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of serious consideration; but the prosecuting witness swears that the defendant assured him verbally, before the written contract was drawn, that the land was unincumbered. The rule applied in civil cases in actions upon written contracts, namely, that prior conversations and oral agreements are merged in the writing, can have no application here. Fraud is not merged in a written contract. Gooch v. Conner, 8 Mo. 391. There is no question here as to the contract between the parties, or that the writing does not truly state it. Where the written contract itself was brought about by fraud, proof of that fraud may be in parol. When the parol testimony was offered, defendant did not object, presumably because counsel saw no grounds for objection. In our judgment, none existed.

Because of the error committed in ruling out the testimony of witness Swofford, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

BROWN, P. J., and KENNISH, J., concur.

to constitute the taking of the property without due process of law.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. 88 871-875; Dec. Dig. § 290;* Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-81; Dec. Dig. § 76.*]

4. NOTICE (§ 11*)-SUFFICIENCY OF PUBLICA

TION.

As a rule, when the law requires a notice to be published for a certain number of days before legal proceedings are had, it is sufficient if the last publication occur before such proceedings are had.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Notice, Cent. Dig. §§ 25-29; Dec. Dig. § 11.*1 5. COURTS (§ 93*)-RULE OF DECISION. The Supreme Court is not bound to follow its prior decisions if they be erroneous, though it usually follows them when to do otherwise would disturb a large number of titles. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 336-339; Dec. Dig. § 93.*]

6. DRAINS ($ 76*)-ESTABLISHMENT-NOTICE TO PROPERTY OWNERS.

Rev. St. 1909, § 5584, provides for the appointment of a surveyor and three viewers to survey and estimate the expense of draining lands and assess the benefits, and that the viewers shall state in their report the name of the owners of each tract "so far as they are by diligent effort able to ascertain the same," and section 5587 provides that the clerk shall fix a time for hearing objections to the assessment of benefits, and thereupon issue a notice directed by name to every person re

STATE ex rel. COLEMAN, County Treasurer, turned by the engineer and viewers as the own

v. BLAIR et al.

(Supreme Court of Missouri. July 2, 1912. Rehearing Denied Nov. 14, 1912.)

1. DRAINS (§ 14*)-ORGANIZATION TRICTS-COLLATERAL ATTACK.

er of every lot affected, and issue like notice by name to all persons "whom it may in any manner be ascertained" own any interest in the land, as well as notice generally to all persons owning such lands, without mentioning their OF DIS- names. Held, that the statutes do not require the viewers to go to the record of deeds to ascertain who owns the lands against which they have assessed benefits.

The legality of the organization of a drainage district cannot be collaterally attacked in an action to collect drainage taxes.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 5, 6; Dec. Dig. § 14.*]

2. DRAINS ( 14*)-INCORPORATION OF DISTRICT NOTICE TO OWNers.

Rev. St. 1909, § 5587, providing a notice to landowners of the application to incorporate a drainage district shall be published in four issues of some weekly paper, the last insertion to be before the day set for hearing, does not require the last publication of a notice to be on the last day before the day set for hearing. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. $$ 5, 6; Dec. Dig. § 14.*]

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 290*)-DRAINS (8 76*)-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-HEARING IN DRAINAGE PROCEEDINGS-TIME.

Rev. St. 1909, § 5587, requires notice to landowners of an application to incorporate a drainage district to be published in four issues of a weekly paper; the last insertion to be before the day set for hearing. The hearing of objections by landowners of assessment of benefits was set for March 20, 1906, and notice of hearing was published on February 16th, March 2d, 9th, and 16th. A certain landowner resided in the state of New Jersey, and the time required to travel from New Jersey to Bates county, Mo., where the land is situated, was 36 hours. The clerk or judge of the county court knew where such defendant lived. Held, that it could not be said that the notice required was not notice at all until its publication the fourth time, or that the publication of the notice was for so short a time as

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-81; Dec. Dig. § 76.*]

7. DRAINS (8 76*)-COLLECTION OF ASsessMENTS-SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE.

Since the drainage law does not require the same kind of notice as in ordinary suits to collect back taxes, the sufficiency of the notice of hearing of objections to the assessment of benefits in drainage proceedings must be governed by the provisions of the drainage law.

Cent. Dig. §§ 76-81; Dec. Dig. § 76.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Drains,

8. STATUTES (§ 227*)-CONSTRUCTION-MANDATORY STATUTES-"MAY."

The word "may," when used in a statute, is sometimes construed as mandatory, but more frequently as directory.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 308, 309; Dec. Dig. § 227.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases. vol. 5, pp. 4418-4447; vol. 8, p. 7719.] 9. DRAINS (8 76*)-ESTABLISHMENT OF DISTRICT-PUBLICATION OF NOTICE.

