benevolent or charitable side of the law. In my state, which is fairly abreast of other states in the side lines of the profession, we had no juvenile court law until, about three years ago, an organization of ladies determined that there ought to be such a law in the state. They approached one and another of our lawyers to draft such a law for them, and finally the work of doing it devolved upon myself. Now, there is a reluctance on the part of the courts and the machinery to enforce the law. I think the conservatism of our profession is unfortunately manifested in such things. I accept it not only as a suggestion, but as a direction to me in future to see that the line of public duty commended by the Chairman's address is brought to the attention of every graduate of my school.

Edmund F. Trabue, of Kentucky:

I am not a member of the faculty of any law school and I have never taught law, but it seems to me that the question propounded by the Chairman is a most practical one. That is, How are we to maintain the integrity of the profession, which was once its glory and which it is said is now on the wane? I have no doubt it is true that it has suffered in a very great degree, and I am convinced that the higher education of the lawyer is probably the surest, if not the only practical, remedy for the ill. The man who undertakes to practice law, and who is not qualified to compete with others who are better prepared, must invariably fall into evil practices, and the experience of practical lawyers shows that he does. That man will impress his methods upon the profession as well as be impressed by the methods of his brethren. If those men are sufficiently numerous, they will impress the profession in proportion even more than they will be impressed by the other members of the profession. Therefore, the greater number you have of well prepared lawyers, the higher standard of integrity and of professional ethics you will have.

There is another idea that suggests itself in this connection: What are you to do to remedy the evil that you find in those members of the profession who are dragging it down? How

are you to reach them? The physician appeals to the nature. of the human being that he treats; he receives a response if his treatment is sound. But the lawyer cannot do so to the same extent; he must appeal to the courts and the courts make the response; therefore, the remedy must be one that reaches the courts as well. Now, if the lawyers without professional ethics are sufficiently numerous, they will impress the courts; their methods will impress the courts and the methods of other lawyers, and the tone of the courts will respond accordingly.

You have said, Mr. Chairman, that in England the case is different from what it is here, and that the case is different now from what it once was. Now, is it not the difference in the courts that give the response when called upon to apply the remedy? I believe that while the same lawyers, educated in the same schools, get on the different Benches, still there is a difference in those judges after they are on the Bench, because one of them has complete independence, while another has not, and assuming the intention and desire to do the best in every case, the one who has complete independence will apply the remedy, while the one who has not such independence cannot do so. This is not at all reflecting on the individual when he gets on the Bench.

I believe that we must, in providing a remedy or in undertaking to find one, apply it partly to the Bench. We must increase the independence of the judges. We must enable the judges to respond in impunity when they feel that they are called upon to remedy an evil or to discipline an offender. So I believe that the remedy is two-fold: first, in a higher education; secondly, in increasing the independence of the judges. As a practical matter I think the principal remedy lies in the first expedient.

Clarence H. Miller, of Texas:

I agree in general with the remarks of the Chairman, but it seems to me that the evil he mentions is a little more deepseated than has been recognized. I doubt whether a course

of lectures on moral conduct will revolutionize the morality of the Bar. He has made some comparison between the English and the American courts and practitioners. If the lawyers of Toronto, for instance, as was intimated, have a higher moral standard than the lawyers of Buffalo, it is not, I think, because they got as law students more moral lectures. The difference between the English and the American lawyer in his attitude to public duties is not due to difference in professional training, but rather to national characteristics. The ideals of England and America are not the same. There you will find among the people generally, as well as among the lawyers, a greater reverence for public rights, a higher appreciation of public duties than here. The English have, according to my observation, more public spirit than we, and in my opinion, this difference is not satisfactorily accounted for by differences in schooling or education. The evil the Chairman complains of is not so much a professional as an American fault. It has its source in our inordinate love for the almighty dollar. The glittering prizes handed out by great corporations and combinations of capital to the lawyers who can successfully represent them before the law are so tempting in this country, where wealth is unduly valued, that something more than moral lectures in our law schools will have to be accomplished in order to persuade men to refrain from accepting such prizes upon the terms on which they are offered.

To strike at the root of the evil efforts must be made outside the Bar to build up higher ideals among the American people. One profession, secluded to itself, cannot reasonably expect to reach and maintain higher moral standards than those which are generally recognized by the people among whom that profession exists.

In saying what I have I do not mean that there should not be a course in law schools on legal ethics, because I believe it will assist, but what I do insist upon is that it will not reach the real source of the evil.

Reference has been made to the administration of justice in England and America and the points of superiority of the

English system have been accentuated. There are, however, defects in that system which do not exist in ours, and which ought to be noticed in fairness to ourselves. If justice is administered more quickly in England than here, it is in some instances administered there very expensively. I personally know of a case where an American brought an ordinary civil slander suit in London. There were no depositions taken and not over a half a dozen witnesses summoned, all of whom lived in the city. The case was not tried, but when called for trial an agreed judgment was entered. In that simple case the costs, which in Texas, under the circumstances stated, would not have exceeded seventy-five dollars, were over thirteen hundred dollars. It would seem that we have some good points as well as some bad ones.

William S. Curtis, of Missouri:

I hoped that some one would suggest, since we are talking about elevating the ethical standards of the profession, what I consider the chief difficulty. That is this: the reluctance of our judges to act upon reports of grievance committees of the Bar associations in cases of disbarment, and I hope there are judges here who will listen to this suggestion. Not only do many of our judges hesitate about disciplining the profession in cases requiring it, but when a Bar association does succeed in having a member disciplined, in a year or two afterwards a motion is made for his reinstatement and it is generally granted. That, I think, is the great obstacle to elevating the general moral tone of the profession.

The Chairman:

I should like to correct a slight misconception on the part of the gentleman from Texas in regard to my feeling on a course of ethics. I sympathize with him in his point of view. I said that I did not think you could teach ethics or materially elevate the standard of the Bar by a course of legal ethics; but I did not say that a course in legal ethics is out of place. There are certain definite rules in regard to right conduct as a lawyer which go beyond the rules of ordinary morality, but

I do not think you can elevate the moral tone very decidedly by merely mentioning such rules. The point that does impress me is that if it is the duty of the profession to do some definite thing, as, for instance, to administer justice with certainty and rapidity, and some other common law country has adopted an improvement, you should not allow your student to escape from the law school without seeing that he knows what that improvement is. The very fact that he had the knowledge would give him the interest and would give him the feeling that he belonged to a profession that had a public duty to perform.

Also with regard to the expense of administering justice in England. I am glad the gentleman called attention to that. Although there is a great deal to be said for the English point of view, I think the high costs of an English case a defect. At the same time, when I go to file a writ, whether I am charged five pounds or a shilling has nothing to do with the question whether my case is going to be decided quickly or not. Now, quick dispatch of business is the point in which they excel. Our administration of justice would be as quick and as certain as theirs if we adopted certain fundamental reforms, not one, but a combination of them; and our delays in the administration of justice do run up the costs of litigation. With us the costs are in large part costs which are not "court costs." The successful party cannot saddle such outside costs on the other side.

In this connection, let me give an illustration of a case in Philadelphia where a man sued to collect a bill amounting to about five hundred dollars. There were three witnesses. The plaintiff's case went over from time to time because it was not reached on the calendar. Then when it was called up it was appealed and a new trial was granted. Again it was tried, and when the plaintiff finally succeeded in obtaining a judgment, counting his own time and expense in travel, seeing his witnesses and paying his lawyer he found his successful litigation had cost him exactly five hundred dollars more than he