II. WHERE Brought.

§ 24. National banks.- A local action may be maintained in a state court against a national bank in a county or city other than that in which the bank is situated. Casey v. Adams, 12 Otto, 66. Suits may be brought by as well as against a national bank in the federal courts of the district in which it is situated. Union Nat. Bank v. Chicago, 3 Biss., 88. See BANKS. § 25. Against corporations.— The act of May 4, 1858, providing that "all suits not of a local nature, hereafter to be brought in the circuit and district courts of the United States, in a district in any state containing more than one district, against a single defendant, shall be brought in the district in which the defendant resides," has no application to suits against a corporation created by the state in which the suit is brought; the defendant in such case resides in all the districts. Locomotive, etc., Co. v. Erie R'y Co., 10 Blatch., 307.

§ 26. Seizure.- The trial of a seizure under the act of 1793, in relation to the enrolling and licensing of vessels for the coasting trade, must be in the district in which the seizure is made. Keene v. United States, 5 Cr., 309.

$27. Foreclosure of mortgage.- Where a statute requires a suit to foreclose a mortgage to be brought in the district in which the land lies, suit may be brought and judgment obtained for the amount of the note secured in a district other than the one in which the land lies. App v. Bridge, McCahon, 118.

§ 28. The United States may bring a suit as indorsee against the maker of a note in the district in a state in which both maker and payee reside. United States v. Greene, 4 Mason, 427.

§ 29. Torts. In general, an action in personam for an injury to person or personal property is transitory, and may be maintained in the courts of any country where the parties may happen to be, unless the law of such country otherwise provides. There is nothing in the fact that the wrong was committed without the territorial limits of the sovereignty to which the court belongs, or in the alienage of the parties, which of itself prevents the court from taking jurisdiction. Bernhard v. Creene, 3 Saw., 233. See § 59.

§ 30. No recovery can be had under a state statute for an injury occurring beyond the limits of the state. So when the administratrix of a resident of New York sued a New Jersey corporation, under the laws of New Jersey, for the death of her intestate, occurring through the negligence of the company in New York, it was held that no cause of action existed. Mackay v. Central R. R., 14 Blatch., 67.

$ 31. Injury from cause in another state. Where a consequential injury results to lands lying in one state from causes arising and operating in another state, suit may be brought in the federal court in the latter state. Rundle v. Delaware and Raritan Canal, 1 Wall. Jr., 288. Thus, an injury may be prosecuted in the county or state in which the injury is done, or in the county or state in which the property is situated. Stillman v. White Rock Manuf'g Co., 3 Woodb. & M., 538. Where the city of St. Louis built a dyke on the Missouri side of the Mississippi river, and injury resulted therefrom to plaintiff's land in Illinois, it was held that plaintiff might sue in the federal courts in Missouri. Rutz v. City of St. Louis, 2 McC., 345. See § 14.

§ 32. Partnership.-In Louisiana, a partnership continues after dissolution for purposes of liquidation and partition, and the partners may be sued in the domicile of the firm for such purpose. Goodrich v. Hunton, 2 Woods, 137.

See, also, COURTS, sub-title Jurisdiction.

III. CAUSE OF ACTION.

SUMMARY For money paid as a bribe, § 33.- On a decree in equity, § 34.- Against public officers, § 35.— For money obtained by fraud, § 36.

§ 33. A party paid money to a federal officer as a bribe, and the money was taken from the officer and deposited in the United States treasury. Held, that the party could not recover the money by suit in the court of claims. Clark v. United States, § 37.

8 34. A decree of a court of equity, directing the payment of money, will not support an action at law. Hugh v. Higgs, § 38.

§ 35. Where the law requires the supervisors of a town to place judgments against the town upon the tax list, a neglect of duty will subject the supervisors to an action by the party injured; but the damages will be merely nominal if no special damages are proved. Dow v. Humbert, §§ 39-41.

§ 36. Where money is obtained by fraud, an action will lie before the expiration of the term of credit. And while trover for the property bought with the money, and also for the money, if it could be identified, would be the better form of action, an action by attachment is proper, and will not be held to be an affirmance of the contract. Gibson v. Stevens, SS 42-49. See § 2.

[NOTES.- See §§ 50-73.]

CLARK v. UNITED STATES.

(12 Otto, 322-332. 1880.)

APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.- Clark and Fulton bribed Robinson, provost marshal at New Orleans in 1864, to secure the release of some cotton that he had seized. Robinson was detected, and the money was taken from him and placed in the United States treasury. Clark and Fulton filed a claim in the court of claims to get their money back, calling it a case of extortion on the part of Robinson. There was judgment against the claimants.

§ 37. One who bribes an officer of the United States cannot in the court of claims recover his money back.

Opinion by WAITE, C. J.