The fact that an order of the county court, directing notice of the assessment of drainage benefits, directed the clerk to insert the notice in the "Western Enterprise," when it was in fact inserted in the "Rich Hill Enterprise," was not a fatal variance so as to invalidate the notice, where the evidence showed that there was only one paper in the city, which was sometimes designated by the one name and sometimes by the other.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-81; Dec. Dig. § 76.*]

10. DRAINS (8 76*)-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 290*)-NOTICE-PERSONS ENTITLED.

A notice of drainage proceedings addressed to "the estate of B., B.'s heirs," etc., was not objectionable as not being due process of law because B.'s will investing his heirs with title to the land sought to be assessed was on record showing the name of the heir taking the estate.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-81; Dec. Dig. § 76;* Con- ion, Blair will be hereafter treated as the stitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 871-875; Dec. Dig. § 290.*]

11. DRAINS (§ 76*)-OBJECTIONS TO ASSESSMENT-TIME OF HEARING-"REGULAR SESSION" "REGULAR MEETING"-"REGULAR TERM."

Under Rev. St. 1909, § 5615, providing that the terms "regular session" and "regular meeting" of the county court, as used in the article, shall include the regular sessions of such court commencing on the first Monday in February, etc., as well as any adjourned term provided for by the court when in session, fixing the date of hearing objections to an assessment of benefits at an adjourned session of the county court was sufficient within Rev. St. 1909, § 5587, contained in the same chapter and article, requiring such date to be fixed at "the next regular term" of the county court. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-81; Dec. Dig. § 76.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6038, 6040.]

12. STATUTES (§ 185*)-CONSTRUCTION.

Whatever is implied is as much a part of a statute as though expressly inserted therein. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 264; Dec. Dig. § 185.*] 13. NOTICE (§ 9*)-TIME RETURNABLE.

If the law fixes a definite date on which a notice is returnable, it cannot be returned on a different date.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Notice, Cent. Dig. §§ 16-21; Dec. Dig. § 9.*]

14. PROCESS (§ 70*)-SERVICE-CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE.

Statutes giving jurisdiction by constructive service must be strictly construed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Process, Cent. Dig. 84; Dec. Dig. & 70.*]

suit is to enforce the lien of said taxes against the lands of defendants. Defendant De Witt C. Blair filed a separate answer asserting ownership in himself of the lands described in plaintiff's petition, and denying generally all other allegations therein. The other defendants filed no pleadings and made no defense. For the purpose of this opinsole defendant. The delinquent drainage tax bills upon which plaintiff's suit is based were introduced in evidence. Whereupon, to Overcome the prima facie case thus made by plaintiff, defendant assailed the incorporation of the drainage district, and attempted to prove the invalidity of the tax bills by introducing the records of the county court and the petition, reports, notices, and other proceedings which resulted in the organization of said drainage district and the assessment of benefits against his lands.

John H. Lucas, of Kansas City, and Harvey Clark, of Nevada, Mo., for appellants. T. J. Smith and J. F. Smith, both of Butler, for respondent.

BROWN, J. (after stating the facts as above). I. The defendant contends that the judgment of the county court organizing and incorporating the drainage district is void because: (1) Only two of the three viewers, appointed by the court to examine the lands sought to be drained, reported in favor of the necessity, utility, and practicability of the proposition, while the third viewer made an adverse report on said proposition; and, (2) section 5581, R. S. 1909, is unconstitutional, in that the notice therein prescribed is not due process of law. Defendant also asserts that the notice issued under said last-named section was irregular and insufficient in both form and substance.

[1] Neither of the issues thus tendered can

in Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Ver- avail defendant in this action, because a non County; B. G. Thurman, Judge.

