HILL. HILL. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Dec. 12, 1912.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Chancery Branch, Second Division. Action by Bessie R. Hill against W. W. Hill. From a judgment denying relief, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Rowan Hardin, of Louisville, for appellant. W. A. McKay, of Louisville, for appellee.

uor, and he appeals. Affirmed. M. E. Rhoades, of Potosi, and Byrns & Bean, of De Soto, for appellant. W. A. Cooper and S. G. Nipper, both of Potosi, for the State.

CAULFIELD, J. Defendant was indicted, tried, and on September 7, 1910, convicted, under section 11640 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1909, for selling intoxicating liquor in less quantity than five gallons; he being a merchant, having a merchant's license authorizing him to deal in goods, wares, and merchandise, but no dramshop license. He appeals to this court, but has assigned no error and filed no brief here. Having examined the record, we find no error, insufficiency, or irregularity in the indictment, trial, or other proceedings, justifying a reversal of the judgment, and find that the evidence warrants the conviction, and the instructions fairly present the case to the jury. The judgment is therefore affirmed. REYNOLDS, P. J., and NORTONI, J., con

cur.

(Supreme

STRICKLIN et al. v. MOORE. Court of Arkansas. Jan. 20, 1913.) On petition for rehearing. Denied.

HOBSON, C. J. Dr. W. W. Hill and Miss Bessie Riley were married in June, 1907. They lived together as man and wife until July, 1911, when she left her husband's home, and in a few days thereafter brought this suit against him for divorce on the ground that without fault on her part he had habitually behaved toward her for not less than six months in such a cruel and inhuman manner as to indicate a settled aversion to her and to destroy permanently her peace and happiness. An answer was filed, controverting the allegations of the petition. Voluminous proof was taken, and on final hearing the circuit court dismissed the petition, refusing either to give the wife a divorce or allow alimony. From this judgment she appeals. We have read the record with great care, and are satisfied we ought not to disturb the chancellor's judgment. Neither the husband nor the wife was without fault, and For former opinion, see 151 S. W. 1009. each should in good faith seek a reconciliation with the other. The proof shows they are both complaint on demurrer on the former appeal, HART, J. In testing the allegations of the excellent people of fine character. He is a successful physician. She is a lady of refine- N. Stricklin as tenant by the curtesy, coupled the court said that the adverse possession of W. ment and culture. Each has the power to with the adverse possession of his wife, would make the other happy. We are satisfied from constitute an investiture of title in the heirs of the record that the wife loves her husband, and Mary D. Stricklin, subject to the life tenancy that he has been more absorbed in his business and less attentive to her than he should tate by curtesy is a mere continuation of the of W. N. Stricklin. The reason is that the eshave been. They differ in temperament. The wife's estate, and is in the nature of an estrouble between them seems to have grown tate by descent rather than by purchase. Aclargely out of the fact that each failed to comprehend the other. They owe it to themselves cording to the allegations of the complaint, W. and to society to follow the teachings of the referred to a claim of right by curtesy, it havN. Stricklin's possession was capable of being church to which each belongs, and re-establishing been alleged in the complaint that his wife the home in which they lived apparently hap: died in the possession of the lands. It then bepily when this disturbance arose. Judgment affirmed. came a question whether the character of her previous possession, which had not run for the statutory period, could be continued by him. We held, under the allegations of the complaint, that his adverse possession could be tacked to the previous possession of his wife, and that, if the possession was continued for the statutory period, it would create an investiture of title in her heirs, subject to the life estate of W. N. Stricklin.

STATE v. CORDIA. (St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri. Nov. 12, 1912.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Washington County; Joseph J. Williams, Judge. Francis Cordia was convicted of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor, and he appeals. Affirmed. M. E. Rhoades, of Potosi, and Byrns & Bean, of De Soto, for appellant. S. G. Nipper and W. A. Cooper, both of Potosi, for the State.

CAULFIELD, J. Defendant was indicted, tried, and on September 3, 1910, convicted for selling intoxicating liquor in less quantity than five gallons; he being a merchant, having a merchant's license, authorizing him to deal in goods, wares, and merchandise, but no dramshop license, and the prosecution being under section 11640 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1909. He appeals to this court, but assigns no error, and does not file a brief in the cause. An examination of the record fails to disclose any error or insufficiency in the indictment or other proceedings or any error or irregularity in the trial justifying a reversal of the judgment. The evidence warrants the conviction, and the instructions fairly present the case to the jury. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

REYNOLDS, P. J., and NORTONI, J., con

cur.

STATE v. CORDIA. (St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri. Nov. 12, 1912.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Washington County; Joseph J. Williams, Judge. Francis Cordia was

It is well settled that adverse possession must be continuous, and its continuity must be in the same right. Therefore it was necessary for appellants in this case to show that Mrs. Stricklin was in possession of the land at the time of her death, as well as to show that the possession of W. N. Stricklin after her death was continued in her right. We did not hold, as counsel for appellants seem to think we did, that a husband cannot act as agent for his wife, and cannot take charge of and manage her real estate. We did hold, however, that there was no testimony in the case that would have warranted a jury in finding that W. L. Stricklin was in possession of the lands prior to the death of his wife as her agent, or that he was holding the land for her. On the contrary, we held that the undisputed evidence showed that W. N. Stricklin held possession of the land in his own right prior to the death of his wife, and that, therefore, there could be no previous possession of the wife, to which his possession after her death could be tacked, so as to continue the adverse possession in her right. As we said, the testimony of B. L. Stricklin amounted to no more than a conclusion on his part that his mother was in the possession of the land prior to her death, for he did not testify to any fact or circumstance from which it might be inferred that she was in possession of the land, but only

