right reserved by the proprietary to re-enter and avoid the warrant, or to regrant the land, as an estate or interest in the soil, as land, even before such right was asserted. If it was so considered, and, as land, was confiscated by the 5th section, then it was likewise so considered in the 8th section; and, as land, was excepted 266*] and *saved to the proprietary. If the legislature considered this right merely as a claim to money, secured on the land, then it is not confiscated by the 5th section, but remains to the proprietor, unaffected by it. We can perceive no principle of sound construction, by which, comparing the 5th and 8th sections with each other, the 5th shall, so far as respects land in manors, be made more comprehensive than the 8th; no principle by which the confiscating clause shall be made broader than the saving

clause.

The 5th and 8th sections, then, leave the arrears of purchase money due for land sold within the manors, precisely in the situation in which the act found them.

other considerations, "in remembrance of the enterprising spirit which distinguished the founder of Pennsylvania." Not only, then, is there nothing in the act evincing that vindictive, hostile temper, which would justify the court in extending it, by construction, to *ob- [*268 jects not fairly embraced by its terms, but its whole spirit is in opposition to the idea. Taking this view of the subject, we should be astonished, indeed, to find that the same Legislature which left untouched the accruing quitrents on the lands sold within the manors, as well as those which were in arrear, should seize the arrears of purchase money within the same manors; that the legislature should spare, so far as respected the manors, that which partook, in its nature and essence, of the proprietary character, and should seize that which was, in its essence, private debt, and was distinguishIt was necessary to reserve the quit-rents ex-able from other private debts in nothing but in pressly in the 8th section, because they may, the manner in which it was secured. on fair construction, be understood to be comprehended in the 5th section; and, consequently, to be vested in the commonwealth, if not expressly excepted. The quit-rents would not, indeed, be confiscated by that part of the section which relates to soil or land; but may very well pass under the words "royalties, franchises, lordships, and all other the hereditaments and premises comprised, mentioned, and granted in the same charter, or some of them." The quit rent is a hereditament, reserved under the very words of the charter, and annexed to the seigniory. It would not be absolutely improper to term it "royalty," since similar reservations are generally to be found in grants made to individuals in the royal governments. The express exception of quit-rents, therefore, without mentioning the arrears of purchase money, furnish no argument in favor of the plaintiffs in error. The quit-rents were excepted in the 8th section, because they would, 267*] if not excepted, have been vested in the commonwealth by the 5th. The arrears of purchase money were not excepted, because they did not pass by the 5th section. But if the quit-rents were not comprised in the 5th section, they were abolished in the 9th, and might, therefore, without impropriety, be included in the exception of the 8th, so far as respects manors.

Both parties have resorted to the 9th and 10th sections of the act.

The 9th section discharges all the lands held under the late proprietaries, not within the tenths or manors, from quit-rents, or arrearages of quit-rents, and arrearages of purchase money. And the 10th section provides that the said arrearages of purchase money, other than for lands within the said tenths and manors, shall be accounted to be due and payable to the commonwealth."

No man who reads this act, will be at a loss for the motive which induced the draftsman of the bill to introduce the 9th section. The 5th and 8th taken together, would leave all the lands of *Pennsylvania still chargeable [*269 with quit-rents, and would vest those not within the manors, in the commonwealth. It was the intention of the legislature to discharge the lands not within the manors, from this burthen, and a section was necessary for that purpose. Read the section, omitting the words respecting the purchase money of lands not within the manors, and it expresses, with plainness and perspicuity, the idea which has been suggested. All who are acquainted with our There is nothing in the act of 1779 which course of legislation, know, that after a bill would lead to the opinion that the legislature has been framed, and the language adapted to was actuated by a spirit of hostility against the its objects, amendments are sometimes introPenn family. No disposition is shown to con- duced into it, in a late state of its progress, fiscate the debts generally, which were due to without being sufficiently cautious to change that family. The great object of the act was, to the language which was adapted to the origintransfer the right to the soil of Pennsylvania, al matter, so as to fit it to the new matter confrom the proprietary to the commonwealth. tained in the amendment. This can alone acThis was a great and a national object. It was count for the perplexity and confusion of the of the more pressing importance at the moment, 9th and 10th sections of this act. The 9th secbecause no means existed at the time of obtain- tion, which is so perfectly clear without the ing titles to ungranted lands, in consequence of words respecting the arrearages of purchase which, as the 4th section recites, "multitudes money for lands not within the manors, is so of inhabitants were daily emigrating from the embarrassed and confused with them as to be state." In accomplishing this great object, scarcely intelligible; and the whole office of the legislature was not unmindful of the ties the 10th section is, to vest in the commonby which Pennsylvania had been formerly con- wealth a part of that which the 9th had abolnected with the proprietor. In addition to the|ished. Courts must, however, give to these private estates of the family, to the manors sections that interpretation which seems best actually surveyed, and to the quit-rents re- to comport with the intention of the legisla-ceived on the lands sold within those manors, ture.

£120,000 are bestowed on the family, among The 8th section had confirmed to the pro

within the manors, how would it "pre- [*272 serve equality among the purchasers," to coerce the payment of the purchase money for lands without the manors, to the commonwealth? Or, what motive can be assigned for discharging those within the manors from paying for their lands, and requiring payment from those without the manors? It would be a caprice for which it would be impossible to account.

prietors, forever, the quit-rents reserved in the manors. The 9th, which was intended to abolish all quit-rents on all other lands, com270*] mences with *general words, which in themselves would comprehend the quit-rents of the manors, and produce a conflict between the two sections, were not those general words limited and explained afterwards. But they are limited and explained by the words "other than the quit or other rents, reserved within Where the language of the legislature is the proprietary tenths, or manors, before men clear, courts cannot be permitted to assume an tioned.' Between the general words, however, intention repugnant to that language, because with which the clause commences, and those it imports what they think unreasonable; but words of limitation, which have been just re- words are not to be forced out of their natural cited, are introduced the words, “and arrear-meaning, to produce what is unreasonable, if ages of purchase money for lands not within not absurd. the tenths or manors aforesaid." Because the words of limitation apply to the quit-rents only, and not to the purchase money, it has been supposed that the purchase money for lands within, as well as without, the manors, has been abolished, and that the concluding words of the section, that the "same lands shall be held free and discharged therefrom, forever," apply to the purchase money of lands within the manors, as well as to the quit-rents of lands not within the manors.

This construction cannot, we think, be sustained. The general words which introduce the section, required the exception and limitation afterwards introduced, so far as respected quit-rents; but the words respecting purchase money, contain their limitation within themselves. The words of description exclude lands within the manors. No general words are applied to the purchase money, which require subsequent explanation or diminution. The words of limitation, too, are, in themselves, 271*] applicable to quit-rents *only. When, then, we come to the enacting part of the clause, which ordains that the same lands and other hereditaments, shall be held free and discharged therefrom, and from the payment thereof, forever;" and ask, what are the same lands? and from what are they discharged? The only answer which can be made to the question | is, that "the same lands" are lands not within the manors; and that the discharge is "from all quit-rents other than the quit or other rents reserved within the proprietary tenths or manors, before mentioned," "and arrearages of purchase money for lands not within the tenths or manors aforesaid." That the legislature deemed it necessary, by one of these sections, to take from the proprietaries the arrearages of purchase money not within the manors, and by the other, to vest them in the commonwealth, is proof that this was not done by the 5th.

The inference to be drawn, as we think, from the 9th section, that the legislature never lost sight of the distinction set up between manors and the general territory of the commonwealth, is strengthened by the language of the 10th section, which provides and enacts, "that, in order to preserve equality among the purchasers of land under the said late proprietaries, the said arrears of purchase money, other than for lands within the said tenths and manors, shall be accounted to be due and payable to the commonwealth."

Now, if the legislature had supposed itself, by the preceding section, to have abolished all the arrears of purchase money due from lands

The plaintiffs in error also rely on the 6th section of the act establishing a land-office, passed in 1781, as amounting, unequivocally, to a confiscation of the rights of the proprietary in the land in contest.

This proposition is sustained by applying to all lands, words which are, indeed, general in themselves, but which are, obviously enough, used by the legislature with reference to particular lands, the right to which was vested in the commonwealth by the act of 1779.

This act does not purport to be an act of confiscation, but an act for opening a landoffice for the lands of the commonwealth. It does not purport to be an act of acquisition, but of disposition of that which had been previously acquired. It commences with a recital, that many of the lands in the state, heretofore taken up," &c., * are yet [*273unpatented, and the purchase money, and arrearages of purchase money, thereon due, arevested in the commonwealth;" "and the ownners and holders of such rights, since the shutting up of the land-office, have not had it in their power to pay in the purchase money and obtain patents; for remedy whereof, be it enacted, that an office be erected," &c.

The subsequent regulations, then, respecting the payment of the purchase money, were intended for such purchase money only as was already vested in the commonwealth; and the unpatented lands referred to, are those only, the purchase money due on which was then vested in the commonwealth. It is important, too, in the construction of this act, to recollect that the framers of the act of 1779 could not have intended any interference, by means of a landoffice, or otherwise, with the manors. They remained the property of the proprietaries, who were themselves to receive the arrears of purchase money, and to complete the titles. The whole act being framed for the property of the commonwealth, the general words of the 6th section must be understood to be limited to the subject-matter of the act; that is, to the property of the commonwealth.

The act directs that patents shall be issued for lands for which the purchase money shall be received; and the 16th section directs that the land, so granted, shall be free and clear of all reservations and restrictions, as to mines, royalties, quit-rents, or otherwise." Now, the act of 1779 *expressly reserves for the [*274 proprietors the quit-rents within the manors. This act, then, cannot be construed to authorize the issuing patents for lands within the manors, unless it be also construed to be a confiscation,

But the 12th section appears to the court to deserve some consideration. That section declares that nothing in the act shall be construed to extend to lands, not granted in the usual forms of the land-office."

There were, then, lands in Pennsylvania, "not granted in the usual forms of the land

office.'

As this case comes on after a general verdict, on an exception to a charge given by the court to the jury, it is incumbent on the person tak ing the exception to show that the charge is erroneous. If it comprehended this act, of which the court is not satisfied, still it is in cumbent on the exceptor to show that lands within manors were granted in the usual forms of the land-office." This fact is not shown.

by implication, of property expressly reserved | is, a survey, duly made and returned into the for, and vested in individuals, by a preceding land-office, before the 4th of July, 1776. The act of the legislature. This construction, to be survey must be understood as one entire thing. justified, must be unavoidable. describing the particular tract of country surveyed, and the words duly made," mean, made according to the forms prescribed by law or usage. It was very well known that, within these surveys, some lands were sold, and some were not sold. On all which were sold, quitrents were received, and on some of them the purchase money was still due. With the land, if not sold, with the quit-rents and purchase money, if sold, the legislature, as has been already shown, declares its purpose not to interfere. There is nothing in the language, nor is there anything in the character of the transaction, which would lead to the opinion that the legislature intended to discriminate between the different rights of the proprietaries within the manors. The hand of government is not laid upon the manors, and all the rights of the proprietaries within those boundaries, whether to land, purchase money, or quit rents, remain untouched. There can be no conceivable reason for supposing that the legislature meant to inquire into the dates of the warrants evidencing the sale of lands, while the right to sell was acknowledged, and to discharge one contract of sale within the untouched boundary, *while another remained valid. The [*277 words make no such distinction, and we can perceive nothing in the nature of the property which will justify the court in making it. If we trace these words.

The act of 1783 is obviously limited to the same subject to which the act of 1781 applies. All arguments founded on this act are liable, too, to this additional objection. It was enacted after the treaty of peace, when the power of the state legislature over the estate of William Penn, real and personal, had ceased.

We come now to that part of the argument 275*] which applies particularly to warrants issued on the common terms, for lands afterwards surveyed as a manor.

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It is contended by the plaintiffs in error, that manors," and such lands, though comprehended geographi-"proprietary tenths," to their first use, we shall cally within the lines of a manor, are not legal- find reason to confirm, not to change, the sense ly a part of it; and are not, therefore, either as in which we suppose them to have been used in to the land itself, or as to the purchase money, the act of 1779. saved to the proprietaries, under the act of 1779. The reservation in the 8th section of that act, is of "all the lands called and known by the name of the proprietary tenths, or manors,' which were duly surveyed and returned into the land-office, on or before the 4th day of July, 1776."

It has not been suggested that the lands which may happen to be held by common warrants within a manor, are distinguished by a different appellation, and are "not called and known by the general name given to all the adjoining lands within the survey;" but it is contended that such are not brought within that part of the description which requires that they should be "duly surveyed." Although lands for which a conditional warrant had previously issued, be, in fact, surveyed as a manor, it is insisted that such survey was not duly made.

This is giving to the word "duly," a meaning which, in the opinion of the court, was not intended by the legislature.

By the 19th section of the charter, license is granted to William Penn, and his heirs, to erect any parcels of land, within the province aforesaid, into manors.' There is no restriction on this power, which confines its exercise to lands which are vacant at the time. There was, then, no want of power in Penn to comprehend within a manor lands which were actually sold. The rights of the purchaser, the tenure by which he held his property, could not be changed, nor would they be changed, by including his land within the survey of a manor.

The proprietary tenths originate in the "conditions or concessions agreed on between William Penn and certain adventurers and purchasers, on the 11th of July, 1681. The 9th condition, or concession, is: "In every 100,000 acres, the Governor and proprietary, by lot, reserveth ten to himself, which shall lie but in one place."

Now, it is very apparent that, supposing this stipulation to be a fundamental law, and to The act of 1779 conferred no new right on enure to the benefit of all the inhabitants, it can the Penns, but left them in possession of their only restrain the proprietary from reserving pre-existing rights, whatever they might be, more than ten out of every 100,000 acres of within a described territory. It did not interfere land, and compel him to lay it off in one body. with any controversy which might exist be- If, within any survey of 10,000 acres, [*278 276*] tween Penn and *others within that there should be some lands previously granted, territory, but left such controversy to be decid- the survey would certainly not impair those ed between the parties, as if the law had never grants; nor would those grants vitiate the surbeen passed. The act is simply an adjustment vey. The respective rights of the parties would between Penn and the commonwealth. It re- depend upon the law, which would decide that fers to a fact of public notoriety, as marking the purchaser should hold his land, on complythe lines of division between them. That facting with the conditions of the purchase; and

or proprietary tenths, or out of land commonly called and known by the name of manors or proprietary tenths, which were duly surveyed and returned into the land-office, on or before the 4th of July, 1776, fix its mind on the survey to which reference is made, or on the dates and terms of the grants made for lands within the survey? If on the survey, then the language exwas designed, it is strange that no words were inserted pointing to such distinction. legislature intended to confiscate the estates of the proprietaries in part, and in part only. The line of partition between the commonwealth and the Penn family was to be drawn. It was the province of wisdom and of justice to make this line a plain one. It was proper that the commonwealth, and Penn, and the people of Pennsylvania, should be able distinctly to discern it.

The

that, on his failing to comply with them, the proprietary might either indulge him by giving further time, or might re-enter and hold the land, or regrant it. In the event of re-entry, it can scarcely be contended, that this land would not be considered as a part of the proprietary tenth, provided it did not swell the amount of the reservation beyond the tenth which might be legally reserved. The includ-presses the intention; if some other distinction ing of lands previously sold, within a survey of a reserved tenth, as it would give the proprietary no new right against the purchaser, might sink so much of his reservation, but could produce no other question than might arise between him and the purchaser, respecting the validity of the sale. These are questions with which the legislature of 1779 manifested no intention to interfere. It will not, we presume, be doubted that the words 46 manors and "proprietary tenths" have the same meaning throughout the act; that they always designate the same lands; that, when used in reference to quit-rents, they have the same meaning as when used in reference to the arrears of purchase money.

Now, it appears, from the statement of the testimony made in the charge of the court to the jury, which is the only regular information 279* of the *evidence given in the cause, that an agreement was entered into, in 1736, | between the proprietary and a number of the inhabitants, by which he engaged to make them titles for certain specified quantities of land in their possession, on the common terms. This agreement is stated to have been afterwards carried into execution. The contract, as stated, contains unequivocal proof of having been made under the idea that the survey of 1722 was valid, that it related to lands within the lines of that survey, and that the land within its lines was considered as a manor. That survey may not have been attended with those circumstances which would bring it within the saving of the act of 1779, and, certainly, in this cause, is not to be considered as a valid survey of a manor. It was, nevertheless, believed, in 1736, by the parties to this contract, to be a manor; and those proceedings which took place respecting lands within it, are, consequently, such as might take place respecting lands within a manor. We find sales of land made to fiftytwo persons upon the common terms, and grants made to them according to contract. When the final survey was made, comprehending these lands as being part of the manor of Springetsbury, were they less a part of that manor because they were granted as a part of it before that survey was made? When, in 1779, the legislature excepted from confisca tion the quit-rents "reserved out of the said proprietary tenths or manors," is it creditable that they intended to create a distinction, never heard of before, between the quit-rents on lands 280*] lying *within the lines of the manor, and sold as part of the manor, to depend on the terms or the time of the grant?

The defendants in the Circuit Court gave in evidence fifteen instances of lands lying within the manor being settled for on the common terms. Were these lands excluded from the manor by being so settled for? Did the legislature of 1779, when about to save for the proprietaries the quit-rents reserved out of manors

If the lines of the manors, as surveyed and returned in the land-office, before the 4th of July, 1776, constitute the dividing lines between the parties, they are plainly and distinctly drawn. If some *imaginary [*281 distinctions are to be made between the lands comprehended within those lines, or the quitrents reserved on those which had been sold, the whole certainty of the division is lost, unless some other line, equally plain, equally rational, and equally justified by the words of the act, can be substituted. Is this practicable in the case before the court? Extensive sales were made in a tract of country, supposed by the seller and the purchaser to be a manor. Other sales were made, containing in the contracts no intrinsic evidence that the parties understood the lands to be within a manor. The purchase money, in both cases, is paid, and deeds are made, reserving the usual quit-rents. To ascertain the real boundaries of the manor, to make a legal survey of it, if one had not before been made, a warrant of resurvey is issued, and a survey made and returned into the land-office, comprehending both these classes of lands, with others which were at the same time vacant, as being within the manor. When the legislature saves to the proprietaries the quit-rents out of lands sold within the manors, can a distinction have been intended between those lands which were sold as part of the manor before, and those which were sold after the resurvey? If it be assumed, where the warrants contain no evidence of being intended for manor lands, that the parties or the proprietaries were ignorant of their being comprehended within a manor, what difference, in reason, can this make? The lands were equally liable to quitrents in the one case and the other. They were equally within a manor, whether [*282 known or not known to be within it. Could the legislature have a motive in the one case more than in the other, for abolishing these quit-rents? If the motive existed, it would be shown in the language adopted. But the search for it in the language of the legislature would be as fruitless as in the reason of the case. The court cannot set up this distinction.

If the word manor, when used as describing territory within which quit-rents are saved, comprehends lands sold before the resurvey, then the same word, when applied to the arrears of purchase money, retains the same meaning.