Suit by the State, on the relation of S. L. Coleman, Treasurer and ex officio Collector of Revenue of Bates County, against De Witt C. Blair and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Civil action in the circuit court of Bates county to collect drainage taxes in the sum of $2,659.20. Plaintiff had judgment below, and defendants appeal.

drainage district is a public corporation, and the legality of its organization and the sufficiency of its corporate existence cannot be inquired into in this collateral action. State v. Fuller, 96 Mo. 165, 9 S. W. 583; Catholic Church v. Tobbein, 82 Mo. 418; Burnham v. Rogers, 167 Mo. 17, 66 S. W. 970; School District v. Hodgin, 180 Mo. 70, 79 S. W. 148. [2, 3] II. It is further contended that the length of time prescribed by section 5587, R. S. 1909, for the publication of notice to landowners of the date when they may be heard on the question of benefits assessed against their lands for the drainage of same, is so short as to constitute the taking of property without due process of law, as prohibit. ed by section 30, article 2, Constitution of Missouri, and section 1, fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Plaintiff's petition alleges the organization of drainage district No. 1 in Bates county, Mo., by the county court of that county on February 7, 1906, under the provisions of article 4, chapter 122, R. S. 1899 (now article 4, chapter 41, R. S. 1909). The taxes sued for were levied by the county court in the year 1907, to pay bonds issued and sold to raise money to drain overflowed lands of defendants and other persons situated within said drainage district. These taxes remained unpaid on November 1, 1908, and this

Section 5587, supra, provides that notice to landowners of the application to incorporate a drainage district "shall be published

in four issues of some weekly newspaper | ous doctrine to announce that constructive published in the county, the last insertion service by publication in a newspaper might to be before the day set for hearing." From be rendered invalid because the defendant or the phraseology of the statute quoted, it is other parties to be notified were so far away evident that the last publication of the no- from the place where the court is sitting tice need not be on the last day before the that the notice could not reach them in day set for the hearing. Statutes of prac- time to be effective. tically the same purport have been construed by this court to be complied with when the last insertion of the notice occurred 10 days before the cause was set for hearing. Robbins v. Boulware, 190 Mo. 33, 88 S. W. 674, 109 Am. St. Rep. 746; Ratliff v. Magee, 165 Mo. 461, 65 S. W. 713. Thus it will be seen that the issue presented here is not alone whether section 5587, supra, is unconstitutional, but whether the notice as published and the judgment based thereon amounted to taking defendant's property without due process of law.

The hearing of objections by the landowners to the assessment of benefits against their lands was set for March 20, 1906, and the notice of said hearing was published in the Rich Hill Enterprise on February 16 and March 2, 9, and 16, 1906. Defendant Blair resided in the state of New Jersey, and the time required to make the trip from New Jersey to Bates county, Mo., is 36 hours.

What constitutes due process of law is in a large measure governed by the particular facts of each case. No general rule can be laid down that will cover all cases.

The defendant cites and mainly relies up on Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 20 Sup. Ct. 410, 44 L. Ed. 520, which was an action to enforce a vendor's lien against real estate in Texas owned by a party residing in the state of New Jersey. The statute of Texas prescribed five days' notice; and the process in that case was delivered personally to the defendant five days before the action was set for trial. The distance between the place of trial and the place of service was so great that it would have required four days' continuous travel for defendant to have been present at the trial. The process so served was adjudged insufficient because not allowing the defendant a reasonable time to employ counsel and attend the trial, and therefore was held not to be due process of law. It will be readily seen that the facts in this case are entirely unlike the facts in Roller v. Holly, supra. There, the clerk of the court issuing the process must have known that the defendant was so far away from the place of trial that he would need more than five days' time after service of process to go to Texas, employ counsel, and prepare for his defense. The clerk knew where defendant lived, otherwise, he could not have forwarded the process to be served on him in New Jersey; while in the case at bar it does not appear that the clerk of the county court or the judges thereof had any knowledge of the whereabouts of de

In Wade on the Law of Notice (2d Ed.) § 1029, it is said: "Publication is a means authorized by statute in most, if not all, the states of the Union, for obtaining constructive service of process, when from the nonresidence, absence from the state, or absconding of the defendant, a more direct mode of service becomes impracticable. Service of summons in this manner is called 'constructive,' not because the publication in the manner prescribed by statute raises any reasonable presumption that thereby the defendant is advised of the pendency of the suit, for its authorization is not confined to cases where there is even a possibility of its ever coming to the knowledge of the party to be affected. The defendant may have removed so far beyond the confines of civilization that it would be impossible in the nature of things for the paper containing the first insertion of the notice to reach him before the return day, and it will still be as effective as though the paper came regularly to his hands."

Defendant proceeds on the theory that the notice which he complains of was no notice at all until it was inserted in the newspaper the fourth time. We do not think this proposition can be sustained upon authority or sound reason. Undoubtedly the first, second, and third publications of the notice perform

ed some office. It is well known that no one

person reads all the newspapers, and that whether or not a defendant will actually see a notice to him when published in a newspaper is a mere matter of chance. He would certainly be as likely to see the notice when published the first time as any subsequent publication.

[4] The usual rule is that, when the law requires a notice to be published for a certain number of weeks or days before legal proceedings are had, it is sufficient if the last insertion of the notice shall occur before such proceedings are had. German Bank v. Stumpf, 73 Mo. 311; Drainage District v. Campbell, 154 Mo. 159, 55 S. W. 276; Harper v. Ely, 56 Ill. 179; Fry v. Bidwell, 74 Ill. 381.

Defendant's resourceful counsel has called our attention to many statutes of Missouri prescribing how service may be had by publication; but he omits section 152, R. S. 1909, providing for publication of notice to creditors and others interested in proceedings to sell real estate of deceased persons to pay debts. That statute calls for a notice very much like the notice prescribed in the

estate through the probate court to pay debts it has never been deemed necessary to insert the notice of the proceeding in a news paper more than 28 days before the cause is set for hearing. If we were to adopt the rule for which the defendant contends, it would probably invalidate a large number of the probate sales which have heretofore taken place in Missouri. Young v. Downey, 145 Mo. 250, 46 S. W. 1086, 68 Am. St. Rep. 568. [5] We are not bound to follow prior decisions of this court if the law as announced therein be erroneous, but we usually follow our precedents when to do otherwise would disturb a large number of titles. Cruzen v. Stephens, 123 Mo. 337, loc. cit. 346, 27 S. W. 557, 45 Am. St. Rep. 549. Upon the authorities hereinbefore cited and for the reasons noted in paragraph 5 of this opinion, we overrule defendant's contention on this point.

[6] III. Defendant contends that the notice as published fails to comply with sections 1770 and 1776 of our general Code of Civil Procedure, citing Davis v. Montgomery, 205 Mo. 271, 103 S. W. 979, and many other cases defining the requirements of orders of publication under the foregoing sections.

It is manifest that the notice in judgment does not conform to the requirements of sections 1770 and 1776, supra; and this requires us to determine what kind of a notice is contemplated by section 5587, R. S. 1909. If article 4, chapter 41, R. S. 1909, relating to the organization of drainage districts, had simply required the notice under section 5587, supra, to be directed to the owner of the land, then said section would have to be construed in the same manner as orders of publication intended to notify nonresident owners in ordinary suits to collect delinquent taxes. Section 11,498, R. S. 1909. In other words, it would be necessary in organizing a drainage district to notify either the real or the record owners of lands situated in the district by their true names; or, if their names were unknown, then it would be necessary to describe their interests or claims to such lands and how such claims or interests were derived.

[7] However, we find that the drainage law does not require the same kind of notice as in ordinary suits to collect back taxes, and the sufficiency of the notice now under consideration must be tested by the provisions of the drainage law. Ratliff v. Magee, 165 Mo. 465, 65 S. W. 713. Section 5584, which provides for the appointment of a surveyor and three viewers to survey and estimate the expense of draining overflowed lands and to assess benefits against same, provides that said viewers shall in their report give "the name of the owner or owners of each tract of land and any interest therein, so far as they are by diligent effort

supra, provides that the clerk shall fix the time for hearing objections to the assessment of benefits assessed against the lands within the drainage district, and "shall thereupon issue in the name of the state a notice directed by name to every person returned by the engineer and viewers as the owner of every lot or parcel of land affected by the proposed improvement or any interest therein ;" and also like notice by name to all other persons "whom it may in any manner be ascertained" own such land or any part thereof, or any interest therein; and also notify generally "all other persons, without mentioning their names who may own such lands or any part thereof, or any interest therein, of the general object and nature of the petition and report of the engineer and viewers, and that on the day so fixed, the county court will hear said petition, and report and any evidence that may be adduced concerning the same."

In construing this section, we must determine what is meant by requiring the notice to designate by name "all persons whom it may in any manner be ascertained own such land." Do these words require the viewers to go to the deed records and there ascertain who owns the lands against which they have assessed benefits? We think not. It is evident that the framers of this drainage law thought it would seldom or rarely be applied in draining lands which were unimproved or which were owned by nonresidents. By requiring the viewers and engineer to ascertain and return the names of the owners, it was contemplated that said viewers and engineer should find out who were the owners of the land by inquiry of the persons in possession thereof or other persons within the drainage district. Section 5583, R. S. 1909, provides that, after the first notice is given of the intention to organize the district, persons opposed to such organization may file their remonstrances with the court, and, where such remonstrances are filed, it would, under this law, become the duty of the clerk to notify the remonstrators of the date fixed for hearing objections to the assessment of benefits. The provision in section 5587, supra, that all other persons shall be notified of the petition and assessment of benefits, "without mentioning their names," indicates that it was not the intention of the framers of this law to have the land records examined in order to ascertain who should be notified.