END OF CASES IN VOL. 151

INDEX-DIGEST

KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

THIS IS A KEY-NUMBER INDEX

It Supplements the Decennial Digest, the Key-Number Series and
Prior Reporter Volume Index-Digests

See Charities, § 30; Divorce, §§ 37, 133; Hus-nothing was said as to the 2 per cent. till aft

$ 69 (Ky.) Where, pending appeal, the defendant in an action for damages for assault and battery dies and the case is reversed, the action should be dismissed under Ky. St. § 10. See Navigable Waters, § 44. -Shields' Adm'rs v. Rowland, 151 S. W. 408.

See Guardian and Ward, §§ 148-163; Partnership, § 336.

of lumber remitted, as each shipment was See Boundaries.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (5) NUMBER

I. NATURE AND REQUISITES. (A) Acquisition of Rights by Prescription in General.

84 (Mo.) A grant to trustees of a church in trust for the congregation of the church for the use of the premises as a place of worship is a grant for a charitable use within Rev. St. 1909, § 1886, relating to limitations.-Strother v. Barrow, 151 S. W. 960.

87 (Mo.) Limitations did not begin to run in favor of the parties in possession of public land until the issuance of a patent correctly describing the land.-Marshall v. Hill, 151 S. W. 131.

(E) Duration and Continuity of Posses

sion.

-Dulce Realty Co. v. Staed Realty Co., 151
S. W. 415.

884 (Mo.) Where defendant had held open and exclusive possession of land in dispute, claiming title, fong enough for her possession to ripen into title, it did not affect that result because she may have known the record title was in another.-Cousins v. White, 151 S. W. 737.

§ 85 (Ark.) In ejectment between the heirs of a wife and a purchaser under an execution against the husband, evidence held insufficient to show any such change of possession under a colorable deed from the husband to the wife as gave her title by adverse possession prior to the execution sale.-Stricklin v. Moore, 151 S. W. 1009.

cellor's finding that plaintiff occupied the land § 85 (Ky.) Evidence held to sustain a chanin question by defendant's permission only and not under an unconditional parol gift.-Murphy v. Newingham, 151 S. W. 930.

(G) Payment of Taxes.

§ 87 (Ark.) Act March 18, 1899 (Laws 1899, P. 117), now Kirby's Dig. § 5057, providing that parties paying taxes on uninclosed and unimproved land shall be deemed to be in possession, but that no one can invoke the act unless he and his predecessors shall have made seven payments, three after its enactment, disability at its passage, but not under disabilwhile retroactive, is not so as to persons under ity when payments began.-Deane v. Moore, 151 S. W. 286.

III. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL,
AND REVIEW.

verse possession by a junior patentee, the court
§ 116 (Ky.) Where there is evidence of ad-
must by its instructions define the extent of
possession under the evidence.-Bryant
Strunk, 151 S. W. 381.

v.

§ 116 (Mo.) In an action for the recovery of land where adverse possession was set up, evidence held to sufficiently show defendant's possession under color of title, so as to authorize an instruction that 10 years possession under color of title would ripen into actual title.Cousins v. White, 151 S. W. 737.

AFFIDAVITS.

See Appeal and Error, §8 201, 242; Criminal
Law, §§ 956, 958; Exceptions, Bill of, § 54;
Judgment, § 158; Witnesses, § 392.

§ 62 (Ark.) Where a wife never had actual possession of land, the possession of the husband after her death was in his own right, and not as tenant by curtesy; and hence created title by adverse possession in himself as against See an outstanding title and not in the heirs of the wife.-Stricklin v. Moore, 151 S. W. 1009.

§ 62 (Mo.) A widow occupying property under her quarantine cannot thereby acquire title as against the heir or remainderman.-Moran v. Stewart, 151 S. W. 439.

AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE.
Estoppel, § 38.

AGENCY.

See Principal and Agent.

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.

By delay during which a widow is permitted See Assault and Battery, § 54. to occupy the whole of an estate, the other heirs do not lose their right to apply to the court to assign dower to her; the possession not being hostile.-Id.

See Contracts.

AGREEMENT.

ALAMO PROPERTY.

See Perpetuities, § 4; States, § 88.
ALIMONY.

§ 64 (Ky.) Possession under an unconditional parol gift of a well-defined body of land for 15 years confers title, but not so if the entry was under a mere expectation of a gift in the future.-Murphy v. Newingham, 151 S. W. 930. $73 (Ky.) A patent, though void because including land previously granted, is color of See Divorce, § 245; Husband and Wife, § 288. title, and defines the possession of the patentee claiming to the extent of his boundary.—Bryant v. Strunk, 151 S. W. 381.

§ 80 (Mo.) A quitclaim deed purporting to convey land abutting a private alley, and describing such alley as "known as a private alley," held insufficient as color of title there

AMENDMENT.

See Costs. § 316; Criminal Law, § 214; Judgment, § 318; Pleading, §§ 236-252. AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY.