ica, from purchasing negroes on the coasts of Africa, enacting that voyages for that purpose may not be undertaken to the coasts north of the equator, after the 22d of November, nor to

those south of the equator, after the 30th of May, 1820, under the penalties specified." 1.-B. p. 3.

the recovery of such ship and cargo, except within a term not exceeding three years, to reckon from the date of the ship's entrance into the port where she has unloaded; after the expiration of which period, the said action shall be inadmissible and void.

"Art. I. All persons, of whatsoever quality or condition, who shall proceed to fit out or prepare vessels for the traffic in slaves, in any part of the coast of Africa lying north of the equator, shall incur the penalty of the loss of the slaves, who shall be declared free, with a destination hereinafterwards mentioned. The vessels engaged in the traffic shall be confiscated, with all their tackle and appurtenances, together with the cargo, of whatever it may consist, which shall be on board on account of 37*] *the owners or freighters of such vessel, and of the owners of such slaves. The officers of such vessel-to wit, the captain or master, the pilot and supercargo-shall be banished for five years to Mozambique, and each shall pay a fine equivalent to the pay or other profits which he was to gain by the adventure. Policies of insurance cannot be made on such vessels, or their cargoes; and if they are made, the assurers who shall knowingly make them shall be condemned in triple the amount of the stipulated premium.

Art. II. All persons, of whatever rank or condition, who shall import slaves into Brazil, in foreign vessels, shall incur the same penalty of the loss of the slaves, who shall become freemen, and be provided for as hereinafter directed.

"Art. III. Information shall be received relative to all the above cases. And if the vessel and her cargo have been confiscated, half of the whole proceeds of the property, sold by public auction, as well as half of the fines, shall be given to the informer, and the other half shall be paid into my royal treasury, to which the whole produce shall belong, if there be no informer. In case, however, of a vessel having been captured by a ship of war, such vessel and her cargo shall be subject to the provisions specified in the seventh article of the regulations concerning the mixed commission, annexed, under number 3, to the above convention of July the 28th, 1817. But in case the ship should be captured or confiscated, it shall not be lawful to commence an action for

"Art. IV. Informations, and all proceedings inclusive of the final sentence and execution, shall be brought before the judges appointed to try causes respecting contraband goods and embezzlement, in any place or dis

before any other magistrate or judge competent to decide on those matters, to whom I deem proper to commit this jurisdiction, as well as the authority requisite for carrying into execution the sentences passed by the mixed commission, in cases cognizable by the latter, and for trying and determining other cases that may occur, as also those accruing from them, allowing the party to bring an appeal conformably to the ordinance. It shall, however, be lawful for either of the parties to apply to the mixed commission, for them to determine whether or not the case have reference to the abolition; in which event, the proceedings upon it shall be delivered *up to the commission in the [*38 state in which they are; and whatever the commission may decide, shall be carried into effect.

"Art. V. The slaves made over to my royal treasury in the manner specified in the above seventh article of the regulations concerning the mixed commission, and those declared free by the above article (as it would be unjust to abandon them without support), shall be delivered into the office of the judge of the district, or where there is none, into that of the judge charged to watch over the rights of the Indians, whose powers I enlarge with that jurisdiction, to serve as freedmen for fourteen years in any public service of the navy, the fortresses, agriculture, or manual trades, as may be thought most convenient, being for that purpose enrolled in the respective stations; or shall be hired out to individuals of known property and probity, who shall be bound to support, clothe, and instruct them, teaching them some handicraft or labor that may be agreed upon, during the stipulated period; the terms and the conditions of which shall be renewed as often as necessary till the fourteen years are expired; the time of servitude may be shortened by two or more years, according as the good conduct of these persons may entitle them to the enjoyment of full freedom. In case these freedmen are destined for the public service, the officer who shall have authority in the respective stations to which they are assigned shall nominate a proper person to fix the period as above mentioned, who shall be responsible for their education and treatment. They shall have as cu

The Amedie, it must be considered, on the evidence produced to the court, and from the 41*] situation *of this vessel at the time of capture, that she was employed in carrying slaves from the coast of Africa to a Spanish colony. We are of opinion this appears to have been the original design and purpose of the voyage, notwithstanding the pretense set up to veil the real intention of the proprietor. The American claimant, however, complains of the injury and interruption he has sustained in carrying on his usual and lawful trade, that of importing slaves for the purpose of sale, and calls upon the Prize Court to redress the grievance, and repair the damage he has sustained by the capture and unjust detention of this vessel.

