them to prove their birthright. their property, from the grasp of pirates. If Whatever may have once been the condition of the claimants had not interposed, the course of Africa, and of the African slave trade, the authe court would have been obvious. The ille- thentic information on this subject will show gal and piratical capture by our citizens, gave that it is now impossible to determine, by the them no rights; and even if it did, they in- fact of possession, whether the party has been stantly forfeited them under our laws, which lawfully acquired or not. There must be an they intended to violate. But the claimants overwhelming probability of the lawfulness of demand restitution of the Africans found on such acquisition, to raise such a presumption. board this vessel, alleging them to be their This is instanced by the different presumptions property, lawfully acquired on the coast of allowed in different parts of our own country, Africa, and piratically taken from them by the in respect to this description of persons. In Arraganta. This demand is resisted by the the southern-states, there is the highest degree government of the United States, upon the of probability, from universal practice and wellground that the persons in question are not by known law, that such persons are slaves. But our laws to be considered as slaves, but as free in the northern states, the probability is just men. These laws the court must administer, the contrary, and the presumption is reversed. and not the laws of Spain. Our national pol- | And in the present state of the slave trade, icy, perhaps our safety, requires that there Africans, in a slave ship on the high seas, are should be no increase of this species of popula- in no such circumstances as to raise a presumption within our territory. The acts of Congress tion that they are lawfully held in slavery. provide that, however brought here, they shall For if there be a permitted slave trade, there be set free, and sent back to their own native is also a prohibited slave trade; and the procountry. The Spanish and Portuguese claim- hibition is much more extensive than the perants demand them as their property. We repel mission. *The claimants must, conse- (*74 the claim, by asserting their right to liberty. quently, show something more than mere posThe demand of restitution is inconsistent with session. They must show a law, making such our policy, as declared in our statutes and other persons property, and that they acquired them 72*] *public acts. These declarations gave under such law. In order to maintain their fair warning to those engaged in the slave title, they show the municipal law of Spain; trade, that though we did not intend to inter- but the operation of that law can only extend fere with them on the high seas, yet, if their throughout the territory of Spain, and to Spanvictims should come within the reach of our ish vessels on the high seas. These persons are laws, we should protect them. These acts con- now within the jurisdiction of our conflicting stitute a solemn pledge to all nations interested law; and they are brought here without any in the suppressions of this inhuman traffic, and violation of the sovereign rights of Spain. Our to Africa herself, that if the objects of it should own law, which is in force here, must prevail seek our protection, where they may lawfully over the law of Spain, which cannot bave an receive it, within our territorial jurisdiction, extraterritorial operation. There is no reason and at the feet of our tribunals of justice, they of comity, or policy, or justice, which requires should be entitled to that protection. There- us to give effect to foreign law conflicting fore, admitting the facts as alleged by the with our own law on the same subject. Beclaimants, what they claim as justice in a mat. sides, the Spanish law is not only contrary to ter of property, cannot be done to them, with ours, but is inconsistent with the law of nature, out disregarding our own policy, endangering which is a sufficient reason for maintaining the our own safety, infringing our own laws, and supremacy of our own code. If this municipal violating the plighted faith of the country. law of Spain were allowed to prevail against our
But supposing they have a right to insist on law, in our own territory, and before our own restitution of their property, what proof ought courts, the same effect must be given to the law to be required, and what proof do they give, of of every other country, under the same circumtheir proprietary interest? It is material, also, stances. If, instead of these Africans, there here to consider that those human beings, who had been taken by the same illegal capture, are claimed as property, come into the jurisdic Spanish slaves, from an Algerine corsair, and tion of the court, not by any wrongful act of afterwards brought in the same manner into ours, but lawfully, providentially; and are to our ports, they might, upon the same princibe treated just as if they were thrown upon our ple, be reclaimed by the representative of Alshore by a storm. The Spanish owners show, giers, who could easily show that, by the law as proof of property, their previous possession; prevailing among the Barbary states, they were and the possessor of goods, it is said, is to be slaves. presumed the lawful owner. This is true as to The municipal law of Spain, then, is insuffigoods, because they have universally and nec- cient *to maintain the title set up by the (*75 73*] essarily an *owner. But these are men, claimants. They are driven to the necessity of whom it cannot be affirmed that they have of invoking the aid of the law of nations, as universally and necessarily an owner. In some sanctioning their asserted right to property in particular and excepted cases, depending upon these human beings. But if the law of nations the local law and usage, they may be the sub- is silent upon this subject; if it neither sancjects of property and ownership; but by the tions nor forbids the traffic in African slaves: if law of nature all men are free. The presump. it is municipal law alone which determines in tion that even black men and Africans are what manner private property is acquired and slaves, is not a universal presumption. It lost, then the claimants have no law to stand would be manifestly unjust to throw the onus upon in asserting their claim. Supposing, how
ever, this idea not to be correct, it is incumbent 1.- Vide Appendix, Note I, a.