Upon the facts found the court below was right in treating this as a case of bribery rather than extortion. The claimants undoubtedly held an executive license to transport by way of New Orleans, notwithstanding the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 377, sec. 9), any cotton they had bought in the parishes of East Feliciana and West Feliciana, under the authority of the special agent of the treasury at New Orleans, if they gave the required bond and presented to the acting collector of customs at that port the original authorities or permits under which they acted, or copies thereof certified by the officer with whom they were filed, with proof to the satisfaction of the acting collector that the cotton was actually purchased in good faith under and by virtue of such authorities. By the express terms of this license any cotton transported, or attempted to be transported, under it, without the original permits or authorities or certified copies and proof required, was subject to seizure and condemnation. It is not pretended that when the seizure was made the claimants had in their possession any evidence of their right, under this authorization, to transport the cotton which was seized. While it has been found that the bond was executed and delivered to the acting collector on the 16th of November, 1864, the findings are entirely silent as to the presentation of the original permits or the required proof before the transportation was entered upon. Neither did the executive license have upon it the prescribed certificate that the bond had been executed and delivered. Under such circumstances the seizure could not have been wrongful in the first instance. It was the duty of the military authorities at that point to see that nothing passed out from the enemy's country under this authority until the requisite evidence was furnished. New Orleans was a military post, and congress had seen fit to restrict materially the power of the president to permit commercial intercourse with the inhabitants of the insurgent territory. The executive license, when construed in connection with this new congressional action, was evidently intended only to protect such rights as had become vested under previous authorities or permits rightfully issued. Therefore nothing could pass except what the collector had been satisfied by proof was "actually purchased in good faith under and by virtue of said authorities."

The claimants, when the seizure was made, did not attempt to secure a re

lease by producing the necessary evidence of their rights, but by tempting a subordinate officer in the military service by a liberal offer of money. He made no demands, but accepted what they voluntarily gave him. In this way the executive order was evaded and a pass through the lines secured by corrupting an officer. Clearly this was bribery, and placed the claimants and the man they corrupted in pari delicto. They could not recover back from him the money they paid, neither can they from the United States after it has been taken from him as a punishment for his faithlessness to his trust.

It is insisted, however, that when the claimants presented to the military authorities the executive license, with the certificate of the acting collector indorsed to the effect that the requisite bond had been delivered to him, they had done all that was required to get their property back and proceed with the transportation. They evidently did not so understand the effect of what they had done, for they voluntarily offered and paid more money to secure what they wanted, and that they interpreted the instrument correctly is, to our minds, clear. The execution of the bond is one thing, and the production of the original permits and proof another. It is true that in the license the provision as to the bond follows that as to the permits and proof; but the delivery and acceptance of the bond were no more evidence of the presentation of the permits than the presentation of the permits would have been of the delivery of the bond. The certificate of the bond on the license was evidence of the performance of that condition, but nothing more. The execution of the bond was not at all dependent on the presentation of the permits and proof. The penalty of the bond was fixed in Washington and specified in the license itself, and it was entirely immaterial, so far as the requirements of the license were concerned, whether the bond was delivered before or after anything else was done. Before, therefore, the commanding general could be required to release the seizure, it must have been shown to him that the acting collector was satisfied that the original permits had been given, and the purchases in good faith made, as alleged by the claimants. Instead of attempting to make such a showing, bribery was resorted to, and in that way the necessary order obtained. Beyond all doubt, the judgment below was right, and it is consequently affirmed.

HUGH v. HIGGS.

(8 Wheaton, 697-698. 1823.)

ERROR to Circuit Court of District of Columbia.

Opinion by MARSHALL, C. J.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.-This is an action on the case, brought to recover the money which the plaintiff in error had been decreed by a court of chancery to pay to the defendants in error. The defendant in the court below contended that an action at common law did not lie on a decree in chancery, and excepted to the opinion of that court overruling this objection. It is admitted by the opposite counsel, that, in general, the action does not lie to recover money claimed under the decree of a court of equity, but he supposed that, in this case, the money had been received by the defendant below upon transactions which took place after the decree. Upon examining the record, we perceive that the money was in his hands as trustee at the time the order to pay it over was made.

38. A decretal order directing the payment of money will not support an action at law. (a)

An objection was also made to an opinion of the circuit court upon another part of the case. There was an agreement between the parties under seal, and having some relation to the money to which part of the claim relates, and the defendant below objected to the form of the action on that account. But we cannot discover, from the bill of exceptions, whether the money in contest was or was not received under that instrument. On that point, therefore, the court gives no opinion. The judgment is to be reversed for error in the opinion of the court below, which declares the action to be sustainable on the decretal order of the court of chancery, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Judgment reversed.

DOW v. HUMBERT.

(1 Otto, 294-303. 1875.)

ERROR to U. S. Circuit Court, Western District of Wisconsin.
Opinion by MR. JUSTICE MILLER.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.-The defendants are sued by plaintiff for a failure to perform their duty as supervisors of the town of Waldwick, in the county of Iowa, Wis., in refusing to place upon the tax list the amount of the judg ments recovered by him against that town. By the statutes of Wisconsin, no execution can issue against towns on judgments rendered against them; but the amounts of such judgments are to be placed, by order of the supervisors, on the next tax list for the annual assessment and collection of taxes; and the amount so levied and collected is to be paid to the judgment creditor, and to no other purpose. The declaration avers due notice served on the supervisors of these judgments, and demands that they be so placed on the tax list. The first judgment is described in the declaration as rendered in the circuit court for the district of Wisconsin, on the 27th of October, 1870, for $708.90; and the notice to the supervisors, set out in the declaration, uses the same language. The other judgment is described as rendered in the circuit court for the western district of Wisconsin, June 10, 1871, for the sum of $1,531.56. The answer of the defendants denies that there is any such judgment as that first described; and, as to the second judgment, they say that after it was rendered the town of Waldwick was divided, and a part of it organized into the new town of Moscow; that thirty-seven per cent. of the judgment was collectible from that town; and that it was not the duty of the defendants to levy the whole judgment on the property of the citizens of Waldwick.

§ 39. Averment, a judgment of the circuit court for the district of Wisconsin; proof, eastern district of Wisconsin; a variance.

On these issues the parties went to trial before a jury. In support of the issue as to the existence of the first judgment, plaintiffs introduced a copy of a record of a judgment between the same parties for the same amount, and of the same date as that described in the declaration, in the circuit court for the eastern district of Wisconsin; to which defendants objected, because it varied from the judgment described in the declaration, and in the notice given

(a) In every instance in which an action of debt can be maintained upon a judgment at law for a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the like action can be maintained upon a decree in equity which is for an ascertained and specific amount, and nothing more. Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How., 77; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How., 202. A decree in equity may be enforced by a bill filed in a court of equity in another state. Shields r. Thomas, 18 How., 261.

to defendants to place it on the tax list. The court sustained the objection, and this ruling is the ground of the first assignment of errors. The argument of counsel on this branch of the case rests mainly on the ground of the sufficiency of the notice to the supervisors. But the question before that is, whether such a judgment was admissible under the pleadings as they stood. There had been for many years a circuit court for the district of Wisconsin. Shortly before this judgment was rendered, the district was divided into two districts, and the circuit courts were by the express language of the act of congress called the circuit court for the eastern district and the circuit court for the western district, respectively. There was no such court in existence at the date of the judgment offered as the circuit court for the district of Wisconsin, and the defendants were justified in pleading nul tiel record to a declaration founded on a judgment of that date in that court; and on this issue, as it stood when the record of a judgment in the circuit court for the eastern district was offered, it did not prove a judgment in the circuit court for the district of Wisconsin. If plaintiff had asked leave to amend his declaration by inserting the word eastern before district in his first count, in describing his judgment, it would no doubt have been granted; and the question would then have arisen as to the sufficiency of notice to the supervisors, the notice containing the same mistake; but on the plea of nul tiel record of a judgment of the circuit court for the district of Wisconsin, it is clear a judgment of the circuit court for the eastern district of Wisconsin is not evidence of such a judgment. § 40. Where supervisors of a town fail to place a judgment against the town upon the tax list as required by law, they are liable for actual damages. (a)

Plaintiff having introduced a record of his judgment for $1,531.56 in the western district of Wisconsin, and notice and demand as to that to the supervisors, the defendants were permitted, as the court said, solely in mitigation of damages, to offer the record of the division of the township, and resolutions of the board, adopted after this suit was brought, directing the town clerk to place this latter judgment, with its interest, on the tax list in November, 1872; to which exceptions were taken, and this constitutes the ground of the second and third assignments of error. They will be considered in connection with the fourth and last assignment. This being all the testimony, plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the defendants the amount of both these judgments, with interest from their date; and, this being refused, he asked the same instruction as to the second judgment, which was refused. Exceptions were taken to both these refusals, and to the following language in the charge which the court did deliver: "The jury are instructed upon the whole evidence in the case that the plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages from the defendants by reason of their failure to direct the levy of the tax in question. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover any more, because he has not shown that he has suffered any injury from the neglect or omission of the defendants to cause the clerk to put the judgment on the next tax roll of the town."

The whole case turns upon the soundness of this latter instruction, representing as it does the converse of that which the plaintiff asked, and which was refused; and the single question presented is, whether these officers, by the mere failure to place on the tax list, when it was their duty to do so, the judgment

(a) In Newark Savings Institution v. Panhorst, 7 Biss., 99, a mandamus had issued to the supervisors of a county, requiring them to levy a tax to pay a judgment, which they disobeyed. They were then sued for damages, and the circuit court, considering itself bound by the decision in Dow v. Humbert, supra, on the question of damages, allowed the plaintiff compensation for its labor and expense in employing counsel.