On the different occasions when cases of this description formerly came before the court, the slave trade was liable to considerations very different from those which now belong to it. So far as respected the transportation of slaves to the colonies of foreign nations, this trade has been prohibited by the laws of America only; this country had taken no notice of that prohibition; our law sanctioned the trade, which it was the policy of the American law first to restrict, and finally to abolish. It appeared to us, therefore, difficult to consider the prohibitory law of America in any other light than as one of those municipal regulations of a foreign state, of which this court could not take any cognizance, and of course could not be called upon to enforce; nor could it possibly bar a party in a court of prize. But by the altera tion which has since taken place in our law, the question stands now upon very different grounds. We do now, and did at the time of this capture, take an interest in preventing that traffic in which this ship was engaged. The slave trade has since been totally abolished in this country, and our legislature has declared the African slave trade is contrary to the principles of justice and humanity. Whatever opinions, as private individuals, we before might have entertained upon the nature of this

trade, no court of justice could with propriety have assumed such a position as the basis of any of its decisions, whilst it was permitted by our own law; but we do now lay down as a principle, that this is a trade which cannot, abstractedly speaking, be said to have a legitimate existence; I say abstractedly speaking, because we cannot legislate for other countries; nor has this country a right to control any foreign legislature that may think proper to dissent from this doctrine, and give permission to its subjects to prosecute this trade. We cannot, certainly, compel the subjects of other nations to observe any other than the first and generally received principles of universal law. But thus far we are now entitled to act, according to our law, and to hold that, prima facie, the trade is altogether illegal, and thus to throw on a claimant the whole burden of proof; *in [*42 order to show that, by the particular law of his own country he is entitled to carry on this traffic. As the case now stands, we think that no claimant can be heard in an application to a court of prize for the restoration of the human beings he carried unjustly to another country, for the purpose of disposing of them as slaves. The consequence of making such proof is not now necessary to determine; but where it cannot be made, the party must be considered to have failed in establishing his asserted right. We are of opinion, upon the whole, that persons engaged in such a trade cannot, upon principles of universal law, have a right to be heard upon a claim of this nature in any court. In the present case, the 'claimant does not bring himself within the protection of the law of his own country; he appears to have been acting in direct violation of that law, which admits of no right of property such as he claims; ours is express and satisfactory upon the subject.

Where, therefore, there is no right established to carry on this trade, no claim to restitution of this property can be admitted. We are hence of opinion the sentence of the court below was valid, and ought to be affirmed.

JUDGMENT.-Sir William Scott: "An American ship, quasi American, is entitled, upon proof, to immediate restitution; but she may forfeit, as other neutral ships may, that title,

belligerent rights most clearly and universally. But though this prize law looks primarily to violations of belligerent rights as grounds of confiscation in vessels not actually belonging to the enemy, it has extended itself a good deal beyond considerations of that description only. It has been established, by recent [*43 decisions of the Supreme Court, that the court of prize, though properly a court purely of the law of nations, has a right to notice the municipal law of this country in the case of a British vessel, which, in the course of a prize proceeding, appears to have been trading in violation of that law, and to reject a claim for her on that account. That principle has been incorporated into the prize law of this country within the last twenty years, and seems now fully incorporated. A late decision, in the case of The Amedie, seems to have gone the length of establishing a principle, that any trade contrary to the general law of nations, although

that she has abstained from it either in act or declaration. Our own country, it is true, has taken a more correct view of the subject, and has decreed the abolition of the slave trade, as far as British subjects are concerned; but it claims no right of enforcing its prohibition against the subjects of those states which have not adopted the same opinion with respect to the injustice and immorality of the trade.,

The principle which has been extracted by the judge of the court below, from the case of The Amedie, is the reverse of the real principle there laid down by the Superior Court, which was, that where the municipal laws of the country to which the parties belong have prohibited the trade, the tribunals of this country will hold it to be illegal, upon the general princi46*] ples of justice and humanity, and refuse restitution of the property; but on the other hand, though they consider the trade to be generally contrary to the principles of justice and humanity, where not tolerated by the laws of the country, they will respect the property of persons engaged in it under the sanction of the laws of their own country. The Lords of Appeal did not mean to set themselves up as legis lators for the whole world, or presume in any manner to interfere with the commercial regulations of other states, or to lay down general principles that were to overthrow their legislative provisions with respect to the conduct of their own subjects. It is highly fit that the judge of the court below should be corrected in the view which he has taken of this matter, since the doctrine laid down by him in this sentence is inconsistent with the peace of this country and the rights of other states.

The proceedings of this court, as of appeal, have been commenced and carried on by both parties in the manner in which instance causes are usually conducted. A libel has been brought on the one side, to which a negative.issue has been given on the other. Objections, however, have been taken to the jurisdiction, upon two grounds. In the first place it has been said that the sentence of the court below, condemning the property of the crown, was a prize sentence, and, consequently, that the appeal ought to have been made to the Privy Council, and not to the Instance Court of Admiralty, which is a mere municipal tribunal. It has likewise been said that, supposing this court to be possessed of an appellate jurisdiction, still it has no jurisdiction over the question itself, which depends altogether upon the jus gentium. But I think the proceedings of the parties have sufficiently founded the jurisdiction in the cause; and I am by no means clear that a court of civil jurisdiction might not otherwise have adjudicated on a question of this kind, and have excluded a claim asserted to be founded on principles contrary to general justice. The general injustice of a claim may be the subject of cog nizance in a municipal court; a claim founded on piracy, or any other act which, in the general estimation of mankind, is held to be illegal and immoral, might, I presume, be rejected in any court upon that ground alone. I am of

opinion, therefore, that neither of the objections which have been taken are founded. After issue has been given here by the captors, as in an instance court, they cannot object to the competency of the court to entertain the question; and I am by no means willing to put the parties to the expense and inconvenience of commencing proceedings de novo before another tribunal.

On the part of the appellants it is, I think, sufficiently established in *evidence, that [*47 the ship and cargo are Swedish property; whilst, on the other side, there is nothing but a general suggestion that they may belong to American citizens. It may, perhaps, be true, that persons of that country have dishonestly engaged themselves in this traffic under color of the Swedish flag, and the Island of St. Bartholomew may be a convenient resort for such an illegal purpose; but there is nothing in this particular case which can lead to a grave suspicion, much less to a legal conclusion, that this ship is not bona fidei the property of Swedish subjects.

The question, then, is, whether the slave trade is permitted by the law of Sweden. I have before stated that this trade was, till of late years, generally allowed by the tastes of Europe, when, from motives of humanity, some of them were induced to abolish it, as far as their own subjects were concerned. It does not appear that anything has been done by Sweden in the way of abjuring it, much less that she has issued any positive declaration to that effect. The court is certainly inclined to hold that it lies on the individual making the claim to show that the law of his country countenances the trade; but, in this particular instance, that demand ap pears to be satisfied; sufficiently, at least, to throw on the other party the onus of proving that it is not so allowed. The indorsement upon the pass, signed by the Swedish governor, that this vessel was "bound to the coast of Guinea, for slaves," raises a presumption of the legality of the trade, and shifts the burthen of proof from the claimant to the captor. It is not necessary that there should be an immediate act of the Swedish government itself on board, declaring what the precise state of the law may be; the court is bound to accept the declaration and authority of the governor, as it appears upon the pass, if not contradicted. I do not find that the authenticity of this pass is at all denied by the judge of the court below; he goes on the broad and sweeping ground that all dealing in slaves is unlawful, because the trade is not authorized by any civilized state, which is certainly an incorrect and erroneous statement. If the captors had it in their power to prove that Sweden had abolished this trade, they should now have produced that proof; for they must have been aware that the sentence of the judge could never be supported on the principles stated by him in his judgment. The sanction of the colonial governor has been produced by the claimants; and I am clearly of opinion, under this authority standing before me, and standing uncontradicted, that Sweden has not abolished the slave trade.

His Swedish Majesty is the more willing to contract, as this traffic has never been authorized by him," though it had never been prohibited, and therefore had been tolerated in practice upon the principles then generally received.