on the claimants to show, positively, that the slave trade, as now practiced, has the sanction by those who must be considered as actors in of the law of nations, as now understood by the the cause, and who must, consequently, prove civilized and Christian nations of the world. their title as alleged, the fair abstract question That it once had that sanction, may, perhaps, arises, and their claim may well be repudiated be admitted; but it must also be admitted that as founded in injustice and illegality. there was once a time when it had not that The learned counsel here commented upon sanction. The permission began by general the different cases in England and this country, assent and usage. The King of Spain, in the with the view of reconciling them, and showing preamble to his edict of 1817, admits that it that they were all consistent with the principle was incorporated into the code of nations as an he maintained. In the cases of The Amedie, 3 exception to the general principles on which The Fortuna,4 and The Donna Marianna, 5 that code is founded. When the practice was the ship and persons on board were lawfully adopted by the general, not universal assent, of brought into the custody of the court, either as civilized nations, it became a part of the law being captured jure beili, or taken under cirof nations. In the same manner, a general, cumstances which warranted a seizure as for a and not a universal denunciation of the prac- municipal offense. The claims were accordingtice, is sufficient to make it cease to be a part ly rejected, upon the ground of the unlawfulof the law of nations. In the great moral and ness of the trade. In the subsequent cases of legal revolution which is now going on in the The Louis, and of Madrazo *v. Willes,' [*78 76*] world respecting this trade, the *time the originál seizure was held to be unjustifiable, must come when it will cease to have a legal and consequently restitution was decreed. But existence by the universal concurrence of na. none of the important principles settled in the tions. In the meantime, the question must be other cases, are overruled in these cases, which discussed, as it arises under various circum turn exclusively upon the point that the wrong stances, until we reach the desired period when first done in the unlawful seizure must be rethe universal sentiment of the wise and the dressed. In the case of La Jeune Eugenie, 8 the good shall become the rule of conduct sanc. claim of a French subject was rejected, as betioned by authority capable of enforcing it. All ing founded in a breach of the municipal law the modifications and improvements in the of his own country, and the subject-matter in modern law of nations have been gradually in controversy was delivered up, with the consent troduced. The writers upon that law explain of the executive government of this country, to the manner in which these changes have been the sovereign of France, to be dealt with as made and sanctioned. The documents to be he should think fit. All these latter cases show, laid before the court will show the present state that where the court has rightfully obtained of the world's opinion and practice upon this sub- possession of human beings, who are claimed as ject, and will prove that the time is at hand, if slaves, it will not restore them to their alleged it has not already arrived, when the slave trade proprietors, although it may not go so far as to is not only forbidden by the concurrent voice punish those who are engaged in the trade, by of most nations, but is denounced and punished the confiscation of the vehicle in which it is caras a crime of the deepest die. This is shown ried on. by the declarations contained in the treaties of But another view may be taken of this Paris and Ghent; by the acts and conferences subject. The King of Spain, in his edict of at the Congresses of Vienna, London, and Aix 1817 (before referred to), informs us, that the la Chapelle; by the treaties between Great slave trade originated in motives of humanity, Britain, and Spain, and Portugal; by the ne- and was intended to avoid the greater evils gotiations between the United States and Great growing out of the barbarous state of the AfriBritain; and by the reports of the committees can continent. Suppose this to be a just repreof the House of Commons, and the House of sentation, and that the trade formerly consisted Representatives in Congress. We contend, then, merely in the transportation of persons who that whatever was once the fact, this trade is were slaves in Africa, to be slaves elsewhere; it now condemned by the general consent of pa- is at last discovered, by the *evidence tak- [*79 77*] tions, who have publicly *und solemnly en before the British House of Commons in declared it to be unjust, inhuman and illegal. | 1790, by the investigations of the African InstiWe insist, that absolute unanimity on this sub-tution, and by the reports of the British and ject is unnecessary; that, as it was introduced, American naval officers, to have entirely chang; so it may be abolighed, by general concurrence. ed its character. Slaves are no longer acquired This general concurrence may not anthorize a merely by capture in war, or by trade; but free court of justice to pronounce it a crime against persons are seized and carried off by the traders all nations, so as to make it the duty of all to and their agents. Wars are instigated by them, seck out and punish offenders, as in the case of for the mere purpose of making slaves. The piracy. No decision has yet gone that length, persons thus enslaved are clandestinely brought por is it necessary in this case to contend for away, under circumstances of extreme cruelty, such a principle. But in a case where the Af- aggravated by the necessity of concealment, and ricans are lawfully brought before a court of smuggled into every country where the cupidity the law of nations, and are claimed as property, of avarice creates a demand for these unhappy
1.-Vide Appendix, Note I., b. p. 32.
2.- Vattel, Droit des Gens, Chap. Prelim. s. 25-27, 56, liv. 1. ch.2, s. 293; Burlam. 165; Martens, 1, 9, 8.5, l. 11, s. 1. 3.-Acton's Rep. 240.
4.-1 Dodson's Rep. 81.
7.-3 Barnwell and Ald. 353. Tho several cases