[8] The word "may" is sometimes construed as mandatory, but more frequently otherwise. As used in the words of the statute last quoted, it does not impose upon the clerk of the county court, the viewers, engineer, or any other persons connected with the proceeding, the duty of examining the land records to ascertain the names of

benefits have been assessed. This point is a statute has required notice to be given in ruled against defendant.

The sufficiency of the notice of the hearing on the assessment of benefits is also attacked on three other grounds: (1) That the notice was not published in the newspaper designated by the county court; (2) that the defendant was not named in said notice as published, therefore, as to him, it was not due process of law; and (3) that the notice was not returnable to the next regular term of court after its issue.

[9] IV. The order of the county court of Bates county, directing the publication of notice of the assessment of benefits, directed the clerk to insert said notice in the "Western Enterprise"; but it was in fact published in the "Rich Hill Enterprise." Oral evidence introduced by the plaintiff proves that there was only one newspaper published in the city of Rich Hill, Mo., using the word "Enterprise" as a part of its name, and that it was sometimes designated by the public as the "Western Enterprise," and sometimes as the "Rich Hill Enterprise." This variance in the name of the paper is not sufficient to invalidate the notice.

Wade, in his treatise on the Law of Notice (2d Ed.) § 1067, correctly announces the law on this point as follows: "A slight variance in the title of the paper in which the notice is directed to be published, from that by which it is really known, will not vitiate the process, where it satisfactorily appears that the publication was in the one intended by the order. As where the order designated the 'Evening Day Book,' and the notice was published in the 'New York Day Book,' there being no evidence offered that there was any other paper of the same or a similar name, to which the order could apply, this was held sufficient."

a certain form to absent landowners, such statute has almost universally been held to constitute due process of law. Huling v. Kaw Valley Railroad & Improvement Co., 130 U. S. 559, 9 Sup. Ct. 603, 32 L. Ed. 1045, was a suit under a statute of Kansas governing the condemnation and appropriation of lands for railroad purposes. That statute did not provide that the notice to absent landowners should designate them by name, but only required that such notice should give the numbers of the sections, townships, and ranges through which the railroad would be constructed. The Supreme Court of the United States, in upholding the constitutionalty of the above-mentioned statute, said: "The owner of real estate who is a nonresident of the state within which the property lies cannot evade the duties and obligations which the law imposes upon him in regard to such property by his absence from the state. Because he cannot be reached by some process of the courts of the state, which, of course, have no efficacy beyond their own borders, he cannot therefore hold his property exempt from the liabilities, duties, and obligations which the state has a right to impose upon such property; and in such cases some substituted form of notice has always been held to be a sufficient warning to the owner of the proceedings which are being taken under the authority of the state to subject his property to those demands and obligations. Otherwise, the burdens of taxation, and the liability of such property to be taken under the power of eminent domain, would be useless in regard to a very large amount of property in every state of the Union. It is therefore the duty of the owner of real estate who is a nonresident to take measures that in some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition; and, if he fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences. publication is 'due process of law' as applied to this class of cases." See, also, Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 24 Sup. Ct. 390, 48 L. Ed. 623, and Johnson et al. v. Hunter (C. C.) 127 Fed. 219.

Such

[10] V. The notice as published is directed to the estate of John I. Blair, John I. Blair's heirs, and numerous other persons owning land in the drainage district, and further purports to notify "all other persons who own or have any interest in or to the following described real estate lying and being in the county of Bates and state of Missouri, followed by a description of all lands in the district, including those involved in this action." Defendant earnestly insists that, although the notice as published may have been in conformity with the drainage laws, nevertheless, it was not due process of law under the federal Constitution, because the will of his father, John I. Blair, whereby defendant became invested with title to the lands sought to be subjected to the lien of the tax bills, was on record in Bates county before any steps were taken to organize the drainage district; and therefore the notice [13] It is undoubtedly true that, where the should have been directed to defendant by law fixes a definite date on which a notice name instead of to the estate of heirs of his or other process shall be returnable, it canfather. not be made returnable at a different date.

[11, 12] VI. This brings us to the further contention of defendant that the assessment of benefits against his land is invalid because the clerk of the county court fixed the date of hearing objections to said assessment of benefits at an adjourned sitting of said court instead of during "the next regular term" thereof, as required by section 5587, R. S. 1909.

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